New York Law Review

Tag: products liability

  • Elkan v. Arredondo, 41 N.Y.2d 693 (1977): Establishing Defect in Products Liability Claims

    Elkan v. Arredondo, 41 N.Y.2d 693 (1977)

    In a products liability case, a manufacturer is not entitled to summary judgment if there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the product was defective when it left the manufacturer’s control.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s grant of summary judgment to Volkswagenwerk, AG (VWAG). The Elkans sued Arredondo (driver of the other vehicle), Luby Volkswagen (from whom they purchased the car), and Volkswagen of America, Inc., alleging a defective seat belt system caused Mrs. Elkan’s injuries in a car accident. Luby then impleaded VWAG, the manufacturer. VWAG moved for summary judgment, arguing the car had multiple prior owners, and Luby installed “the seat belt system.” The Court of Appeals found a factual dispute existed as to whether VWAG installed defective anchors, precluding summary judgment.

    Facts

    The Elkans were involved in a car accident where their Volkswagen, manufactured by VWAG, was struck by Arredondo’s vehicle. The Elkans’ Volkswagen was a secondhand vehicle. After the impact, Mrs. Elkan’s seat belt came open, and she was ejected from the vehicle, sustaining severe injuries. The Elkans claimed that the seat belt system and door latch mechanism were defectively designed. The car had four prior owners before the Elkans purchased it from Luby. VWAG argued that Luby installed the “seat belt system.”

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, New York County, denied VWAG’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed and granted summary judgment to VWAG. The Elkans appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the seat belt system was defective when the vehicle left VWAG’s control, precluding summary judgment.

    Holding

    Yes, because there was a factual dispute regarding whether Luby installed only the seat belts or the entire seat belt system, including the anchors, which could have been defective when they left VWAG’s control.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that VWAG failed to conclusively prove that Luby installed the entire seat belt *system*, including the anchors. Mr. Elkan’s testimony indicated that “seat belts” were installed, not necessarily the entire system, and the Luby work order simply stated “install seat belt.” The court stated that “The trier of fact may infer from this evidence either that the installation was of the belt but not the anchors or that it was of both.” This created a factual issue as to whether VWAG was responsible for installing defective anchors. The court emphasized that if VWAG had submitted expert testimony pinpointing the cause of the seat belt failure after examining the car, Luby would have been required to present countervailing evidence. However, based on the evidence presented, it was for the trier of fact to determine whether a defect existed when the vehicle left VWAG’s control. The court implied that the burden was on VWAG, as the moving party, to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of a factual issue. Because the evidence was ambiguous regarding the scope of Luby’s installation, VWAG failed to meet this burden. This case illustrates that in products liability cases, the plaintiff must ultimately prove the defect existed at the time the product left the manufacturer’s control, but the *defendant* bears the initial burden on a motion for summary judgment to show the absence of such a defect.

  • Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 809 (1980): Recovery for Emotional Distress Resulting from Injury to Another

    Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 809 (1980)

    A plaintiff cannot recover for emotional distress caused by observing injury to a third person, even a close relative, where the plaintiff was not in the zone of danger and did not suffer direct physical injury as a result of the defendant’s negligence.

    Summary

    In this case, the New York Court of Appeals considered whether a mother could recover for emotional and physical injuries allegedly resulting from the administration of a drug, Delalutin, during pregnancy, which caused her child to be born with severe deformities. The court held that neither the mother nor the father could recover for emotional distress, as they were not within the zone of danger and the mother’s physical injuries were derivative of her emotional distress over her child’s condition. The court emphasized the importance of limiting liability in cases of emotional distress to prevent potentially limitless claims.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs, a mother and father, brought suit against E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., the manufacturer of the drug Delalutin, and the administering physician. The mother had been administered Delalutin during her pregnancy. The child was born with severe limb deformities and other defects. The parents claimed the deformities were caused by the drug. The mother sought recovery for both emotional distress and physical injuries, while the father sought recovery solely for emotional distress.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint. The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court’s order, dismissing the father’s claim but allowing the mother’s claim to proceed. The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, dismissing the claims of both the mother and the father.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a mother can recover for emotional and physical injuries allegedly sustained as a result of the negligent administration of a drug during pregnancy that caused deformities in her child, where the mother was not within the zone of danger and her physical injuries are primarily derived from her emotional distress over the child’s condition.

    Holding

    No, because the mother was not within the zone of danger and her physical injuries are primarily derived from her emotional distress over the child’s condition. The court held that allowing recovery in this situation would expand the scope of duty too broadly and potentially lead to unlimited liability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principle established in Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609 (1969), which limits recovery for emotional distress caused by observing injury to a third person. The court reasoned that allowing recovery in this case would create an exception that would swallow the general rule. The court emphasized that the mother’s physical injuries were primarily a consequence of her emotional distress over her child’s condition, and she was not in the zone of danger. The court stated that to allow recovery, the emotional distress must result directly from a duty owed to the plaintiff and be a direct, rather than consequential, result of the defendant’s negligence. Quoting from Tobin v. Grossman, the court highlighted the policy considerations against expanding liability for emotional distress: “Every injury has far reaching repercussions… The problem for the law is to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree.” The court recognized the deep emotional impact on the parents but ultimately concluded that policy considerations dictated against extending the scope of liability in this context. Judge Fuchsberg dissented, arguing that the mother was a direct patient of the doctor and consumer of the drug, and that her allegations of physical injuries (nervous system damage, dizziness, vomiting, and nausea) raised questions of fact as to whether she suffered independent personal injuries apart from her emotional distress.

  • McDermott v. City of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 211 (1980): Statute of Limitations for Indemnification Claims

    McDermott v. City of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 211 (1980)

    An indemnification claim’s statute of limitations accrues when the party seeking indemnity suffers a loss, typically upon payment to the injured party, regardless of the underlying breach of duty.

    Summary

    Joseph McDermott, a sanitation worker, sued New York City after his arm was severed by a sanitation truck’s hopper. The city then filed a third-party claim against Heil Company, the truck’s manufacturer, seeking indemnification, alleging the injury was due to Heil’s breach of duty in providing an unfit and dangerous product. The trial court dismissed the third-party complaint as time-barred under the Uniform Commercial Code’s (UCC) four-year statute of limitations for breach of warranty, measured from the truck’s delivery date. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the indemnification claim accrued only when the city made payment to McDermott, making the action timely.

    Facts

    On February 5, 1969, New York City received a sanitation truck manufactured by Heil Company. On February 24, 1969, while using the truck, Joseph McDermott’s arm was severed by the hopper mechanism. McDermott and a coworker testified they did not activate the hopper, which was designed to activate only when a button was pressed. The City settled with McDermott for $150,000.

    Procedural History

    McDermott sued the City in 1969. In June 1975, the City brought a third-party action against Heil Company. The trial court dismissed the third-party complaint as time-barred under the UCC’s statute of limitations. The Appellate Division affirmed. The City appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the statute of limitations for an indemnification claim against a product manufacturer begins to run from the date of the product’s delivery or from the date the indemnitee (here, the City) makes payment to the injured party.

    Holding

    No, because an indemnification claim accrues when the party seeking indemnification suffers a loss, which occurs when payment is made to the injured party, making the City’s claim timely.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the distinction between contribution and indemnification. Contribution involves proportional reimbursement between joint tortfeasors, while indemnification, rooted in equity and contract (express or implied), seeks full reimbursement. The court stated: “The right to indemnity, as distinguished from contribution, is not dependent upon the legislative will. It springs from a contract, express or implied, and full, not partial, reimbursement is sought”.

    Implied indemnification is based on fairness, preventing unjust enrichment. The court reasoned that it is fundamentally unfair if “[a] person who, in whole or in part, has discharged a duty which is owed by him but which as between himself and another should have been discharged by the other, is entitled to indemnity”.

    Because the indemnification action is quasi-contractual, the contract statute of limitations (six years in New York) applies. The cause of action accrues upon payment by the party seeking indemnity. The court stated, “Because the indemnity claim is a separate substantive cause of action, independent of the underlying wrong, this accrual rule remains the same, whatever the underlying breach of duty for which indemnification is sought.”

    The court rejected Heil’s argument that the indemnification claim, based on a defective product, should be treated differently. The court reasoned that recent developments in products liability law had eroded the theoretical underpinnings of earlier cases that refused to allow indemnification actions based on breach of warranty. The court also held that the City’s settlement with the plaintiff did not preclude the indemnity action under General Obligations Law § 15-108, as that section applies only to contribution claims.

    Finally, the Court found sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of products liability, based on testimony suggesting the hopper mechanism self-activated, allowing the fact finder to infer a defect existed at the time of delivery.

  • Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471 (1980): Manufacturer Liability After Product Modification

    Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471 (1980)

    A manufacturer is not liable under strict products liability or negligence when a product is substantially altered after it leaves the manufacturer’s control, and that alteration is the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.

    Summary

    Gerald Robinson, a plastic molding machine operator, was injured when his hand was caught in a machine manufactured by Reed-Prentice. His employer, Plastic Jewel, had modified the machine by cutting a hole in the safety gate to accommodate its production process. Robinson sued Reed-Prentice, alleging defective design. The New York Court of Appeals reversed a judgment in favor of Robinson, holding that Reed-Prentice was not liable because Plastic Jewel’s modification substantially altered the machine and was the proximate cause of the injury. The court emphasized that a manufacturer’s responsibility is limited to the condition of the product when it leaves their control, and they are not responsible for subsequent alterations that render a safe product dangerous. The court stated that imposing liability in this scenario would expand manufacturer’s duty beyond reasonable bounds.

    Facts

    Reed-Prentice manufactured a plastic molding machine and sold it to Plastic Jewel in 1965. The machine included a safety gate with interlocks to prevent operation when the gate was open, complying with state safety regulations. Plastic Jewel modified the machine by cutting a large hole in the Plexiglas portion of the safety gate to allow for continuous molding of beads on a nylon cord. Gerald Robinson, an employee of Plastic Jewel, was injured when his hand went through the hole and was caught in the machine’s molding area.

    Procedural History

    Robinson sued Reed-Prentice, who then impleaded Plastic Jewel. The case was submitted to the jury on strict products liability and negligence theories. The jury found in favor of Robinson, apportioning 40% liability to Reed-Prentice and 60% to Plastic Jewel. The Appellate Division reversed and ordered a new trial on damages unless Robinson stipulated to a reduced verdict, which he did. Reed-Prentice and Plastic Jewel appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a manufacturer can be held liable under strict products liability or negligence when a product is substantially modified by a third party after it leaves the manufacturer’s control, and the modification is the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.

    Holding

    No, because a manufacturer’s duty is limited to designing and producing a product that is safe when it leaves their control. Substantial modifications by a third party that render a safe product defective are not the manufacturer’s responsibility.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a manufacturer’s duty is to design and produce a safe product at the time of sale. While manufacturers must consider foreseeable uses (and misuses) of a product in their design, they are not required to create products impossible to abuse or whose safety features cannot be circumvented. The court stated that imposing liability for modifications by third parties would expand the scope of a manufacturer’s duty beyond reasonable bounds. The court emphasized that the safety gate, as originally designed, would have prevented the accident. Plastic Jewel’s modification, not a defect in the original design, was the proximate cause of Robinson’s injuries.

    The court distinguished between defects existing at the time of manufacture and subsequent alterations. Quoting the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, the court noted that a product is defective if, at the time it leaves the seller’s hands, it is “in a condition not reasonably contemplated by the ultimate consumer and is unreasonably dangerous for its intended use.” Because the machine was safe when it left Reed-Prentice, they could not be held liable.

    The court acknowledged the hardship for the injured plaintiff, who might be barred from suing his employer due to workers’ compensation laws. However, this did not justify imposing an unreasonable duty on manufacturers. The court concluded that “where the product is marketed in a condition safe for the purposes for which it is intended or could reasonably be intended, the manufacturer has satisfied its duty.”

  • Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780 (1979): Statute of Limitations in Latent Injury Cases

    Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780 (1979)

    In cases involving latent injuries from harmful substances, the statute of limitations may begin to run when the injury manifests itself, not necessarily when the exposure occurred, particularly if the harmful effects are delayed or unknowable.

    Summary

    This case addresses when the statute of limitations begins to run in a case of latent injury. Susan Thornton was injected with Thorotrast in 1954 for a diagnostic examination. She later developed cancer in 1972 or 1973, allegedly due to the Thorotrast. The defendants argued the statute of limitations began in 1954. The plaintiff argued it began when the cancer developed. The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the statute of limitations began to run at the time of the injection. A dissenting opinion argued that the statute should run from when the injury manifested, recognizing the delayed nature of harm from certain products.

    Facts

    1. Susan Thornton was injected with Thorotrast, a radioactive contrast agent, in 1954 at Roosevelt Hospital for a sinus examination.
    2. The patient was not informed of the potential for Thorotrast to cause cancer.
    3. Thornton did not experience any immediate adverse effects from the injection.
    4. In 1972 or 1973, Thornton was diagnosed with undifferentiated squamous cell carcinoma, allegedly caused by the Thorotrast.

    Procedural History

    1. Plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against Roosevelt Hospital and the manufacturer of Thorotrast.
    2. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the statute of limitations had expired.
    3. Special Term granted leave to replead in strict liability but dismissed causes premised on negligence. The orders were affirmed in part.
    4. The Appellate Division struck portions of the orders that granted leave to replead in strict liability and affirmed the dismissal of negligence claims. Plaintiff appealed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the statute of limitations for a cause of action based on latent injuries caused by a radioactive substance begins to run from the date of exposure or from the date the injury manifests itself.

    Holding

    1. No, because the court held that the statute of limitations began to run from the time of the injection.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The dissenting judge, Fuchsberg, argued that the court should consider the unique nature of latent injuries. He emphasized that for drugs with a latent or slowly evolving potential for harm, the injury may not manifest until long after exposure. He criticized the reliance on Schmidt v Merchants Desp. Transp. Co. and Schwartz v Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., arguing they reflected an outdated view of products liability law that did not adequately account for the temporal gap between consumption and injury. Fuchsberg stated, “There can be no doubt that a cause of action accrues only when the forces wrongfully put in motion produce injury.” He cited Urie v Thompson, where the Supreme Court recognized that for injuries resulting from prolonged exposure, the afflicted employee is “injured” only when the accumulated effects manifest themselves. The dissent also noted that a growing number of courts across the country recognize that the injured user should not be foreclosed from having their day in court before knowledge of any injury or before any injury has occurred. He argued that the policy should be akin to that governing infants’ cases. To the extent that there very well may be some awareness in the case of the infant, but none in the case of an adult in circumstances like those now before us, there may be even more reason for the law to extend its protection to the adult.

  • Smith v. Russell, 45 N.Y.2d 18 (1978): Res Judicata Bars Second Suit Based on Statute of Limitations in First Suit

    Smith v. Russell, 45 N.Y.2d 18 (1978)

    A dismissal based on the statute of limitations operates as a decision on the merits for res judicata purposes, barring a subsequent action on the same claim.

    Summary

    Plaintiff sued defendant for damages related to a collapsed swimming pool, alleging negligence and breach of contract in the first suit. The action was dismissed as time-barred under the statute of limitations. Plaintiff then commenced a second action alleging strict products liability and breach of warranty based on substantially the same facts. The court held that the dismissal of the first action on statute of limitations grounds acted as a judgment on the merits, precluding the second action under the doctrine of res judicata. Furthermore, the plaintiff, having raised the issue of strict liability in the first action, was estopped from relitigating it in the second.

    Facts

    Plaintiff purchased a swimming pool from defendant in October 1969, which was installed later that month. The pool collapsed around March 15, 1973. Plaintiff initiated an action on January 7, 1974, alleging negligence and reliance on the defendant’s expertise in swimming pool construction. The bill of particulars alleged the use of inferior materials and insufficient patented braces by the defendant.

    Procedural History

    In the first action, the defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff argued strict liability and tort. The Special Term granted the defendant’s motion, dismissing the case based on the statute of limitations. The plaintiff did not appeal. Plaintiff then commenced a second action. The defendant moved for summary judgment based on res judicata and statute of limitations. The second Special Term granted the defendant’s motion, dismissing the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the dismissal of the first action based on the statute of limitations constitutes a decision on the merits, thereby precluding a subsequent action on the same claim under the doctrine of res judicata.

    Holding

    Yes, because a judicial decision based on the statute of limitations is considered a decision on the merits, preventing the plaintiff from bringing another action to enforce the same claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that when a plaintiff brings an action and is barred by the statute of limitations, the judicial decision is considered to be on the merits. The court cited the Restatement of Judgments, § 49, Comment a, which states this principle directly. Because the first case was dismissed as time-barred, the plaintiff was precluded from bringing a second action based on the same underlying claim. The court further noted that the plaintiff had raised the issue of strict products liability in the first action regarding the statute of limitations issue and was therefore estopped from relitigating it in the second action. The proper course of action for the plaintiff was to appeal the initial determination rather than filing a second lawsuit. As the court stated, “Plaintiffs remedy was an appeal from that determination rather than a second action setting forth the same cause of action as that claimed to have been asserted when the controversy was reviewed initially.”

  • Halloran v. Virginia Chemicals, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 386 (1977): Admissibility of Habit Evidence to Prove Negligence

    Halloran v. Virginia Chemicals, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 386 (1977)

    Evidence of a person’s habit or regular usage, particularly a deliberate and repetitive practice under complete control, is admissible to infer conduct on a specific occasion, even in negligence cases, provided a sufficient number of instances of the conduct are established.

    Summary

    Frank Halloran, a mechanic, was injured when a can of refrigerant exploded. He sued Virginia Chemicals, the packager. The central issue was whether Halloran’s prior practice of using an immersion coil to heat refrigerant cans was admissible to prove negligence on the day of the accident. The Court of Appeals held that evidence of habit or regular usage is admissible to infer conduct on a particular occasion, even in negligence cases, if a sufficient number of instances are proven. The court reversed the lower court’s decision, finding that the evidence was not collateral and should have been admitted to help determine if Halloran acted negligently by overheating the can.

    Facts

    Halloran, a mechanic, was injured when a can of Freon refrigerant exploded while he was charging an air conditioning unit. He typically used warm tap water to heat the Freon cans to accelerate the flow, checking the temperature with a thermometer. On the day of the accident, the can exploded before he could remove it from the water. Halloran claimed he used warm water and a thermometer, but neither was produced at trial. Virginia Chemicals sought to introduce evidence that Halloran habitually used an immersion coil to heat the water, despite warnings on the can, which Halloran denied.

    Procedural History

    Halloran sued Virginia Chemicals. The trial court excluded evidence of Halloran’s prior use of an immersion coil. The jury found Virginia Chemicals liable. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and certified a question of law for review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence of a plaintiff’s habit or regular usage of a particular method, specifically using an immersion coil to heat refrigerant cans, is admissible to prove negligence on a specific occasion, even if the plaintiff denies such practice.

    Holding

    Yes, because evidence of a deliberate and repetitive practice by one in complete control of the circumstances is highly probative and admissible to allow the inference of its persistence, and hence negligence, on a particular occasion, provided a sufficient number of instances of the conduct are established.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while evidence of general carelessness is typically inadmissible to prove negligence on a specific occasion, evidence of habit or regular usage is different. Habit involves a “repetitive pattern of conduct and therefore predictable and predictive conduct.” The court distinguished this from occasional carelessness. The court noted, “Because one who has demonstrated a consistent response under given circumstances is more likely to repeat that response when the circumstances arise again, evidence of habit has, since the days of the common-law reports, generally been admissible to prove conformity on specified occasions.” The court emphasized that for habit evidence to be admissible, the party must show a sufficient number of instances of the conduct in question. The court noted that Halloran testified to a specific, routine practice. By doing so, he opened the door to refutation of that testimony. The court further clarified that the defendant should be able to “fix, at least generally, the times and places of such occurrences” to establish habit. The Court quoted *Matter of Kellum, 52 NY 517, 519-520* to illustrate how “a lawyer, to prove due execution of a will, may testify that he always has wills executed according to statutory requirements”. The court held that the exclusion of the evidence was prejudicial to Virginia Chemicals because it prevented them from presenting a plausible explanation for the explosion.

  • Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376 (1976): Eliminating the Patent Danger Rule in Product Design Negligence

    Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376 (1976)

    A manufacturer has a duty to design products so as to avoid unreasonable risks of harm to foreseeable users, even when the danger is patent, thus eliminating the previous ‘patent-danger’ rule.

    Summary

    Paul Micallef, a printing press operator, was injured while trying to remove a blemish (“hickie”) from a printing plate while the machine was running, a common practice in the industry. He sued the manufacturer, Miehle Co., alleging negligent design because the machine lacked safety guards. The trial court initially set aside a jury verdict for the plaintiff but later granted a new trial. The Appellate Division reversed, citing the patent danger rule. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, explicitly abandoning the patent danger rule, holding that a manufacturer has a duty to use reasonable care to avoid unreasonable risks of harm, regardless of whether the danger is obvious. The case was remanded for a new trial.

    Facts

    Paul Micallef worked as a printing press operator at Lincoln Graphic Arts, operating a large photo-offset press manufactured by Miehle Co.
    While operating the press, Micallef noticed a blemish on the printing plate, known as a “hickie.”
    He attempted to remove the hickie while the machine was running, a common industry practice known as “chasing the hickie.”
    His hand was drawn into the nip point between the plate cylinder and an ink-form roller, causing injury.
    The machine lacked safety guards to prevent such accidents.
    Micallef was aware of the danger, but stopping the machine would cause significant delays and reduce its efficiency.
    The manufacturer’s representatives observed the machine in operation and knew how employees chased hickies.

    Procedural History

    Micallef sued Miehle Co. for negligent design and breach of implied warranty.
    The jury found Miehle Co. negligent, but also found Micallef contributorily negligent, barring recovery on that ground.
    The jury returned a verdict for Micallef on the breach of warranty claim.
    The trial court initially set aside the verdict, relying on an intervening Court of Appeals decision regarding contributory negligence in strict products liability cases.
    The trial court then granted a new trial on all issues in the interest of justice due to potential jury confusion.
    Miehle Co. appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the jury verdict on negligence (finding contributory negligence a bar) and directing judgment for the defendant on the warranty cause of action, relying on the patent danger rule of Campo v. Scofield.
    Micallef appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the “patent danger” rule, as articulated in Campo v. Scofield, remains valid in New York, precluding manufacturer liability for injuries caused by patently dangerous designs.

    Holding

    No, because the patent danger rule is no longer valid. A manufacturer is obligated to exercise reasonable care in the design of its products to avoid unreasonable risks of harm to anyone likely to be exposed to the danger when the product is used in its intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals explicitly abandoned the patent danger rule established in Campo v. Scofield.
    The court reasoned that the patent danger rule’s rigidity produced harsh results because it is difficult for users to fully perceive the scope of danger in manufactured goods.
    The court highlighted advancements in technology, noting that products are often complex and their defects are difficult for consumers to detect.
    The court stated that manufacturers are in the best position to recognize and cure defects, promoting public interest by holding them responsible.
    The court adopted a standard of “reasonable care,” requiring manufacturers to design products to avoid unreasonable risks of harm to foreseeable users.
    “What constitutes ‘reasonable care’ will, of course, vary with the surrounding circumstances and will involve ‘a balancing of the likelihood of harm, and the gravity of harm if it happens, against the burden of the precaution which would be effective to avoid the harm.’”
    The court noted that the obviousness of the danger is still relevant to the issue of whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable care.
    Regarding the breach of implied warranty claim, the court noted that such claims are more correctly treated under the theory of strict products liability. The court declined to reconsider its prior holding on strict products liability from Codling v. Paglia. Judge Fuchsberg and Judge Cooke expressed a preference for adopting Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
    The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and granted a new trial.

  • Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403 (1968): Limitations on Interrogatories in Wrongful Death Actions

    21 N.Y.2d 403 (1968)

    CPLR 3130 prohibits the use of interrogatories in wrongful death actions, regardless of the underlying legal theory of recovery, such as negligence or breach of warranty.

    Summary

    The administratrix of an estate brought a wrongful death action against several defendants, including the manufacturer of a scaffold, based on both negligence and breach of warranty. The plaintiff served interrogatories seeking information about the scaffold’s manufacturing and testing. The lower courts set aside the interrogatories based on CPLR 3130, which prohibits interrogatories in wrongful death actions. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the statutory prohibition applies regardless of the legal theory underlying the wrongful death claim, acknowledging potential inconsistencies and suggesting legislative reconsideration.

    Facts

    Clement Heath Allen, a window washer, died after a scaffold he was using on a building’s roof tipped over, causing him to fall 45 stories. The scaffold had been installed two weeks prior to the incident. Sydelle Allen, as administratrix, sued the building owners, their managing agent, and the scaffold manufacturer, Spider Staging Sales Company, alleging negligence. A second cause of action asserted breach of express and implied warranties against Spider Staging.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff served written interrogatories upon Spider Staging. Special Term set aside the interrogatories. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, with two justices dissenting. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal based on a certified question regarding the propriety of the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPLR 3130 excludes the use of interrogatories in all wrongful death actions, irrespective of whether the action is based on negligence or breach of warranty.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPLR 3130 expressly prohibits the use of interrogatories in actions to recover damages for wrongful death, regardless of the theoretical predicate for liability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the legislative history of CPLR 3130, noting the initial proposal to allow interrogatories in all actions was narrowed due to concerns about potential abuse, particularly in negligence and wrongful death cases. The Judicial Conference specifically intended to preclude interrogatories in such actions. Despite recognizing anomalies created by the statute, such as allowing interrogatories for breach of warranty claims in personal injury cases arising from the same accident, the Court adhered to the plain language of the statute. The Court acknowledged the blurring of lines between negligence and breach of warranty in products liability law since the statute’s enactment but emphasized that courts must apply the statute as written. The Court noted, “A statute must be read and given effect as it is written by the Legislature, not as the court may think it should or would have been written if the Legislature had envisaged all the problems and complications which might arise in the course of its administration.” Because the legislature has proscribed the use of interrogatories in wrongful death actions, the court below properly set aside the interrogatories. The court suggested that the Legislature reconsider the statute in light of evolving products liability law.