New York Law Review

Tag: product liability

  • Reis v. Volvo Cars of North America, 25 N.Y.3d 36 (2015): Standard of Care in Product Design Defect Cases

    Reis v. Volvo Cars of North America, 25 N.Y.3d 36 (2015)

    In a product design defect case, the standard of care is whether a reasonable person would conclude that the utility of the product’s design outweighed the risk inherent in marketing it, not whether the manufacturer used the same degree of skill and care as others in the industry.

    Summary

    Americo Silva’s 1987 Volvo lurched forward when he started the engine while it was in gear, pinning plaintiff Reis against a wall and causing severe injury. Reis sued Volvo, alleging negligent design for failing to include a starter interlock. The trial court erroneously instructed the jury using a malpractice standard of care (PJI 2:15). The jury found Volvo negligent but not liable for a design defect, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the malpractice standard was inappropriate for a design defect case and the error likely influenced the inconsistent verdict.

    Facts

    Americo Silva was showing the plaintiff, Reis, his recently purchased 1987 Volvo station wagon. Silva started the car while it was in gear, causing it to lurch forward and severely injure Reis. The car lacked a starter interlock, a safety device that prevents the car from starting while in gear. Plaintiff contended that the absence of this interlock constituted a design defect. Plaintiff presented evidence that other manufacturers such as General Motors, Ford and Toyota included starter interlocks in their 1987 models. Volvo argued that the risk of such an accident was minimal and the interlock had potential disadvantages.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied Volvo’s motion for summary judgment. The case proceeded to trial while Volvo’s appeal was pending. The jury found Volvo negligent but not liable for a design defect and awarded the plaintiff damages. The Appellate Division dismissed the failure to warn claims but otherwise affirmed. Volvo appealed to the Court of Appeals as of right.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury using PJI 2:15, the standard of care instruction for malpractice cases, in a product design defect case.
    2. Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury using PJI 2:16, regarding customary business practices.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the standard of care applicable to malpractice cases is different from the standard in negligence cases, including design defect cases.
    2. Yes, because there was sufficient evidence to permit the jury to consider industry custom and practice, without mandating that they find Volvo negligent based solely on that evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that PJI 2:15, designed for malpractice cases, was improperly applied. The Court explained that in malpractice cases, the standard is the level of skill and care used by others in the same profession. In contrast, negligence cases require comparing the defendant’s conduct to that of a reasonable person under like circumstances. In negligent design/design defect cases, the specific question is “whether the product is one as to which if the design defect were known at the time of manufacture, a reasonable person would conclude that the utility of the product did not outweigh the risk inherent in marketing a product designed in that manner” (quoting Voss v Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59 NY2d 102, 108 [1983]). The Court noted the jury’s inconsistent verdict, finding Volvo negligent but not liable for a design defect, suggested the erroneous charge confused the jury. The Court affirmed the appropriateness of PJI 2:16, which allows the jury to consider industry custom and practice as evidence of reasonable conduct, but does not mandate a finding of negligence based solely on that evidence. The Court quoted the instruction: “a general custom, use or practice by those in the same business or trade may be considered some evidence of what constitutes reasonable conduct in that trade or business.”

  • Hoover v. New Holland N. Am., Inc., 23 N.Y.3d 41 (2014): Product Liability and Substantial Modification Defense

    Hoover v. New Holland N. Am., Inc., 23 N.Y.3d 41 (2014)

    A manufacturer is not automatically shielded from liability for a design defect merely because a safety feature was modified post-sale if there is evidence the safety feature was defectively designed at the time of sale.

    Summary

    Jessica Hoover was severely injured by a post hole digger when her clothing became entangled in its rotating driveline after the safety shield had been removed. Hoover sued CNH America LLC (CNH) and Niagara Frontier Equipment Sales, Inc. (Niagara), alleging a design defect. The defendants claimed the “substantial modification” defense, arguing that the owner’s removal of the shield was a post-sale modification that relieved them of liability. The New York Court of Appeals held that summary judgment was not appropriate for the defendants because there were triable issues of fact regarding whether the safety shield was defectively designed initially, regardless of the subsequent modification. The court emphasized that the defense does not apply when the plaintiff shows the product was dangerous from the outset because of a defectively designed safety feature.

    Facts

    Plaintiff Jessica Hoover was helping her stepfather, Gary Hoover, dig post holes using a tractor-driven post hole digger. The digger’s safety shield, originally made of plastic, had been removed by the previous owner, Peter Smith, after it broke due to wear and tear. While Jessica was holding the gearbox to steady the auger, her jacket became caught in the rotating driveline near the universal joint (U-joint), which had a protruding nut and bolt. She sustained severe injuries, including the amputation of her right arm.

    Procedural History

    Hoover sued CNH and Niagara, among others, alleging negligence and strict products liability based on design defect, manufacturing defect, and failure to warn. The Supreme Court dismissed the manufacturing defect and failure to warn claims but allowed the design defect claim against CNH and Niagara to proceed. After a jury trial, a verdict was rendered in favor of Hoover. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendants were entitled to summary judgment based on the substantial modification defense, given the evidence of a potential design defect in the safety shield of the post hole digger.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to raise triable issues of fact as to whether the safety shield was defectively designed at the time of sale, precluding summary judgment based on the substantial modification defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the substantial modification defense, articulated in Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., does not automatically absolve a manufacturer of liability if the plaintiff presents evidence that the product was defectively designed at the time of sale. The Court emphasized that, to prevail on a substantial modification defense, the defendant must first demonstrate the product was “not defective” when manufactured and sold. If the defendant makes this showing, they must then show that a post-sale modification rendered the otherwise safe product defective and that the modification was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.

    Here, Smith testified that the shield had been destroyed by normal wear and tear, suggesting it was not effectively designed to last. Hoover also presented expert testimony that the plastic shield was inadequately tested and not reasonably safe, and that a safer alternative design was feasible. The court found this was sufficient to create a triable issue of fact. Quoting Robinson, the Court stated that the substantial modification defense is intended to insulate manufacturers “from liability for injuries that would never have arisen but for the post-sale modification of a safety feature on an otherwise safe product.” The Court distinguished Robinson, explaining that in that case, the injured party did not demonstrate that the safety gate was defectively designed. The Court noted that a manufacturer must “use reasonable care” in designing a product that is reasonably safe for all of its intended uses and foreseeable misuses.

  • Doomes v. Best Transit Corp., 16 N.Y.3d 594 (2011): Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards and Preemption of State Tort Claims

    16 N.Y.3d 594 (2011)

    Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) establish minimum safety requirements; compliance with these standards does not automatically preempt state common-law claims seeking to impose a higher standard of care unless there is a clear conflict or congressional intent to preempt the field.

    Summary

    In a personal injury case stemming from a bus accident, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether federal regulations concerning motor vehicle safety preempted state tort claims regarding the absence of passenger seatbelts and negligent modification of the bus chassis. The court held that the FMVSS, which mandated seatbelts only for the driver, did not preempt state claims alleging negligence for failing to install passenger seatbelts. However, the court also found that the plaintiffs’ claim regarding negligent weight distribution lacked sufficient evidence, as expert testimony relied on speculative data.

    Facts

    A bus owned by Best Transit Corp. and driven by Wagner Alcivar, carrying 21 passengers, crashed when Alcivar fell asleep at the wheel. The bus had a seatbelt for the driver but not for the passengers. Several passengers were injured. The bus chassis was originally manufactured by Ford, but Warrick Industries, Inc. modified it, extending its length and altering its weight distribution.

    Procedural History

    Passengers sued Best Transit, Ford, Warrick, J&R Tours (prior owner), and Alcivar, alleging negligence due to the lack of passenger seatbelts and improper weight distribution. Claims against J&R Tours were dismissed, and Ford settled. The Supreme Court reserved judgment on Warrick’s motion to preclude evidence regarding seatbelts based on federal preemption. The jury found Best and Alcivar negligent in operating the bus and Warrick liable for defective manufacturing and breach of warranty. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaints against Warrick, finding the seatbelt claims preempted and the weight distribution claim lacking sufficient evidence. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether federal motor vehicle safety standards preempt state tort claims based on the failure to install passenger seatbelts on a bus when federal standards only require a driver’s seatbelt.
    2. Whether there was legally sufficient evidence to support the plaintiffs’ claim that negligent modification of the bus chassis, resulting in improper weight distribution, was a proximate cause of the accident.

    Holding

    1. No, because the federal motor vehicle safety standards establish minimum requirements, but the saving clause in the Safety Act permits common-law claims, and the federal standard’s silence on passenger seatbelts does not conflict with a state law duty to install them.
    2. No, because the expert’s opinion regarding weight distribution was based on speculative estimates rather than empirical data, thus failing to establish a causal link to the accident.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding preemption, the court examined express and implied preemption. The court found no express preemption, citing the saving clause in 49 USC § 30103(e): “[c]ompliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law.” This clause allows common-law claims even when federal standards are met. The court dismissed field preemption, stating that the statutes were not intended to “so greatly envelop the field of motor vehicle safety standards as to leave little room for state participation or operation.” Regarding conflict preemption, the court found it was not impossible to comply with both federal and state requirements, citing Sprietsma v Mercury Marine, 537 US 51, 67-68 (2002). The court distinguished this case from Geier v American Honda Motor Co., 529 US 861 (2000), where the federal government deliberately provided manufacturers with choices among safety devices. Referencing Williamson v Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 131 S Ct 1131 (2011), the court stated that the NHTSA had not expressed an intention to provide manufacturers with an option regarding passenger seatbelts on buses. Therefore, state common-law claims were not preempted.

    Regarding the weight distribution claim, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to show the design defect was a proximate cause of their injuries. Plaintiffs’ expert based his opinion on speculative weight estimates rather than empirical data. He testified that the inattentiveness of the driver was a contributing factor, and he could not say with certainty whether the proper weight ratio existed. The court concluded that any finding that the weight distribution adversely affected steering and handling was conclusory.

  • Adams v. Genie Industries, Inc., 14 N.Y.3d 535 (2010): Proving Defective Design in Product Liability

    14 N.Y.3d 535 (2010)

    To establish a design defect claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the product was not reasonably safe at the time of manufacture, considering the likelihood of harm, the feasibility of a safer design, and whether the utility of the product outweighed its risks.

    Summary

    Plaintiff, injured when a personnel lift tipped over, sued Genie Industries alleging defective design due to the lack of interlocked outriggers. The jury found Genie liable for defective design and negligence. Genie appealed, arguing insufficient evidence of a design defect and error in submitting a post-sale negligence claim to the jury. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the evidence supported the jury’s finding of a design defect, and any error in submitting the post-sale negligence claim was harmless. The court also clarified the rule regarding appeals after stipulations to additur or remittitur.

    Facts

    Genie Industries sold a personnel lift to the plaintiff’s employer in 1986. The lift included detachable outriggers intended to stabilize the lift during use, accompanied by a warning label stating that all outriggers must be installed before operating. In 1997, while using the lift to perform maintenance work approximately 12 feet above the ground, the plaintiff was injured when the lift tipped over because the outriggers were not in use and had been lost.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued Genie Industries, alleging negligence and defective design. The trial court submitted questions to the jury, who found Genie liable. The trial court denied Genie’s motion to set aside the verdict but granted the plaintiff’s motion for additur, increasing damages for pain and suffering. The Appellate Division affirmed. Genie stipulated to the additur and was granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Genie, by stipulating to the additur ordered by the trial court, waived its right to appeal other issues in the case.
    2. Whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the personnel lift was defectively designed.
    3. Whether the trial court erred in submitting to the jury the question of Genie’s post-sale negligence.

    Holding

    1. No, because Genie is not appealing the additur itself, but rather the underlying finding of liability. The court reexamined and rejected a broader application of a prior rule that would have barred the appeal.
    2. Yes, because the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that the lift was not reasonably safe due to the absence of interlocked outriggers.
    3. Yes, but the error was harmless because the post-sale negligence claim was essentially a duplicate of the design defect claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the right to appeal, the Court of Appeals reevaluated its prior holdings, specifically the rule established in Batavia Turf Farms v. County of Genesee, clarifying that a stipulation to damages does not forfeit all other appellate claims. The court reasoned that barring a party from raising legitimate appellate issues due to an unrelated agreement on damages is unfair and may operate as a trap. Thus, Genie was permitted to appeal the liability finding.

    On the design defect claim, the court applied the standard from Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., requiring the plaintiff to show the product was not reasonably safe due to the likelihood of harm and the feasibility of a safer design. The court found sufficient evidence: expert testimony demonstrated the technological feasibility and minimal cost of interlocked outriggers in 1986; a former Genie employee testified about proposing the idea; and evidence showed Genie had purchased a competitor’s lift with interlocked outriggers. This evidence supported the jury’s conclusion that the absence of interlocked outriggers rendered the product “not reasonably safe.” The court emphasized, “It will be for the jury to decide whether a product was not reasonably safe in light of all the evidence presented by both the plaintiff and defendant.”

    Regarding the post-sale negligence claim, the court acknowledged that, generally, a seller’s duty after a sale is to warn of newly discovered risks. Since the trial court had already determined Genie’s warning label was adequate, submitting the post-sale conduct to the jury was erroneous. However, this error was deemed harmless because the post-sale negligence claim was duplicative of the design defect claim, and no new evidence was presented that uniquely pertained to the post-sale period. “Plaintiff presented no evidence of any facts that came to Genie’s attention after the sale that might have triggered a new duty; plaintiff merely asserted that Genie should have recalled or retrofitted the personnel lift for the same reasons that it should not have sold it in the first place—principally, because the outriggers were not interlocked.”

  • Passante v. Agway Consumer Products, Inc., 2 N.Y.3d 375 (2004): Optional Safety Features and Product Liability

    Passante v. Agway Consumer Products, Inc., 2 N.Y.3d 375 (2004)

    A manufacturer can be liable for a defectively designed product that lacks an optional safety feature if the product is unreasonably dangerous without it in its normal use, despite the buyer’s knowledge and rejection of the feature.

    Summary

    Samuel Passante was injured while using a dock leveler at work. He sued the manufacturer (Rite-Hite) and seller (Mullen) arguing it was defectively designed by not including a trailer restraint system (Dok-Lok), an optional feature. The New York Court of Appeals held that summary judgment for the seller was inappropriate because the dock leveler posed an unreasonable risk of harm without the restraint system during normal use. This distinguished the case from prior precedent where the buyer’s informed decision to forego a safety feature shielded the manufacturer from liability. The court also reinstated a failure to warn claim, finding the existing warnings inadequate.

    Facts

    Passante, an employee of G&P Fresh Pac, was injured using a Rite-Hite dock leveler sold to G&P by Mullen. The dock leveler lacked a Dok-Lok trailer restraint system, an optional feature. Passante, weighing 140 pounds, had to stand on the leveler’s hinged lip to make it contact the trailer bed; the leveler was designed for a “150 pound walk down.” The trailer driver moved the truck prematurely, causing the lip to collapse and Passante to fall. G&P had declined to purchase the Dok-Lok system, partly due to cost and concerns about driver compliance.

    Procedural History

    Passante sued Rite-Hite, Mullen and G&P. Mullen moved for summary judgment, which Supreme Court denied. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint against Mullen. After this decision, Mullen moved for summary judgment dismissing Rite-Hite’s cross-claims, and Rite-Hite sought summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint. Supreme Court dismissed Rite-Hite’s cross-claims without prejudice. The Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s order upon plaintiff’s appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a product is defectively designed as a matter of law when it lacks an optional safety feature that the buyer knowingly declined to purchase?

    2. Whether the seller adequately warned users of the dock leveler of the dangers involved in its operation?

    Holding

    1. No, because the manufacturer and seller failed to demonstrate that the dock leveler was not unreasonably dangerous without the optional trailer restraint system during normal use.

    2. No, because there are triable issues of fact as to the sufficiency of the warnings provided concerning the equipment, particularly the danger of remaining on the lip after it engaged the trailer bed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished this case from Scarangella v. Thomas Built Buses, where a buyer’s informed decision to forego an optional safety feature relieved the manufacturer of liability. Scarangella requires considering whether: (1) the buyer is knowledgeable about the product and aware of the safety feature; (2) there exist normal circumstances where the product is not unreasonably dangerous without the feature; and (3) the buyer can balance the benefits and risks of not having the safety device. Here, while G&P was knowledgeable and aware of the Dok-Lok, the court found that the defendants failed to demonstrate that the dock leveler was not unreasonably dangerous without the trailer restraint system in its normal use. The Court relied on a Rite-Hite brochure describing the “Danger Zone” and the risk of trailers moving, as well as expert testimony regarding the risk from the collapsing lip. The court also found triable issues as to the adequacy of the warnings. Although a warning sheet was posted, it didn’t warn against remaining on the lip after it engaged the trailer. The court emphasized that “in cases where reasonable minds might disagree as to the extent of plaintiff’s knowledge of the hazard, the question is one for the jury.” The dissent argued that all three Scarangella factors were met, and the dock leveler was safe if used with proper precautions such as confirming the truck was off before use. They warned the decision eviscerated Scarangella, increased costs for manufacturers and distributors, and removed buyer’s options to refuse safety features.

  • Rose v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 8 N.Y.3d 572 (2007): Consumer Satisfaction as a Requirement for Safer Alternative Design

    Rose v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 8 N.Y.3d 572 (2007)

    In a negligent product design case where the product’s sole function is to provide consumer satisfaction, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a safer alternative design provides a comparable level of satisfaction to the original product.

    Summary

    Norma Rose, a long-time smoker, sued cigarette companies for negligent product design, claiming they should have used lower levels of tar and nicotine. The New York Court of Appeals held that Rose failed to prove that “light” cigarettes, with lower tar and nicotine, provided the same “utility” (i.e., satisfaction) as regular cigarettes. The court reasoned that because the sole function of a cigarette is to gratify a smoker’s desire, a safer alternative design must also fulfill that desire to a comparable extent. Without proof that light cigarettes are as satisfying as regular cigarettes, the plaintiff’s claim failed. This case underscores the importance of considering consumer expectations and product utility in negligent design cases.

    Facts

    Norma Rose smoked regular cigarettes for over 40 years, manufactured by American Tobacco Company and Philip Morris. She quit in 1993 and was diagnosed with lung cancer and another smoking-related condition in 1995. Rose and her husband sued American Tobacco’s successor (Brown & Williamson), Philip Morris, and another company, alleging negligent product design. Rose claimed the cigarette companies were negligent in designing their product because they should have used lower levels of tar and nicotine.

    Procedural History

    All claims except the one for negligent product design were dismissed at the trial level. The jury found American Tobacco and Philip Morris negligently designed the cigarettes and awarded compensatory and punitive damages. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in a negligent product design claim against a cigarette manufacturer, the plaintiff must demonstrate that a safer alternative cigarette design (i.e., light cigarettes) provides a comparable level of satisfaction to consumers as regular cigarettes, where the product’s sole function is consumer satisfaction.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiff failed to prove that the alternative design (“light” cigarettes) provided the same level of satisfaction to consumers as the original product (“regular” cigarettes), which is an essential element when the product’s sole function is consumer satisfaction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the principle from Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., which states that a plaintiff must show “the potential for designing . . . the product so that it is safer but remains functional.” In this case, the function of a cigarette is to provide pleasure to the smoker. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs presented evidence suggesting light cigarettes are “safer” due to lower tar and nicotine levels, but failed to demonstrate that they are equally “functional,” meaning equally satisfying to smokers. The court emphasized the lack of evidence showing that smokers find light cigarettes as satisfying as regular cigarettes, despite the well-known health risks associated with regular cigarettes. The court distinguished cigarettes from products with more objective functions, like circular saws or molding machines, where consumer preference is less central to the product’s utility. The court drew an analogy to Felix v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, where a quick-drying lacquer sealer was deemed not negligently designed because a safer, water-based alternative took significantly longer to dry, rendering it functionally different. The court acknowledged the irony of discussing cigarettes’ “utility” given their harmful effects but emphasized that banning regular cigarettes is a legislative, not a judicial, function. To hold cigarette companies liable for every sale of regular cigarettes would be a judicial ban on the product, which the court declined to do. The court stated, “It is still lawful for people to buy and smoke regular cigarettes, and for cigarette companies to sell them.”

  • Bradley v. Earl B. Feiden, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 264 (2007): Breach of Warranty Despite No Defect in Component Part

    Bradley v. Earl B. Feiden, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 264 (2007)

    A product can breach the implied warranty of merchantability if it’s unfit for its intended purpose, even if a specific component is not proven defective, especially when the jury instructions tie a products liability claim to a specific component but not the breach of warranty claim.

    Summary

    Joseph Bradley sued General Electric (GE) and Earl B. Feiden, Inc. after a fire in his kitchen was allegedly caused by a GE refrigerator. Bradley asserted negligence, strict products liability, and breach of warranty. GE then filed a third-party action against NASCorp and Mid-South. The jury found GE not liable on the products liability claim (finding no defect in the defrost timer), but liable for breach of warranty (finding the refrigerator unfit for its intended purpose). The New York Court of Appeals held that sufficient evidence supported the breach of warranty claim, despite the lack of a specific defect identified in the defrost timer, given the evidence indicating the fire originated in the refrigerator itself. The court also addressed contractual indemnification, finding that Mid-South was required to indemnify GE for defense costs.

    Facts

    Joseph Bradley purchased a new GE Hotpoint refrigerator. Three weeks later, a fire broke out in Bradley’s kitchen, with the fire department initially reporting the refrigerator as the fire’s origin. Bradley sued GE and Feiden, alleging the fire was caused by a defect in the refrigerator’s defrost timer. At trial, Bradley presented expert testimony indicating the fire originated within the refrigerator’s freezer compartment. GE countered with evidence suggesting the fire originated in a can opener. The jury was presented with a special verdict sheet asking about the origin of the fire, a defect in the defrost timer, and breach of warranty.

    Procedural History

    Bradley sued GE and Feiden in New York Supreme Court. GE brought a third-party action against NASCorp and Mid-South. The jury found for GE on the products liability claim but for Bradley on the breach of warranty claim. GE moved for a directed verdict and to set aside the verdict, which was denied by the Supreme Court. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order regarding the breach of warranty claim and reinstated the jury verdict. Mid-South appealed by permission of the Appellate Division under CPLR 5602 (b), a question having been certified to us by that Court.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether legally sufficient evidence existed to support the jury’s verdict in favor of the plaintiff on a breach of warranty claim against the manufacturer and retailer of a refrigerator unit when the jury also found for the manufacturer on a related products liability claim.

    2. Whether the supplier of the bracket control assembly component of the refrigerator is contractually required to indemnify the manufacturer for defense costs, even where the jury found no defect in the supplier’s component.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the jury could have rationally concluded the refrigerator was not fit for its intended purpose (to safely refrigerate food) regardless of whether the defrost timer was defective, especially since the jury instructions tied the products liability claim specifically to the defrost timer.

    2. Yes, because the contractual indemnification clause was triggered by any “claims based on strict or product liability relating to Product,” and did not require a successful claim to mandate indemnification for defense costs.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a breach of warranty claim only requires proof that the product was not “fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used” (UCC 2-314 [2] [c]). This can be established through circumstantial evidence. The jury instructions specifically tied the products liability claim to a defect in the defrost timer. The jury was free to find that the refrigerator itself was the source of the fire and thus unfit for its purpose, even without finding a specific defect in the defrost timer. As the court stated, the jury could rationally conclude that “such an appliance was not fit for its intended purpose, regardless of whether the defrost timer was defective, and thus that GE breached the implied warranty of merchantability.” Regarding indemnification, the court found the contract language sufficiently clear and unambiguous in requiring Mid-South to indemnify GE for claims related to its product, regardless of actual fault. The Court quoted Levine v Shell Oil Co., stating that if the indemnitor “had reservations as to the scope of the agreement, he should have insisted on a different indemnification clause or refused to give his assent to the contract.” Therefore, Mid-South was responsible for GE’s defense costs until the jury verdict.

  • Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281 (2002): Limits on Barring Recovery Based on Plaintiff’s Illegal Conduct

    97 N.Y.2d 281 (2002)

    New York public policy does not bar a plaintiff’s recovery for enhanced injuries caused by a defective product, even if the plaintiff’s own illegal conduct (like drunk driving) was a cause of the initial accident, as long as the duty breached by the defendant (safe product design) does not arise directly from the illegal act.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a plaintiff could recover damages from Volkswagen for a design defect that allegedly enhanced the injuries sustained by her husband, who was driving drunk when he crashed. The Court held that the claim was not automatically barred by public policy. Even though the decedent’s drunk driving was a serious violation of the law that contributed to his injuries, the manufacturer’s duty to design a safe vehicle existed independently of the driver’s illegal conduct. The Court emphasized that preclusion based on a plaintiff’s illegal conduct applies narrowly and does not negate comparative fault principles in product liability cases.

    Facts

    Silhadi Alami, while intoxicated, drove his Volkswagen Jetta into a utility pole at approximately 35 mph. He sustained fatal injuries. His widow, Shauna Alami, sued Volkswagen, alleging that design defects in the Jetta enhanced her husband’s injuries and caused his death. Her expert claimed the car’s floorboard buckled upon impact due to inadequate structural support, leading to the fatal thoracic and abdominal injuries. The expert contended that readily available safety features would have significantly reduced the injuries.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted Volkswagen’s motion for summary judgment, barring the claim based on the decedent’s drunk driving. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the decedent’s negligent driving the sole proximate cause of his injuries. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the claim was not precluded by public policy.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a plaintiff’s claim against a car manufacturer for design defects that enhanced injuries in an accident is precluded on public policy grounds when the accident was caused by the plaintiff’s illegal act of driving while intoxicated.

    Holding

    No, because the manufacturer’s duty to design a reasonably safe vehicle exists independently of the driver’s intoxication, and the claim is based on the manufacturer’s breach of that independent duty, not on profiting from the illegal act itself.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while driving under the influence is a serious violation of the law, the Barker v. Kallash and Manning v. Brown precedents do not automatically bar recovery. Those cases preclude recovery when the plaintiff’s conduct is a serious violation of the law and the injuries are a direct result of that violation. However, this rule should be applied narrowly. The Court emphasized that the Barker/Manning rule extends the principle that one may not profit from their own wrong to tort actions. Here, Mrs. Alami isn’t seeking to profit from her husband’s intoxication. Instead, she is seeking to enforce Volkswagen’s duty to produce a safe vehicle. The duty originates from Volkswagen’s obligation, not from her husband’s illegal act. The Court distinguished this case from situations like a burglar injured on defective stairs, where the duty of care only arises because of the unlawful entry. The Court noted the Volkswagen did not dispute the viability of a claim for design defects that enhance or aggravate injuries in its initial motion. The dissenting opinion argued that the majority’s decision unduly limited the scope of the Barker-Manning doctrine and invited individuals injured as a result of their own seriously unlawful acts to shift the blame to others. The dissent contended that the decedent’s drunk driving was the sole cause of the accident, precluding the suit under Barker. Citing Humphrey v. State of New York, the dissent pointed out that in the case at hand, the accident was caused by a combination of impaired judgement and state negligence.

  • Scarangella v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc., 93 N.Y.2d 655 (1999): Optional Safety Features and Product Design Defect

    93 N.Y.2d 655 (1999)

    A manufacturer is not liable for a design defect when a buyer chooses not to purchase an optional safety feature, provided the buyer is knowledgeable about the product, the product is reasonably safe for normal use without the feature, and the buyer is in the best position to assess the risks and benefits of foregoing the feature.

    Summary

    Concetta Scarangella, a school bus driver, was injured when a bus, lacking an optional back-up alarm, struck her in the bus parking yard. She sued the bus manufacturer, Thomas Built Buses, alleging a design defect due to the absence of the alarm. Huntington Coach Corp., the bus purchaser, had declined to purchase the optional alarm due to noise concerns in the residential neighborhood of the bus yard. The New York Court of Appeals held that Thomas Built Buses was not liable because Huntington, a sophisticated buyer, knowingly declined the optional safety feature, making them responsible for assessing the risk in their specific operational context. This case clarifies when the responsibility for optional safety features shifts from the manufacturer to the purchaser.

    Facts

    Huntington Coach Corp. purchased ten school buses from Thomas Built Buses, declining the optional back-up alarm. Kevin Clifford, Huntington’s president, was aware of the alarm but opted against it due to noise concerns in the residential neighborhood where the buses were parked. Huntington instructed drivers to use the regular horn when backing up. Scarangella, a Huntington bus driver, was injured in the bus yard by a bus operating in reverse without the alarm.

    Procedural History

    Scarangella sued Thomas Built Buses for negligence, breach of warranty, and products liability, claiming a design defect. Thomas moved to preclude evidence regarding the back-up alarm design defect. The Supreme Court granted the motion. Scarangella proceeded to trial on a mirror defect theory, where the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reviewed the preclusion of evidence related to the back-up alarm.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a school bus manufacturer is liable for a design defect when the purchaser of the bus, a sophisticated entity, knowingly declined to purchase an optional back-up alarm, and an accident subsequently occurred due to the absence of that alarm.

    Holding

    No, because Huntington, as a sophisticated buyer, was in the best position to assess the risks and benefits of forgoing the optional back-up alarm, given their specific operational circumstances and knowledge of the product’s use.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied a risk-utility balancing test, considering factors such as the likelihood of injury, the plaintiff’s ability to avoid injury, awareness of the product’s dangers, and the usefulness of the product with and without the safety feature. The Court relied on Biss v Tenneco, Inc. and Rainbow v Elia Bldg. Co., which held that a manufacturer is not liable when a knowledgeable buyer rejects an optional safety feature. The court distinguished Rosado v Proctor & Schwartz, where the manufacturer attempted to shift the entire safety burden to the buyer through boilerplate language, without offering a safer machine configuration. The Court articulated a three-factor test: (1) the buyer is knowledgeable and aware of the safety feature; (2) the product is reasonably safe for normal use without the feature; and (3) the buyer is in a superior position to balance the risks and benefits. In this case, Huntington was a sophisticated buyer, the buses were primarily used in the yard (a controlled environment), and Huntington was best positioned to weigh the noise concerns against the safety benefits. The Court noted that Scarangella failed to provide evidence negating these factors or demonstrating other relevant design defect considerations. The Court stated, “If knowledge of available safety options is brought home to the purchaser, the duty to exercise reasonable care in selecting those appropriate to the intended use rests upon him. He is the party in the best position to exercise an intelligent judgment to make the trade-off between cost and function, and it is he who should bear the responsibility if the decision on optional safety equipment presents an unreasonable risk to users”.

  • Drattel v. Toyota Motor Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 35 (1998): Federal Preemption and State Tort Claims

    92 N.Y.2d 35 (1998)

    The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 does not preempt state common-law actions against vehicle manufacturers based on defective design, specifically the absence of air bags, because the Act’s savings clause preserves common-law liability.

    Summary

    Caryn Drattel sued Toyota after being injured in a 1991 Toyota Tercel without a driver’s-side air bag, alleging defective design. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 preempted this state common-law action. The Court held that the Act did not preempt the claim. The decision emphasizes the Act’s savings clause, which preserves common-law liability, and distinguishes Supreme Court cases where savings clauses were absent. The court also rejected arguments for implied preemption, finding no conflict between the Act and state tort law in this case. This ruling allows plaintiffs to pursue design defect claims based on the lack of air bags, influencing future automotive safety litigation in New York.

    Facts

    Plaintiff Caryn Drattel was injured while driving her 1991 Toyota Tercel. The vehicle was equipped with both a shoulder harness and a lap seat belt. Drattel sued Toyota, alleging defective design due to the absence of a driver’s-side air bag, which she claimed was a safer alternative design.

    Procedural History

    Supreme Court granted Toyota’s motion for partial summary judgment, finding the state claims preempted by federal law. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the complaint against Toyota. Toyota appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, answering the certified question in the affirmative.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 expressly or impliedly preempts a state common-law claim against a vehicle manufacturer for defective design based on the absence of an air bag.

    Holding

    No, because the Safety Act’s savings clause expressly preserves common-law liability, and there is no implied preemption as compliance with both federal and state law is possible, and state law does not obstruct the purposes of Congress. The court found the express language of the Act provided sufficient guidance against preemption.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court began by noting the presumption against federal preemption of state law, especially in areas of historic state police power. The analysis centered on whether Congress intended to preempt state common-law claims through the Safety Act.

    The Court addressed express preemption, distinguishing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, which involved a statute without a savings clause. The Court emphasized the Safety Act’s savings clause, stating that it “potently and pointedly negates any lingering notion of express preemption of State common-law claims.” The savings clause, which authorizes the prosecution of “any” common-law claims, including those relating to specific safety standards, was deemed critical.

    The Court also rejected the argument for implied preemption. It reasoned that the Safety Act does not occupy the entire field of automotive safety and that compliance with both federal safety standards and state common law is possible. The court emphasized that the express purpose of the Safety Act was to reduce traffic accidents and injuries, not to ensure uniformity at the expense of safety.

    The dissent argued that the majority’s holding undermined the goal of uniform national standards and that the state tort claim conflicted with the federal scheme. The dissent highlighted the balancing of safety and economic factors Congress intended, and the flexibility given to manufacturers to choose among occupant crash protection systems.

    The majority concluded by stating, “Until Congress speaks more definitively and differently, we are satisfied that its express language in the Act itself provides sufficient guidance against preemptive features in these circumstances.” The court explicitly stated it should be reluctant to insulate administrative decisions from the civil jury and place common law protections beyond the reach of the motoring public.