New York Law Review

Tag: procedural arbitrability

  • Matter of Board of Educ. v. Watertown Educ. Ass’n, 74 N.Y.2d 906 (1989): Arbitrability of Teacher Assignment Disputes

    Matter of Board of Educ. v. Watertown Educ. Ass’n, 74 N.Y.2d 906 (1989)

    A court should not stay arbitration unless public policy considerations absolutely prohibit the arbitrator from deciding particular matters or granting specific relief; questions of procedural compliance with a grievance process are for the arbitrator to decide.

    Summary

    The Watertown City School District sought to stay arbitration demanded by the Watertown Education Association concerning the appointment of a non-bargaining unit member to a coaching position. The Association argued this violated their collective bargaining agreement. The School District claimed the issue was not arbitrable due to public policy and the Association’s failure to follow pre-arbitration grievance procedures. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision to stay arbitration, holding that it was premature to intervene, as the arbitrator could potentially fashion a remedy that did not violate public policy. The court also determined that procedural compliance with the grievance process was an issue for the arbitrator.

    Facts

    The Watertown City School District (School District) and the Watertown Education Association (Association) had a collective bargaining agreement stating that instructional position vacancies would be filled from within the bargaining unit.
    When a part-time head varsity basketball coach position opened, the School District appointed someone outside the bargaining unit.
    Two Association members, both former head basketball coaches, applied for the position but were rejected. The School District claimed they were unqualified, which the Association disputed.
    Following the appointment, the Association filed a grievance, which was denied, and then demanded arbitration, claiming the appointment violated the collective bargaining agreement. They sought the immediate appointment of a member applicant and back pay.

    Procedural History

    The School District initiated a CPLR article 75 proceeding seeking to stay arbitration on public policy grounds.
    Special Term denied the stay and ordered arbitration.
    The Appellate Division reversed and granted a stay.
    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether arbitration should be stayed on public policy grounds where the remedy sought might infringe upon the School District’s supervisory responsibilities.
    2. Whether arbitration should be stayed because the Association allegedly failed to comply with a contractual pre-grievance informal resolution requirement.

    Holding

    1. No, because it is possible the arbitrator could fashion a remedy that does not violate public policy, and preemptive judicial intervention is not justified where the arbitrator may use broad powers to fashion a narrowly tailored procedural remedy.
    2. No, because questions concerning compliance with a contractual step-by-step grievance process are matters of procedural arbitrability to be resolved by the arbitrators.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized the limited role of courts in reviewing applications to stay arbitration, stating that courts should not interpret contract conditions or determine the merits of a dispute. Citing Board of Educ. v Barni, 51 NY2d 894, 895-896. They should also not stay arbitration merely because the remedy sought might impinge on the board’s supervisory responsibility. A stay is only justified if public policy considerations, embodied in law or statutes, absolutely prohibit the matter from being decided by an arbitrator or certain relief from being granted. Citing Matter of Sprinzen [Nomberg], 46 NY2d 623, 631.

    Even if the School District remains the ultimate judge of qualifications, the court found it unclear whether the arbitrator’s interpretation or resolution would necessarily substitute the arbitrator’s judgment for the School District’s or require hiring an “unqualified” person. Because relief was possible without violating public policy, the lower court’s stay was premature. As the court noted, “To justify preemptive judicial intervention in the arbitration process, public policy considerations embodied in decisional law or statutes must ‘prohibit, in an absolute sense, particular matters being decided or certain relief being granted by an arbitrator.’” Matter of Sprinzen [Nomberg], 46 NY2d 623, 631

    Regarding the pre-grievance informal resolution requirement, the Court held that compliance with a step-by-step grievance process is a matter of procedural arbitrability for the arbitrator to decide. The Court highlighted that the collective bargaining agreement in effect provided a three-step grievance process, and that questions concerning compliance with such a process should be resolved by the arbitrators. Citing Matter of County of Rockland [Primiano Constr. Co.], 51 NY2d 1, 8.

  • Long Island Oil Products Co. v. Local 553, 18 N.Y.2d 392 (1966): Arbitrability of Procedural Issues in Labor Disputes

    Long Island Oil Products Co. v. Local 553, 18 N.Y.2d 392 (1966)

    In labor disputes with a broad arbitration clause, questions of procedural compliance with grievance steps prior to formal arbitration are presumptively for the arbitrator to decide, not the courts.

    Summary

    Long Island Oil Products Co. sought to stay arbitration with Local 553, arguing the union failed to follow preliminary grievance procedures. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ stay, holding that procedural issues, like compliance with pre-arbitration steps, are for the arbitrator to decide, given the broad arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement. Federal labor law governs these agreements, presuming arbitrability unless the contract explicitly excludes such issues. This ruling emphasizes judicial deference to arbitration in labor disputes and ensures consistent interpretation of labor contracts.

    Facts

    Long Island Oil Products Co. and Local 553 were parties to a collective bargaining agreement containing a “no strike” clause and a grievance procedure culminating in arbitration. A dispute arose regarding wages allegedly owed to an employee, Louis Bostic. The union contacted the company, and a meeting was held. The company denied Bostic was their employee, refusing the claim. The union then served a “Request for Arbitration.” The company argued the union failed to follow the grievance procedure by not properly convening an arbitration committee before seeking arbitration before the Trucking Industry Arbitration Authority.

    Procedural History

    The company sought a stay of arbitration in Special Term, which was granted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Union appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether, under the collective bargaining agreement, the question of compliance with the preliminary steps to arbitration is an issue for the court or the arbitrator to decide.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because in labor disputes with broad arbitration clauses, procedural issues regarding compliance with pre-arbitration grievance steps are presumptively for the arbitrator to decide. The Court found that the broad language of the arbitration clause indicated that procedural, as well as substantive questions, were to be arbitrated.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that federal labor law, specifically Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, governs the interpretation and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements with arbitration clauses. Citing Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), the Court noted that state contract law must yield to federal labor law principles. The Court adopted the federal presumption of arbitrability, stating, “where a labor agreement contains an arbitration provision, the presumption is that questions of arbitrability are for the arbitrator.” This presumption extends to procedural issues, citing John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964). The Court reasoned that intertwining issues of substance and procedure arising from the same dispute should be resolved in a single forum. The Court stated, “Once it is determined, as we have, that the parties are obligated to submit the subject matter of a dispute to arbitration, ‘procedural’ questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition should be left to the arbitrator.” The Court found no language in the agreement to rebut the presumption of arbitrability. The Court distinguished commercial arbitration from labor arbitration, noting the special economic circumstances surrounding collective bargaining. Thus, the procedural question of whether the union properly convened an arbitration committee was for the arbitrator to decide along with the underlying wage dispute.

  • Long Island Lumber Co. v. Martin, 15 N.Y.2d 380 (1965): Arbitrability of Procedural Issues in Labor Disputes

    15 N.Y.2d 380 (1965)

    In labor disputes with collective bargaining agreements containing arbitration clauses, procedural questions regarding compliance with preliminary steps are presumed arbitrable and should be decided by the arbitrator, not the court.

    Summary

    Long Island Lumber Co. (the Company) sought to stay arbitration demanded by Local 824 (the Union) regarding wage discrepancies for an employee. The Company argued the Union failed to follow preliminary grievance procedures before demanding arbitration. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ decisions to stay arbitration, holding that procedural issues, including compliance with preliminary steps in a grievance process, are arbitrable questions for the arbitrator to decide, especially in the context of collective bargaining agreements. The court emphasized the strong presumption of arbitrability in labor disputes, aligning with federal labor law and policy promoting peaceful resolution through arbitration.

    Facts

    The Company and the Union were parties to a collective bargaining agreement with a grievance and arbitration clause. The Union alleged that an employee, Louis Bostic, was not receiving the wages stipulated in the agreement. The Union contacted the Company, and a meeting was held on November 13, 1962, attended by union officers, Mrs. Rosen (Company secretary), and Bostic. The Company claimed Bostic was employed by another entity and denied the wage claim. On December 4, 1962, the Union served the Company with a request for arbitration before the Trucking Industry Arbitration Authority. The Company contended that the November 13 meeting was merely a discussion and that the Union failed to properly constitute an arbitration committee as a precondition to further arbitration.

    Procedural History

    The Company sought a stay of arbitration in Special Term, which was granted. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The Union appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether, under a collective bargaining agreement with an arbitration clause, a court should decide if the Union satisfied the procedural prerequisites to arbitration, or whether that determination is for the arbitrator.

    Holding

    1. No, because under federal labor law, procedural questions arising out of a dispute subject to arbitration are themselves to be decided by the arbitrator, unless the agreement explicitly states otherwise.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied heavily on federal labor law, particularly Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, which governs the interpretation and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. The Court emphasized the presumption of arbitrability in labor disputes, citing the Steelworkers Trilogy (Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., and Steelworkers v. Enterprise Corp.). The court adopted the reasoning in John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, which held that procedural questions that grow out of a dispute and bear on its final disposition should be left to the arbitrator. The court stated, “Once it is determined, as we have, that the parties are obligated to submit the subject matter of a dispute to arbitration, `procedural’ questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition should be left to the arbitrator.” The court reasoned that separating substantive and procedural issues between different forums would be illogical and inefficient. The court found no unmistakably clear language in the agreement rebutting the presumption of arbitrability for procedural matters. It noted the arbitration clause was broad, covering “all grievances” and “all disputes with respect to the interpretation of this agreement”. Therefore, the arbitrator should decide whether the Union complied with the agreement’s preliminary steps. Even if the issue was contract interpretation, the court stated that the procedural questions also raise issues of interpretation which are plainly arbitrable. While the Court acknowledged a different rule might apply in commercial arbitration, the unique economic circumstances of collective bargaining necessitate resolving disputes through arbitration.