New York Law Review

Tag: probate

  • American Committee for Weizmann Institute of Science v. Dunn, 10 N.Y.3d 82 (2007): Standard for Vacating Probate Decree Based on Undue Influence

    American Committee for Weizmann Institute of Science v. Dunn, 10 N.Y.3d 82 (2007)

    A party seeking to vacate a probate decree based on undue influence must establish a substantial basis for challenging the will and a reasonable probability of success on the merits.

    Summary

    The American Committee for Weizmann Institute of Science sought to vacate a probate decree, claiming a will was executed under undue influence and breached a contract to bequeath property. The New York Court of Appeals held that the charity failed to demonstrate a substantial basis for its challenge and a reasonable probability of success on the merits of its undue influence claim. The Court also ruled that correspondence between the decedent and the charity did not constitute a binding contract to make a testamentary provision because it lacked clear evidence of the decedent’s intent to renounce her right to alter her will.

    Facts

    Doris Dunn Weingarten died on January 16, 2004. Five days prior, she executed a will leaving her co-op apartment to her niece, Jennifer Dunn, and the residuary estate to other relatives. The American Committee for Weizmann Institute of Science (Weizmann) petitioned to vacate the probate decree, alleging undue influence by Irving and Jennifer Dunn and claiming a contract existed where Weingarten was obligated to leave Weizmann the co-op’s sale proceeds. Weizmann presented letters from 1994 and 1998 as evidence of the contract. They argued that a longstanding relationship existed and Weingarten always intended to donate to Weizmann.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate’s Court dismissed Weizmann’s petition, finding that the contract claim was insufficient and Weizmann failed to raise a prima facie case of undue influence. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating there was no nonspeculative reason to allow discovery. The Court of Appeals granted Weizmann’s motion for leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the correspondence between the decedent and Weizmann constituted a contract to make a testamentary provision sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds (EPTL 13-2.1)?

    2. What standard applies to a petition to vacate a probate decree brought by a nonparty to the initial probate proceeding based on “newly-discovered evidence” of undue influence?

    Holding

    1. No, because the correspondence does not indisputably demonstrate the decedent’s intent to renounce her right to freely execute a subsequent will during her lifetime.

    2. A party seeking to vacate a probate decree based on undue influence must establish a substantial basis for its challenge to the probated will and a reasonable probability of success on the merits of its claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the contract claim, the Court of Appeals emphasized that freedom of testation is a jealously guarded right, and any promise to restrict that right must be analyzed closely for fraud. Agreements not to revoke prior wills demand the most indisputable evidence. The court cited Edson v. Parsons, 155 N.Y. 555, 568 (1898), noting such contracts are “easily fabricated and hard to disprove, because the sole contracting party on one side is always dead when the question arises.” Here, the 1994 and 1998 letters did not clearly evidence the decedent’s promise to bequeath the co-op’s proceeds to Weizmann; they were ambiguous and did not rise to the level of an indisputable promise.

    Regarding the undue influence claim, the Court held that to establish entitlement to vacatur, a party must demonstrate a substantial basis for its contest and a reasonable probability of success through competent evidence that would have probably altered the outcome of the original probate proceeding. Permitting vacatur based upon mere allegations of undue influence would be unduly disruptive. The verified petition offered evidence of the decedent’s alleged intent in 1981, 1994, and 1998, but no evidence of her intent in the years prior to her death was presented. The court noted the will left the co-op to her niece, a close relative, whose father opened his home to the decedent while she received hospice care.

  • Matter of the Estate of Pascal, 309 N.Y. 108 (1955): Summary Judgment Inappropriate When Material Facts Disputed

    Matter of the Estate of Pascal, 309 N.Y. 108 (1955)

    Summary judgment is inappropriate in any case, including probate proceedings, where there are material issues of fact that require a trial to resolve.

    Summary

    This case addresses the propriety of summary judgment in a probate proceeding. The appellant, a lawyer, prepared a will and codicil for the decedent, naming himself as executor and his stepdaughter as a primary beneficiary. The respondent, executor under a prior will, filed objections, challenging the decedent’s competence and alleging fraud and undue influence. The Surrogate denied the appellant’s motion for summary judgment, finding questions of fact requiring trial, a decision affirmed by the Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that summary judgment is inappropriate when material issues of fact exist, and such issues were present here concerning the decedent’s condition and the circumstances surrounding the will.

    Facts

    During 1977, the appellant, an attorney, drafted a will and codicil for the decedent, who was approximately 85 years old.
    The will named the appellant as the executor, his son as the substitute executor, and his stepdaughter, who had been the decedent’s companion and housekeeper for about two years, as the residual beneficiary of two-thirds of the estate.
    The respondent, who was the executor under a 1973 will that named her nephew as the principal beneficiary, filed objections to the 1977 will, alleging the decedent’s lack of competence and claims of fraud and undue influence.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate’s Court denied the appellant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that questions of fact existed that required a trial.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the Surrogate’s Court order without providing specific reasoning.
    The Appellate Division certified the question of whether the Surrogate’s order, as affirmed, was properly made to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Surrogate’s Court erred in denying the appellant’s motion for summary judgment, given the objections raised regarding the decedent’s competence and the circumstances surrounding the creation of the will and codicil.

    Holding

    Yes, because in light of the disputed affidavits and testimony regarding decedent’s condition and the circumstances surrounding the will and codicil, the Surrogate did not err in concluding that there were triable issues relating to the matters raised by respondent’s objections.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, emphasizing that summary judgment is inappropriate when material issues of fact exist. The court cited CPLR 3212(b), which governs summary judgment procedures.
    The court found that the disputed affidavits and testimony concerning the decedent’s condition and the circumstances surrounding the will’s creation raised triable issues of fact.
    The court explicitly stated, “Here, in light of the disputed affidavits and testimony regarding decedent’s condition and the circumstances surrounding the will and codicil, we cannot say that the Surrogate erred in the conclusion that there were triable issues relating to the matters raised by respondent’s objections.”
    The court noted that its review was limited to the certified question, and other issues were not properly before the court.
    The decision underscores the importance of a full trial when there are genuine disputes over facts that could affect the outcome of the case, particularly in sensitive matters like probate challenges based on competence or undue influence. The court declined to offer its views on the “presumably significant issue” raised by the appellant because the Appellate Division failed to give the benefit of the court’s views on that issue.

  • Matter of Collins, 60 N.Y.2d 466 (1983): Probate When Attesting Witnesses Lack Memory

    Matter of Collins, 60 N.Y.2d 466 (1983)

    A will may be admitted to probate even if both attesting witnesses have forgotten the events surrounding the will’s execution, provided that the court is satisfied from all the evidence that the will was properly executed.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a will can be admitted to probate under New York law when both attesting witnesses have no recollection of the will’s execution. The Court of Appeals held that it can. Bertha Collins’s 1977 will was challenged after her death. The attesting witnesses to the will testified but could not recall the circumstances of its execution. Despite this, the Surrogate’s Court admitted the will to probate, relying on the attestation clause, the genuineness of the signatures, and other testimony. The Appellate Division reversed, but the Court of Appeals reinstated the Surrogate’s Court’s decision, emphasizing that prior law and the intent of SCPA 1405(3) allow for probate even when witnesses’ memories fail, provided there is sufficient other evidence of due execution.

    Facts

    Bertha Collins died in 1981, leaving a 1977 will that named William Mayne as the primary beneficiary. The will had an attestation clause and was signed by two witnesses, Mary Pedaci and Richard Skellen. During preliminary examinations, Pedaci identified her signature but had no memory of the will’s execution. Skellen recalled signing the document and reading “Will and Testament” at the top, but otherwise had no recollection. A doctor testified that he examined Collins on the day the will was made and found her mentally competent. A legal secretary and a document examiner testified to the genuineness of Collins’s signature.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate’s Court denied the respondents’ motion to dismiss the probate petition, finding prima facie proof of due execution despite the witnesses’ lack of memory. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that SCPA 1405(3) required at least one witness to confirm the testatrix’s signature and intent. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether, under SCPA 1405(3), a will can be admitted to probate when both attesting witnesses do not recall the events surrounding the execution, but the court is otherwise satisfied that the will was properly executed.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Legislature did not intend SCPA 1405(3) to radically depart from prior law, which allowed a will to be admitted to probate even if both attesting witnesses could not recall the execution, as long as there was sufficient other evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that SCPA 1405(3) was intended as a clarifying amendment, not a revolutionary change to existing law. The court noted that for over a century, New York courts have consistently interpreted predecessor statutes to permit probate even when attesting witnesses did not recall the event or testified against the will. The court quoted Matter of Kellum, 52 NY 517, 519, stating, “If the attestation clause is full and the signatures genuine and the circumstances corroborative of due execution, and no evidence disproving a compliance in any particular, the presumption may be lawfully indulged that all the provisions of the statute were complied with, although the witnesses are unable to recollect the execution or what took place at the time.” The court emphasized that the purpose of this long-standing rule was to prevent injustice when witnesses honestly forgot the event or testified falsely. The Court rejected the argument that SCPA 1405(3) now requires at least one witness to give testimony supporting due execution, arguing that this interpretation would allow a will to be defeated even with abundant other proof if both witnesses had memory lapses. Instead, the court interpreted SCPA 1405(3) to clarify that the testimony of attesting witnesses cannot be dispensed with merely because one witness has a lapsed memory; at least one other attesting witness must still be examined. The court found that the Surrogate’s Court did not err in admitting the will to probate, given the evidence presented, and remitted the case to the Appellate Division to determine if the evidence was sufficient to prove the will.