New York Law Review

Tag: probable cause

  • People v. Mendoza, 82 N.Y.2d 415 (1993): Probable Cause Based on Information from Housing Authority Employee

    People v. Mendoza, 82 N.Y.2d 415 (1993)

    Probable cause to arrest can be established based on information provided by a New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) employee regarding unauthorized persons in a vacant HPD building.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant. An HPD employee informed police that unauthorized persons were inside a supposedly vacant HPD apartment building. Upon entering the apartment, police found the defendant and others, arrested them for trespassing, and discovered cocaine in the defendant’s pocket during a search. The Court of Appeals determined that the Appellate Division’s finding of probable cause was a mixed question of law and fact, supported by the record, and therefore beyond further review by the Court of Appeals.

    Facts

    On May 31, 1991, Albert Tyson, an employee of the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD), informed police officers at the 28th precinct that unauthorized individuals were present in an apartment within an HPD building that was supposed to be vacant. Police officers proceeded to the apartment, where they encountered several individuals, including the defendant, Mendoza.

    Procedural History

    Mendoza was arrested and charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree after a search revealed seven vials of cocaine in her pocket. She moved to suppress the cocaine and statements made after the arrest. The suppression court denied the motion. Mendoza pleaded guilty after the denial of her suppression motion, but appealed, arguing the arrest was unlawful. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that the police had probable cause to arrest Mendoza. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant for trespassing based on information provided by an HPD employee that unauthorized persons were in a vacant HPD apartment.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Appellate Division’s determination of probable cause was a mixed question of law and fact, which was supported by evidence in the record and, therefore, beyond the Court of Appeals’ further review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on precedent establishing the standard of review for probable cause determinations. The court stated that the determination of probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact. Citing People v Diaz, 81 NY2d 106, 108; People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417, 420; People v Harrison, 57 NY2d 470, 477-478, the Court reasoned that where the Appellate Division makes a determination of probable cause and that determination has support in the record, the Court of Appeals cannot further review that determination. Because the information from the HPD employee provided a reasonable basis to believe that trespassing was occurring, the Court held that the Appellate Division’s finding of probable cause was supported by the record.

  • People v. Martinez, 86 N.Y.2d 630 (1995): Sufficiency of Evidence for Escape in the First Degree

    People v. Martinez, 86 N.Y.2d 630 (1995)

    To secure an indictment for escape in the first degree, the prosecution needs to demonstrate that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe the defendant committed a Class A or Class B felony; the ultimate disposition of the underlying charge is irrelevant.

    Summary

    Martinez was arrested for selling narcotics (a Class B felony) after an undercover officer radioed that a “positive buy” occurred. While being transported, Martinez escaped. Subsequent lab analysis revealed the substance sold was not narcotics. The Grand Jury indicted Martinez for escape in the first degree. The New York Court of Appeals held that the prosecution only needed to establish that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe Martinez committed a Class B felony at the time of arrest, not that the underlying crime was actually committed. The officer’s reasonable belief, based on the undercover’s report, was sufficient.

    Facts

    An undercover officer negotiated a drug purchase and signaled a “positive buy” to his backup team, describing the seller. Officer Combs, part of the backup team, arrested Martinez based on the description, for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (a Class B felony). Martinez was placed in a police van but escaped during transport. A lab analysis later revealed the substance sold was not narcotics.

    Procedural History

    The Grand Jury indicted Martinez for escape in the first degree (Penal Law § 205.15 [2]). The Supreme Court dismissed the indictment, finding insufficient evidence of the underlying narcotics crime. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the indictment, concluding that probable cause for the underlying narcotics arrest was sufficient. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People presented sufficient evidence of the underlying narcotic crime to support an indictment for escape in the first degree, specifically, whether the People must prove the A or B felony or merely establish probable cause for the arrest of such felony.

    Holding

    No, because the People need only establish that the police had reasonable cause to believe at the time of the arrest that an A or B felony had been committed; the ultimate disposition of the underlying charge is irrelevant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the statute (Penal Law § 205.15 [2]) requires only that the defendant have been “arrested for, or charged with” an A or B felony. A person is in custody when restrained by a public officer following an authorized arrest. The key question is whether the police had probable cause to believe an A or B felony had been committed at the time of the arrest.

    The court rejected the argument that the prosecution must prove the underlying felony. The degree of escape is based not on the arrestee’s ultimate guilt, but on the potential impact on society of an escaped prisoner charged with a serious crime. The court distinguished cases involving larceny, where value must be proven to establish probable cause for grand larceny. In narcotics cases, the police don’t need to know the exact nature or amount of the drug before making an arrest for criminal sale.

    Probable cause exists when an officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances “sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed” (People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 423). The “fellow officer rule” allows an arresting officer to rely on information from another officer with probable cause. Here, Officer Combs relied on the undercover officer’s report of a “positive buy” to reasonably believe Martinez had sold narcotics. According to the court, “[a]lthough it was subsequently revealed that the substance purchased was not a narcotic…[the officers] could reasonably believe, based upon their experience and all the circumstances surrounding the transaction, that defendant had sold narcotics to the undercover.” This was sufficient to support the indictment for escape in the first degree.

  • People v. Chapman, 81 N.Y.2d 243 (1993): Probable Cause and Warrantless Vehicle Searches Based on Openly Visible Drug Paraphernalia

    81 N.Y.2d 243 (1993)

    The observation of drug paraphernalia in plain view within a vehicle, coupled with the officer’s experience and the totality of the circumstances, can provide probable cause for a warrantless search of the vehicle.

    Summary

    These consolidated cases address whether police officers had probable cause to conduct warrantless searches of vehicles based on observations of drug paraphernalia in plain view. In both cases, officers stopped vehicles for traffic violations and subsequently observed vials and caps commonly used for packaging crack cocaine. The Court of Appeals held that under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had probable cause to believe the vehicles contained evidence of a crime, justifying the searches. The court also addressed issues related to predicate felony sentencing, finding error in one case.

    Facts

    People v. Chapman: Police officers observed an Audi speeding and committing traffic violations. After stopping the vehicle, an officer saw an open shopping bag containing vials and yellow caps in plain view. The occupants denied ownership or knowledge of the vials’ purpose. A subsequent search revealed crack cocaine hidden in a bread crumb container. The defendant admitted to purchasing the crack cocaine.

    People v. Yancy: A Port Authority officer stopped to direct traffic. He noticed the driver of a white Nissan avoiding eye contact. Approaching the vehicle, the officer observed an open paper bag containing vials. The officer radioed for backup and questioned the driver, who gave conflicting information. A search revealed bags of empty vials and cocaine hidden inside a doll.

    Procedural History

    People v. Chapman: The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding probable cause. The Appellate Division affirmed. Leave to appeal was granted by a judge of the Court of Appeals.

    People v. Yancy: The trial court upheld the arrest, search, and seizure of evidence. The defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced as a predicate felon. The sentence was vacated, and the defendant was resentenced. The Appellate Division affirmed. Leave to appeal was granted by a judge of the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the police officers had probable cause to conduct warrantless searches of the vehicles based on their observations of drug paraphernalia in plain view.

    2. In People v. Yancy, whether the trial court properly sentenced the defendant as a predicate felon based on a prior New Jersey conviction.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because under the totality of the circumstances, the officers’ observations, experience, and the defendants’ conduct provided probable cause to believe the vehicles contained evidence of a crime.

    2. No, because the trial court improperly considered a superseded complaint to determine the nature of the defendant’s prior New Jersey conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances known to the arresting officer warrant a reasonable person to conclude that a crime is being or was committed. The Court acknowledged the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, recognizing the mobility of vehicles and the diminished expectation of privacy. While the mere observation of an article known to have illicit uses is insufficient, the presence of “additional relevant behavior or circumstances” can establish probable cause.

    In these cases, the Court emphasized the officers’ experience in narcotics investigations, the large quantity of vials in open view, and the defendants’ suspicious behavior. The Court stated: “Here, the officers’ incidental observation of hundreds of separately packaged empty vials and caps in open view following a valid automobile stop; the officers’ respective experience in narcotics investigations and drug detection, which allowed them to surmise that defendants possessed a large quantity of empty vials for something other than personal use; and, each defendant’s responses and conduct subsequent to the stop for the traffic infraction provide evidentiary support for the mixed law and fact findings of the courts below that there was probable cause.”

    Regarding the predicate felony sentencing in People v. Yancy, the Court held that the trial court erred in considering a superseded complaint to determine the nature of the defendant’s prior New Jersey conviction. The indictment did not specify which subsection of the New Jersey robbery statute the defendant violated, and therefore, it was not clear whether the crime would qualify as a felony in New York. The Court noted, “In this case, the trial court should not have extended or enlarged the allegations of the accusatory instrument by relying on a superseded complaint to fill the void created by the indictment in order to determine the precise nature of the crime defendant was convicted of in New Jersey”. Because the People failed to prove that the defendant was convicted of an offense equivalent to a felony in New York, the defendant was entitled to resentencing.

  • People v. Pimentel, 93 N.Y.2d 982 (1999): Sufficiency of Factual Allegations to Warrant a Suppression Hearing

    People v. Pimentel, 93 N.Y.2d 982 (1999)

    A defendant is entitled to a suppression hearing if their motion papers contain factual allegations that, if true, would support the grounds for suppression, especially when the defendant has limited access to information about the basis for their arrest.

    Summary

    Pimentel was arrested for selling crack cocaine. He moved to suppress evidence, specifically a beeper, arguing the police lacked a legal basis for the arrest and search. He asserted he did not sell or assist in selling drugs. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Pimentel’s factual allegations, combined with limited information available to him and the People’s conclusory response, were sufficient to warrant a suppression hearing. The case was remitted for a hearing to determine if the evidence should be suppressed.

    Facts

    The arresting officer allegedly observed Pimentel accept currency from a customer and escort the customer to another individual who provided crack cocaine. Pimentel was arrested. At the time of arrest, a beeper was found on Pimentel. Pimentel asserted that he did not sell drugs or assist others in selling or possessing drugs, and that the police were either mistaken or lying about his role.

    Procedural History

    Pimentel moved to suppress the beeper. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing, concluding that Pimentel failed to raise a factual issue requiring a hearing. Pimentel was convicted of drug charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the case for a suppression hearing.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s motion papers contained sufficient factual allegations to warrant a suppression hearing regarding the beeper found on his person at the time of arrest.

    Holding

    Yes, because Pimentel denied selling drugs or assisting others in selling or possessing drugs, and this denial, considered in the context of the limited information available to him and the People’s uninformative response, was sufficient to raise a factual issue requiring a hearing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on People v. Mendoza, 82 N.Y.2d 415, which established guidelines for determining whether motion papers are sufficient to warrant a suppression hearing. The Court stated that a motion may be summarily denied if “‘the sworn allegations of fact do not as a matter of law support the ground alleged’” to require suppression. The court should consider the face of the pleadings, assessed in conjunction with the context of the motion, and the defendant’s access to information. In this case, Pimentel denied participating in the drug sale. Given the “meager information” available to Pimentel (the complaint alleged he received money and escorted the purchaser), he could do little more than deny participation. The People’s response added no further factual details justifying the arrest. The Court stated that “[b]y failing to set forth the facts leading to defendant’s arrest, the People failed to render defendant’s flat denial insufficient.” The Court emphasized that Pimentel was not obligated to provide an “innocent explanation” for his conduct when the People’s assertions were largely conclusory. Therefore, the Court held that Pimentel’s allegations were sufficient to warrant a hearing, and remitted the case for that purpose.

  • People v. Moreno, 70 N.Y.2d 403 (1987): Judge’s Recusal Not Required for Reviewing Own Warrant

    People v. Moreno, 70 N.Y.2d 403 (1987)

    A judge who issues a search warrant is not automatically required to recuse themselves from ruling on a motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to that warrant; the decision to recuse is a matter of the judge’s individual conscience.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial judge must recuse themselves from ruling on the validity of a search warrant that they had previously issued. The Court held that Judiciary Law § 14 does not compel such recusal and that the decision to recuse is a matter of individual conscience for the court. The Court also rejected the argument that a rule prohibiting judges from reviewing their own search warrants is necessary to protect the integrity of trials, noting the availability of appellate review.

    Facts

    The defendant was subject to a search warrant issued by a Town Court Justice. At trial, the same judge who issued the warrant presided and ruled on the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during the search. The defendant argued the judge should have recused themselves.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial judge is required to recuse themselves from ruling on the validity of a search warrant that they issued while sitting as a Town Court Justice.

    Holding

    No, because nothing in Judiciary Law § 14 compels such recusal; the decision is a matter of individual conscience for the court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that Judiciary Law § 14 does not mandate recusal in this situation. The decision to recuse is left to the individual judge’s discretion. The Court referenced prior decisions, including People v. Liberatore, 79 NY2d 208, 217, which held that a judge may entertain a motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to an eavesdropping warrant they issued, and People v. Tambe, 71 NY2d 492, 506, which held that a judge issuing a search or eavesdropping warrant may entertain a motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to it.

    The Court also rejected the defendant’s argument that allowing judges to review their own warrants compromises trial integrity. They cited People v. Tambe, stating, “There is no basis to conclude that [Judges who review their own search warrants] fail to give suppression motions anything less than fair and impartial consideration and further review is available by the Appellate Division which possesses the same power in such matters as does the suppression court.” The court also found that the warrant application contained a detailed, signed statement by a codefendant, Charles Burkett, sufficient to establish probable cause.

  • People v. Parris, 83 N.Y.2d 342 (1994): Admissibility of Spontaneous Statements and Probable Cause for Arrest

    People v. Parris, 83 N.Y.2d 342 (1994)

    A spontaneous statement made to law enforcement requires notice under CPL 710.30(1)(a), and an arrest requires probable cause based on reliable information, not unsubstantiated hearsay or rumor.

    Summary

    Gwendolyn Parris was convicted of criminally negligent homicide for the stabbing death of her cousin. The Court of Appeals addressed whether her initial spontaneous statement to police was admissible without prior notice and whether subsequent statements should have been suppressed as fruits of an unlawful arrest. The Court held that notice was required for the initial statement. Further, the Court found that the arrest was not based on probable cause. The case was remitted to the Supreme Court to determine if Parris’s detention was a lawful temporary detention, and if not, whether subsequent statements were sufficiently attenuated from the illegal detention to be admissible.

    Facts

    After a fatal stabbing, Detective Wasserman learned from the victim’s family that the defendant, Parris, had inflicted the wound. At the scene, anonymous informants told Detective O’Brien that “Gwenny” stabbed the victim. Parris arrived at the scene and was identified as “Gwenny.” She was placed in a police car, where she spontaneously stated that she stabbed the victim. Later, at the precinct, after receiving Miranda warnings, Parris made three more statements: a written statement to Detective Wasserman, another to Detective Sanchez, and a videotaped statement to an Assistant District Attorney.

    Procedural History

    The People notified Parris of their intent to offer her statements at trial, but the notice omitted her initial statement in the police car. Parris moved to suppress the statements, arguing an unlawful arrest and an involuntary waiver of rights. The trial court denied the motion, finding probable cause for the arrest and deeming the initial statement spontaneous and thus not requiring notice. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People were required to provide notice under CPL 710.30(1)(a) of their intent to offer Parris’s initial, spontaneous statement to police.

    2. Whether Parris’s statements to the police and the Assistant District Attorney should have been suppressed as the fruits of an arrest made without probable cause.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because CPL 710.30(1)(a) requires notice whenever the prosecution intends to offer at trial evidence of a statement made by a defendant to a public servant, regardless of its apparent spontaneity.

    2. No, not definitively; the case is remitted to determine whether the police action constituted an arrest or a temporary detention based on reasonable suspicion, and whether any taint from the initial illegality was attenuated.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPL 710.30(1)(a) mandates notice for any statement made to law enforcement that the prosecution intends to use at trial, to allow the defendant to challenge its voluntariness. Even a spontaneous statement requires notice because “the defendant had the right to have a court review the circumstances under which the statement was given and to determine its voluntariness.” Quoting People v. Greer, 42 N.Y.2d 170, the court stated that even if the statement was voluntary, preclusion is required if the People fail to give the required notice.

    Regarding probable cause, the Court noted that probable cause requires information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed by the suspect, citing People v. Hicks, 68 NY2d 234, 238. While hearsay can provide probable cause, the informants must be reliable and have a basis for their knowledge. Here, the anonymous tips and family statements lacked a sufficient basis of knowledge, constituting mere “suspicion or ‘rumor’.”

    The Court remitted the case to determine whether the initial detention was an arrest or a lawful temporary detention based on reasonable suspicion under People v. Hicks. If the detention was unlawful, the court must determine if the subsequent statements were attenuated from the illegal detention, guided by People v. Rogers, 52 NY2d 527. If the statements were not sufficiently attenuated, they must be suppressed, potentially requiring a new trial. If the later statements are admissible, the conviction should be reviewed under a harmless error analysis, citing People v. Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230.

    The Court upheld the trial court’s admission of evidence of a prior uncharged crime, as it was central to establishing the decedent’s conflict with the defendant.

  • People v. M&M, 86 N.Y.2d 974 (1995): Warrantless Car Search Based on Plain View Doctrine and Probable Cause

    People v. M&M, 86 N.Y.2d 974 (1995)

    Evidence found in plain view inside a vehicle, coupled with probable cause, justifies a warrantless search of the vehicle.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction, holding that the warrantless search of his car was justified under the plain view doctrine. Police officers, responding to a report of assault and a threat involving a gun, accompanied the complainant to her apartment to arrest the defendant. After failing to find the gun in the apartment, the complainant suggested it might be in the defendant’s car. An officer, using a flashlight, saw what appeared to be heroin in plain view inside the car. This observation, along with the stolen license plates, provided probable cause for the search, making the evidence admissible.

    Facts

    The complainant reported to police that her boyfriend, the defendant, had assaulted her and threatened her with a gun.

    Four police officers accompanied the complainant to her apartment to arrest the defendant and search for the gun.

    During the arrest, keys with the defendant’s name fell from his clothing; he identified them as keys to his red Chevy parked across the street.

    A search of the apartment, with the complainant’s consent, did not reveal the gun.

    The complainant suggested the defendant may have placed the gun in his car.

    Shining a flashlight into the car, an officer saw a vinyl bag containing a clear plastic bag with a brown substance resembling heroin.

    A check of the license plates revealed they were stolen. The officers then unlocked the car and recovered drugs and drug paraphernalia.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the seized evidence, arguing he did not consent to the search and that his statements were involuntary. County Court denied the motion.

    The defendant was convicted of first-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance and second-degree criminal use of drug paraphernalia.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the warrantless search of the defendant’s vehicle was justified under the plain view doctrine and whether there was probable cause to conduct the search.

    Holding

    Yes, because the heroin was in plain view on the front seat of the car, and the police had probable cause to enter the automobile once they observed the substance that reasonably appeared to be heroin.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the heroin was in plain view and lawfully viewed by the police, referencing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 and People v. Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d 106, 110-112. The court stated, “Irrespective of the standard for determining the voluntariness of defendant’s consent… we determine that there is evidence in the record to support the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the heroin was in plain view on the front seat of the car and thus lawfully viewed by the police in response to complainant’s information that the gun might be found there.”

    The court reasoned that after observing what reasonably appeared to be heroin and discovering that the license plates were stolen, the police officers had probable cause to enter the automobile.

    The court emphasized that the officers were responding to the complainant’s information about the gun, providing a legitimate reason to approach the vehicle. The plain view observation of the heroin then justified the subsequent search.

    The court distinguished the case from situations where police lack a legitimate reason to be in the position to observe the evidence in plain view. Here, the officers’ presence was directly related to the investigation of the reported assault and threat.

    The court explicitly stated, “Once they observed the plastic bag containing what reasonably appeared to be heroin, the police officers had probable cause to enter the automobile.” This highlights the critical role of probable cause in justifying the warrantless search.

  • People v. Parris, 83 N.Y.2d 342 (1994): Establishing Probable Cause with Hearsay Information

    83 N.Y.2d 342 (1994)

    Hearsay information, even hearsay-upon-hearsay, can establish probable cause for a warrantless arrest if the information satisfies both prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test: the informant’s reliability and basis of knowledge.

    Summary

    Yuseff Parris was arrested after police received a report of a burglary in progress from a neighbor. Officers dispatched to the scene received a description of the fleeing suspect from another officer who interviewed the neighbor. Based on that description, the arresting officers located Parris, who fled and discarded a weapon during the pursuit. The Court of Appeals considered whether probable cause for the arrest was properly established at the suppression hearing. The Court held that while hearsay can be used to establish probable cause, the prosecution failed to adequately demonstrate the basis of knowledge of the original informant (the neighbor) under the Aguilar-Spinelli test. The court reversed the lower court’s decision and granted the motion to suppress.

    Facts

    A neighbor reported a burglary in progress at 64-04 Wetherole Street, Queens County, via a 911 call.
    Uniformed officers responded to the scene and met another officer, Ianelle.
    Officer Ianelle informed the responding officers that the next-door neighbor, described as an eyewitness, provided a detailed description of the suspect who fled on a bicycle before police arrival.
    Responding officers canvassed the area and spotted Parris, who matched the description.
    When approached, Parris fled on his bicycle, then on foot, abandoning a loaded revolver during the chase.
    Parris was apprehended and found to be in possession of stolen items from the burglarized premises.
    The neighbor identified Parris as the burglar at the scene of the arrest.

    Procedural History

    Parris was indicted and moved to suppress the recovered stolen property, gun, his statements, and the showup identification, arguing a lack of probable cause for the arrest.
    Supreme Court denied the motion to suppress.
    Parris pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of attempted burglary in the first degree.
    On appeal, the Appellate Division upheld the Supreme Court’s denial, relying on People v. Petralia.
    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People sufficiently established probable cause for Parris’s warrantless arrest at the suppression hearing, considering the arresting officers relied on a description communicated by another officer who obtained it from a purported eyewitness.

    Holding

    No, because the People failed to establish the basis of knowledge of the original informant (the neighbor) under the Aguilar-Spinelli test, rendering the hearsay insufficient to establish probable cause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reviewed established search and seizure law, reaffirming that a suppression court’s probable cause analysis for a warrantless arrest mirrors that used for warrant applications.
    The Court clarified that the People are not obligated to produce any particular witness at a suppression hearing, but must present evidence demonstrating probable cause for the arrest.
    Hearsay information can establish probable cause, provided it satisfies the Aguilar-Spinelli test, which requires demonstrating the informant’s reliability and basis of knowledge.
    The Court stated that People v. Petralia confirms the principle that hearsay can establish probable cause if it meets the Aguilar-Spinelli requirements and is not limited to undercover operations.
    The Court also acknowledged that even hearsay-upon-hearsay can be used, so long as each level of hearsay satisfies the Aguilar-Spinelli test.
    In this case, the neighbor was deemed a reliable informant, satisfying the first prong of Aguilar-Spinelli, because he was an identified citizen informant.
    However, the People failed to establish the neighbor’s basis of knowledge. The testimony at the hearing lacked specific facts showing how the neighbor knew a burglary had occurred or that the person he described was involved. The Court rejected the conclusory characterization of the neighbor as an “eyewitness” as insufficient to establish the basis of knowledge.
    The Court declined to consider the prosecution’s alternative theory that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop Parris, which then escalated to probable cause when he fled, because that argument was not raised before the suppression court.

  • People v. Voliton, 83 N.Y.2d 192 (1994): Resisting Arrest After Unlawful Police Seizure

    83 N.Y.2d 192 (1994)

    A defendant can be convicted of resisting arrest even if the initial attempt to detain them was unlawful, provided there was a subsequent, authorized basis for the arrest.

    Summary

    Voliton was convicted of assault and resisting arrest after an encounter with police. The Appellate Division overturned the felony assault convictions, finding the initial police seizure unlawful under People v. May. However, they upheld the convictions for reckless assault and resisting arrest. Voliton appealed, arguing a due process violation and that the resisting arrest conviction was invalid because the initial detention was unlawful. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the due process claim unpreserved and finding that the reckless assault provided a basis for a subsequent, authorized arrest, thus supporting the resisting arrest conviction, focusing on his actions after being apprehended on foot.

    Facts

    Two police officers observed Voliton in a car parked near a suspected drug location. They blocked his car and approached with weapons drawn, suspecting criminal activity. Voliton attempted to drive away, injuring the officers. Shots were fired, and Voliton was eventually apprehended after a chase and physical struggle where he punched and kicked the officers.

    Procedural History

    Voliton was convicted in the trial court of assault in the second degree (two counts), assault in the third degree, and resisting arrest. The Appellate Division overturned the second-degree assault convictions, citing an unlawful seizure, but affirmed the remaining convictions. Voliton appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether substantive due process bars convicting a defendant for actions in direct response to a police seizure later deemed illegal.
    2. Whether a resisting arrest conviction can stand when the initial attempt to detain the defendant was unlawful.

    Holding

    1. No, because the constitutional objection was raised for the first time on appeal and is therefore unpreserved.
    2. Yes, because the defendant’s commission of an assault, third degree, against one officer during the initial encounter furnished the predicate for his subsequent authorized arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court held the due process argument was unpreserved because it was raised for the first time on appeal, and it did not fall under an exception to the preservation rule. The Court distinguished this case from situations impacting the court’s fundamental jurisdiction. Regarding the resisting arrest charge, the Court reasoned that although the initial attempt to detain Voliton may have been unlawful, his subsequent reckless assault of an officer provided probable cause for a lawful arrest. Because the jury found that Voliton punched and kicked the officers while they were attempting to handcuff him after the foot chase, the resisting arrest conviction was valid. The Court also cited Penal Law § 35.27, noting that a person may not use physical force to resist an arrest, authorized or unauthorized, when it reasonably appears the person is a police officer. The court highlighted the lack of a requested jury instruction regarding self-defense against excessive force. Judge Smith dissented, arguing that the trial was fundamentally flawed because the jury wasn’t instructed on justification, and they should have been informed the initial police conduct was illegal when considering the assault charge. He also argued no basis existed for the resisting arrest conviction because the initial police conduct was unlawful: “It is inconsistent for this Court, as it was for the Appellate Division, to sustain a charge of resisting arrest in the face of the conclusion that the police officers violated the law.”

  • People v. Adrion, 82 N.Y.2d 628 (1993): Enforcing Darden When Informant Information is Crucial for Probable Cause

    People v. Adrion, 82 N.Y.2d 628 (1993)

    When a confidential informant’s tip is essential to establishing probable cause, the prosecution must produce the informant for a Darden inquiry, even if the arresting officer observes suspicious circumstances; failure to produce the informant requires suppression of the evidence.

    Summary

    Defendants were arrested after an FBI agent, acting on a confidential informant’s tip, observed them unloading stolen merchandise. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the prosecution could refuse to produce the informant for a Darden inquiry, arguing that the agent’s observations independently established probable cause. The Court held that the prosecution was obligated to produce the informant or forfeit the evidence because the informant’s tip was crucial for establishing probable cause. The Court reasoned that Darden addresses verifying the truthfulness of police testimony about a known informant, a distinct issue from assessing an anonymous tip’s reliability.

    Facts

    The Samsonite Corporation reported the theft of luggage. An FBI agent in New York was informed by the Newark office that a confidential informant stated the stolen luggage was in a Ryder truck at a specific Brooklyn address. The agent found the truck, observed defendant Grado arrive in another Ryder truck, and saw defendants unloading cartons into a garage. The agent noticed the markings on the cartons matched those of the stolen luggage. Grado provided implausible explanations regarding the goods and their destination.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were indicted for criminal possession of stolen property and moved to suppress the evidence. The trial court ordered the People to produce the confidential informant for a potential Darden hearing. The People refused, stating the FBI would not make the informant available. The trial court suppressed the evidence, finding no probable cause without the informant’s information. The Appellate Division reversed, but the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, granting the motion to suppress and dismissing the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People may refuse to comply with a trial court’s order to produce a confidential informant for a Darden inquiry when the arresting officer obtained confirmatory information through their own observations.

    Holding

    No, because the Darden procedure addresses the distinct problem of verifying the truthfulness of the police witness’s testimony about dealings with a known informant, ensuring the informant is not “wholly imaginary” or the communication “entirely fabricated.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished between verifying an anonymous tip and verifying police testimony about a confidential informant. People v. Elwell (50 N.Y.2d 231) allows independent police observations to validate an anonymous tip by establishing its reliability and accuracy. However, Darden (34 N.Y.2d 177) addresses a different concern: ensuring the police are truthful about the existence and role of the informant. The Court emphasized that “[w]hat is at stake in Darden situations is the integrity of the proceeding itself.” The Court reasoned that even though the agent observed suspicious activity, he wouldn’t have been at that location without the informant’s tip. Therefore, the tip was crucial to establishing probable cause, necessitating a Darden inquiry. The Court rejected the argument that cross-examination was sufficient to test the officer’s credibility, reaffirming the trial court’s authority to require the informant’s production to ensure a fair proceeding. The Court stated, “[T]here is no satisfactory substitute for the production of the informant — or at least the production of extrinsic proof of the informant’s existence when the informant is demonstrably unavailable.”