New York Law Review

Tag: probable cause

  • People v. Bryant, 8 N.Y.3d 530 (2007): Sufficiency of Allegations to Warrant a Suppression Hearing

    People v. Bryant, 8 N.Y.3d 530 (2007)

    A defendant is not automatically entitled to a Mapp/Dunaway hearing on a suppression motion; the defendant’s factual allegations must be sufficiently specific and detailed to warrant a hearing.

    Summary

    This case clarifies the standard for determining when a defendant is entitled to a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s allegations were too conclusory to warrant a hearing because the defendant failed to adequately controvert a post-arrest statement that established probable cause for the arrest. The Court emphasized that the motion’s context, the face of the pleadings, and the defendant’s access to information are relevant factors in evaluating the sufficiency of the allegations.

    Facts

    The defendant, Bryant, was arrested and charged with robbery-related crimes. After his arrest, Bryant provided a written statement to the police, which was disclosed to him along with the People’s voluntary disclosure form. In the statement, Bryant admitted that he knew the police were looking for him because “one of the officers was with” one of the robbery victims, so he ran. He also stated that he threw a gun away before his arrest.

    Procedural History

    Bryant moved to suppress evidence, arguing that his arrest was unlawful. The suppression court denied the Mapp/Dunaway portion of the motion without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed the suppression court’s decision. Bryant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the suppression court committed reversible error by denying the defendant’s suppression motion without a hearing, where the defendant’s allegations were deemed too conclusory given the context of the motion and the information available to him.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s allegations in support of his motion were too conclusory to warrant a hearing. His post-arrest statement, disclosed to him, described events close in time and place to one of the charged crimes, and the statement on its face established probable cause for the arrest, which the defendant failed to controvert in his motion papers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the suppression court did not commit reversible error. The Court relied on People v. Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 426 (1993) and People v. Jones, 95 NY2d 721, 728-729 (2001), stating that the decision should be based on “(1) the face of the pleadings, (2) assessed in conjunction with the context of the motion, and (3) defendant’s access to information.” The Court noted that the defendant’s post-arrest statement provided probable cause for his arrest. The statement indicated that Bryant knew the police were looking for him and that he discarded a gun before being apprehended. Because Bryant’s motion papers failed to adequately challenge the probable cause established by his own statement, his allegations were deemed too conclusory to warrant a hearing. The Court reasoned that a hearing is only required when the defendant presents factual allegations that raise a legitimate question about the legality of the police conduct. The court emphasized that a defendant must offer specific factual allegations; mere conclusory statements are insufficient to trigger a hearing.

  • People v. Shabazz, 99 N.Y.2d 634 (2003): Admissibility of Evidence Based on Police Radio Transmissions

    People v. Shabazz, 99 N.Y.2d 634 (2003)

    When a defendant fails to challenge the reliability of police radio transmissions at a suppression hearing, the prosecution is entitled to a presumption of reliability, and the defendant’s argument that the proof was deficient is unpreserved for appellate review.

    Summary

    Bobby Shabazz was convicted of weapon possession charges. Police stopped his vehicle based on radio transmissions indicating he was involved in recent shootings. During the stop, Shabazz made an incriminating statement, and a subsequent vehicle search revealed a gun. Shabazz moved to suppress the gun and his statements, but the motion was denied. On appeal, he argued that the radio transmissions were unreliable, but the Appellate Division upheld the conviction, citing his failure to raise the reliability issue during the suppression hearing. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the defendant’s failure to challenge the reliability of the radio transmissions at the suppression hearing meant that the prosecution was entitled to rely on a presumption of reliability, and his appellate argument was unpreserved.

    Facts

    Police officers received radio transmissions reporting recent shootings involving a black male named Bobby Shabazz, driving a gray 1987 Chevy Astro van with a specific license plate number. The officers located a matching vehicle, confirmed the license plate, and stopped the van. The defendant, Shabazz, was driving. As police removed him from the van, he asked, “Who did I kill?” A subsequent search of the van revealed a gun in the back seat.

    Procedural History

    Shabazz was charged with criminal possession of a weapon and other charges. He moved to suppress the gun and his statements, but the suppression court ruled the evidence admissible. A jury convicted him of the weapon possession offenses. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Shabazz then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the radio transmissions were sufficient to justify the motor vehicle stop and subsequent arrest, considering the defendant’s argument on appeal that the People did not establish the reliability of the information conveyed in those transmissions.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to challenge the reliability of the radio transmissions at the suppression hearing; therefore, the burden never shifted to the People to establish the reliability of that information, and the issue is unpreserved for review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that the legality of a motor vehicle stop and search is a mixed question of law and fact that will not be disturbed on appeal if the Appellate Division’s finding has a record basis. Here, the officers’ testimony about the radio information supported the conclusion that the stop was lawful under People v. Dodt, 61 NY2d 408 (1984). The critical point was that Shabazz *never* challenged the reliability of the radio information at the suppression hearing. Because he failed to do so, the burden never shifted to the People to prove the reliability of the information as per People v. Jenkins, 47 NY2d 722 (1979). The Court cited People v. Martin, 50 NY2d 1029, 1031 (1980), stating that the argument was unpreserved for review. Furthermore, the court dismissed his argument that the search was illegal for failure to verify his identity before arrest, also because it was unpreserved. The Court concluded that there was a sufficient basis to support the Appellate Division’s determination that probable cause existed for the arrest.

  • People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341 (2001): Establishes Objective Test for Traffic Stops Based on Probable Cause

    97 N.Y.2d 341 (2001)

    A traffic stop is lawful if supported by probable cause, regardless of the officer’s primary motivation or what a reasonable officer would have done under the circumstances.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a traffic stop based on probable cause is invalid if the officer’s primary motivation was to investigate a different matter. An unidentified complainant reported a reckless driver in a red Suzuki. A state trooper observed a matching vehicle with a faulty muffler. The trooper stopped the vehicle, and based on observations, sobriety tests, and admissions, arrested the defendant for driving while intoxicated. The Court of Appeals held the stop was lawful because the trooper had probable cause to believe the defendant violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law, irrespective of the trooper’s subjective motivation.

    Facts

    An unidentified person reported a reckless driver operating a red Suzuki with its top down or removed to the authorities. A State Trooper located a Suzuki matching that description. While following the Suzuki, the trooper noticed that it had a faulty muffler, a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(31). The trooper then initiated a traffic stop.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated and subsequently indicted and convicted of felony driving while intoxicated. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and granted the defendant’s suppression motion. The Appellate Division reasoned that the trooper used the traffic infraction as a pretext to investigate the reckless driving complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, denied the defendant’s suppression motion, and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a traffic stop supported by probable cause is unlawful if the officer’s primary motivation was to investigate a matter unrelated to the traffic violation.

    Holding

    No, because provided a traffic stop is supported by probable cause, “neither the primary motivation of the officer nor a determination of what a reasonable traffic officer would have done under the circumstances is relevant.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on an objective test, focusing solely on whether probable cause existed for the traffic stop. The Court stated, “provided a traffic stop is supported by probable cause, ‘neither the primary motivation of the officer nor a determination of what a reasonable traffic officer would have done under the circumstances is relevant’.” The court emphasized that the suppression court’s undisturbed finding was that the trooper had probable cause to believe the defendant committed a muffler violation. The court explicitly rejected the Appellate Division’s focus on the trooper’s subjective motivation. This ruling provides law enforcement with clear guidance: if probable cause exists for a traffic violation, the stop is lawful, regardless of the officer’s underlying intent. The court in this case does not discuss dissenting or concurring opinions.

  • People v. Adrion, 82 N.Y.2d 628 (1993): Probable Cause Based on Independent Police Observation

    People v. Adrion, 82 N.Y.2d 628 (1993)

    Probable cause for an arrest can be established through an officer’s independent observations, even if the initial information leading to the observation came from a confidential informant; a Darden hearing is not required if probable cause exists independently of the informant’s tip.

    Summary

    Adrion was arrested after a confidential informant provided information to the police about stolen luggage at a specific location. An officer went to the location and arrested Adrion after finding boxes. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the People could not establish probable cause without the informant’s testimony, the Appellate Division’s reinstatement of the prosecution was reversed. This case stands in contrast to cases where police make independent observations that establish probable cause separate from informant information.

    Facts

    A confidential informant told the police that stolen luggage could be found in a specific location.

    A police officer went to that location and saw boxes.

    The police officer arrested Adrion.

    Procedural History

    The trial court’s decision is not included.

    The Appellate Division reinstated the prosecution.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether probable cause to arrest Adrion existed independently of the confidential informant’s information.

    Holding

    No, because the People could not establish probable cause without the testimony of the confidential informant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from situations where probable cause can be established by the independent observations of a police officer. The court emphasized that in this case, the officer’s actions (going to the location and seeing boxes) were directly based on the informant’s tip, and without the informant’s information, there was no independent basis for probable cause. The court compared the instant case to People v. Darden, stating that, similarly, the testimony of the confidential informant was necessary to establish probable cause. Because the People could not establish probable cause without the testimony of the confidential informant, this Court reversed the reinstatement of the prosecution by the Appellate Division.

  • People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341 (2001): Traffic Stops and ‘Pretext’

    97 N.Y.2d 341 (2001)

    A police officer’s subjective intent does not invalidate a traffic stop if the officer has probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred, even if the stop is a ‘pretext’ to investigate other suspected criminal activity.

    Summary

    This case consolidates three separate appeals concerning the legality of traffic stops where the officers’ primary motivation was to investigate potential criminal activity rather than enforce traffic laws. The New York Court of Appeals adopted the Supreme Court’s holding in Whren v. United States, ruling that a traffic stop is lawful under the New York State Constitution if there’s probable cause for a traffic violation, regardless of the officer’s subjective intent or whether a reasonable traffic officer would have made the stop. This decision clarifies the objective standard for evaluating traffic stops in New York.

    Facts

    People v. Robinson: Officers stopped a livery cab for running a red light, primarily intending to give the driver safety tips. An officer saw a passenger wearing a bulletproof vest and a gun on the floor, leading to the passenger’s arrest.

    People v. Reynolds: An officer observed a known prostitute entering the defendant’s truck. After a registration check revealed an expired registration, the officer initiated a traffic stop. The officer arrested the driver for DWI, after observing signs of intoxication.

    People v. Glenn: Officers observed a livery cab making an illegal turn. They stopped the vehicle suspecting a robbery. They found cocaine on the back seat and on the passenger’s person, leading to the passenger’s arrest.

    Procedural History

    In Robinson and Glenn, the Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, applying the Whren rationale. In Reynolds, the Rochester City Court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress, dismissing all charges, which County Court affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a traffic stop violates Article I, Section 12 of the New York State Constitution when an officer has probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has occurred but the primary motivation for the stop is to conduct another investigation.

    Holding

    No, because where a police officer has probable cause to believe that the driver of an automobile has committed a traffic violation, a stop does not violate Article I, § 12 of the New York State Constitution, regardless of the officer’s primary motivation or whether a reasonable traffic officer would have made the stop.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the language of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 12 is identical, generally conferring similar rights. However, the Court recognized its authority to expand rights beyond the Federal Constitution when a longstanding New York interest is involved. The Court adopted the objective standard in Whren v. United States. The Court emphasized the importance of upholding the law and the potential harm to innocent citizens if police are unduly restricted. The Court noted that pretextual stops could be challenged under the Equal Protection Clause if they are the result of discriminatory enforcement. The court found that a probable cause stop is not based on the discretion of police officers, but on violations of law. As the Court stated: “In none of the cases cited by defendants has this Court penalized the police for enforcing the law. We should not do so here.” The dissent argued that the majority’s decision inadequately protects citizens from arbitrary exercises of police power, especially considering the ease with which minor traffic violations can be found and the potential for discriminatory enforcement. The dissent proposed a “reasonable police officer” standard, asking whether a reasonable officer assigned to traffic enforcement would have made the stop under the circumstances, absent a purpose to investigate more serious criminal activity.

  • People v. Mendoza, 95 N.Y.2d 721 (2001): Adequacy of Description for Probable Cause in ‘Buy and Bust’ Arrests

    95 N.Y.2d 721 (2001)

    In a ‘buy and bust’ operation, a defendant challenging probable cause for arrest based on a transmitted description must provide available details about their appearance and others present at the scene to warrant a suppression hearing, especially when the description was not disclosed prior to the motion.

    Summary

    Mendoza was arrested for selling cocaine to an undercover officer. He moved to suppress evidence, arguing the description relayed to the backup team was insufficient for probable cause. The court summarily denied the motion. The Court of Appeals held that while a defendant isn’t required to deny participation to challenge probable cause based on description inadequacy, they must provide available factual details about their appearance and others present to warrant a hearing, especially when the description wasn’t disclosed beforehand. The order was affirmed because Mendoza failed to provide his own description or describe others present.

    Facts

    An undercover officer allegedly purchased cocaine from Mendoza in a ‘buy and bust’ operation. Mendoza was arrested by a backup team based on a description radioed by the undercover officer. Prior to trial, Mendoza moved to suppress physical evidence, including prerecorded ‘buy money,’ arguing the description given to the backup team was insufficient to establish probable cause for his arrest.

    Procedural History

    The suppression court summarily denied Mendoza’s motion. Mendoza was convicted after a jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant in a ‘buy and bust’ case must deny participating in the drug transaction to challenge the legality of their arrest based on an inadequate description transmitted to the arresting officer.

    2. Whether a defendant is entitled to a suppression hearing when challenging probable cause based on an inadequate description, even without specific knowledge of that description.

    Holding

    1. No, because a defendant can challenge the legality of an arrest based on an inadequate description without denying participation in the crime, as long as they suggest other grounds for suppression.

    2. No, because the defendant must still provide factual averments of pertinent facts to which he has access, such as a description of himself at the time of the arrest and descriptions of others present at the scene.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals referenced CPL 710.60(1), which necessitates sworn factual allegations supporting suppression grounds, and People v. Mendoza, 82 N.Y.2d 415 (1993), dictating that factual allegation sufficiency is evaluated by pleadings, motion context, and defendant’s access to information. A general denial of criminal activity is insufficient, but the Court clarified that a defendant can challenge an arrest and search independent of denying criminal culpability, challenging the description relayed to the arresting officer, citing People v. Dodt, 61 N.Y.2d 408 (1984), which mandates a reviewing court have the description to independently determine probable cause. The Court stated, “Although defendant’s participation in the sale— even if expressly admitted — would not foreclose all possible challenges to the subsequent search and arrest.” However, the Court emphasized the defendant’s responsibility to present available factual details, noting “defendant should have submitted facts as to the presence and general description of such other persons in the vicinity at the time of the arrest” and a “description of his own appearance at the time of the arrest.” Because Mendoza had not provided a description of himself or others present, the Court affirmed that he was not entitled to a suppression hearing. The Court noted, “suppression motions would be more expeditiously handled if the People were to disclose the description outright to a defendant within the time in which a motion to suppress must be made.”

  • People v. Edwards, 95 N.Y.2d 486 (2000): Establishes Mandatory Darden Hearing for Confidential Informants

    People v. Edwards, 95 N.Y.2d 486 (2000)

    When a confidential informant’s information is essential to establishing probable cause for an arrest, a Darden hearing (an in camera examination of the informant) is mandatory unless specific exceptions apply, ensuring the informant’s existence and reliability while protecting their identity.

    Summary

    The case clarifies that a Darden hearing is a mandatory requirement, not a discretionary procedure, when a confidential informant’s information is crucial to establishing probable cause. Johnson Edwards was convicted of murder and attempted murder. His motion to suppress lineup identifications was denied. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in denying Edwards’ request for an in-camera examination of a confidential informant whose information was pivotal in establishing probable cause for his arrest. The Court emphasized the importance of verifying the informant’s existence and reliability through a Darden hearing, balancing the need to protect informant confidentiality with the defendant’s right to challenge the basis of probable cause.

    Facts

    A confidential informant told Detective Neenan that “Tony” confessed to shootings. The informant described “Tony” and provided details about the shootings, including a separate shooting of John Thomas. Subsequently, Thomas identified Johnson Edwards (the defendant) from a photo as the person who shot him. Chester Martin and other witnesses identified Edwards in a lineup as the shooter in the initial incident. Edwards was arrested based on this information and subsequently identified in a lineup.

    Procedural History

    Edwards was charged with murder, attempted murder, and weapons offenses. He moved to suppress the lineup identifications. The trial court denied the motion, finding probable cause for the arrest based on the informant’s information and the lineup results. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying Edwards’ motion for an in-camera examination of the informant. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a Darden hearing was required.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court is required to conduct an in camera examination of a confidential informant (a Darden hearing) when the informant’s information is necessary to establish probable cause for an arrest, or whether such a hearing is discretionary.

    Holding

    Yes, because when the informant’s testimony is necessary to establish probable cause, the court must grant the defendant’s request for a Darden hearing to verify the informant’s existence and the basis of their knowledge while protecting their identity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Darden hearing requirement balances the need to protect confidential informants with the defendant’s right to challenge the basis for probable cause. The court emphasized that without a Darden hearing, a defendant’s ability to test the officer’s claim of probable cause is significantly limited, potentially thwarting efforts to challenge the officer’s credibility. The Court explicitly stated that a Darden hearing “is required ‘where there is insufficient evidence to establish probable cause apart from the testimony of the arresting officer as to communications received from an informer.’ ” The Court also clarified exceptions to the Darden rule, such as when the informant cannot be located or refuses to appear due to fear of personal injury, in which case the People may establish the informant’s existence through extrinsic evidence. The Court dismissed the argument that satisfying the Aguilar-Spinelli test obviates the need for a Darden hearing, noting that the Darden rule’s primary purpose is to verify the informant’s existence, not merely the reliability of the tip. The court emphasized that, “the People are required to produce the police informant for an in camera inquiry unless they can demonstrate that the informant is unavailable and cannot be produced through the exercise of due diligence.”

  • People v. Bilsky, 95 N.Y.2d 172 (2000): Successive Search Warrant Applications and Law of the Case

    People v. Bilsky, 95 N.Y.2d 172 (2000)

    The law of the case doctrine does not bar prosecutors from seeking a search warrant from a second magistrate after a first magistrate initially signed and then voided the warrant, especially when the second application discloses the prior presentment.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the “law of the case” doctrine prevents prosecutors from seeking a second search warrant from a different judge after the first judge had second thoughts about signing it. The Court of Appeals held that the doctrine doesn’t apply in this situation, especially when the second application discloses the initial unsuccessful attempt. The court reasoned that the first magistrate’s actions did not constitute a legal determination on the merits, and applying the law of the case doctrine in this context would be impractical and could hinder law enforcement’s ability to obtain valid warrants. The court also emphasized the importance of disclosing prior warrant applications to prevent judge-shopping.

    Facts

    NYPD officers conducted surveillance of defendant’s apartment, suspecting cocaine sales. An officer prepared a search warrant affidavit based on the surveillance. On February 26, 1997, the warrant application was presented to a Criminal Court Magistrate who signed the warrant but immediately crossed out her signature, stating she was “uncomfortable” and advising them to seek another magistrate. The next day, prosecutors presented an identical affidavit, but with added sentences disclosing the previous presentment, to a second Magistrate, who issued the warrant. A subsequent search revealed illegal drugs, paraphernalia, and weapons, leading to the defendant’s arrest.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, challenging the warrant’s validity. The Supreme Court denied the motion. After defense counsel discovered confusion about which Magistrate issued the warrant, the Supreme Court granted a motion to renew but again denied the suppression motion, stating that the second judge acted as a neutral magistrate. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the “law of the case” doctrine applies to bar a second Magistrate from issuing a search warrant when a first Magistrate initially signed the warrant but then struck her signature and expressed discomfort, without making a specific finding of a lack of probable cause?

    Holding

    No, because the first Magistrate’s actions did not constitute a legal determination on the merits of the warrant application. The law of the case doctrine is inapplicable when there’s no prior judicial determination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the law of the case doctrine applies to judicial determinations made during a single litigation before final judgment, where the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the initial determination. Citing People v. Evans, 94 N.Y.2d 499 (2000), the court emphasized the doctrine regulates prejudgment rulings made by courts of coordinate jurisdiction in a single litigation. Here, the first Magistrate’s striking of her signature did not constitute a legal determination that probable cause was lacking. The court emphasized that “[w]ere we to adopt defendant’s theory we would be deeming a proposed search warrant, which lacks an authorizing signature, as a binding judicial determination. That is neither tenable nor practical.”

    Moreover, the court noted that search warrant applications are generally ex parte and preliminary to a criminal action, so they typically aren’t the type of determinations to which the law of the case applies. Constitutional warrant requirements ensure a neutral magistrate’s detached judgment. Successive authorizations before different magistrates are permissible when the first declines to issue a warrant for various reasons. The key is the magistrate’s neutrality and the existence of probable cause.

    The Court highlighted the importance of disclosing prior warrant applications to prevent “judge shopping.” Quoting United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir.), the Court stated that the important questions are whether the magistrate was “neutral and detached,” and whether probable cause actually existed, not how many magistrates the government applied to before finally obtaining a warrant. A defendant retains the right to challenge the warrant via a suppression motion. The Court cited People v. Nieves, 36 N.Y.2d 396 (1975), stating that critical element is whether facts made known to the issuing Magistrate at the time of the warrant application were sufficient to establish probable cause.

  • People v. Serrano, 93 N.Y.2d 73 (1999): Necessity of Examining Informant Testimony for Probable Cause in Sealed Warrant Cases

    People v. Serrano, 93 N.Y.2d 73 (1999)

    When a search warrant is based on a confidential informant’s testimony, and the warrant affidavit alone is insufficient to establish probable cause, the suppression court must examine the transcript of the informant’s testimony before the issuing magistrate to determine if probable cause existed and if CPL 690.40(1) was substantially complied with.

    Summary

    Serrano was convicted of robbery and homicide. Evidence against him, including photographs, was seized via a search warrant. The warrant was based on a police officer’s affidavit and a confidential informant’s testimony before the issuing judge. Because the prosecution sought to keep the informant’s identity secret, the defense was denied access to the warrant application. The suppression court denied Serrano’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding the warrant affidavit alone established probable cause. The Court of Appeals held that when the warrant affidavit is insufficient on its own, the suppression court must examine the transcript of the informant’s testimony to determine if probable cause existed. The case was remitted for a new suppression hearing.

    Facts

    Defendant was convicted of killing the occupant of an apartment while robbing him. The prosecution introduced photographs showing the defendant with another suspect and holding a handgun resembling the weapon used in the crime. These photographs were seized from the defendant’s mother’s home pursuant to a search warrant. The warrant was based on a police officer’s affidavit and the testimony of a confidential informant before the issuing Justice.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the evidence. The People requested a protective order sealing the warrant and affidavit to protect the informant’s identity. The suppression court held an ex parte in camera hearing and granted the protective order. The court denied the motion to suppress, finding the warrant affidavit itself established probable cause. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the suppression court erred in failing to hold a Darden-type hearing where the confidential informant would have been produced for in camera examination.
    2. Whether the suppression court erred in failing to examine the transcript of the informant’s testimony before the issuing Justice to determine if probable cause existed and if CPL 690.40(1) was substantially complied with.

    Holding

    1. No, because when the informant had appeared and testified before the magistrate who issued the search warrant, verification of the existence of the informant, and of what was told to the police, will have already been achieved and need not be duplicated before the suppression court.
    2. Yes, because the search warrant and supporting affidavit did not, by themselves, establish probable cause, and the suppression court needed the transcript of the examination of the informant in order to properly determine that there was probable cause to issue the search warrant, and that CPL 690.40(1) was substantially complied with.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a Darden hearing is not always required when search warrant papers are sealed, especially when the informant has already testified before the issuing magistrate. The purpose of a Darden hearing is to verify the informant’s existence and credibility, which is already achieved when the informant testifies before the magistrate. However, the Court emphasized that the suppression court must examine the transcript of the informant’s testimony to ensure probable cause and compliance with CPL 690.40(1), which requires the examination to be under oath and either recorded or summarized. The Court found that the warrant affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause on its own because it lacked factual averments to determine the informant’s reliability as required by the Aguilar-Spinelli test. The Court quoted People v. Griminger, stating that a warrant application must demonstrate “(i) the veracity or reliability of the source of the information, and (ii) the basis of the informant’s knowledge.” Since the affidavit did not establish the informant’s reliability, the warrant papers did not alone establish probable cause. The failure to examine the transcript and ensure compliance with CPL 690.40(1) frustrated the statute’s objectives of assuring the regularity of the application process and preserving the grounds for appellate review. The Court remitted the case for a new suppression hearing, allowing the People to present the transcript or reconstruct the informant’s testimony. If the warrant was not supported by probable cause or CPL 690.40(1) was not substantially complied with, the judgment of conviction should be vacated, and the motion to suppress granted.

  • People v. Rosario, 78 N.Y.2d 583 (1991): Fellow Officer Rule and Probable Cause Based on Hearsay

    78 N.Y.2d 583 (1991)

    Under the fellow officer rule, an arresting officer can rely on information from a fellow officer to establish probable cause, even if that information is hearsay, provided the sending officer possessed the requisite probable cause.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant based on the fellow officer rule. The undercover officer’s radio transmission of a “positive observation,” which the arresting officer understood to mean a drug transaction, coupled with a detailed description of the participants, was sufficient to establish probable cause. The court found that the undercover officer’s observation of a drug transaction provided adequate grounds for the arrest, negating the need for the undercover officer to testify at the suppression hearing.

    Facts

    On October 16, 1991, undercover police officer Anthony Romano, a member of the Queens Tactical Narcotics Task Force (TNT), observed defendant Rosario exchanging what appeared to be drugs for money with two individuals. Romano radioed fellow officer Evelyn Cardenales, who was working as his backup, informing her that he had made a “positive observation.” He provided a detailed description of the participants’ clothing, physical characteristics, and location. Cardenales proceeded to the location and arrested Rosario and the other individuals.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was arrested and charged with drug-related offenses. At a suppression hearing, the defendant argued that the police lacked probable cause for the arrest. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant based on the undercover officer’s radio transmission of a “positive observation” and a detailed description of the participants.

    Holding

    Yes, because under the fellow officer rule, an arresting officer is entitled to act on the strength of a radio bulletin from a fellow officer and to assume its reliability, and the undercover officer’s observation of the drug transaction established probable cause for the arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the fellow officer rule, which allows a police officer to act on the strength of a radio bulletin from a fellow officer and to assume its reliability (People v Lypka, 36 NY2d 210, 213). The court also cited People v Petralia, 62 NY2d 47, 52, stating that a court may rely on the hearsay testimony of the arresting officer alone to establish probable cause at a suppression hearing, without needing to produce the undercover officer. The court found that the arresting officer, Cardenales, was justified in relying on Romano’s personal observation of the crime.

    The court addressed the defendant’s argument that the phrase “positive observation” was insufficient to communicate the nature of the conduct observed. However, Cardenales testified that the phrase was commonly used among police officers to indicate an exchange of drugs for money, and she understood it to mean that Romano had personally witnessed such an exchange. The court drew an analogy to People v Maldonado, 86 NY2d 631, where a “positive buy” was deemed sufficient to establish probable cause.

    The court rejected the defendant’s attempt to distinguish the case from Maldonado, arguing that it involved a police officer’s mere observation of a drug transaction, rather than a purchase of narcotics by the undercover officer. The court stated that Romano’s observation of the exchange of drugs for money, standing alone, established probable cause, referencing People v McRay, 51 NY2d 594, 604: “[e]xchange of currency negates all but the most implausible explanations for the transaction, and thus conveys more than sufficient indicia of a drug sale to warrant an arrest.” The Court of Appeals emphasized that an experienced officer’s observation of a drug transaction provides sufficient probable cause for an arrest under the fellow officer rule, supporting effective law enforcement and efficient investigations.