New York Law Review

Tag: probable cause

  • People v. Brady, 16 N.Y.2d 186 (1965): Establishing Probable Cause for Arrest Based on Observed Conduct and Prior Knowledge

    People v. Brady, 16 N.Y.2d 186 (1965)

    Probable cause for an arrest exists when the totality of the circumstances, including observed conduct and prior knowledge, would lead a reasonable and prudent peace officer to believe that a crime has been committed and the defendant committed it.

    Summary

    Brady was convicted of criminally concealing stolen property. The police, aware of recent burglaries in a hotel and Brady’s prior suspicious activity there, observed him acting suspiciously outside the hotel. He repeatedly examined “little white boxes” and denied his identity when stopped. The court held the arrest lawful, finding probable cause based on the officers’ observations and prior knowledge. Brady’s admission during trial that the stolen jewelry exceeded $100 in value removed the misdemeanor charge from consideration, negating the need for the jury to consider it.

    Facts

    Police officers were aware of a series of burglaries at a specific hotel.
    Months prior to the arrest, Brady had been stopped on an upper floor of the hotel with keys to five different rooms.
    On the night of the arrest, officers observed Brady leaving the hotel.
    They saw him repeatedly take “little white boxes” out of his pockets and examine their contents as he walked along the street.
    When stopped by the officers, Brady denied that his name was Brady and denied being at the hotel that evening.
    During the trial, Brady admitted the value of the stolen jewelry exceeded $100.

    Procedural History

    Brady was convicted in the trial court of criminally concealing and withholding stolen property as a felony.
    The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and granted a new trial.
    The People and Brady cross-appealed by permission to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police had probable cause to arrest Brady, making the subsequent search incident to that arrest lawful.
    Whether the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that if they found the value of the stolen property to be less than $100, they should find the defendant guilty of a misdemeanor.

    Holding

    Yes, because the officers’ observations of Brady’s suspicious behavior, combined with their prior knowledge of his activities at the hotel, were sufficient to establish probable cause for a reasonable officer to believe that a crime had been committed and that Brady had committed it.
    No, because Brady’s admission during trial that the value of the stolen jewelry exceeded $100 removed the issue of value from the case, making a charge on the misdemeanor offense unnecessary.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the police officers had probable cause to arrest Brady based on the totality of the circumstances. The officers knew of recent burglaries at the hotel, and that Brady had previously been found on an upper floor with keys to multiple rooms. They observed him leaving the hotel and suspiciously examining small boxes. His subsequent denial of his identity further supported the probable cause. The court quoted Bell v. United States, stating that the officers observed the standard of what would be probable cause to “a reasonable, cautious and prudent peace officer.” Because the arrest was lawful, the search at the precinct station was a valid search incident to arrest.

    Regarding the failure to instruct on the misdemeanor offense, the court cited People v. Walker, noting that when a defendant admits a fact in open court, that fact is established, and no further evidence is needed. Brady’s admission that the jewelry’s value exceeded $100 removed the question of value from the jury’s consideration. The court also cited People v. Mussenden, stating that “the submission of a lesser degree or an included crime is justified only where there is some basis in the evidence for finding the accused innocent of the higher crime, and yet guilty of the lower one.” Since Brady admitted the value exceeded $100, there was no basis for finding him guilty of the misdemeanor but not the felony.

  • People v. Alfinito, 16 N.Y.2d 181 (1965): Challenging the Veracity of a Search Warrant Affidavit

    People v. Alfinito, 16 N.Y.2d 181 (1965)

    A defendant may challenge the veracity of factual statements made in an affidavit supporting a search warrant, but bears the burden of proving that the statements were perjurious; any fair doubt should be resolved in favor of the warrant.

    Summary

    Alfinito was charged with policy gambling violations. He moved to suppress evidence, arguing it was obtained through an unlawful search because the supporting affidavit for the search warrant contained false statements. The Criminal Court granted the motion, finding a conflict in testimony. The Appellate Term reversed, ordering a new hearing for factual findings. The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant can challenge the truthfulness of statements in a search warrant affidavit, but bears the burden of proof, and doubts are resolved in favor of the warrant.

    Facts

    A police officer obtained a search warrant based on an affidavit stating that a confidential informant (with a history of reliability) reported placing bets with Alfinito in a specific apartment. The officer also claimed to have personally observed several individuals engaging in transactions with Alfinito at that location, including handing over slips of paper and money. Police records indicated Alfinito had prior arrests and a conviction for policy violations.

    Procedural History

    The Criminal Court granted Alfinito’s motion to suppress evidence, citing a conflict in testimony that created a doubt in favor of the defendant. The People appealed to the Appellate Term, which reversed and ordered a new hearing, noting the lack of specific findings of fact by the Criminal Court. Both the People and Alfinito appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can challenge the truthfulness of factual statements made in the affidavit supporting a search warrant.

    Holding

    Yes, because Section 813-c of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits an inquiry into whether the affidavit’s statements were perjurious, but the burden of proof is on the defendant, and any fair doubt should be resolved in favor of the warrant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court recognized the importance of protecting citizens’ rights against unlawful searches and seizures, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Mapp v. Ohio. However, it also acknowledged the need to avoid creating overly strict rules that would invalidate warrants based on conflicting testimony. The court balanced these concerns by holding that a defendant can challenge the truthfulness of statements in a search warrant affidavit, but the burden of proof rests on the defendant to show that the statements were perjurious. The court reasoned that because a judicial officer already examined the allegations when issuing the warrant, any fair doubt about their veracity should be resolved in favor of upholding the warrant. The court stated, “Our duty is to fashion a rule which will prevent such a violation of the citizen’s rights and at the same time avoid creating a situation where overstrict rules would invalidate numerous warrants simply because witnesses can later be found to swear to the opposite of what the officer swore when he procured the warrant.”

  • People v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d 86 (1965): Informant’s Privilege and Probable Cause for Arrest

    People v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d 86 (1965)

    When probable cause for an arrest depends solely on an informant’s tip, the prosecution must disclose the informant’s identity to allow the defendant a fair opportunity to challenge the basis for probable cause, unless the prosecution presents independent evidence corroborating the tip or the informant’s reliability.

    Summary

    Malinsky and others were convicted of concealing stolen goods. Prior to trial, they moved to suppress evidence seized during their arrest, arguing the search warrant was improperly executed. The trial court ruled the nighttime execution invalid but ordered a hearing to determine if the search was incident to a lawful arrest based on probable cause stemming from an informant’s tip. The defense was denied the ability to question the detective about the informant. The New York Court of Appeals held that while prior statements of a witness must be disclosed under People v. Rosario, the informant’s identity need only be disclosed if probable cause hinges solely on the informant’s tip without independent corroboration. The case was remanded for a new hearing to allow the prosecution to present additional evidence, if any, supporting the informant’s reliability or independent probable cause.

    Facts

    A trailer containing drugs and cosmetics was stolen from a terminal in Boston. Three days later, New York City police, acting on a search warrant, seized the stolen goods as the defendants removed them from a warehouse in Queens. Prior to obtaining the warrant, police had observed the defendants and received a tip from an unnamed informant, who had previously provided reliable information, stating that there was a stolen load of goods at the warehouse and that Malinsky and Lustigman were involved. The police saw the defendants loading cartons onto a truck before arresting them. Only after the arrest did the officers confirm that the goods were stolen from the Boston terminal. The cartons lacked identifiable markings, and the informant did not describe the goods or their packaging.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were indicted and moved to suppress the evidence seized, arguing the search warrant was improperly executed at night. The trial court agreed the nighttime execution was unauthorized but ordered a separate hearing to determine if the search was justified as incident to a lawful arrest. The suppression hearing court denied the motion to suppress, and the evidence was admitted at trial, resulting in the defendants’ convictions. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendants access to the notes made by Detective Sullivan regarding the arrest.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to compel disclosure of the identity of the confidential informant.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because under People v. Rosario, defense counsel must be permitted to examine a witness’ prior statement that relates to the subject matter of the testimony.
    2. No, not necessarily, because disclosure of an informant’s identity is only required where probable cause depends solely on the arresting officer’s testimony about the informant’s communications and there is insufficient other evidence to establish probable cause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the detective’s notes, the court cited People v. Rosario, emphasizing that defense counsel must be allowed to examine a witness’ prior statements related to their testimony, provided the statements don’t contain confidential information. The court held that the Rosario rule applies equally to hearings and trials.

    Regarding the informant, the court acknowledged the government’s privilege to protect the identity of informants to encourage citizens to report crimes, citing Roviaro v. United States. However, this privilege is limited by fairness requirements. Quoting Roviaro, the court stated, “the privilege must give way” where “the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or of the contents of his communication, * * * is essential to a fair determination of a cause.”
    The court noted that when the legality of a search without a warrant relies on an informant’s communications to establish probable cause, the government must disclose the informant’s identity unless there is sufficient evidence apart from the confidential communication to sustain such a finding.”

    The court found that in this case, probable cause rested almost entirely on the informant’s tip, with limited corroborating evidence. The officers’ observations of the defendants loading cartons onto a truck did not, by themselves, establish probable cause without knowing the goods were stolen or that the defendants were not authorized to be there.

    The court remanded the case to allow the prosecution the opportunity to present further evidence to support the informant’s reliability or establish independent probable cause based on the police’s own investigation. The court concluded that “unless the prosecution is required to disclose the informer’s identity— so that he may be produced for possible questioning—the defendants will be denied the opportunity, to which they are entitled, of rebutting the detective’s crucial testimony.” If the prosecution fails to provide additional support, the court indicated that the informer’s identity must be disclosed or the evidence suppressed.

  • People v. McCarthy, 14 N.Y.2d 203 (1964): Probable Cause Requirement for Misdemeanor Arrests

    People v. McCarthy, 14 N.Y.2d 203 (1964)

    An arrest for a misdemeanor requires probable cause to believe the suspect is guilty, and evidence obtained from a search incident to an unlawful arrest is inadmissible.

    Summary

    McCarthy and Kancza were arrested for carrying a suspicious package. Prior to the arrest, they made statements to police indicating it was found nearby. The package contained stolen radios and radio parts. The New York Court of Appeals held that the circumstances did not provide probable cause for the initial arrest of McCarthy and Kancza, making the subsequent search of the package illegal. Therefore, the evidence (stolen radios) should have been suppressed, because a search cannot be validated by its success if the initial arrest was unlawful. The court reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial.

    Facts

    A police officer observed McCarthy and Kancza carrying a closed package addressed to General Consolidated Ltd.

    McCarthy told the officer the box contained a doll for his sister and claimed he found the package nearby.

    McCarthy and Kancza were arrested on suspicion.

    After their arrest, McCarthy and Kancza stated that they received the package from Collins, who threw it over a fence.

    Collins later admitted to throwing the package over a fence.

    The package was opened at the police station and found to contain stolen radios and radio parts.

    Procedural History

    The defendants moved to suppress the evidence (radios and radio parts), arguing it was obtained through an illegal search and seizure without a warrant, and as a result of an illegal arrest without probable cause.

    The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and the defendants were convicted.

    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police had probable cause to arrest McCarthy and Kancza for a misdemeanor at the time of the arrest.

    Whether the evidence seized (the radios and radio parts) should have been suppressed as the product of an illegal search incident to an unlawful arrest.

    Holding

    No, because the circumstances did not provide the officer with probable or reasonable cause to believe that McCarthy and Kancza were guilty of a crime at the time of their arrest.

    Yes, because the evidence was obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure incidental to an unlawful arrest, the evidence should have been suppressed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the established rule that even for a misdemeanor arrest under New York Criminal Procedure Law, officers must have probable cause to believe the person is guilty. The court found the circumstances surrounding McCarthy and Kancza’s possession of the package, and their initial explanation, did not provide probable cause to believe they had committed a crime. The court emphasized that probable cause must exist *prior* to the arrest. The court cited *People v. O’Neill*, noting that “[a] search is good or bad when it starts and does not change character from its success.” The Court further cited *People v. Loria*, stating that the validity of a warrantless arrest depends on probable cause, and such cause cannot be based on evidence obtained from a search whose validity depends on the validity of the arrest. In other words, the discovery of the stolen goods could not retroactively justify an arrest that was initially unlawful. The dissent is not discussed.

  • People v. Dalinonte, 16 N.Y.2d 156 (1965): Probable Cause Requires More Than Observing Known Gamblers Entering a Private Residence

    People v. Dalinonte, 16 N.Y.2d 156 (1965)

    To establish probable cause for a search warrant related to bookmaking activities in a private residence, the affidavit must present more than mere observations of known gamblers entering the premises, especially when combined only with the presence of unlisted telephones.

    Summary

    Defendants were convicted of bookmaking based on evidence seized during a search. They argued the search warrant was issued without probable cause. The affidavit supporting the warrant detailed observations of known gamblers entering a private residence with unlisted phones. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that these observations, without additional evidence suggesting illegal activity like placed bets or confidential tips, were insufficient to establish probable cause for the warrant’s issuance, thus rendering the seized evidence inadmissible.

    Facts

    Police officers observed James Faliero, a known gambler, entering the premises at 556 Lakeview Avenue on multiple occasions. Later, Anthony Nasca and Anthony Fino, both known bookmakers, were observed entering the same premises on several days, often carrying large envelopes. The residence was listed to Aldo Dalimonte and had two unlisted telephone numbers. These observations occurred during normal bookmaking hours.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted of bookmaking based on evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. Prior to trial, the defendants moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search warrant lacked probable cause. The trial court denied the motion. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case, focusing on whether the affidavit supporting the search warrant established probable cause.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant provided sufficient probable cause to believe that the crime of bookmaking was being committed at the premises located at 556 Lakeview Avenue.

    Holding

    No, because the affidavit presented only observations of known gamblers entering a private dwelling with unlisted phones, which is insufficient to establish probable cause without additional evidence linking the premises to illegal gambling activity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that probable cause requires a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by facts strong enough to warrant a cautious person’s belief that the law is being violated. The court stated that the determination of probable cause is a mixed question of fact and constitutional law, requiring an independent appraisal of the facts. The court reviewed precedents involving similar facts, noting that observation of known bookmakers entering a private dwelling with telephones is insufficient to establish probable cause without additional evidence, such as a placed bet, reliable confidential information, or frequent telephone contact with other known gamblers. The court distinguished the present case from those where probable cause was established due to such additional evidence. The court concluded that the affidavit in this case only established a bare suspicion, insufficient for probable cause. The search warrant was therefore invalid, and the evidence seized was inadmissible. As the court stated, probable cause exists when “there is reasonable ground of suspicion supported by facts and circumstances strong enough in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the law is being violated on the premises to be searched”. Because the warrant was issued without probable cause, the evidence obtained was illegally obtained and inadmissible.