New York Law Review

Tag: probable cause

  • People v. Wheatman, 29 N.Y.2d 337 (1971): Establishing Probable Cause with Hearsay from Grand Jury Testimony

    People v. Wheatman, 29 N.Y.2d 337 (1971)

    An affidavit supporting a search warrant can be based on hearsay if it provides the magistrate with sufficient information to determine both the reliability of the informant and the reliability of the information provided.

    Summary

    This case addresses the requirements for establishing probable cause in a search warrant affidavit when the affidavit is based on hearsay. The District Attorney obtained search warrants based on an affidavit summarizing grand jury testimony alleging a bid-rigging conspiracy. The New York Court of Appeals held that the affidavit was sufficient because the grand jury witnesses testified under oath against their penal interests, and their testimonies corroborated each other. This established both the reliability of the informants and the reliability of the information, justifying the issuance of the search warrants. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, which had found the affidavit insufficient.

    Facts

    The District Attorney investigated a bid-rigging conspiracy involving painting contracts for New York City Housing Authority projects. The conspiracy allegedly involved painting contractors and a Housing Authority official, Wheatman, who provided inside information on bidding estimates. Assistant District Attorney Phillips applied for search warrants for the offices of the contractors, submitting an affidavit based on sworn testimony from witnesses before the Grand Jury. The affidavit stated that these witnesses admitted to being parties to an agreement to rig bids and identified the contracting firms as parties to the agreement. It further alleged that Jerry Jerome obtained Housing Authority estimates and shared them with other conspirators. Based on this information, Judge Fine issued warrants, and a search uncovered relevant documents.

    Procedural History

    The defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search, arguing the affidavit lacked probable cause. The trial court denied the motion. The defendants were convicted, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding the affidavit insufficient. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Appellate Division, on reargument, affirmed Wheatman’s conviction, finding he lacked standing to challenge the warrants. Wheatman also appealed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an affidavit based on hearsay testimony before a grand jury can establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant if the affidavit adequately demonstrates the reliability of the informants and the reliability of their information.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the affidavit summarized sworn grand jury testimony where witnesses admitted to being part of a bid-rigging agreement, thereby testifying against their penal interests and corroborating each other’s accounts, which sufficiently established both the reliability of the informants and the reliability of their information.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that for an affidavit based on hearsay to be sufficient, it must allow a magistrate to independently assess the reliability of both the informant and their information. The court noted that reliability can be established in various ways, including prior reliable information, corroboration, statements against penal interest, and sworn testimony. In this case, the informants’ reliability was demonstrated by their sworn testimony before the grand jury, where they admitted to being parties to the bid-rigging agreement, thereby testifying against their penal interests. The fact that multiple informants corroborated each other’s testimony further bolstered their reliability.

    Regarding the reliability of the information, the court found it significant that the witnesses had firsthand knowledge of the conspiracy. The affidavit indicated that the witnesses testified to being parties to the agreement and identified the roles of various individuals and companies. The court reasoned that because the bid estimate information was essential to the conspiracy, it was reasonable to infer that copies of the forms would be found in the offices of the conspirators. The court rejected the argument that the affidavit was defective for failing to provide a “substantial basis” for concluding that the material sought would be found in the contractor’s offices.

    The court also addressed the defendants’ request for the names of the grand jury witnesses, stating that revealing their identities would jeopardize the ongoing investigation and potentially expose the witnesses to interference or intimidation. Quoting the decision, the court noted the importance of protecting witnesses “from interference from those under investigation,” preventing “subornation of perjury and tampering with prospective [trial] witnesses” and assuring “prospective witnesses [before the Grand Jury] that their testimony will be kept secret.”

    In conclusion, the court found the affidavit sufficient to establish probable cause and reversed the Appellate Division’s order. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to consider other factual and legal contentions raised by the defendants.

  • Williams v. Barbera, 26 N.Y.2d 158 (1970): Malicious Prosecution Requires Termination on the Merits

    Williams v. Barbera, 26 N.Y.2d 158 (1970)

    A malicious prosecution action requires that the underlying criminal proceeding terminate in a manner indicative of the accused’s innocence, typically a decision on the merits, and a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is insufficient.

    Summary

    Williams sued Barbera for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, invasion of privacy, and violation of civil rights, arising from a trespass charge in Canada. The Canadian court dismissed the trespass charge for lack of jurisdiction because title to the land was in question. The New York Court of Appeals held that the malicious prosecution claim must fail because the Canadian court’s dismissal was not a determination on the merits indicative of Williams’s innocence. The court emphasized that a malicious prosecution action requires a termination that fairly implies a lack of reasonable grounds for the prosecution.

    Facts

    Williams encamped on a beach in front of Barbera’s house in Ontario, Canada. Barbera, claiming ownership of the beach, had Williams arrested and charged with trespass under the Petty Trespass Act of Ontario. The Ontario Magistrate’s Court declined jurisdiction because the case involved a question of title to land, as barred by the Petty Trespass Act.

    Procedural History

    Williams filed suit in New York against Barbera, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, invasion of privacy, and violation of civil rights. The defendant moved to dismiss based on documentary evidence, including the Canadian judgment. Special Term denied the motion. The Appellate Division modified the order by striking the malicious prosecution cause of action, holding that it could not be maintained without a determination on the merits. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a dismissal of a criminal charge for lack of jurisdiction constitutes a favorable termination on the merits, sufficient to support a claim for malicious prosecution.

    Holding

    No, because a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does not imply a lack of probable cause for the prosecution and does not reflect on the merits of the underlying claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that a malicious prosecution claim requires a termination of the underlying prosecution that fairly implies a lack of reasonable grounds for the prosecution. Quoting Burt v. Smith, 181 N.Y. 1, 5, the court stated, “A malicious prosecution is one that is begun in malice, without probable cause to believe it can succeed, and which finally ends in failure.” A dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, unlike a decision on the merits, does not suggest that the prosecution lacked probable cause. The court noted that neither of the rules for ascertaining the sufficiency of the termination (as stated in Levy’s Store v. Endicott-Johnson Corp., 272 N.Y. 155, 162; Halberstadt v. New York Life Ins. Co., 194 N.Y. 1, 10-11) directly address a dismissal for want of jurisdiction, but the underlying reasoning dictates that such a dismissal cannot support a malicious prosecution claim. The court also emphasized the public policy of ensuring that people feel secure in resorting to the courts for the apprehension and punishment of crimes. Permitting a malicious prosecution claim based on a jurisdictional dismissal would undermine this policy. Finally, the court cited the Restatement, Torts, § 663, comment d, which states that a prior discharge for want of jurisdiction has no tendency to prove lack of probable cause. The court further reasoned that applying the law of Ontario, where the trespass occurred, also dictated the same outcome, as Ontario law requires a determination on the merits to sustain a malicious prosecution claim.

  • People v. Waitz, 31 A.D.2d 298 (N.Y. 1969): Establishing Probable Cause for Search Warrants

    People v. Waitz, 31 A.D.2d 298 (N.Y. 1969)

    A search warrant must be supported by an affidavit containing specific facts establishing unlawful activity on the premises to be searched; a conclusory statement that individuals frequenting the premises are “LSD users and sellers” is insufficient to establish probable cause.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendants’ convictions for possession of dangerous drugs, holding that the search warrant used to seize the drugs was issued without sufficient probable cause. The affidavit supporting the warrant stated only that “LSD users and sellers” frequented the defendant Waitz’s cottage. The court found this statement to be a conclusory assertion lacking specific facts to establish unlawful activity on the premises. Furthermore, the court held that the warrant, which described the cottage but not the surrounding area, did not justify the search of the defendant’s car when it was driven onto the property while officers were present. Because the warrant lacked proper foundation and the car search exceeded its scope, the evidence obtained should have been suppressed.

    Facts

    Police obtained a search warrant for a cottage belonging to defendant Waitz. The affidavit supporting the warrant stated that “LSD users and sellers are frequenting” the cottage. When the police arrived to execute the warrant, the defendant’s automobile was driven onto the property. The police searched the car, as well as the cottage, and seized LSD, marijuana, and hypodermic needles.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted of possession of dangerous drugs based on the evidence seized during the search. Justice McInerney granted a certificate of reasonable doubt, questioning whether the mere presence of alleged drug users and sellers at a house was sufficient for probable cause. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment of conviction, and the People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an affidavit stating that “LSD users and sellers are frequenting” a premises provides sufficient probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant for that premises.
    2. Whether a search warrant authorizing the search of a specific building extends to a vehicle that is driven onto the property while the search is being conducted.

    Holding

    1. No, because the affidavit contains a conclusory statement lacking specific facts to establish unlawful activity on the premises.
    2. No, because the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, and the automobile was not included in the warrant’s description of the premises.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the affidavit supporting the search warrant lacked the factual substance required to establish probable cause. The statement that “LSD users and sellers are frequenting” the cottage was deemed a conclusory characterization, without any specific facts to suggest that illegal activity was occurring within the premises. The court cited Spinelli v. United States and Aguilar v. Texas, emphasizing that a mere assertion of police suspicion or reputation is insufficient to justify a magistrate’s finding of probable cause. “But just as a simple assertion of police suspicion is not itself a sufficient basis for a magistrate’s finding of probable cause, we do not believe it may be used to give additional weight to allegations that would otherwise be insufficient.”

    The court also addressed the scope of the search warrant, noting that it authorized the search of the cottage but did not mention the automobile. Citing People v. Rainey, the court emphasized that the Fourth Amendment and the New York Constitution require that a search warrant “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched.” Since the warrant did not include the automobile, the search of the car was deemed unlawful. Probable cause must be shown in each instance, and a warrant to search a building cannot be extended to justify the search of a separate location, such as a vehicle that happened to be present at the time of the search. The court concluded that the evidence obtained from both the cottage and the car should have been suppressed, leading to the reversal of the defendants’ convictions.

  • People v. Brosnan, 32 N.Y.2d 284 (1973): Automobile Exception to the Warrant Requirement

    People v. Brosnan, 32 N.Y.2d 284 (1973)

    Evidence of a crime, discovered during a lawful search of an automobile based on probable cause related to the vehicle itself, is admissible even if the probable cause originated from a separate crime.

    Summary

    Brosnan was convicted of robbery and assault. During a later arrest for a similar crime, a search of his car revealed evidence related to the prior crime. The New York Court of Appeals held that the search was lawful because the police had probable cause to believe the car was connected to the second crime, allowing the evidence from the first crime to be admitted. This ruling aligns with the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, permitting searches of vehicles when probable cause exists due to their mobility and the reduced expectation of privacy. The court emphasized that the search was justified by the connection of the vehicle to the crime, not solely as an incident to the arrest.

    Facts

    Dorothy Ringwood was robbed and assaulted on July 10, 1965.

    On January 15, 1966, Brosnan was arrested for the robbery and assault of Diane Tiederman. Tiederman provided police with a detailed description of her assailant and the car used in the crime.

    A police officer spotted Brosnan driving a car matching Tiederman’s description. Upon arrest, a search of the car revealed a woman’s handbag and coat believed to belong to Tiederman, as well as a knife.

    A subsequent search of the car’s trunk at the police station uncovered a wallet and documents belonging to Ringwood, the victim of the prior robbery.

    Procedural History

    Brosnan was convicted of robbing and assaulting Dorothy Ringwood. He appealed, arguing that the evidence found in his car was obtained through an unlawful search and should have been suppressed. The People conceded that the consecutive sentences for robbery and grand larceny should have run concurrently.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the search of Brosnan’s car, which uncovered evidence related to a crime different from the one for which he was arrested, was a lawful search based on probable cause.

    Holding

    Yes, because the police had probable cause to believe that the car was an instrumentality of the crime for which Brosnan was arrested, justifying the search regardless of whether the evidence found related to a different crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), which established that a warrantless search of an automobile is permissible when police have probable cause to believe the vehicle itself is connected to a crime. The court distinguished this case from situations where the search is solely incident to an arrest, emphasizing that the probable cause stemmed from the car’s use in the Tiederman crime. The court stated, “The car was so connected in ongoing relationship and direct instrumentality with the Tiederman crime, as it was reported and described to police, that its seizure and inspection without a warrant were justified on probable cause independently of association with defendant’s arrest.” Just as in Chambers, evidence of a separate crime found during a lawful search is admissible in the prosecution of that other crime.

    The court further noted the consistency of this ruling with Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), which distinguished between the protections against search for a vehicle versus a home, recognizing the mobility of vehicles and the reduced expectation of privacy in them. The court cited People v. Lewis, 26 N.Y.2d 547, restating that “There must exist a reasonable belief that the search will produce the fruits, instrumentalities, contraband or evidence” related to the crime.

    The court addressed the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, stating that such claims must be initially raised in the trial court, not on appeal. The court did, however, modify the judgment to mandate concurrent sentences for robbery and grand larceny.

  • People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98 (1967): Limits on Vehicle Searches Incident to Arrest

    People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98 (1967)

    A warrantless search of a vehicle is not justified as incident to an arrest when the arrestee is secured away from the vehicle, and there is no reasonable belief that the vehicle contains fruits, instrumentalities, contraband, or evidence related to the crime for which the arrest was made.

    Summary

    Marsh was convicted of felony weapon possession after the denial of his motion to suppress a loaded revolver found in his car. An officer arrested Marsh based on an outstanding warrant for receiving stolen property. After securing Marsh inside a police station, the officer searched Marsh’s car, discovering the weapon. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the search was not a valid search incident to arrest because it was not contemporaneous with the arrest and there was no probable cause to believe the car contained evidence related to the crime for which Marsh was arrested. The Court emphasized that once Marsh was secured inside the station, there was no risk he could access any weapons in the car.

    Facts

    Patrolman Beedenbender, while directing traffic, recognized Marsh, a driver with Virginia license plates, from a prior narcotics arrest (later dismissed). The officer was aware of an outstanding warrant for Marsh’s arrest from February 1, 1965, related to a charge under Penal Law §1308. Beedenbender followed Marsh, requested him to park near the 30th precinct, and inspected Marsh’s license and registration, finding them in order. He then took Marsh inside to confirm the warrant’s validity. Upon confirmation, Marsh was arrested. Ten minutes after the arrest and while Marsh was inside the station, the officer searched Marsh’s vehicle, finding a loaded .45 caliber revolver under the driver’s seat. Marsh and his passengers were then arrested for weapon possession.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Marsh’s motion to suppress the weapon. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding sufficient unity of time and place between the arrest and search. The District Attorney conceded error on appeal to the Court of Appeals, but the Court considered the merits. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, dismissing the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a warrantless search of a vehicle, conducted after the driver has been arrested, secured inside a police station, and where there is no reasonable belief that the vehicle contains evidence related to the crime for which the driver was arrested, is a valid search incident to arrest under the Fourth Amendment?

    Holding

    No, because the search was not contemporaneous with the arrest, and there was no reasonable belief that the vehicle contained evidence related to the crime for which the driver was arrested. The Court emphasized that “[o]nce an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied heavily on Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), which held that a search of a vehicle is not incident to arrest if it is remote in time or place from the arrest. The Court reasoned that the justifications for a search incident to arrest—officer safety and preventing the destruction of evidence—are absent when the arrestee is secured away from the vehicle. In this case, once Marsh was inside the station, there was no danger he could use a weapon from the car. The Court acknowledged the exceptions to the warrant requirement for vehicle searches, particularly where securing a warrant is impractical due to the vehicle’s mobility, as articulated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). However, the Court emphasized that even in such cases, a reasonable belief that the search will produce fruits, instrumentalities, contraband, or evidence is required. Here, the outstanding warrant for receiving stolen property, issued almost three years prior, did not provide a sufficient basis for a reasonable belief that a search of the vehicle would be productive. The Court distinguished this case from others where vehicle searches were upheld, noting that in those cases, the car itself was seized as an instrumentality or evidence of the crime. The Court stated, “Rather it is the lack of any justification to make the search after the 10 minutes had elapsed which brings about the result herein.”

  • People v. Rosemond, 26 N.Y.2d 101 (1970): Lawful Street Inquiry and Probable Cause Based on Answers

    People v. Rosemond, 26 N.Y.2d 101 (1970)

    A police officer’s common-law right to inquire about unusual or suspicious circumstances on the street is not limited by the statutory requirements of reasonable suspicion needed for a stop and frisk; probable cause for arrest can arise from the answers to a lawful street inquiry combined with observed circumstances.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the legality of a street inquiry and subsequent arrest. Police observed Rosemond and another man entering an apartment building empty-handed and exiting shortly after, carrying bags. When questioned, Rosemond claimed he didn’t know what was in the bag he was carrying. This response, combined with the officers’ observations, provided probable cause for arrest. The court held that the initial inquiry was lawful under the common-law duty of police to investigate suspicious circumstances, and Rosemond’s evasive answer justified further action leading to the discovery of stolen property. The court affirmed the conviction, finding no violation of Rosemond’s Fourth Amendment rights.

    Facts

    A police officer observed Rosemond and another man entering an apartment building empty-handed. A short time later, the officer saw them exiting the same building, one carrying a plaid zippered suitcase and the other a plaid plastic shopping bag. The officer followed them and, as they were entering a hallway, approached and asked Rosemond what he had in the package. Rosemond replied that he did not know. The officer then discovered that an apartment in the building they had exited had been burglarized.

    Procedural History

    Rosemond and his companion were indicted for burglary, petit larceny, and receiving stolen property. A motion to suppress the evidence, arguing an unlawful search, was denied. Rosemond pleaded guilty to attempted burglary in the third degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision by a divided court, and Rosemond appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Section 180-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure is the exclusive basis for a policeman to stop and question a citizen.
    2. Whether Rosemond’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the police conduct in this case.

    Holding

    1. No, because Section 180-a does not limit the pre-existing common-law right of police to inquire about unusual or suspicious circumstances.
    2. No, because the initial street inquiry was lawful, and the answers given, combined with the officer’s observations, provided probable cause for arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Section 180-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which addresses police inquiry under specific circumstances (reasonable suspicion of a felony), does not eliminate the broader, pre-existing common-law right and duty of police to inquire about unusual situations. The court stated, “To be alert, aware and knowledgeable of street events would seem the fundamental test of competent and skillful police work.”

    The court emphasized that reasonable suspicion of a felony should not be the sole criterion for inquiry, and inquiry is not prohibited even if most of what it elicits may be innocent. The court provided an example: “For example, men carrying a cash register out of a grocery store may very well be taking it out for repair; but they may not; and under conditions of manner and attitude difficult to lay down categorically, police would be quite warranted in finding out by asking questions.”

    The court distinguished this case from others involving stop and frisk or other physical actions. The crucial difference was that the police only asked questions, and the answers themselves provided probable cause. Specifically, Rosemond’s statement that he did not know what was in the bag he was carrying, in the context of having just exited an apartment building with the bag, created a reasonable ground to believe that a larceny had occurred. The court analogized the facts to People v. Entrialgo, where the results of a street inquiry justified further police action.

    The court concluded that there was no evidence of official compulsion during the street questioning. The fact that uniformed officers asked questions did not automatically make the interrogation coercive. Therefore, Rosemond’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.

  • People v. Rivera, 26 N.Y.2d 304 (1970): Determining When an Arrest Occurs

    People v. Rivera, 26 N.Y.2d 304 (1970)

    The point at which a police encounter escalates into an arrest requiring probable cause is a factual determination, and observations made after an illegal arrest cannot retroactively validate it, but observations made during a lawful surveillance can provide probable cause for a subsequent arrest.

    Summary

    Rivera was convicted of unlawful possession of barbiturates. The police, without probable cause, followed a taxi in which Rivera was a passenger. After the officers approached the taxi and one knocked on the window, Rivera dropped capsules to the floor. The officer, believing them to be barbiturates, arrested Rivera and seized the capsules. The lower courts denied Rivera’s motion to suppress the evidence. The New York Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the hearing court must determine at what point the arrest occurred because if the arrest occurred when the officers initially approached the taxi without probable cause, then anything observed afterward could not validate the arrest. However, if the approach was merely a routine surveillance, Rivera dropping the capsules could establish probable cause for a subsequent arrest.

    Facts

    Detective La Briola observed Rivera enter a building known for narcotics sales, then re-enter a taxi. La Briola followed the taxi. When the taxi stopped at a light, La Briola blocked it with his car. La Briola’s partner approached the taxi, knocking on the rear window with his shield. La Briola then saw Rivera place three capsules on the floor of the taxi. Believing the capsules to be barbiturates, La Briola opened the door, seized the capsules, and arrested Rivera. La Briola admitted he could not distinguish barbiturates from other pills.

    Procedural History

    Rivera was convicted in the Criminal Court of the City of New York for unlawful possession of barbiturates after his motion to suppress the evidence (the capsules) was denied. The Appellate Term affirmed, and Rivera appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police officers’ act of blocking the taxicab constituted an illegal arrest, rendering the subsequently seized evidence inadmissible. Further, if the initial encounter was not an arrest, whether Rivera dropping the capsules to the floor provided probable cause for their seizure and Rivera’s arrest.

    Holding

    No, the judgment of conviction is reversed and the case remanded because the hearing court must determine when the arrest occurred. If the arrest occurred when the officers initially approached the taxi without probable cause, then anything observed afterward could not validate the arrest. Yes, if the initial approach was merely a routine surveillance, Rivera dropping the capsules could establish probable cause for a subsequent arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the timing of the arrest is crucial. An arrest requires probable cause. If the arrest occurred when the officers initially blocked the taxi, at a time when they lacked probable cause, then the arrest was illegal, and the subsequent seizure of the capsules was unlawful. As the Court stated, “Thus if the arrest occurred then, nothing which thereafter happened could validate the arrest or justify an incidental search.” However, the court acknowledged that police officers have the right to conduct routine surveillance. If the officers merely approached the taxi for routine questioning (as in Rios v. United States), and Rivera’s act of dropping the capsules created a reasonable belief that he possessed contraband, then that act would provide probable cause for a valid arrest. The court found Rivera’s behavior of placing the capsules on the floor after noticing the police to be significant evidence of consciousness of guilt, justifying the inference that contraband was being discarded. The court distinguished the facts from cases involving harder narcotics in opaque packaging, noting that the capsules likely contained drugs covered by the relevant statute. Because the hearing court based its denial of the motion to suppress on the erroneous ground that the police could stop a taxi at any time, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for a factual determination of when the arrest occurred.

  • People v. Hendricks, 25 N.Y.2d 129 (1969): Establishing Probable Cause Based on Informant Testimony

    People v. Hendricks, 25 N.Y.2d 129 (1969)

    An affidavit in support of a search warrant relying on information from a confidential informant must demonstrate both the informant’s reliability and the basis of the informant’s knowledge to establish probable cause.

    Summary

    This case addresses the requirements for establishing probable cause for a search warrant when relying on information from a confidential informant. The Court of Appeals held that an affidavit must demonstrate both the informant’s reliability and the basis of their knowledge. The affidavit in this case was deemed insufficient because it only established the informant’s past reliability but failed to provide any details about how the informant obtained the information about the defendant possessing a weapon and stolen property. Consequently, the evidence seized and the defendant’s subsequent admissions were suppressed.

    Facts

    Detective Mugan obtained a search warrant for John Hendricks and his residence based on an affidavit stating that a reliable informant told him Hendricks possessed an illegal revolver and stolen property. Upon executing the warrant, officers found a loaded gun and airline tickets in Hendricks’s briefcase and more weapons in his home. After being confronted with the evidence, Hendricks admitted ownership of the weapons.

    Procedural History

    Hendricks was indicted on weapons and forgery charges. The trial court suppressed the airline tickets but not the weapons. After a hearing, the court upheld the warrant’s validity. Hendricks pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor weapons charge. The Appellate Division affirmed. Hendricks appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the affidavit supporting the search warrant established probable cause based on the informant’s information.
    2. Whether the defendant’s admissions should be suppressed as fruits of an illegal search and seizure.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the affidavit only established the informant’s reliability but failed to show how the informant obtained the information about Hendricks’s possession of the weapon and stolen property.
    2. Yes, because the admissions were directly linked to the illegal search and seizure, and the taint of the illegality had not been attenuated.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the two-pronged test from Aguilar v. Texas and Spinelli v. United States, requiring the affidavit to demonstrate both the informant’s reliability and the basis of the informant’s knowledge. While Detective Mugan’s affidavit established the informant’s reliability by citing past instances where the informant provided information leading to arrests and convictions, it failed to provide any details about how the informant obtained the information about Hendricks’s possession of the weapon and stolen property. The court stated, “There must be more than an ultimate conclusion of probable cause or the affiant’s mere assertion that the information received was reliable.”

    The court distinguished this case from situations where the informant provides detailed information, suggesting firsthand knowledge, or where police independently corroborate the information. Here, the informant’s assertion was a mere conclusion, similar to the insufficient affidavits in Aguilar and Spinelli.

    The court rejected the argument that it should presume the informant saw the weapon, stating it would be impermissible, as it was in Giordenello v. United States, to presume that the informant had firsthand knowledge. A remand for a further hearing to establish the basis of the informant’s knowledge was also rejected, because “it would be manifestly unfair to the defendant to now allow the People to offer proof that the informer told the officer he saw the defendant in possession of the gun.”

    The court further held that the defendant’s admissions made after being confronted with the illegally seized items should also be suppressed. The court explained that these admissions were “tainted by the primary illegality” of the search and seizure because the link between them was “straight but short and immediate” and the taint was not attenuated.

  • People v. Perel, 34 N.Y.2d 68 (1974): Admissibility of Evidence After an Abandonment

    People v. Perel, 34 N.Y.2d 68 (1974)

    Evidence obtained after a defendant abandons property is inadmissible if the abandonment is a direct result of an unlawful arrest lacking probable cause.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction for illegal possession of narcotics, holding that the evidence (pills containing methadone) should have been suppressed. The defendant dropped an envelope containing the pills while being arrested for burglary. The court reasoned that the prosecution failed to establish probable cause for the initial burglary arrest. Consequently, any abandonment of property by the defendant stemming from that unlawful arrest could not justify the subsequent search and seizure of the envelope and its contents. Therefore, the evidence was deemed inadmissible.

    Facts

    Patrolman De Angelo arrested the defendant on a burglary charge, without an arrest or search warrant. During the arrest, the defendant dropped a white envelope with his name and address on it. The officer retrieved the envelope, felt a substance inside, and opened it, discovering two pills. The defendant told the officer the pills contained either amphetamine or dolophine. Subsequent laboratory tests revealed that the pills contained methadone, a narcotic.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County, for illegal possession of narcotics. His motion to suppress the evidence was denied after a hearing. The Appellate Term, Second Department, affirmed the judgment of conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted permission for further appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence (the envelope and pills) should have been suppressed because it was obtained as a result of an unlawful search and seizure incident to an arrest for which probable cause was not established.

    Holding

    Yes, because the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the initial arrest for burglary was supported by probable cause; an abandonment cannot justify admission of evidence if it stems from a primary illegality.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that a search without a warrant is reasonable only if incident to a lawful arrest or authorized by consent, or constitutes a valid abandonment of property. Here, there was no consent. Although the defendant dropped the envelope, the court found no valid abandonment because the prosecution failed to establish the lawfulness of the underlying arrest. The court cited People v. Malinsky, noting that to justify a warrantless search incident to an arrest, the prosecution must “go forward in the first instance with evidence to show that probable cause existed * * * in sustaining the legality of a search made, without a warrant, as incident to an arrest”. The mere dropping of an envelope, as in People v. Corrado, is insufficient to establish probable cause. Since the People failed to provide evidence of probable cause for the burglary arrest, the subsequent search and seizure were unlawful. The court reasoned that any abandonment stemming from the unlawful arrest could not validate the seizure of the evidence. As such, the evidence should have been suppressed. The dissent argued that the defendant should have specifically challenged the probable cause for the burglary arrest at the hearing, and the court should have presumed its validity.

  • People v. Hunger, 23 N.Y.2d 444 (1969): Admissibility of Evidence Obtained from Illegal Wiretaps

    People v. Hunger, 23 N.Y.2d 444 (1969)

    Evidence obtained as a direct or indirect result of illegal wiretapping is inadmissible in a criminal trial, and defendants have the right to a hearing to determine if such wiretapping occurred and if it tainted the evidence used against them.

    Summary

    Defendants were convicted of narcotics possession and bribery. They appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient, that the charges should have been severed, that the search warrant was illegal, and that they were improperly denied a hearing regarding potential illegal wiretaps. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions but remitted the case for a hearing on the wiretap issue, holding that the defendants were entitled to explore whether illegal wiretapping had tainted the evidence used against them, even if the prosecution claimed no direct evidence from the wiretaps was introduced.

    Facts

    Police obtained a search warrant for an apartment and the person of defendant Hunger based on information from a confidential informant and their own observations. The search revealed a large narcotics operation. Prior to the search, the police had been wiretapping the phone of defendant Harrison for four months. The defendants were subsequently charged with narcotics possession and bribery related to the narcotics operation.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted in the trial court. Prior to trial, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to sever the narcotics and bribery charges. During a hearing on whether the police officer perjured himself to obtain the search warrant, evidence of wiretapping emerged. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a full evidentiary hearing on the wiretaps. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, but modified the judgment and remitted the case for a suppression hearing on the wiretapping issue.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendants a full evidentiary hearing to determine if illegal wiretapping had occurred and if it tainted the evidence used against them at trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendants had a right to explore whether illegal wiretapping had led to information improperly used against them, regardless of the prosecution’s claim that no direct evidence from the taps was introduced.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred in cutting off questioning about the source of the police officer’s information and in denying the defendants a full evidentiary hearing concerning the wiretaps. The Court stated, “The representation of the District Attorney that no evidence or leads were obtained from the wiretaps cannot deprive the defendants, if they have standing, of an opportunity to test the legality of the wiretaps and whether the taps, if illegal, had led to information which was improperly used at this trial.” The court emphasized that an ex parte review of the wiretapping orders would be insufficient to protect the defendants’ constitutional rights, citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). The court remanded for a hearing where the District Attorney must disclose all wiretapping of conversations to which each defendant was a party or had standing to object. If the wiretapping orders were illegal, the court must determine if the convictions were based on tainted evidence and if a new trial is required. The Court also addressed the issue of probable cause for the warrant. It stated that even assuming the informant’s tip would not have furnished a basis for probable cause, there were the independent observations of the police officer. The court found that the officer knew that one of the apartments was occupied by a “plant girl”, and that shortly after placing a watch on the apartment building, the defendant Hunger, who had been seen at the building where the first plant had been found, was seen entering the apartment. Three other “plant girls” were also seen entering the building. The court held that this was the “abnormal activity” Justice Harlan referred to in Spinelli. This activity was highly suspicious and reinforced the probative value of the tip. Together, these circumstances constituted probable cause.