New York Law Review

Tag: probable cause

  • People v. Bryant, 37 N.Y.2d 208 (1975): Probable Cause and Second Chances at Suppression Hearings

    People v. Bryant, 37 N.Y.2d 208 (1975)

    The mere presence of empty glassine envelopes and a folded bill in a car, even in a narcotics-prone area, without more, does not constitute probable cause for arrest, and the prosecution is not entitled to a second chance to establish probable cause at a suppression hearing after failing to do so initially.

    Summary

    Bryant and Jones were arrested after a patrolman observed empty glassine envelopes and a folded $10 bill in their parked car. At the suppression hearing, the officer testified about the items and the location’s reputation for narcotics activity. Defense counsel waived cross-examination. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, finding no probable cause. The Appellate Term remitted for a new hearing, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the initial finding of no probable cause should stand and the prosecution was not entitled to a second opportunity to present evidence. The Court emphasized deference to the original judicial determination and the insufficiency of the evidence to establish probable cause.

    Facts

    A patrolman observed Bryant and Jones sitting in a parked car. He approached the vehicle and requested the driver’s license and registration. The officer saw 43 empty glassine envelopes and a folded $10 bill on the dashboard. Based on these observations, the patrolman arrested both defendants and searched them. A glassine envelope containing a white residue was found on Jones; Bryant had nothing. The $10 bill contained a white substance later determined to be six grains of cocaine. The arresting officer testified he had previously made arrests for drugs being passed in folded dollar bills and that the arrest occurred in a “narcotics prone location”.

    Procedural History

    The Criminal Court of the City of New York granted the defendants’ motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search. The Appellate Term characterized the patrolman’s testimony as equivocal and remitted the case to the Criminal Court for a hearing de novo. A dissenting justice would have affirmed the lower court’s order. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term’s order and reinstated the Criminal Court’s order granting suppression.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the observation of empty glassine envelopes and a folded bill in a car parked in a narcotics-prone area, without more, constitutes probable cause for arrest.
    2. Whether the prosecution is entitled to a second opportunity to present evidence at a suppression hearing after failing to establish probable cause initially.

    Holding

    1. No, because the mere presence of such items, without additional suspicious behavior or circumstances, is insufficient to raise the level of inference from suspicion to probable cause.
    2. No, because the People have the initial burden to establish probable cause and are not entitled to a second chance to succeed where they have already tried and failed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals deferred to the hearing court’s finding of no probable cause, noting the intermediate appellate court did not disagree with that finding. The court cited People v. Oden, stating that “the mere passing of a glassine envelope in a neighborhood in which narcotics were known to have been present, unsupplemented by any additional relevant behavior or circumstances found to exist, was insufficient to raise the level of inference from suspicion to probable cause”. The court emphasized that the arresting officer saw only containers suitable for holding narcotics, without actually observing any narcotics being exchanged or used. The court found no warrant to disturb the lower court’s finding that there was no probable cause for the defendants’ arrest. Regarding the second hearing, the Court found it improper because the original hearing was completed, and the People had a full opportunity to present evidence. The defendants chose to rest on the People’s evidence. Citing People v. Malinsky, the Court reiterated that the People bear the burden of showing probable cause to justify a warrantless search incident to arrest, and there was no justification to give them a second chance to succeed where they had already failed. The Court stated that “The People, in order to prevail, are under the necessity of going forward in the first instance with evidence to show that probable cause existed…in sustaining the legality of a search made, without a warrant, as incident to an arrest.”

  • People v. Wright, 37 N.Y.2d 88 (1975): Establishing Probable Cause for a Search Warrant Based on Informant Testimony

    People v. Wright, 37 N.Y.2d 88 (1975)

    An affidavit supporting a search warrant based on hearsay information from an informant must demonstrate both the informant’s veracity and the basis of the informant’s knowledge to establish probable cause.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction for criminal possession of a weapon. The court held that the search warrant was improperly issued because the affidavit supporting it lacked probable cause. The affidavit relied on information from an informant, James, who claimed the defendant received a stolen pistol. However, the affidavit failed to establish how James knew this information. The single observed narcotics transaction involving the defendant was insufficient to establish a likelihood of narcotics being kept on the premises. Therefore, the evidence seized during the search and the defendant’s admission of ownership should have been suppressed.

    Facts

    Police obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s apartment for narcotics or weapons based on an affidavit by Patrolman Hantz. The affidavit stated that officers saw the defendant pass a glassine envelope to a police officer under investigation for robbery. A “reliable informant,” James, stated that the officer under investigation and another person had robbed narcotics dealers of narcotics and two pistols, with one pistol given to the defendant. The affidavit didn’t explain how James knew the defendant received the pistol, or when/where it occurred.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in a jury trial for criminal possession of a weapon. His motions to suppress the pistol and his admission of ownership were denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, vacated the conviction, suppressed the evidence, and dismissed the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the affidavit provided probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant for either narcotics or weapons in the defendant’s apartment.

    Holding

    No, because the affidavit failed to establish a sufficient basis for the informant’s knowledge that the defendant possessed a stolen pistol, and the single narcotics transaction was insufficient to establish probable cause that narcotics were present in the defendant’s apartment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that when an affidavit relies on hearsay from an informant, it must satisfy two prongs: (1) the informant’s veracity and (2) the basis of the informant’s knowledge. While James’ statement against penal interest could establish his credibility, the affidavit failed to reveal the basis for his knowledge regarding the defendant’s possession of the pistol. The affidavit did not clarify whether James personally witnessed the transfer or learned about it through another source. The court cited People v. Hendricks, 25 N.Y.2d 129 (1969) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), noting that the magistrate could not rely on James’ statement without knowing its foundation.

    The court also determined that the affidavit lacked probable cause to believe narcotics were present in the defendant’s apartment. The single narcotics transaction observed by Hantz was not linked to the defendant’s residence, and it didn’t demonstrate that the defendant was a large-scale dealer or user. As the court stated, “Wright’s giving Antomez one glassine envelope did not establish him as a large-scale dealer or user likely to have narcotics on his premises.”

    Because the warrant lacked probable cause, the pistol and the defendant’s admission of ownership obtained as a result of the illegal search should have been suppressed. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and dismissed the indictment.

  • People v. Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d 549 (1975): Establishing Probable Cause with Informant Testimony for Search Warrants

    People v. Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d 549 (1975)

    An affidavit supporting a search warrant application based on information from an undisclosed informant must satisfy a two-pronged test: establishing the informant’s veracity and the basis of their knowledge, but warrants are favored and should be upheld in marginal cases.

    Summary

    This case consolidates appeals concerning the validity of search warrants based on information from confidential informants. The Court of Appeals addressed whether the affidavits supporting the warrants established probable cause, specifically focusing on the reliability of the informants and the basis of their knowledge. The court held that both warrants were valid because the affidavits provided sufficient details to establish the informants’ credibility and a basis for believing their information was accurate. The Court reiterated a preference for warrants, presuming police good faith when a warrant is secured.

    Facts

    In Hanlon, a detective obtained a search warrant based on an informant’s tip that marijuana and a weapon were located at Hanlon’s residence, along with the detective’s observation of known narcotics users entering and leaving the premises. The informant had previously provided information leading to arrests. In Rosen and Fredericks, a detective obtained warrants to search the defendants and a printing corporation based on an informant’s detailed description of an illegal football pool operation, which police surveillance corroborated. The informant had a history of providing accurate information.

    Procedural History

    In Hanlon, the County Court denied the motion to suppress the evidence. The Appellate Term affirmed on different grounds. In Rosen and Fredericks, the City Court granted the motion to suppress, finding the affidavit insufficient. The People appealed the disposition in Rosen and Fredericks.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the affidavit in Hanlon sufficiently established the timeliness of the informant’s information and the informant’s reliability.

    2. Whether the affidavits in both cases sufficiently established the basis of the informants’ knowledge.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a common-sense reading of the affidavit suggests the information was recent, and the informant had purchased narcotics from the defendant, provided accurate information previously, and the police corroborated the information.

    2. Yes, because in Hanlon, the detailed nature of the information suggested personal observation. In Rosen and Fredericks, the pattern of activity described by the informant, including specific details, was sufficiently accurate to lead to a reasonable belief that the conclusion was likewise accurate.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the two-pronged test established in Aguilar v. Texas, requiring that an affidavit based on an informant’s tip must establish both the informant’s veracity and the basis of their knowledge. The court found the Hanlon affidavit satisfactory because it indicated that the informant had purchased drugs from the defendant, which is against the informant’s penal interest. The affidavit also stated that the informant had provided accurate information previously. Furthermore, the police corroborated aspects of the informant’s information. The court cited Spinelli v. United States to explain that detailed information can suggest personal observation.

    Regarding the Rosen and Fredericks case, the court acknowledged that the defendants conceded the reliability of the informant, but the defendants challenged the basis of knowledge. The court stated, “The pattern of activity related by the informant, even to the extent of relating the time, day, place and mechanics of the operation, was of such accuracy and detail as to lead to a reasonable belief that the conclusion was likewise accurate.” The court also stated, “As the pattern unfolded the informer’s statements were reinforced by what the defendants did and the defendants’ activity was colored by what the informant said.”

    The court emphasized a strong preference for search warrants, stating that when a warrant has been secured, the good faith of the police will be presumed and the subsequent search upheld in a marginal or doubtful case. The court cautioned against reading search warrant applications in a hypertechnical manner, stating that they must be considered in the clear light of everyday experience and accorded all reasonable inferences.

    “Where a search warrant has been secured, the bona fides of the police will be presumed and the subsequent search upheld in a marginal or doubtful case.”

  • People v. McRay, 51 N.Y.2d 594 (1980): Probable Cause and Observation of Glassine Envelope Exchange

    People v. McRay, 51 N.Y.2d 594 (1980)

    The observation of a glassine envelope exchange in a high-crime area, while relevant, does not automatically establish probable cause for an arrest; additional circumstances are needed to elevate suspicion to probable cause.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression of evidence, holding that the observation of a glassine envelope exchange in a high-crime area, without more, is insufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest. A police officer, using a telescope, observed the defendant receive a glassine envelope from another individual in an area known for narcotics activity. The court emphasized that probable cause requires a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed, based on the totality of the circumstances. Since the lower court did not credit certain aspects of the officer’s testimony and found no additional suspicious behavior, the Court of Appeals deferred to the factual findings and upheld the suppression order.

    Facts

    On October 5, 1973, Officer Gervasi, part of a narcotics enforcement unit, was surveilling an area known for drug activity. Using a telescope, he saw the defendant and another person, Johnson, engage in a brief conversation. Johnson handed the defendant a glassine envelope. The officer could not ascertain the contents of the envelope. The officer testified that the defendant took a quick look at the envelope and then closed her hand in a fist.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was arrested, and evidence was seized. She moved to suppress the evidence, arguing a lack of probable cause. The Criminal Court granted the suppression motion after a hearing. The Appellate Term affirmed the Criminal Court’s order. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the observation of a glassine envelope exchange in a high-crime area, combined with the defendant’s actions after receiving the envelope, constitutes probable cause for an arrest.

    Holding

    No, because the mere passing of a glassine envelope in a high-crime area, without additional suspicious behavior or circumstances, is insufficient to establish probable cause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that probable cause requires facts and circumstances known to the officer that would warrant a prudent person in believing that an offense has been committed. The court acknowledged that a high crime rate is a relevant circumstance to be considered. However, the court deferred to the Criminal Court’s factual findings, noting that the Criminal Court did not fully credit the officer’s testimony regarding the defendant’s actions and the appearance of the envelope. The court distinguished this case from *People v. Quinones*, where a narcotics expert observed multiple glassine envelopes being exchanged at close range after suspicious interactions. Here, the court found that the observation of a single glassine envelope exchange, without more, was insufficient to elevate suspicion to probable cause. The court stated that, “the mere passing of a glassine envelope in a neighborhood in which narcotics were known to have been present, unsupplemented by any additional relevant behavior or circumstances found to exist, was insufficient to raise the level of inference from suspicion to probable cause”. The court also cited *People v. Brown*, where a high crime area, a suspected narcotic addict, and a meeting were deemed insufficient for probable cause. The Court of Appeals reiterated its limited power to review questions of fact, emphasizing its role is to determine whether the facts, as found by the lower courts, constitute probable cause as a matter of law. The court’s decision highlights the necessity of specific, articulable facts beyond generalized suspicion to justify an arrest and search.

  • People v. McRay, 51 N.Y.2d 594 (1980): Probable Cause and Observations of Glassine Envelopes

    People v. McRay, 51 N.Y.2d 594 (1980)

    Observations of glassine envelopes, even in a high crime area, are not sufficient, without more, to establish probable cause for a search and arrest, if the observed actions are susceptible of innocent interpretation.

    Summary

    McRay was arrested after a police officer observed him holding a small purse, opening it, and then handing it to a woman. The officer testified he saw what appeared to be glassine envelopes inside, but admitted he could not distinguish them from candy wrappers. The court held that the officer lacked probable cause for the arrest and search, as the defendant’s actions were susceptible to innocent interpretation. The observation of glassine envelopes, without additional suspicious behavior, was insufficient to justify a warrantless search and arrest.

    Facts

    A Housing Department patrolman, Hackett, in a high-crime area, observed McRay holding a small, zippered purse. McRay opened the purse halfway and withdrew matches. Hackett, approaching closer, thought he saw glassine envelopes in the purse. He conceded he couldn’t distinguish them from candy wrappers. McRay then handed the purse to a woman who accepted it without comment. Both were arrested, and a search of the purse revealed heroin-filled glassine envelopes.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted McRay’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding a lack of probable cause. The Appellate Division reversed. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Supreme Court’s suppression order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police officer had probable cause to arrest and search McRay based on the observation of what appeared to be glassine envelopes in a purse, coupled with the act of handing the purse to another person, in a high-crime area.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s actions were susceptible to an innocent interpretation, and the officer’s observation of the glassine envelopes, without more, did not elevate suspicion to probable cause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the observed acts were “susceptible of various innocent interpretations.” The court emphasized that more is required to establish probable cause than merely observing actions that could be innocent, even in a high-crime area or involving someone with a narcotics background. The court distinguished this case from situations where behavior is unequivocally suspicious. Here, McRay’s actions—holding a purse, taking out matches, and handing the purse to a woman—could easily be explained innocently. The officer’s testimony that he could not distinguish the glassine envelopes from a candy wrapper further weakened the basis for probable cause. The court stated, “Defendant’s actions are susceptible of innocent explanation, since he may have been handed the purse to find a match or take a piece of chocolate therefrom and then return the purse to the owner.” The court reinforced that an equivocal observation coupled with innocent actions does not create probable cause. The Court cited People v. Russell, 34 N.Y.2d 261, 264 (1974), emphasizing the need for “supplementation by any additional behavior raising the level of inference from suspicion to probable cause.”

  • People v. Lypka, 36 N.Y.2d 210 (1975): Probable Cause Based on Interstate Police Bulletins

    People v. Lypka, 36 N.Y.2d 210 (1975)

    An interstate police bulletin can provide probable cause for a warrantless search, but the prosecution must demonstrate that the sending agency possessed the requisite probable cause to act when the search is challenged in a suppression hearing.

    Summary

    Defendants were convicted of weapon possession and criminal trespass after a warrantless search of their vehicles. The search was based on an interstate police bulletin detailing weapons and stolen motorcycles believed to be in their possession. The New York Court of Appeals held that while a police officer can rely on a bulletin or alert from another officer or department, the prosecution must demonstrate that the sending agency had probable cause to issue the bulletin when a motion to suppress is made. Because the prosecution failed to establish the Pennsylvania authorities’ basis for the information, the case was remitted for a new suppression hearing.

    Facts

    Undersheriff Brewer of Seneca County received a call from Detective Holhman of the Lancaster, Pennsylvania Police Department, stating that the defendants were en route from Lancaster to Interlaken, NY, with specified weapons and stolen motorcycles. The detective provided detailed descriptions of the vehicles. A teletype message containing the same information was sent to the State Police Headquarters in Albany. Deputies and State Troopers converged on the Lypka residence without arrest or search warrants. The defendants purportedly consented to a search of their vehicles, which revealed contraband and weapons.

    Procedural History

    The County Court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding the defendants had consented to the search. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding probable cause and applying the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. One justice dissented, arguing for the necessity of a warrant. The New York Court of Appeals withheld determination of the appeal and remitted the case to the County Court for further proceedings on the motion to suppress.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an interstate police bulletin alone can furnish probable cause for a warrantless motor vehicle search, such that evidence found during that search is admissible.

    Holding

    No, not without further substantiation. The determination of the appeal was withheld and the case remitted to the County Court because the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the Pennsylvania authorities possessed the necessary probable cause to support a search for weapons and stolen property.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged that a police officer is entitled to act on the strength of a police bulletin or alert from another officer or department, and to assume its reliability, citing Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U. S. 560, 568. The court noted that “where the bulletin or alert, prima facie, furnishes probable cause, a reasonable search is permissible. In such circumstances the sender’s knowledge is imputed to the receiver and, when the receiver acts, he presumptively possesses the requisite probable cause to search.” However, the court emphasized that this presumption disappears when a motion to suppress is made, and the action is challenged. “At that point, bare reliance on an unsubstantiated hearsay communication from the instigating officer or department will not suffice for probable cause.”

    The court stated that the prosecution must demonstrate that the sender or sending agency itself possessed the requisite probable cause to act. Because the record lacked any proof that the Pennsylvania authorities had probable cause, the resulting search was not sustained by the proof. The court also considered the potential danger to the public safety given the nature of the reported items (weapons) and found that the immediate police response was reasonable. The court stated: “That protection of the public may have been accomplished by less intrusive means does not itself render the search unreasonable.”

    The court distinguished the case from situations where the receiver’s independent observations confirm the sender’s information and emphasized that the circumstances called for an immediate response. The court determined that the failure to seek a warrant did not make the search unreasonable. The court emphasized practical considerations, stating that it “would be unreasonable to expect or to require that the basis for the bulletin, be it the report of an eyewitness to a crime, the report of an informer, or whatever, be broadcast with the bulletin.”

  • People v. Seney, 39 N.Y.2d 527 (1976): Establishing Probable Cause for Eavesdropping Warrants

    People v. Seney, 39 N.Y.2d 527 (1976)

    Probable cause for an eavesdropping warrant exists when an affidavit details specific facts linking individuals to criminal activity, even if the affidavit also contains extensive background information.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the initial eavesdropping warrant issued for Raymond Seney was supported by probable cause. Investigator Whelan’s affidavit detailed extensive surveillance linking Seney and others to a large-scale burglary ring. While the affidavit included considerable background information, it also contained specific instances indicating Seney’s involvement, such as renting a house under a false name near burglary sites, his apprehension near stolen property, and suspicious behavior while casing estates. The court found that these specific facts, coupled with background information establishing a sophisticated burglary operation, provided sufficient probable cause, validating subsequent warrants based on evidence obtained from the initial warrant.

    Facts

    In 1970, Raymond Seney and Salerno moved from Florida to Greenwich, Connecticut, renting a house under a false name and covering the windows. During their five-month occupancy, 32 burglaries with a similar modus operandi occurred in Greenwich and neighboring Westchester County. Seney was apprehended near a safe stolen during a burglary. Police observed Seney driving repeatedly through estate neighborhoods, suggesting he was “casing” the homes. Salerno was also seen crouching near a stone fence of one estate. Furthermore, telephone toll calls from Seney’s phone correlated with the De Witt Wallace burglary and connected him with alleged members of the burglary ring.

    Procedural History

    The State Police Investigator obtained an eavesdropping warrant targeting Raymond Seney. Evidence from this warrant led to subsequent warrants. The defendant appealed the issuance of the initial warrant arguing it lacked probable cause. The Appellate Division upheld the warrant, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the affidavit submitted by the State Police Investigator provided sufficient probable cause to justify the issuance of the initial eavesdropping warrant directed at Raymond Seney.

    Holding

    Yes, because the affidavit detailed specific facts and circumstances linking Seney to a large-scale burglary ring, providing a sufficient basis for probable cause despite the inclusion of extensive background information.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the affidavit was “inartistically drafted” and contained a mass of undifferentiated background material, it also presented specific instances indicative of Seney’s complicity in the burglary ring. These instances included Seney and Salerno renting a house under a false name near burglary sites, Seney’s apprehension near stolen property, and his suspicious behavior “casing” estates. The court acknowledged that the background material, while extensive, was relevant in establishing the scope of the police investigation into a sophisticated burglary ring and the necessity of an eavesdropping warrant as required by former Code Crim. Pro., § 816, subd. 4 and CPL 700.15, subd. 4. The court stated that “the defect, however, does not defeat a warrant otherwise based on probable cause.” Because the initial warrant was properly issued, the evidence derived from it provided a valid basis for the subsequent warrants. The court emphasized the importance of considering the totality of the circumstances presented in the affidavit, including both the specific facts and the background information, to determine whether probable cause exists. The court implied that a purely technical or hyper-critical reading of the affidavit would be inappropriate in the context of a complex criminal investigation. This approach aims to balance individual rights with the need for effective law enforcement in combating sophisticated criminal enterprises.

  • People v. Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d 182 (1975): Establishing Probable Cause for a Search Warrant Based on Informant Testimony

    People v. Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d 182 (1975)

    Probable cause for a search warrant can be established when an informant’s tip is corroborated by independent police investigation, even if the independently observed conduct is, by itself, innocuous.

    Summary

    Hanlon was convicted of possessing gambling records after a search of his car, which was conducted with a warrant. The warrant was based on an affidavit from a police officer who stated a confidential informant told him they saw bets being accepted at a steel plant and passed to Hanlon. The officer also saw an unknown person leave the plant and drop a package near the fence, which Hanlon retrieved on multiple occasions. While the officer’s observations alone might not establish probable cause, they corroborated the informant’s information, thus establishing the informant’s reliability. The New York Court of Appeals held that the corroboration of the informant’s information elevated Hanlon’s conduct from innocuous to suspicious, justifying the issuance of the search warrant. The conviction was reinstated.

    Facts

    A confidential informant told a police officer that bets on horse races were being accepted inside a steel plant and then passed through the fence to Hanlon.

    The officer independently observed an unidentified person leaving the steel plant and dropping a package by the fence on numerous occasions.

    The officer observed Hanlon pick up these packages.

    Based on this information, the officer obtained a search warrant for Hanlon’s car.

    Procedural History

    The City Court denied Hanlon’s motion to suppress the evidence found during the search.

    Hanlon was convicted in City Court of possessing gambling records.

    The County Court reversed the conviction, holding that the motion to suppress should have been granted.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the County Court’s order and reinstated the City Court’s conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the affidavit supporting the search warrant established probable cause based on the information provided by a confidential informant and corroborated by independent police observation.

    Holding

    Yes, because the officer’s independent observations corroborated the informant’s information in significant detail, establishing the informant’s reliability, and elevated Hanlon’s observed conduct from innocuous to suspicious.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while Hanlon’s observed conduct alone might be considered innocuous, the independent observations of the officer corroborated the informant’s tip, establishing the reliability of the informant. The Court cited People v. Coffey, noting the importance of independent verification of an informant’s tale. The court stated, “Thus, there was such an independent verification and separate objective checking of the informer’s tale as was sufficient to establish the reliability of the informer in this instance.” The Court emphasized that the informant’s information, combined with the officer’s observations, transformed Hanlon’s conduct from unusual to highly suspicious. This combination provided the necessary probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant. The Court also dismissed Hanlon’s argument that he was entitled to a transcript or summary of the informant’s testimony before the issuing judge, as the affidavit itself was sufficient to establish probable cause.

  • People v. Darden, 34 N.Y.2d 177 (1974): Establishing Probable Cause with Confidential Informants

    People v. Darden, 34 N.Y.2d 177 (1974)

    When probable cause for an arrest hinges on information from a confidential informant, and the defendant challenges the informant’s existence or reliability, the trial court should conduct an in camera inquiry to verify the informant’s existence and the basis of their knowledge while protecting the informant’s identity.

    Summary

    In this case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the issue of establishing probable cause for an arrest based on information provided by a confidential informant. The defendant, arrested based on an informant’s tip, challenged the refusal to disclose the informant’s identity at a suppression hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s order upholding the refusal to disclose the informant’s identity but outlined a procedure for an in camera inquiry by the suppression judge to verify the informant’s existence and reliability. This inquiry aims to balance the defendant’s right to challenge probable cause with the public interest in protecting informants.

    Facts

    On December 24, 1969, Rochester police arrested the defendant at the Rochester airport after he arrived on a flight from New York City. The police seized an attaché case he was carrying, and a search revealed a substantial quantity of heroin. The arrest was based on information from a previously reliable informant who described the defendant’s appearance and indicated he would be carrying an attaché case. The informant had named individuals who provided the information, and the police knew the informant to be reliable based on prior tips leading to drug arrests and convictions. Prior to the informant’s tip, police received an anonymous tip about a large heroin shipment and learned from street inquiries that the local heroin supply was low.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a dangerous drug. At the suppression hearing, the trial court upheld the District Attorney’s refusal to disclose the informant’s identity and denied the motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search. The defendant then pleaded guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the District Attorney’s refusal to disclose the identity of the confidential informant deprived the defendant of a fair hearing on the issue of probable cause for the arrest.

    Holding

    No, because while the informant’s identity need not be disclosed, in cases where probable cause relies solely on an informant’s communication, the suppression judge should conduct an in camera inquiry to verify the informant’s existence and reliability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the importance of protecting the anonymity of police informants to ensure a continued flow of information crucial to effective law enforcement, citing Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59. However, the court also recognized the defendant’s right to challenge the basis of probable cause for their arrest. Balancing these competing interests, the Court of Appeals proposed a new procedure for cases where probable cause hinges on an informant’s communication. The suppression judge should conduct an in camera inquiry, requiring the prosecution to produce the informant for interrogation. The prosecutor may be present, but not the defendant or their counsel. Defense counsel can submit written questions for the judge to ask the informant. The judge must then make a summary report, available to both the defendant and the prosecution, regarding the informant’s existence and the substance of their communication to the police. The transcript of the in camera testimony is sealed for appellate review. This procedure is designed to protect against the possibility that the informant is imaginary or the communication fabricated while preserving the informant’s anonymity. The court stated that “Assuring the desirable flow of useful information to the police will, of course, depend on predictable and reliable assurances that anonymity of informers will be preserved.” To the extent that this new procedure departs from prior decisions requiring the issue of probable cause be determined solely on the basis of a record fully available to the defendant, the court acknowledged this and indicated that they would depart from those prior decisions.

  • People v. Nieves, 36 N.Y.2d 496 (1975): Limits of ‘Premises’ Search Warrants

    People v. Nieves, 36 N.Y.2d 496 (1975)

    A warrant authorizing the search of a premises and any person found “therein” does not extend to the search of a person who is observed leaving the premises just prior to the warrant’s execution.

    Summary

    Police obtained warrants to search two apartments and any persons found “therein.” Detectives observed Nieves leaving one of the apartments, stopped him in the hallway, and searched him, finding heroin. The New York Court of Appeals held that the search was not authorized by the warrant because Nieves was not found “therein” (inside the apartment) when the search occurred. The court emphasized that a search warrant’s authority is strictly limited to the place described in the warrant, stopping at the threshold. The case was remitted to determine if probable cause existed for the arrest and search independent of the warrant.

    Facts

    Detectives obtained search warrants for two apartments based on surveillance and information from an informant who had previously provided reliable information.

    One warrant related to an apartment occupied by “Vino” at 72-74 East 119th Street, and another related to an apartment occupied by Betty Lucas at 36 West 138th Street.

    The warrants authorized the search of the apartments, the occupants, and any other person who may be found inside the apartments.

    Two days later, detectives went to the Lucas apartment to execute the warrant.

    As they proceeded along the third-floor hallway, they saw Nieves leaving the Lucas apartment.

    Detectives stopped and searched Nieves, finding a package of heroin.

    Nieves was arrested and charged with criminal possession of a dangerous drug.

    Procedural History

    Nieves moved to suppress the evidence seized from him, arguing the search was unlawful.

    The trial court denied the motion.

    Nieves pleaded guilty.

    The case was appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the trial court’s decision.

    The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the “Vino” warrant, authorizing a search of the person of “Vino,” could be executed anywhere, justifying the search of Nieves?

    2. Whether the Lucas warrant, authorizing the search of the apartment and any person “found therein,” justified the search of Nieves after he exited the apartment but before detectives entered?

    3. Whether, if the search was beyond the scope of the warrants, it could be sustained as incident to a lawful arrest.

    Holding

    1. No, because the “Vino” warrant was tied to a specific location and did not authorize a search of “Vino” wherever he might be found.

    2. No, because “therein” means inside the apartment, and the authority to search stops at the threshold.

    3. The issue of whether the search was incident to a lawful arrest was not determined at trial; thus, the case was remitted for further proceedings.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the “Vino” warrant, when read in conjunction with the underlying application, limited the search authority to the premises where the contraband was believed to be.

    The authority to search individuals, including the occupant, extended only to those who might reasonably be expected to conceal contraband on their persons while inside the premises.

    Regarding the Lucas warrant, the court emphasized that the authority to search is limited to the place described in the warrant. “To put it another way ‘therein’ means therein and the authority to search stops at the threshold.”

    The court rejected the argument that observing Nieves leaving the apartment justified a search at some remote location.

    The court acknowledged that the search could still be valid if it was incident to a lawful arrest, but this issue required a determination of probable cause independent of the warrants, which had not been addressed by the trial court. The court noted the importance of the prosecution presenting evidence to establish probable cause independent of the warrants:

    “[T]he People bear the initial burden of ‘going forward in the first instance with evidence to show that probable cause existed both in obtaining a search warrant and in sustaining the legality of a search made, without a warrant, as incident to an arrest.’”