New York Law Review

Tag: probable cause

  • Martin v. City of Albany, 42 N.Y.2d 13 (1977): Establishing Malice in Malicious Prosecution Claims

    Martin v. City of Albany, 42 N.Y.2d 13 (1977)

    A jury may infer actual malice, a necessary element of a malicious prosecution claim, from the absence of probable cause to initiate criminal proceedings, especially when the parties were strangers at the time the proceedings began.

    Summary

    Elizabeth Martin sued the City of Albany and Officer Deso for malicious prosecution after being arrested and acquitted of obstructing justice. The jury awarded her damages, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding no showing of malice. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s dismissal, holding that a jury could infer malice from the lack of probable cause for the arrest. However, because the Appellate Division also found the verdict against the weight of the evidence, the Court of Appeals ordered a new trial, respecting the constitutional right to a jury trial.

    Facts

    Elizabeth Martin, while driving home with her husband, stopped to assist an acquaintance pulled over by police. Officer Deso arrived and, without allowing Mrs. Martin to explain, allegedly pushed her, twisted her arm, and arrested her. Her husband intervened and was also arrested. Both Martins were charged with obstructing justice, based on Officer Deso’s account that Mrs. Martin refused to move to the sidewalk and Mr. Martin blocked the arrest. The Martins were acquitted after a jury trial.

    Procedural History

    Mrs. Martin sued the City of Albany and Officer Deso for unlawful arrest, assault, and malicious prosecution. A jury found no cause of action on the husband’s claims or the wife’s assault claim, but awarded Mrs. Martin damages for unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment against the husband, reduced the damages for unlawful arrest, and dismissed the malicious prosecution claim. Mrs. Martin appealed the dismissal of her malicious prosecution claim to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented by the plaintiff was legally sufficient to sustain a jury verdict in her favor for malicious prosecution.
    2. If the evidence was sufficient, whether the Appellate Division properly dismissed the complaint on the facts.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find a lack of probable cause, from which they could infer malice.
    2. No, because when reversing a judgment for the plaintiff based on the facts, the Appellate Division is constitutionally precluded from dismissing the complaint and must order a new trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    To establish malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant commenced or continued a criminal proceeding; (2) the proceeding terminated in the plaintiff’s favor; (3) no probable cause existed for the proceeding; and (4) the proceeding was instituted with actual malice. The court focused on the element of malice, noting it’s rarely proven directly, especially when the parties are strangers. It cited the Restatement of Torts § 669, stating that “[l]ack of probable cause for the initiation of criminal proceedings, in so far as it tends to show that the accuser did not believe in the guilt of the accused, is evidence that he did not initiate the proceedings for a proper purpose.” The court emphasized that a jury may infer malice from the lack of probable cause.

    The Court of Appeals found sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude there was no probable cause to arrest Mrs. Martin, thus permitting an inference of malice. While the Appellate Division can overturn a verdict against the weight of evidence, it cannot dismiss the complaint in a case triable by jury as of right; it must order a new trial. To reinstate the jury verdict would require the Court of Appeals to improperly review the Appellate Division’s factual determination. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and granted a new trial on the malicious prosecution claim.

  • People v. Wirchansky, 41 N.Y.2d 130 (1976): Probable Cause and Informant Tips in Search Warrants

    People v. Wirchansky, 41 N.Y.2d 130 (1976)

    A search warrant based on an informant’s tip must disclose the underlying facts from which the informant concluded illegal activity was occurring; otherwise, police observations must independently establish probable cause, and a suspect’s reputation alone is insufficient to justify a search.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed an Appellate Division order, holding that a search warrant issued for Stephen Wirchansky lacked probable cause. The warrant was based on an affidavit from a police officer, which included information from a confidential informant and police surveillance. The court found that the affidavit failed to meet the requirements established in Aguilar v. Texas because it did not disclose the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded illegal gambling activities were taking place. Furthermore, police observations of Wirchansky’s actions were deemed consistent with innocent behavior and insufficient to independently establish probable cause, even when combined with his prior arrest record.

    Facts

    A police officer obtained a search warrant based on an affidavit that included information from a confidential informant stating that gambling paraphernalia was being left in the common hallway of a building and picked up by Stephen Wirchansky. The affidavit also stated that Wirchansky was a known policy runner and had been arrested for gambling activities 20 days prior. Police conducted surveillance and observed Wirchansky driving to the location, entering the hallway for a few minutes, and then leaving. This pattern was repeated over several days.

    Procedural History

    The County Court granted Wirchansky’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search. The Appellate Division reversed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the suppression of evidence.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the affidavit supporting the search warrant provided sufficient probable cause, considering the informant’s tip, police surveillance, and Wirchansky’s prior record.

    Holding

    No, because the informant’s tip failed to disclose the underlying circumstances for their conclusion, and the police observations were consistent with innocent activity; thus, there was not enough information to justify the warrant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the two-pronged standard established in Aguilar v. Texas, which requires that the magistrate issuing the warrant be informed of (1) the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that illegal activities were taking place, and (2) the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant was credible or reliable. While the affidavit satisfied the informant reliability prong, it failed to disclose any underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that Wirchansky was engaged in gambling activities. The court emphasized that the purpose of the Aguilar requirement is to allow a “neutral and detached magistrate” to determine independently whether the informant was justified in their conclusion.

    The court distinguished the case from Spinelli v. United States, where similar observations of a suspect’s conduct were deemed insufficient to corroborate an informant’s tip. While the affidavit contained specific information about the location of the gambling paraphernalia (a mailbox in the hallway), it failed to explain how the informant obtained this knowledge. The court reasoned that the information could have been obtained from a casual remark and, therefore, did not amount to probable cause.

    The court acknowledged that seemingly innocent conduct could indicate illegal activity to a trained police officer, but emphasized that such instances are unusual, and the police officer’s expertise is generally not enough to justify a search of one engaged in seemingly innocent conduct. The court quoted People v. Brown, stating, “[T]he detected pattern, being only the superficial part of a sequence, does not provide probable cause for arrest if the same sketchy pattern occurs just as frequently or even more frequently in innocent transactions.”

    Finally, the court stated that while Wirchansky’s criminal reputation was relevant, it was not enough alone to save the warrant. Citing Spinelli, the court noted that a suspect’s reputation may not be used “to give additional weight to allegations that would otherwise be insufficient.” The court distinguished between instances where the underlying circumstances disclosed by the informant are merely lacking in detail (which can be bolstered by police observations) and instances where the informant’s tip does not disclose any circumstances of the criminal activity (in which case the police observations must independently establish probable cause).

    The Court held that the informant’s tip and the defendant’s reputation should not elevate activities susceptible to an interpretation of innocent activity to probable cause. The Court stressed that such a result would allow for probable cause for a search “every time the police receive an informant’s tip that a ‘known criminal’ is going to a particular location for criminal purposes.”

  • People v. Brown, 40 N.Y.2d 183 (1976): Warrant Based on Informant’s Reliability Established by In-Person Examination

    40 N.Y.2d 183 (1976)

    When an informant appears before a magistrate considering a search warrant application, the magistrate can assess the informant’s credibility in person, and the traditional requirement for the officer to vouch for the informant’s reliability is unnecessary.

    Summary

    This case concerns the validity of a search warrant based on information provided by a confidential informant who appeared before the issuing magistrate. A police officer applied for a search warrant based on information from an informant who claimed to have seen drugs and handguns in an apartment. The informant was brought before the judge, who spoke with him off the record and then issued the warrant. The subsequent search yielded narcotics, weapons, and cash. The defendant, arrested at the scene, argued the warrant was invalid because the officer didn’t establish the informant’s reliability in the warrant application. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the warrant’s validity, holding that the magistrate’s in-person assessment of the informant obviated the need for the officer to vouch for the informant’s credibility.

    Facts

    A police officer applied for a search warrant for an apartment based on information from a registered police informant.

    The informant told the officer he saw drugs being packaged and handguns at the apartment on two occasions: September 5, 1972, and again on September 20, 1972.

    The officer provided the informant’s registration number and presented the informant to the judge, who spoke with him off the record.

    The warrant was issued, and a search of the apartment yielded cocaine, heroin, revolvers, drug paraphernalia, and approximately $5,000 in cash.

    The defendant, Albert Brown, was arrested at the apartment.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search, arguing the warrant was invalid.

    The motion to suppress was denied without a hearing.

    The defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a dangerous drug in the fourth degree, satisfying an indictment charging him with weapon and narcotics offenses.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a search warrant application is valid when based on hearsay information from a confidential informant who appears before the issuing magistrate, even if the police officer does not independently establish the informant’s reliability in the application.

    Holding

    Yes, because when the informant is presented to the court for examination, the court can determine credibility without the officer needing to vouch for the informant’s reliability. The court’s direct examination of the informant serves as an adequate substitute for the traditional requirement of establishing the informant’s credibility through the officer’s testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test for assessing hearsay information from an informant: (1) the informant’s basis of knowledge and (2) the informant’s credibility. The court noted that the first prong was satisfied because the informant claimed to have personally seen the drugs and weapons. Addressing the second prong, the court acknowledged that the officer’s testimony did not independently establish the informant’s reliability.

    However, the court reasoned that the traditional requirement to establish an informant’s reliability is a substitute approach used when the informant is not identified to the magistrate. When the informant appears before the court, the magistrate can assess credibility directly. The court emphasized that the judge noted on the record that the informant’s information “tallies” with that provided by the police officer and can be read “in a commonsense manner”.

    The court also addressed concerns about the informant’s statements not being under oath, stating that there were “adequate safeguards against the rendition of false information” because the informant could be prosecuted for falsely reporting an incident. The court also relied on the preference to be accorded warrants when the resolution of the case was “doubtful or marginal”.

    The dissenting judges argued that the constitutional requirement of “oath or affirmation” was not met for establishing the informant’s reliability because the informant’s statements to the judge were unsworn and unrecorded. They expressed concern that the decision could allow prosecutors to circumvent the requirement of proving an informant’s reliability by simply producing the informant in person before the magistrate without any sworn testimony.

  • People v. Williams, 41 N.Y.2d 762 (1977): Establishing Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt in Disorderly Conduct Cases

    People v. Williams, 41 N.Y.2d 762 (1977)

    To sustain a conviction for resisting arrest or disorderly conduct, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the legality of the underlying arrest and the defendant’s specific actions constituting resistance or disorderly behavior.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest, finding the prosecution failed to establish her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecution did not adequately prove the basis for her brother’s arrest, which she was accused of resisting, and the evidence of her resisting her own arrest was insufficient. The officer’s testimony regarding the disorderly conduct charge was too ambiguous to prove she failed to comply with a lawful order to disperse.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested for disorderly conduct and resisting the arrest of her brother and her own arrest. The arrest occurred outside a building. The specifics of the events leading to the arrest, particularly the reasons for her brother’s arrest, were not clearly established during the trial.

    Procedural History

    The case was initially heard at a lower court, which convicted the defendant. The defendant appealed. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the conviction and reversed the lower court’s decision, dismissing the information.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant resisted her own arrest.

    2. Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant resisted the lawful arrest of her brother, including establishing a legal basis for that arrest.

    3. Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of disorderly conduct for failing to comply with a lawful order to disperse.

    Holding

    1. No, because there was insufficient evidence that the defendant resisted her own arrest outside the building.

    2. No, because the prosecution failed to prove the basis for the underlying arrest of her brother, as required by Penal Law § 205.30.

    3. No, because the police officer’s testimony about what he said to the defendant was too ambiguous to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that she was guilty of disorderly conduct.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on all charges. Regarding the charge of resisting her brother’s arrest, the court emphasized the requirement under Penal Law § 205.30 that the prosecution prove the legality of the underlying arrest. The court noted the prosecution made no effort to establish the basis for her brother’s arrest, and the trial court even sustained the prosecutor’s objection when the defendant attempted to elicit this information. The court stated, “[S]peculation and conjecture are no substitute for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” As to the disorderly conduct charge, the court found the officer’s testimony too ambiguous to establish that the defendant failed to comply with a lawful order to disperse, as required by Penal Law § 240.20, subd 6. The court focused on the lack of concrete evidence and the ambiguity of the testimony, reinforcing the high standard of proof required for criminal convictions. The court implied that a lawful order must be clear and understandable to support a conviction for failing to obey it.

  • People v. Hicks, 38 N.Y.2d 90 (1975): Probable Cause Based on Identified Citizen Informant Testimony

    People v. Hicks, 38 N.Y.2d 90 (1975)

    A search warrant may be issued based on the sworn statement of an identified citizen informant who provides firsthand information regarding criminal activity, without requiring independent corroboration of the informant’s reliability.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a search warrant was validly issued based on the sworn affidavit of a named citizen informant who detailed firsthand observations of the defendant’s criminal activity. The court distinguished this situation from cases involving confidential informants, where the informant’s reliability must be independently established. The court reasoned that citizen informants, who report crime out of civic duty, are inherently more reliable than underworld informants and their sworn statements can directly establish probable cause without requiring corroboration. This decision upholds the importance of citizen involvement in law enforcement and provides a practical framework for assessing probable cause based on identified informant testimony.

    Facts

    Kenneth Leone, an 18-year-old, provided a sworn affidavit to police detailing his observations at Douglas Hicks’ residence. Leone stated that he was in Hicks’ bedroom, where Hicks admitted to stealing a safe during a burglary. Hicks opened the safe, revealing marijuana and fireworks. Hicks also claimed that stereo equipment in the room and a new engine/bucket seats for his car were stolen. Leone’s affidavit included his name, address, and telephone number.

    Procedural History

    Based on Leone’s affidavit, a search warrant was issued for Hicks’ residence. Evidence found during the search led to Hicks being indicted for burglary and grand larceny. Hicks’ motion to controvert the search warrant was denied. He pleaded guilty to petit larceny charges, satisfying all indictment charges and a separate charge in District Court. The Appellate Term affirmed the convictions.

    Issue(s)

    Whether probable cause existed to support the issuance of the search warrant based solely on the sworn affidavit of an identified citizen informant, without independent corroboration of the informant’s reliability.

    Holding

    Yes, because the affidavit was a sworn statement of an identified member of the community attesting to facts directly and personally observed, which sufficiently supports the issuance of a search warrant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the traditional two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test (requiring a showing of the informant’s reliability and basis of knowledge) does not apply when the affidavit is based on the direct observations of a named citizen informant. The court distinguished this situation from cases involving confidential informants, where the police officer is repeating a story told to him by a “reliable” informant; instead, the information furnished the court came directly from the informer’s sworn statement. The court stated, “Unlike Aguilar and Spinelli, the affiant in this case is not a police officer repeating a story told to him by a ‘reliable’ informant; instead, the information furnished the court came directly from the informer’s sworn statement, without the benefit of filtering by the police.” The court emphasized that citizen informants are inherently more reliable than underworld informants because they act out of civic duty and without expectation of personal gain. The court also noted the safeguards against false information, including the risk of prosecution for false statements and civil liability for malicious prosecution. The court concluded that requiring independent corroboration of a citizen informant’s sworn statement would be absurd and would denigrate the character of public-spirited citizens. The court emphasized that such civic-mindedness should be encouraged and applauded.

  • People v. Belton, 55 A.D.2d 694 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976): Automobile Exception to Warrant Requirement After High-Speed Chase

    55 A.D.2d 694 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976)

    A warrantless search of an automobile is permissible under the Fourth Amendment if there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband, especially when coupled with a high-speed flight from police.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of attempted possession of marijuana after police searched his car and found a large quantity of the drug. The search occurred after police observed a passenger with what appeared to be a marijuana cigarette and the defendant subsequently led police on a high-speed chase. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, suppressing the evidence. This court reversed, holding that the observation of the marijuana cigarette, coupled with the high-speed flight, provided probable cause for the search under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The court emphasized that the mobility of vehicles and the lesser expectation of privacy justify warrantless searches when probable cause exists.

    Facts

    Two plainclothes officers observed the defendant’s car at a traffic light. The passenger was seen holding what appeared to be a marijuana cigarette. When an officer approached the car and identified himself, the defendant accelerated rapidly, leading the police on a high-speed chase through city streets. After being stopped, the passenger fled, and the defendant was arrested. An officer searched the car, found the registration in the glove compartment, and then opened the trunk where he discovered a large duffel bag containing approximately 50 pounds of marijuana.

    Procedural History

    The defendant pleaded guilty to attempted possession of a dangerous drug after his motion to suppress the marijuana was denied. The Appellate Division reversed, suppressing the evidence. The People appealed to this court.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the warrantless search of the defendant’s automobile was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment given the observation of a marijuana cigarette and the subsequent high-speed chase.

    Holding

    Yes, because the observation of what appeared to be a marijuana cigarette, coupled with the defendant’s flight from the police, established probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband, justifying a warrantless search under the automobile exception.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches and seizures. The ultimate standard is reasonableness, which depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. While warrantless searches are generally unreasonable, the automobile exception, originating in Carroll v. United States, allows for the warrantless search of a vehicle if there is probable cause to believe it contains contraband. The court distinguished this case from Coolidge v. New Hampshire, noting that the initial confrontation occurred on a public highway. The court also considered the defendant’s flight, stating that while flight alone is of slight value in determining guilt at trial, it is an important factor reinforcing a belief that a vehicle contains additional contraband. The court stated: “True, it has been said that flight, as evidencing consciousness of guilt, is of ‘slight value, and of none whatever unless there are facts pointing to the motive which prompted it’… Instead, the standard is probable cause, that is, whether all the facts and circumstances would lead a prudent police officer to believe that the vehicle contained contraband”. Finally, the court emphasized that one has a lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile than in one’s home and that, since the police could have searched the vehicle at the station house, the immediate search on the scene was not invalid. The court concluded that requiring the police to take the vehicle to the station house would be impractical and offer no additional protection to the defendant. Therefore, the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

  • People v. Washington, 46 N.Y.2d 116 (1978): Establishing Probable Cause for Wiretap Orders

    People v. Washington, 46 N.Y.2d 116 (1978)

    To sustain wiretap and eavesdropping orders, probable cause must be established on the face of each application, without relying on unexpressed assumptions or placing an undue burden on defendants to analyze the bases for prior orders.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision to vacate convictions obtained through wiretap and eavesdropping orders. The court held that the orders, obtained during a District Attorney’s investigation of police involvement in illegal gambling, were unsustainable because they relied on unacceptable premises, including unstated connections between evidence, judicial recollection of prior orders’ bases, and an unreasonable burden on defendants to decipher the justification for the orders. The court acknowledged that guilty defendants might escape punishment, but emphasized the importance of upholding procedural justice.

    Facts

    The New York County District Attorney’s office conducted an investigation into police involvement in illegal gambling operations. During the investigation, the DA obtained 107 wiretap and eavesdropping orders. The legality of these orders was later challenged.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division vacated the convictions that were based on evidence obtained through the wiretap and eavesdropping orders. The People appealed this decision to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether wiretap and eavesdropping orders can be sustained when probable cause is not evident on the face of each application, and instead relies on presumptions about connections between evidence, judicial recollection of prior orders’ bases, and an unreasonable burden on defendants to analyze the justifications for the orders.

    Holding

    No, because sustaining the orders would require unacceptable presumptions about the linking of evidence, judicial recollection, and the defendant’s ability to understand the unexpressed basis for the orders. It would also place an intolerable burden on the persons for whose protection the restrictions on wiretapping and eavesdropping orders have been imposed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that sustaining the wiretap and eavesdropping orders required several unacceptable presumptions. First, that connections between evidence could be pieced together despite changes in federal and state law. Second, that the judge signing the orders recalled the bases of prior orders and understood them to be the basis for subsequent orders, even without explicit indication. Third, that reviewing courts and defendants would understand the unexpressed basis upon which the orders had been granted, and that defendants would have a fair opportunity to analyze those bases. The court stated that “None of these presumptions reflect reality and in any event would place an intolerable burden on the very persons for whose protection the restrictions on wiretapping and eavesdropping orders have been imposed.” The court acknowledged that this decision might allow guilty parties to escape conviction, but emphasized that such is the cost of maintaining procedural justice. The court further justified its holding by noting the considerable time that had passed since the crimes and that the issues concerned a gap between older law and current statutory and decisional law. The court concluded that reversing the Appellate Division to “save the prosecutions” would create a damaging precedent by violating fundamental principles of procedural justice.

  • People v. Slaughter, 37 N.Y.2d 596 (1975): Establishing Probable Cause for Search Warrants Based on Informant Testimony

    People v. Slaughter, 37 N.Y.2d 596 (1975)

    A search warrant may be issued based on hearsay information from a confidential informant if the affidavit establishes both the informant’s credibility and the reliability of the information provided, and independent police observations corroborate the informant’s statements.

    Summary

    Slaughter was convicted of drug possession and unlawful possession of an unregistered rifle after a search of his hotel room pursuant to a warrant. The warrant was based on an affidavit from a police officer relying on information from a confidential informant. Slaughter challenged the warrant, arguing the informant’s information was inaccurate. He also moved for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence from two officers who participated in the raid. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the warrant was properly issued because the affidavit established the informant’s credibility and the information’s reliability, and the “new” evidence was not compelling enough to warrant a new trial.

    Facts

    A police officer obtained a search warrant for Slaughter’s hotel room based on an affidavit stating that a confidential informant had provided information that Slaughter possessed and was selling narcotics and possessed a gun in specific rooms of the Ebony Hotel. The informant was described as reliable, having previously provided information leading to arrests and narcotics seizures. The officer also stated that he had personally observed known narcotics sellers entering the hotel lobby and proceeding to the rooms indicated by the informant. Slaughter presented hotel receipts showing he was out of town on dates the informant claimed to have witnessed the sales.

    Procedural History

    Slaughter was convicted in the trial court. He moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search, arguing the warrant lacked probable cause. The trial court denied the motion after an in camera examination of the informant. After the jury found him guilty, Slaughter moved for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The trial court also denied this motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. Slaughter appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by leave of a judge of that court.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the affidavit provided probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant, considering the information provided by the confidential informant and the alleged inaccuracies in the dates of the reported observations.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in denying Slaughter’s motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence from two police officers who participated in the raid.

    Holding

    1. No, because the affidavit established both the informant’s credibility and the reliability of the information, which was further corroborated by independent police observations.

    2. No, because the newly discovered evidence did not create a probability that a different verdict would have resulted had the evidence been presented at trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the two-pronged test from Aguilar v. Texas, requiring the affidavit to demonstrate both the informant’s veracity and the reliability of the information. The court found the informant’s credibility was established by the fact that the informant had previously supplied information leading to arrests and narcotics seizures. The reliability of the information was bolstered by the officer’s independent observation of known narcotics sellers entering the hotel and proceeding to the rooms identified by the informant. This provided a “substantial basis” for believing the informant.

    Regarding the discrepancy in dates, the court deferred to the trial judge’s finding after an in camera examination of the informant, concluding the inaccuracy did not undermine the informant’s credibility or the officer’s good faith reliance on the information. The court distinguished People v. Alfinito, clarifying that a defendant is only entitled to challenge the truthfulness of allegations in an affidavit when attacking the veracity of the police officer affiant, not merely the credibility of the informant.

    The court held that the newly discovered evidence, consisting of testimony from two additional police officers, did not warrant a new trial. The court pointed out that even if believed, the officer’s testimony merely provided an inconsistent version of events and did not directly contradict the evidence that Slaughter was found with contraband behind a locked door. The court quoted the trial judge who stated the defendant did not meet “the statutory requirement that the new evidence must ‘create a probability that had such evidence been received at the trial the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant.’”

  • People v. Schmoll, 417 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1979): Marital Privilege and Exceptions for Threats; Probable Cause for Arrest

    People v. Schmoll, 417 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1979)

    The marital privilege, a testimonial privilege, does not prevent police from acting on information provided by a spouse, especially when it involves threats against the spouse and children; such information, coupled with a consensual house search, can establish probable cause for arrest.

    Summary

    In this case, the defendant was convicted of criminal possession of dangerous drugs (marijuana) and illegal possession of a sawed-off shotgun. The police acted on information from the defendant’s wife about threats he made against her and their children, along with her consent to search the house. The search revealed the shotgun. The Court of Appeals held that the marital privilege did not bar the police from acting on the wife’s information to protect herself and her children. The Court reversed the marijuana conviction because the wife’s testimony, which was barred by the marital privilege, was the only evidence supporting that charge. However, the shotgun conviction was upheld because there was independent credible evidence to support it.

    Facts

    The defendant’s wife informed the police about threats made by the defendant against her and their children. She also consented to a search of their home. During the search, police discovered a sawed-off shotgun. Based on the wife’s information and the discovery of the shotgun, the police arrested the defendant. A subsequent search of the defendant’s person revealed lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD).

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court of criminal possession of dangerous drugs (marijuana) and illegal possession of a sawed-off shotgun. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the marital privilege precluded the police from acting on information provided by the defendant’s wife and conducting a search consented to by her.
    2. Whether the information provided by the wife and the subsequent house search provided probable cause for the defendant’s arrest.
    3. Whether there was sufficient evidence, independent of the wife’s testimony, to convict the defendant of the marijuana offense.

    Holding

    1. No, because the marital privilege is a testimonial privilege and does not prevent the police from acting on information provided by a spouse, especially when it involves threats.
    2. Yes, because the wife’s disclosures and the discovery of the sawed-off shotgun during the consensual search provided a reasonable belief that the defendant had committed a misdemeanor.
    3. No, because without the wife’s testimony, there was insufficient evidence to convict the defendant of the marijuana offense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the marital privilege, as codified in CPLR 4502(b), is a testimonial privilege, not a universal “gag” rule. The wife’s disclosures to the police were made to protect herself and her children from the defendant’s threats, creating an exception to the privilege. The court emphasized that the police had a duty to act on this information. While the threats alone might not have justified an arrest, the wife’s disclosures combined with the discovery of the illegal shotgun during the consented search provided probable cause to believe the defendant had committed a misdemeanor, namely illegal possession of the shotgun, under Penal Law § 265.05(3). This lawful arrest then justified the incidental search that revealed the LSD. The court explicitly stated the wife’s disclosures were “exceptions to the privilege, which in any event is a testimonial privilege and not a universal ‘gag’ rule.” Regarding the marijuana conviction, the court found that the only evidence supporting it was the wife’s testimony, which was inadmissible due to the marital privilege; therefore, that conviction could not stand. The court also noted that, despite imperfections in the trial, the irregularities were either not properly preserved or were harmless in light of the admissible evidence. The court found credible evidence from witnesses other than the wife that the defendant had possessed the shotgun, justifying the inference that he possessed it in the home he jointly occupied with his wife until two days before his arrest.

  • People v. Singletary, 37 N.Y.2d 311 (1975): Search of Student Based on Reliable Informant Information

    People v. Singletary, 37 N.Y.2d 311 (1975)

    A search of a student by a school official is permissible under the Fourth Amendment if based on concrete, articulable facts provided by a reliable informant, even if the informant’s identity is not disclosed.

    Summary

    Singletary was adjudicated a youthful offender after a search by a high school dean revealed heroin. The search was prompted by a student informant who had previously provided accurate information leading to drug-related arrests and convictions. Singletary argued the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights under the precedent of People v. Scott D. and that he should have been able to elicit the informant’s identity at the suppression hearing. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the adjudication, distinguishing Scott D. based on the reliability of the informant and emphasizing that an in camera examination of the informant adequately protects the defendant’s rights.

    Facts

    A high school dean responsible for security was approached by a student informant who stated Singletary possessed and was selling narcotics on school property.
    The informant had provided similar information on five prior occasions, each leading to the seizure of narcotics.
    The students named by the informant in those prior instances were subsequently arrested and convicted of drug-related charges.
    The dean searched Singletary and found 13 glassine envelopes containing heroin in his sock.

    Procedural History

    Singletary was adjudicated a youthful offender in the Criminal Court of the City of New York based on a guilty plea to attempted possession of a narcotic drug.
    Appellate Term affirmed the judgment.
    Singletary appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by leave of a judge.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the search of Singletary by the school dean violated his Fourth Amendment rights, considering the information was provided by a student informant.
    Whether Singletary was entitled to elicit the identity of the student informant at the suppression hearing.

    Holding

    No, because the dean acted on concrete, articulable facts supplied by an informant whose reliability had been proven by the accuracy of previous communications.
    No, because the defendant’s rights are adequately protected by an in camera examination of the informant by the hearing judge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished this case from People v. Scott D., where the information was imprecise and the informant’s reliability was not established. In Singletary’s case, the informant had a proven track record of providing accurate information leading to arrests and convictions.

    The court relied on People v. Darden and People v. Goggins, which held that a defendant is not necessarily entitled to learn the identity of an informant at a probable cause hearing, especially when probable cause rests solely on the informant’s information. The court stated that when probable cause is the issue, as opposed to guilt, the defendant’s rights are amply protected by an in camera examination of the informant by the hearing Judge. The court noted that no in camera examination was requested in this case.

    “The rule enunciated by Chief Judge Breitel in Scott D. was designed to prevent teachers or other school officials from exercising ‘arbitrary power’ by engaging in ‘random causeless searches’ based upon unfounded ‘equivocal suspicion’.” The court found that the search in this case was not arbitrary but based on reasonable suspicion supported by a reliable informant.