New York Law Review

Tag: Private Placement Adoption

  • Matter of Sarah K., 66 N.Y.2d 223 (1985): Enforceability of Extrajudicial Adoption Consents

    Matter of Sarah K., 66 N.Y.2d 223 (1985)

    In private placement adoptions, an extrajudicial consent to adoption becomes irrevocable 30 days after the commencement of the adoption proceeding, provided the biological parents are notified of the proceeding and the consent form advises them of the limited nature of their right of revocation.

    Summary

    Warren and Christine K., the biological parents of Sarah K., a child with Down’s Syndrome, released Sarah for adoption shortly after her birth. They signed “irrevocable consent” forms. On the eve of a hearing concerning the adoption, the biological parents sought to revoke their consent. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the consents were valid and enforceable. The Court held that under the circumstances, the defects in the consent process did not harm the biological parents, and their “irrevocable consent” must be honored, reversing the lower court’s order to return Sarah to them and granting the adoption petition.

    Facts

    Sarah K. was born to Warren and Christine K. in November 1983 and diagnosed with Down’s Syndrome. Shortly after the birth, the parents decided they could not keep the child and contacted an individual who found adoptive homes for Down’s Syndrome children. They assured her they only wanted to find a home and wanted to accomplish the adoption immediately. The biological father, an attorney, did not seek independent counsel, assuming the adoptive parents’ attorney represented both parties in an uncontested proceeding. The biological parents signed two consent forms captioned “Irrevocable Consent,” which included a statement that they believed the adoptive parents were more capable of raising the child due to her Down’s Syndrome. More than two weeks passed between receiving the forms and signing them. The biological parents later sought to revoke their consent, arguing they were not properly notified of their revocation rights.

    Procedural History

    The adoptive parents commenced adoption proceedings in Family Court, Suffolk County. The biological parents attempted to revoke their consent before the hearing, claiming they were confused about their revocation rights. The Family Court initially determined that the consent procedures deprived the biological parents of their right of revocation and ordered a best interests hearing. After the best interests hearing, the Family Court determined that adoption by the adoptive parents served Sarah’s best interests. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the statute unconstitutional and concluding the consent forms misled the biological parents. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, granting the adoption petition.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Domestic Relations Law § 115-b requires that extrajudicial adoption consents notify the biological parents of the limited nature of their right of revocation, and that their 30-day revocation period runs from notice to them of the commencement of an adoption proceeding.

    Holding

    Yes, because Domestic Relations Law § 115-b requires that extrajudicial adoption consents notify the biological parents of the limited nature of their right of revocation, and that their 30-day revocation period runs from notice to them of the commencement of an adoption proceeding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals interpreted Domestic Relations Law § 115-b to require that extrajudicial consent forms advise biological parents of the effect of their act, so they are fully informed of their limited rights should they choose to make a timely revocation. The Court reasoned that the 30-day revocation period begins when the biological parents are notified of the commencement of an adoption proceeding. While the statute itself may have been defective, the biological parents were not injured by any omission or defect in the consent process. The Court emphasized the legislative intent behind Domestic Relations Law § 115-b, which was to add certainty and finality to adoption proceedings, protecting the interests of all parties involved: biological parents, adoptive parents, and most importantly, the child. The court noted, “The law recognizes that consent implicates not only the very fundamental interests of birth parents, whose decision initiates the process, but also the child’s substantial interests in a stable, continuous home environment, and those of third parties, the adoptive parents, who but for the consent would not have become involved.”

  • In re Daniel C., 63 N.Y.2d 927 (1984): Sufficiency of Consent Forms in Private Placement Adoptions

    In re Daniel C., 63 N.Y.2d 927 (1984)

    In private placement adoptions, a consent form signed by the natural mother must fully inform her of her rights and the consequences of executing the form, including the extent of her right to revocation, to comply with statutory requirements and due process.

    Summary

    This case concerns a natural mother’s attempt to revoke her consent to a private placement adoption. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the mother lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statutory provisions because her attorney conceded she wasn’t misled by the consent form. The dissent argued the consent form was statutorily and constitutionally deficient for failing to adequately inform the mother of her rights, particularly regarding revocation, and that the attorney’s statement should not be construed as a binding admission.

    Facts

    A college senior, Claire C., became pregnant and, to keep it a secret from her family, decided to place the child for adoption after birth. She chose a doctor late in her pregnancy who connected her with prospective adoptive parents (Mr. and Mrs. S.) and an attorney. Three days after the baby, Daniel C., was born, Claire C. turned him over to the prospective adoptive parents’ representative. About six weeks later, she signed an “irrevocable consent” form at her attorney’s office. The form stated the consent would become irrevocable thirty days after the commencement of adoption proceedings unless written notice of revocation was received by the court within those thirty days. Later, Claire C. decided to revoke her consent and notified her attorney, filing a formal revocation notice with the court six days after the adoptive parents initiated adoption proceedings.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate’s Court denied the natural mother’s request to withdraw her consent and ordered the adoption petition to proceed. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the mother lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the relevant statutes because her attorney stated she was not claiming to be misled by the consent form. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the consent form executed by the natural mother complied with the requirements of Section 115-b of the Domestic Relations Law and satisfied basic concepts of due process, specifically regarding the disclosure of her rights and the consequences of signing the form, including the limitations on her right to revoke consent.

    Holding

    No. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision without reaching the constitutional or statutory questions, holding that the natural mother lacked standing to raise these issues because her attorney conceded she was not misled by the form.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority did not address the merits of the statutory and constitutional arguments. They focused solely on the procedural issue of standing, stating that because the appellant’s counsel conceded she was not misled by the consent form, the adoptive parents were foreclosed from introducing evidence of her awareness of the statute’s provisions. Thus, she lacked standing to challenge the form’s sufficiency.

    The dissenting judge, Jasen, argued that the mother *did* have standing and would have reversed the lower courts. Jasen focused on Domestic Relations Law § 115-b, emphasizing that it dictates the requirements for valid private placement consents. The dissent contended that the consent form failed to adequately inform the mother that revocation wouldn’t automatically return the child, that the adoptive parents could oppose revocation, and that the court would ultimately decide the child’s fate based on the child’s best interests, without any presumption favoring the natural mother. The dissent argued the form was misleading because it stated the consent becomes irrevocable 30 days after the adoption proceeding commences “unless written notice of revocation thereof shall be received by this Court within said thirty days,” but failed to mention the limitations on that right of revocation as detailed in DRL § 115-b(1)(d)(ii). According to the dissent, the consent form must *explicitly* state that even with timely revocation, it will only be given effect if the adoptive parents don’t oppose and the court determines revocation is in the child’s best interests. The dissent cited Assemblyman Pisani’s memorandum, arguing that the legislative intent was to ensure the natural mother would be “fully informed as to the consequences of her action and of her right of revocation.” Furthermore, the dissent argued that the consent form was constitutionally infirm as it did not clearly and fully inform the natural mother of the consequences of her actions, thereby violating due process. The dissent noted that “The right of a mother to her offspring is so fundamental that it cannot be abridged except by the most exacting compliance with due process.”