New York Law Review

Tag: private clubs

  • New York State Club Assn. v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 211 (1987): Defining ‘Distinctly Private’ Clubs Under Anti-Discrimination Law

    New York State Club Assn. v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 211 (1987)

    A municipality can define ‘distinctly private’ for purposes of its anti-discrimination laws, even if the state’s general human rights law doesn’t provide a specific definition, as long as the local law is consistent with the state law’s broader purpose and doesn’t conflict with existing state regulations or policies.

    Summary

    The New York State Club Association challenged New York City’s Local Law No. 63, which defined criteria for determining whether a private club was truly ‘distinctly private’ and thus exempt from the city’s anti-discrimination laws. The law stated that clubs with over 400 members providing regular meal service and receiving business-related payments from non-members were not ‘distinctly private.’ The Association argued the law was inconsistent with the state’s Human Rights Law and violated members’ constitutional rights. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the local law, finding it consistent with the state law’s purpose of preventing discrimination and a valid exercise of the city’s police power. The court reasoned that the state’s failure to define ‘distinctly private’ allowed the city to create its own definition to address specific local concerns.

    Facts

    New York City enacted Local Law No. 63 to address discrimination in private clubs. The law defined a club as not ‘distinctly private’ if it had more than 400 members, provided regular meal service, and received payments from non-members for business purposes. The New York State Club Association, representing numerous private clubs, sued the city, arguing the law was unconstitutional. Many of these clubs, according to the plaintiff’s affidavit, were intentionally organized along national origin, religious, ethnic, and gender lines.

    Procedural History

    The New York State Club Association initiated the lawsuit immediately after the Mayor signed Local Law No. 63, seeking a judgment declaring the law unconstitutional. The lower courts upheld the law. The New York State Club Association then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Local Law No. 63 is inconsistent with the State Human Rights Law, violating the “home rule” provision of the New York State Constitution?

    2. Whether Local Law No. 63 violates the club members’ rights to privacy, free speech, and association under the Federal Constitution?

    Holding

    1. No, because the State’s failure to define ‘distinctly private’ indicates a legislative intent to allow local governments to enact definitions consistent with the broad term and the local law supplements but does not contradict the state law.

    2. No, because the law does not unduly infringe on the club members’ freedom of intimate association, as it considers objective characteristics of the organizations, and any infringement on free speech rights is justified by the compelling governmental interest in eliminating discrimination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the state’s Human Rights Law did not preempt the field of anti-discrimination legislation and that the city had the authority to regulate in this area as long as the regulation was consistent with state law. The court distinguished this case from situations where local laws prohibit what is permissible under state law, noting that the state’s Human Rights Law did not mandate an exemption for clubs meeting the criteria in Local Law No. 63. The court stated: “Indeed, the State’s failure to define the term ‘distinctly private’ suggests a legislative intent to allow local governments to enact pursuant to the municipal home rule power definitions that are not inconsistent with the meaning of this broad term.”

    Regarding the constitutional challenge, the court found that the law did not violate the members’ rights to privacy, free speech, or association. The court applied the Supreme Court’s framework from Roberts v. United States Jaycees, noting that the city’s interest in eliminating discrimination was a compelling governmental interest that justified any incidental infringement on protected rights. The court quoted Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984) stating that the City has a compelling interest in assuring to women and minorities equal access to “advantages” and “privileges” such as “‘[leadership skills, * * * business contacts and employment promotions’”. The court also emphasized that the law was narrowly tailored to achieve its purpose, affecting only clubs that were large and engaged in substantial business-related activities with non-members.

  • People v. Hardy, 47 N.Y.2d 500 (1979): Licensing Requirements for Private Clubs Selling Alcohol

    People v. Hardy, 47 N.Y.2d 500 (1979)

    Private clubs that sell alcohol to members are subject to the same licensing requirements as other establishments under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, and a club’s private status does not automatically exempt it from local ordinances prohibiting public nuisances.

    Summary

    The defendants, officers of the Fellowmen Community Development Corporation (a private club), were charged with selling alcohol without a license and maintaining a public resort that disturbed the neighborhood’s peace. The New York Court of Appeals held that private clubs selling liquor are not exempt from state licensing laws. The court also found that whether the club was a “public resort” under the city code was a factual question, not a matter of law, and the city code provision was not unconstitutionally vague. The lower courts erred in dismissing the charges. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

    Facts

    The defendants incorporated the Fellowmen Community Development Corporation, operating it as a private club where liquor was sold. A police officer purchased a membership for one dollar and bought alcoholic beverages on the premises. Another officer observed the sale of liquor and large, noisy crowds at the club during early morning hours.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were arrested and charged with violating the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law and the Rochester Municipal Code. The Rochester City Court dismissed the charges, holding that the laws did not apply to private clubs. The Monroe County Court affirmed, also citing speedy trial concerns. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a private club selling liquor only to members is exempt from New York’s liquor license requirements under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law.
    2. Whether private clubs fall outside the scope of a municipal code prohibiting the maintenance of a public resort that disturbs the peace, comfort, or decency of a neighborhood.
    3. Whether the municipal code provision is unconstitutionally vague.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law applies to any “person” (including corporations) selling alcohol, with no exemption for private clubs.
    2. No, because whether a private club is a “public resort” under the municipal code is a question of fact that depends on how it’s operated.
    3. No, because the code provides an objective standard for measuring disturbance to a neighborhood’s peace, comfort, or decency.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law clearly intends to regulate all alcohol sales, defining “person” to include corporations and “sale” to include any transfer for consideration. The statute also includes specific provisions for “licensed clubs,” implying that all clubs selling alcohol must be licensed. To allow unlicensed clubs to sell alcohol would undermine the law’s purpose. As the court stated, “The policies and regulations established by the Legislature and by the authority pursuant to authorization by the Legislature would quickly become meaningless if their requirements could be avoided by simply incorporating as a private club”.

    Regarding the municipal code, the court determined that the code’s definition of “public resort” was broad enough to potentially include private clubs, depending on whether the club was operating in a way that the public had a right to go there. The court emphasized that the focus is not on the club’s organizational structure but on its actual operation. The court found the municipal code provision was not vague because it provided an objective standard for measuring disturbance, referencing the impact on the neighborhood’s peace, comfort, or decency, rather than subjective feelings. The court noted the provision essentially prohibits disturbance of the peace, or disorderly conduct, laws which have previously been upheld against vagueness challenges. The court remanded the case for a factual determination of whether the club was, in reality, a public resort causing a disturbance.