New York Law Review

Tag: Privacy

  • Harbatkin v. New York City Dept. of Records & Info. Servs., 19 N.Y.3d 370 (2012): Balancing Privacy Interests and Public Access to Historical Records Under FOIL

    Harbatkin v. New York City Dept. of Records & Info. Servs., 19 N.Y.3d 370 (2012)

    Under New York’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), when deciding whether disclosing information constitutes an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, courts must balance the privacy interests at stake against the public interest in disclosure, and the government cannot break a promise of confidentiality made to individuals, even after a significant period has passed.

    Summary

    An historian sought unredacted transcripts of interviews conducted by the New York City Board of Education during its “Anti-Communist Investigations” in the mid-20th century. The City had redacted names and identifying information, citing privacy concerns. The Court of Appeals held that while names of individuals mentioned in the transcripts (but not interviewed) should be disclosed due to the diminished privacy concerns over time, the identities of interviewees who were promised confidentiality should remain protected to uphold the government’s promise, balancing the interests of historical transparency and individual privacy. This case clarifies the application of FOIL exemptions for privacy interests in the context of historical records.

    Facts

    The New York City Board of Education conducted “Anti-Communist Investigations” from the 1930s to the 1960s, intensely during the 1940s and 1950s, interviewing approximately 1,100 individuals. Interviewees were promised confidentiality. An historian, whose parents were targets of these investigations, sought access to the City’s records. The City’s Department of Records and Information Services redacted names and identifying information under a rule requiring redaction unless the person or their heirs consented to disclosure. The historian rejected the City’s offer to access unredacted files if she agreed not to publish names, and filed suit to compel disclosure without redaction.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the City could redact the documents to avoid an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The Appellate Division affirmed. The historian appealed to the Court of Appeals as of right, arguing a constitutional issue, and also moved for permission to appeal. The Court of Appeals retained the appeal as of right but ultimately dismissed it on constitutional grounds, granted the motion for permission to appeal, and modified the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under New York’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), the City’s redaction of names and identifying information from transcripts of the Board of Education’s Anti-Communist Investigations, to protect the privacy of individuals mentioned or interviewed, constitutes an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, considering the historical context and promises of confidentiality.

    Holding

    No, in part and yes, in part. The redaction of names of individuals mentioned in the interviews, but not promised confidentiality, is not permissible because the privacy interest has diminished over time. Yes, the redaction of names and identifying details of interviewees who were promised confidentiality is permissible because the government must uphold its promise, even after a long period.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court applied Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (b), which allows agencies to deny access to records that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Because none of the specific examples of unwarranted invasion of privacy in Public Officers Law § 89 (2) (b) applied, the Court balanced the privacy interests against the public interest in disclosure, citing Matter of New York Times Co. v City of N.Y. Fire Dept., 4 NY3d 477, 485 (2005). The Court reasoned that the privacy interests of those merely mentioned in the interviews had diminished over time because the stigma associated with being labeled a Communist had lessened. Therefore, disclosing their names would not be an unwarranted invasion of privacy. However, the Court emphasized the importance of upholding the government’s promise of confidentiality to interviewees, stating, “We find it unacceptable for the government to break that promise, even after all these years.” The Court acknowledged that the risk of harm to the interviewees or their families might be small, but the promise must be honored. The decision reflects a balancing act between historical transparency and the protection of individual privacy rights, particularly when a promise of confidentiality was made.

  • New York State United Teachers v. Brighter Choice Charter School, 18 N.Y.3d 560 (2012): FOIL Exemption for Lists Used for Fundraising

    New York State United Teachers v. Brighter Choice Charter School, 18 N.Y.3d 560 (2012)

    Under New York’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), an agency may deny access to records, including lists of names, if disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, such as when the list would be used for fundraising purposes.

    Summary

    New York State United Teachers (NYSUT) sought payroll records, including teacher names, from several charter schools via FOIL. The charter schools refused to disclose the teachers’ names, arguing it would be an unwarranted invasion of privacy because NYSUT would use the list for fundraising (i.e., soliciting membership). The New York Court of Appeals held that disclosing the names was not required under FOIL because NYSUT’s intended use of the list to solicit members constituted fundraising, triggering a FOIL exemption. The Court reasoned that the purpose for which the information is sought, not the public or private status of the individuals, determines whether the exemption applies.

    Facts

    NYSUT requested payroll records from six charter schools, including teacher names, titles, salaries, and home addresses. The charter schools partially denied the request, withholding teacher names and home addresses. NYSUT administratively appealed without success and then commenced legal action. NYSUT sought the teacher’s names, titles, and salaries. The Charter Schools agreed to provide titles and salaries but continued to withhold the names.

    Procedural History

    NYSUT commenced a hybrid CPLR article 78/declaratory judgment action in Supreme Court, seeking disclosure of the teacher’s names. Supreme Court ordered disclosure. The Appellate Division affirmed, reasoning that NYSUT dropped its request for home addresses and that the Charter Schools were required to keep basic employee information pursuant to Public Officers Law § 87 (3)(b). The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether charter schools must disclose the names of their teachers pursuant to FOIL when the requesting party intends to use the names for membership solicitation, which the charter schools argue constitutes fundraising, thus triggering an exemption to disclosure.

    Holding

    No, because NYSUT’s intent in requesting the teacher names is to expand its membership and, by extension, obtain membership dues; thus the request falls within the fund-raising exemption of Public Officers Law § 89 (2)(b)(iii).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while charter schools are subject to FOIL and must maintain a record of employee names, titles, and salaries under Public Officers Law § 87 (3)(b), there’s an exception. Under Public Officers Law § 89 (2), an agency may deny access to records if disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, including the “sale or release of lists of names and addresses if such lists would be used for commercial or fund-raising purposes.” The court relied on Matter of Federation of N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Clubs v New York City Police Dept., 73 NY2d 92 (1989), stating that it is the purpose of the solicitation that matters, not what it is called. Giving the term “fund-raising” its “natural and most obvious meaning” (Matter of Capital Newspapers, Div. of Hearst Corp. v Whalen, 69 NY2d 246, 251 [1987]), NYSUT’s intent to expand its membership and obtain dues qualifies as fundraising. The court also noted that ordering disclosure of the names would not further the policies of FOIL, which are to assist the public in making informed choices about governmental activities. The court emphasized that the purpose for which the information is sought drives the analysis. The fact that NYSUT dropped its request for addresses is irrelevant; the fundraising exemption is implicated even when only names are sought, as they can be linked to addresses through other means. The court stated, “it is precisely because no governmental purpose is served by public disclosure’ of this information that section 87 (2) (b)’s privacy exemption falls squarely within FOIL’S statutory scheme”.

  • People v. John, 508 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1986): Limits on Accessing a Victim’s Private Writings

    People v. John, 68 N.Y.2d 730, 508 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1986)

    A defendant is not entitled to a victim’s private writings about an attack if the writings are not Rosario or Brady material, are not in the prosecution’s possession or control, and the victim objects to turning them over based on personal privacy rights.

    Summary

    The defendant, convicted of attempted rape, argued that he was unfairly denied access to the victim’s personal written account of the attack. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the defendant was not entitled to the victim’s private writing because it was neither Rosario nor Brady material, was not in the prosecution’s possession, and the victim asserted her privacy rights. Although the trial court directed the victim to redact and turn over a portion of the writing, the Court of Appeals clarified that the defendant had no legal right to the unredacted document or an in camera review of it.

    Facts

    The victim, a freelance writer, wrote a personal account of the attack in Central Park two days after it occurred.

    The defendant, John, was convicted of two counts of attempted rape in the first degree.

    The defendant sought access to the victim’s personal written account, claiming it was necessary for a fair trial.

    The victim objected to turning over the document based on personal privacy rights.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ordered the victim to redact private matters from her written account and provide the redacted version to the defense.

    The victim complied with the trial court’s order.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant is entitled to a victim’s private written account of an attack when the account is not Rosario or Brady material, is not in the prosecution’s possession or control, and the victim objects to its disclosure based on personal privacy rights.

    Holding

    No, because the victim’s personal account did not qualify as Rosario or Brady material, the document was not in the People’s possession or control, and the victim objected to providing the document based on her right to privacy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the defendant failed to establish any legal basis for accessing the victim’s private writing. The court emphasized that the writing was not Rosario material (prior statements of prosecution witnesses) or Brady material (exculpatory evidence). Because the writing was not in the possession or control of the prosecution and the victim asserted her privacy rights, the People had no obligation to provide the document to the defense.

    The court acknowledged the trial court’s effort to balance the defendant’s right to a fair trial with the victim’s privacy interests by ordering redaction and partial disclosure. However, the Court of Appeals clarified that this action did not establish a right for the defendant to access the entire private writing or demand an in camera inspection of the unredacted document.

    The court stated that the defendant’s claim was based solely on “fairness” and “a right sense of justice,” which did not outweigh established legal principles protecting privacy, particularly where the document was not directly relevant to evidence presented at trial. The court noted that no foundation was presented that it was discoverable or potentially relevant in relation to evidence adduced at trial.

    The court explicitly stated, “Accordingly, the People bear no burden in this procedural and factual context to supply this material at all inasmuch as it was not in their possession or control and the victim objected to turning it over based on personal privacy rights.”

  • NY Veteran Police Assoc. v. NYC Police Dept., 61 N.Y.2d 659 (1983): Freedom of Information and Retiree Privacy

    61 N.Y.2d 659 (1983)

    The Freedom of Information Law does not require the disclosure of the home address of a retiree of a public employees’ retirement system where a statute explicitly prohibits such disclosure, especially when the statute is made retroactive to pending cases.

    Summary

    The New York Veteran Police Association sought to obtain the names and addresses of all retired New York City police officers receiving pensions through a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request. The lower courts initially differed on whether this information should be disclosed. However, while the appeal was pending, New York amended its Public Officers Law to explicitly prevent the disclosure of retirees’ home addresses. The Court of Appeals held that the amendment applied retroactively to pending cases, thus preventing the release of the requested information and reversing the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Facts

    The New York Veteran Police Association, a not-for-profit organization serving retired police officers, requested the names and addresses of all New York City Police Department retirees receiving pensions.
    The request was made under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL).

    Procedural History

    Special Term denied the Association’s application and dismissed the petition.
    The Appellate Division reversed, granting the requested relief.
    While the appeal to the Court of Appeals was pending, the Public Officers Law was amended to prevent the disclosure of retirees’ home addresses.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the amendment to the Public Officers Law, which prohibits the disclosure of retirees’ home addresses and which became effective while the case was pending appeal, applies to the Association’s request for information.

    Holding

    Yes, because the amendment explicitly states that it applies to any request for information for which there had been no final determination on the effective date, including judicial review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the explicit language of the amendment to the Public Officers Law (L 1983, ch 783), which added a new subdivision 7 to section 89. This new statute specifically stated that FOIL does not require the disclosure of the home address of a retiree of a public employees’ retirement system.
    The critical factor was the amendment’s retroactive application: “Its provisions provide that it was to take effect immediately and to apply to any request for information for which there had been no final determination on the effective date, ‘including judicial review.’”
    Because the case was still pending before the Court of Appeals when the amendment became effective, the court concluded that the amendment applied to the proceeding, effectively foreclosing any relief to the petitioner, the New York Veteran Police Association. The court emphasized that the legislature’s intent was clear in applying the amendment to cases still under judicial review, demonstrating a policy decision to protect the privacy of retirees’ home addresses even in ongoing legal disputes.

  • People v. Morhouse, 21 N.Y.2d 66 (1967): Standing to Challenge a Wiretap

    People v. Morhouse, 21 N.Y.2d 66 (1967)

    A defendant has standing to challenge the validity of a wiretap and subsequent search if the defendant’s own privacy was violated, but not merely because evidence obtained from the violation of another person’s rights incriminates the defendant.

    Summary

    Morhouse was convicted of conspiracy based on evidence obtained from a wiretap on a phone not belonging to him and a search of premises he did not own. The New York Court of Appeals considered whether Morhouse had standing to challenge the legality of the wiretap and search. The court held that a defendant has standing only when their own privacy rights have been violated, not when evidence against them is derived from violations of another’s rights. Because Morhouse failed to demonstrate a violation of his own privacy, the court held that he lacked standing to challenge the wiretap and search.

    Facts

    The essential facts are that evidence used to convict Morhouse of conspiracy was obtained from:
    1. A wiretap on a telephone that was not owned by Morhouse.
    2. A search of premises not owned by Morhouse.
    Morhouse was charged with conspiring with the owners of the phone and the possessors of the searched apartment. Morhouse challenged the validity of the wiretap and the subsequent search, arguing that they were unlawful.

    Procedural History

    The District Court convicted Morhouse. The defendant appealed, arguing he had standing to challenge the legality of the wiretap. The Court of Appeals withheld determination of the appeal and remitted the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant has standing to challenge the validity of a wiretap or search when the defendant’s own privacy was not invaded, but the evidence obtained from the wiretap or search is used against them in a conspiracy charge?

    Holding

    No, because the right to privacy is personal, and a defendant cannot complain merely because the violation of another person’s right reveals evidence incriminating them.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the essence of the Fourth Amendment is privacy and that the exclusion of evidence is a means to secure that privacy. Citing Jones v. United States, the court emphasized that restrictions on searches and seizures are for protection against official invasion of privacy. The court stated that “ordinarily, then, it is entirely proper to require of one who seeks to challenge the legality of a search * * * that he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy.” The court distinguished Jones v. United States, noting that in Jones, the defendant was required to assert possession of the contraband to establish standing, which would force him to confess to the crime. Also, the defendant in Jones had a sufficient interest in the premises searched to claim a right of privacy. In Morhouse, the court found that Morhouse did not claim ownership of the phone tapped or the premises searched, nor could he. The court noted that Morhouse’s primary concern was to avoid any contact with the phone or premises. The court concluded that Morhouse was merely a “user” of the phone, which was insufficient to establish standing under the rationale of Jones. The dissenting opinion argued that Morhouse lacked standing because his privacy was not invaded. The dissent emphasized that the fact that the wiretap revealed Morhouse’s participation in the conspiracy did not, in itself, give Morhouse standing to challenge the wiretap.