New York Law Review

Tag: Prison Contraband

  • People v. Finley, 10 N.Y.3d 647 (2008): Defining ‘Dangerous Contraband’ in Prison

    10 N.Y.3d 647 (2008)

    Small amounts of marihuana, even when possessed by inmates in detention facilities, do not automatically constitute “dangerous contraband” under New York Penal Law § 205.00(4) and § 205.25(2); rather, the item must have characteristics creating a substantial probability of causing death, serious injury, escape, or major threats to institutional safety.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether possessing small amounts of marihuana in prison constituted the felony of promoting prison contraband in the first degree. The Court held that such small amounts of marihuana do not automatically qualify as “dangerous contraband.” The Court reasoned that a broad interpretation would nullify the misdemeanor offense of promoting prison contraband in the second degree and that the legislative history indicated a narrower definition was intended. The Court emphasized that for an item to be considered “dangerous contraband,” its characteristics must create a substantial probability of causing death, serious injury, escape, or other major threats to the facility.

    Facts

    In People v. Salters, an inmate’s girlfriend was caught attempting to smuggle 9.3 grams of marihuana into a correctional facility. In People v. Finley, an inmate was found with three marihuana joints in a correctional facility. In both cases, the inmates were charged with promoting prison contraband in the first degree, a felony, based on the assertion that the marihuana was “dangerous contraband.” The prosecution argued that the marihuana could be used in a manner that endangered the safety and security of the detention facilities.

    Procedural History

    In Salters, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to reduce the charges to a misdemeanor and the Appellate Division affirmed the felony conviction. In Finley, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the felony charge but allowed a jury charge on the lesser-included misdemeanor; the Appellate Division affirmed the felony conviction. Both cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether small amounts of marihuana, such as those possessed by the defendants, constitute “dangerous contraband” under Penal Law § 205.00(4) and § 205.25(2), thereby justifying a felony conviction for promoting prison contraband in the first degree.

    Holding

    No, because the term “dangerous contraband” requires a showing that the item is likely to cause death or serious injury, facilitate an escape, or bring about other major threats to a detention facility’s institutional safety or security. The small amounts of marihuana in these cases did not meet that standard.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the statute distinguishes between “contraband” and “dangerous contraband,” with the latter carrying more severe penalties. The Court emphasized that the term “use” in the definition of dangerous contraband refers to the application or employment of the item. The Court rejected the People’s argument that any item that could lead to altercations and inmate disobedience should be considered dangerous contraband, as this would effectively nullify the misdemeanor crime of promoting prison contraband in the second degree. The Court relied on the legislative history of the prison contraband provisions, noting that the felony offense was originally intended to address items that could endanger life or limb. The Court stated, “We therefore conclude that the test for determining whether an item is dangerous contraband is whether its particular characteristics are such that there is a substantial probability that the item will be used in a manner that is likely to cause death or other serious injury, to facilitate an escape, or to bring about other major threats to a detention facility’s institutional safety or security.” The Court also noted the Marihuana Reform Act of 1977, which decriminalized possession of small amounts of marihuana, indicating a more lenient legislative approach. The Court concluded that the small amounts of marihuana in these cases did not present a substantial probability of causing the harms associated with “dangerous contraband.” Dissenting, Judge Pigott argued that in Salters, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence that the 9.3 grams of marihuana could be sold or bartered, potentially leading to violent altercations. However, Judge Pigott concurred that the trial court erred by not charging the lesser included offense.

  • People v. Motley, 69 N.Y.2d 870 (1987): Sufficiency of Information Charging Promotion of Prison Contraband

    People v. Motley, 69 N.Y.2d 870 (1987)

    An information charging a correction officer with promoting prison contraband is sufficient if it alleges the elements of the crime and the particular facts establishing its commission, even if the regulation defining the contraband applies to visitation rather than the officer’s conduct.

    Summary

    Motley, a correction officer, was charged with promoting prison contraband for selling whiskey to an inmate. The information did not specify which regulation defined whiskey as contraband. The Recorder’s Court dismissed the information, arguing that the ‘Standards for Inmate Behavior’ had not been properly filed. The County Court reinstated the information, finding 7 NYCRR former § 200.5(d), which prohibits visitors from giving alcohol to inmates, sufficient. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the information was sufficient because the visitation regulation defined whiskey as contraband, regardless of whether the regulation directly applied to correction officers. The Court emphasized that the information must state every element of the crime and provide notice to the defendant.

    Facts

    Defendant Motley, a correction officer at Elmira Correctional Facility, was accused of selling whiskey to an inmate.

    The information charging Motley did not specify the particular regulation that defined whiskey as contraband.

    Motley moved to dismiss, arguing that the “Standards for Inmate Behavior,” which he believed to be the relevant regulation, had not been properly filed with the Secretary of State.

    Procedural History

    The Recorder’s Court granted Motley’s motion to dismiss the information.

    The County Court reversed, reinstating the information.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the County Court’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an information charging a correction officer with promoting prison contraband is jurisdictionally defective if it relies on a regulation applicable to inmate visitation, rather than one specifically governing the conduct of correction officers.

    Holding

    No, because the statute only requires that the item be identified as contraband by the official action described, regardless of to whom the regulation is directed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that an information is sufficient if it states every element of the crime and the particular facts establishing the defendant’s commission of it. The Court cited CPL 100.40(1)(c) and 100.15(3), as well as People v. Hall, 48 NY2d 927, People v. Case, 42 NY2d 98, 99, and People v. Harper, 37 NY2d 96, 99. The purpose of this requirement is to provide notice to the defendant and to prevent reprosecution, citing People v. McGuire, 5 NY2d 523, 526.

    The Court found that the visitation regulation, 7 NYCRR former § 200.5(d), which prohibits visitors from giving alcohol to inmates, was sufficient to define whiskey as contraband. The Court stated, “That the regulation applied to visitation and not the behavior of inmates or correction officers is immaterial: the statute only requires that whiskey be identified as contraband by the official action described.”

    The Court addressed Motley’s argument that a correction officer would not think to examine the visitation regulations, stating that his potential ignorance of the regulation would only affect the prosecution’s claim that he acted knowingly, not the validity of the information itself.

    The Court distinguished this case from situations where the information fails to allege all the elements of the crime. Here, the information properly alleged a crime because it charged the defendant with selling an item identified as contraband by a regulation.