New York Law Review

Tag: Prior Uncharged Crimes

  • People v. Blair, 90 N.Y.2d 1003 (1997): Admissibility of Prior Uncharged Crimes as Rebuttal Evidence

    People v. Blair, 90 N.Y.2d 1003 (1997)

    Evidence of a prior uncharged crime is inadmissible to demonstrate a defendant’s bad character or criminal propensity unless it is linked to a specific material issue relating to the charged crime and its probative value outweighs its prejudicial impact; additionally, rebuttal evidence must counter some affirmative fact the defendant attempted to prove.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of drug-related crimes. His defense was that an informant planted the drugs in his closet. The prosecution called a rebuttal witness who testified that eight months prior, the defendant had sold her drugs from his apartment. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, finding that the rebuttal testimony was inadmissible because it only demonstrated the defendant’s propensity to sell drugs and did not refute his claim that he had been framed. The Court held that the prior uncharged crime evidence was inadmissible because it didn’t address a material issue raised by the defense.

    Facts

    Police, assisted by an informant, obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s apartment. During the search, police found drugs in the defendant’s bedroom closet. At trial, the defendant claimed that the informant planted the drugs to frame him. After the defense rested, the People called a rebuttal witness. The witness testified that approximately eight months before the search, the defendant had sold her drugs, retrieving them from a back room of his apartment. The defendant objected, arguing that the testimony lacked probative value and was unduly prejudicial. The trial court overruled the objection, finding the evidence relevant to “the issue of knowledge and weight.”

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted on narcotics-related charges in the trial court. He appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting rebuttal testimony regarding a prior uncharged drug transaction when the defendant’s defense was that the drugs were planted, and the testimony served only to demonstrate the defendant’s propensity to sell drugs rather than to rebut a specific fact affirmatively asserted by the defendant.

    Holding

    Yes, because the rebuttal testimony concerning an alleged drug transaction eight months before the events for which he was convicted did nothing to refute defendant’s claim that he had been framed, but merely tended to show his propensity to sell drugs.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that evidence of a prior uncharged crime is inadmissible solely to demonstrate a defendant’s bad character or criminal propensity. However, such evidence may be admissible if it is linked to a specific material issue relating to the charged crime and if its probative value outweighs its prejudicial impact. Furthermore, evidence offered in rebuttal must counter “’some affirmative fact’” which defendant attempted to prove (quoting People v. Harris, 57 N.Y.2d 335, 345, quoting Marshall v. Davies, 78 N.Y. 414, 420). In this case, the defendant’s defense was that he never possessed the drugs found in his closet; he claimed they were planted. The Court found that while evidence of prior uncharged crimes may be relevant to show intent, knowledge, or absence of mistake, these elements were not at issue in the defendant’s case. The Court reasoned that “whether defendant intended to sell the drugs, knew of their weight, or mistakenly or accidentally sold or possessed the drugs was never placed in issue by defendant.” The Court concluded that the rebuttal testimony did not refute the defendant’s claim of being framed and instead, merely demonstrated his propensity to sell drugs, violating the rule against using prior uncharged crimes as propensity evidence. The court cited People v. Crandall, 67 N.Y.2d 111, 118-119.

  • People v. Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d 40 (1988): Ex Post Facto Clause and Repeal of Corroboration Requirements

    People v. Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d 40 (1988)

    The Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution does not prevent applying a statute repealing the requirement for corroboration of a victim’s testimony in sex crime prosecutions to crimes committed before the statute’s effective date.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that repealing a law requiring corroboration of a minor’s testimony in sex crime cases could be applied retroactively without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause. Hudy was convicted of sexual abuse based largely on the testimony of underage victims for acts committed before the corroboration requirement was repealed. The court reasoned that repealing the corroboration rule was a procedural change, not a substantive one, and did not increase the punishment or alter the elements of the crime. However, the conviction was reversed due to trial errors: the admission of evidence of a prior uncharged crime and the restriction of the defendant’s ability to question investigating officers about suggestive interview techniques.

    Facts

    Defendant Hudy, a remedial math teacher, was accused of sexually abusing several elementary school students. Concerns arose after a student reported that Hudy was putting his hands down boys’ pants. An investigation revealed similar allegations from eight other boys, all students of Hudy. Hudy was indicted on multiple counts of sexual abuse and endangering the welfare of a child, involving incidents both before and after November 1, 1984.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Hudy’s motion to dismiss counts related to pre-November 1984 incidents, arguing that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibited applying the repealed corroboration rules. At trial, nine children testified against Hudy. The prosecution introduced testimony from Domenick M., alleging a prior, uncharged similar crime by Hudy. The defense was restricted from questioning the police investigators about suggestive interview tactics. The jury convicted Hudy on all charges. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the application of a statute repealing the corroboration requirement for sex offenses to crimes committed before the statute’s enactment violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a prior uncharged crime.
    3. Whether the trial court erred in restricting the defendant’s ability to cross-examine the investigating officers regarding potentially suggestive interview techniques.

    Holding

    1. No, because the repeal of the corroboration requirement is a procedural change, not a substantive one, and does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
    2. Yes, because the evidence of the prior uncharged crime was irrelevant and served only to demonstrate Hudy’s general criminal propensity.
    3. Yes, because the trial court’s restriction on questioning the investigating officers violated Hudy’s constitutional right to present a defense and confront his accusers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals addressed the Ex Post Facto Clause, noting that such laws are unconstitutional if they are retrospective and detrimental to the accused. The court distinguished between procedural and substantive changes in the law, stating that procedural changes, even if disadvantageous to the defendant, are generally not ex post facto. The repeal of corroboration laws was deemed a procedural change affecting the rules of evidence rather than the definition of the crime or its punishment. The court reasoned that the Ex Post Facto Clause is intended to protect against arbitrary and oppressive legislation, not to limit legislative control over remedies and procedures that do not affect matters of substance.

    The court found that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Domenick M., regarding a prior uncharged sexual offense. The court stated that such evidence is only admissible if it is logically linked to a specific material issue in the case and does not merely demonstrate a general criminal propensity. In this case, the court found that the testimony only served to show that Hudy had a propensity to commit such crimes, and thus, it was inadmissible.

    The court also held that the trial court erred in restricting the defense’s ability to cross-examine the investigating officers regarding suggestive interview techniques. The court stated that a defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense and confront his accusers, and that extrinsic proof tending to establish a reason to fabricate is never collateral and may not be excluded on that ground. Here, the court found that the defense had a good-faith basis for the proposed line of questioning, and that the trial court’s restriction violated Hudy’s rights.

    “[T]he constitutional provision was intended to secure substantial personal rights against arbitrary and oppressive legislation * * * and not to limit the legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do not affect matters of substance” (Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171).