New York Law Review

Tag: Prior Bad Acts

  • People v. Rojas, 97 N.Y.2d 32 (2001): Admissibility of Prior Crime Evidence After Defendant “Opens the Door”

    97 N.Y.2d 32 (2001)

    A defendant’s strategic choices during trial, such as statements made in the opening or cross-examination, can “open the door” to otherwise inadmissible evidence of prior crimes if those choices present a misleading picture that the prosecution needs to correct.

    Summary

    Rojas, an inmate, was charged with assaulting a jail guard. Before trial, the court precluded evidence of Rojas’s prior attempted assault on another inmate. During the trial, Rojas’s defense strategy focused on portraying himself as a victim of unjust treatment. He argued the harshness of his confinement in the “box” and implied he had done nothing to deserve such treatment. The prosecution then introduced evidence of the prior attempted assault to explain Rojas’s segregated status. The New York Court of Appeals held that Rojas had “opened the door” to this evidence through his defense strategy, making it admissible to correct the misleading impression he created, even though it would otherwise be inadmissible propensity evidence.

    Facts

    Enrique Rojas, while incarcerated, allegedly attempted to assault another inmate by stabbing him with a pencil. Jail personnel, deeming him dangerous, placed him in segregated custody, requiring him to wear paper clothing. Rojas refused to change his clothing, leading to a confrontation with guards. During this confrontation, Rojas punched a guard, dislocating his jaw. Rojas was indicted for the assault on the guard and the prior attempted assault on the inmate. The court severed the charges, and Rojas was tried first for assaulting the guard.

    Procedural History

    Prior to trial, Rojas moved to preclude evidence of the attempted assault on the inmate, arguing it was inadmissible propensity evidence. The trial court initially granted the motion, but allowed the prosecution to explain the paper clothing by stating Rojas’s status required it. At trial, Rojas’s defense focused on the harsh conditions of his confinement. The trial court then allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence of the prior stabbing incident. Rojas was convicted of assault. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence of Rojas’s prior alleged crime (attempted assault on another inmate) after initially precluding such evidence based on People v. Molineux, when Rojas presented a defense that portrayed him as a victim of unjust treatment.

    Holding

    Yes, because Rojas’s defense strategy created a misleading impression that needed to be corrected, he “opened the door” to the admission of the prior alleged crime. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the general rule against admitting evidence of prior crimes to show propensity, as established in People v. Molineux. However, the Court emphasized that this rule is not absolute. It stated that the trial court initially made a ruling in favor of the defendant, precluding the admission of his prior alleged bad acts. However, the defense then “sought to utilize that ruling as a sword, to his advantage, by mischaracterizing the purpose of his solitary confinement.” The Court reasoned that Rojas’s defense strategy, particularly his opening statement and cross-examination, portrayed him as an undeserving victim of mistreatment, creating a false impression. The Court emphasized that “[h]aving chosen to make an opening statement, however, the defense adopted a single theme and repeatedly expressed it during its opening statement and cross-examination of Deputy Betsey.” The Court held that by opening the door to this issue, Rojas allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence of the prior attempted assault to explain his segregated status and rebut his claim of unjust treatment. Allowing such evidence was permissible because it was necessary to correct the misleading impression and prevent the jury from acquitting Rojas based on the erroneous belief that his confinement was unjustified. The Court further stated that, “the defense cannot, on the one hand, claim that defendant had ‘done nothing wrong,’ and on the other hand, pervert the court’s preclusion order to restrain the prosecution from refuting that claim.” The Court further reasoned that there is no duty to make an opening statement, but having done so, the defense could not make the argument that the jailers were not properly performing their duty. Judge Smith dissented, arguing that defendant’s opening statement and cross-examination could not be construed as misleading the jury. Furthermore, the judge stated that the defendant did not open the door because an opening statement is not evidence.

  • People v. Gorghan, 91 N.Y.2d 729 (1998): Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts to Show Forcible Compulsion

    People v. Gorghan, 91 N.Y.2d 729 (1998)

    Evidence of a defendant’s prior uncharged acts of violence towards a complainant is admissible to prove an element of the crime under consideration, such as forcible compulsion in a rape or assault case, provided that the probative value of the evidence outweighs the potential prejudice to the defendant.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the admission of evidence regarding the defendant’s prior uncharged acts of violence toward the complainant. The defendant was indicted for several crimes, including forcible rape, sexual abuse, and assault, and was convicted of all charges except forcible rape. The Court held that evidence of prior abusive behavior is admissible to prove elements like forcible compulsion, even when the defense claims the incident never occurred. This determination hinges on a balancing test, weighing the probative value of the evidence against the potential for prejudice to the defendant.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted for forcible rape, sexual abuse, menacing, felonious assault, and criminal contempt based on incidents allegedly occurring over an 11-week period. The complainant was the defendant’s paramour. The prosecution introduced evidence of prior uncharged acts of violence committed by the defendant against the complainant to establish forcible compulsion. The defendant’s defense was that the rape never occurred and that the complainant fabricated the allegations.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was tried and acquitted of forcible rape but convicted of sexual abuse, menacing, felonious assault, and criminal contempt. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior uncharged acts of violence toward the complainant. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the defendant’s prior uncharged acts of violence toward the complainant to prove forcible compulsion, when the defendant’s defense was that the alleged incident never occurred?

    Holding

    Yes, because such evidence is admissible to establish an element of the crime, such as forcible compulsion, provided that its probative value exceeds the potential for prejudice to the defendant, and considering the relationship between defendant and complainant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that evidence of prior uncharged crimes is admissible to establish an element of the crime under consideration. The admissibility of such evidence depends on balancing its probative value against the potential for prejudice to the defendant. This determination requires a discretionary balancing of the probative value and the need for the evidence against the potential for delay, surprise, and prejudice. The court specifically noted, “Accordingly, and when appropriate — as here, in light of the relationship between defendant and complainant — evidence of a defendant’s prior abusive behavior toward a complainant may be admissible to prove the element of forcible compulsion in a rape case.” The Court found this principle applicable even when the defense asserts that the alleged crime never happened. The court reasoned that the prior acts can provide context and explain the complainant’s actions or state of mind. The Court cited People v Alvino, 71 NY2d 233, 241, People v Lewis, 69 NY2d 321, 326-327, and People v Ely, 68 NY2d 520, 529 to support its decision. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions.

  • People v. Badr, 82 N.Y.2d 86 (1993): Admissibility of Prior Sexual Misconduct Evidence

    People v. Badr, 82 N.Y.2d 86 (1993)

    Evidence of a defendant’s prior uncharged crimes and offenses is inadmissible when offered solely to demonstrate criminal propensity, and is unnecessary to prove intent when intent can be easily inferred from the charged act itself.

    Summary

    Badr was convicted of rape, sodomy, sexual abuse, and attempted robbery. The prosecution sought to introduce evidence of Badr’s prior sexual misconduct to demonstrate intent, particularly given the complainant’s admitted consensual sex with Badr after the alleged attack. The trial court allowed the evidence, leading Badr to abandon his consent defense. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding the prior misconduct evidence was improperly admitted because intent was easily inferable from the alleged acts, and the evidence served only to show Badr’s propensity to commit such crimes, which is inadmissible.

    Facts

    The complainant alleged that Badr, in her apartment building, threatened her, blindfolded her, and sexually assaulted her on the roof. Following the alleged attack, she exchanged phone numbers with Badr and arranged a subsequent meeting, during which they had consensual sex. Badr claimed the sexual encounter on the roof was consensual, and the later encounter occurred at his apartment. Badr was charged with rape, sodomy, attempted robbery, sexual abuse, and assault.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ruled that the prosecution could present testimony from four women regarding Badr’s prior sexual misconduct. Badr abandoned his consent defense as a result of this ruling. Badr was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the prosecution could introduce evidence of Badr’s prior sexual misconduct to prove intent, when intent was readily inferable from the charged acts and the evidence primarily served to show Badr’s criminal propensity.

    Holding

    No, because the prior misconduct evidence was relevant only to suggest that because Badr had engaged in sexual misconduct with others, he was likely to have committed the charged acts. The evidence was improperly admitted because intent was easily inferable from the alleged acts themselves.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that evidence of uncharged crimes is inadmissible if its sole purpose is to suggest the defendant has a criminal disposition. While intent is a valid basis for admitting prior misconduct evidence, it’s unnecessary when intent is easily inferred from the commission of the act. The court distinguished this case from situations where intent is genuinely in question. Here, the court reasoned that if the jury believed the complainant’s account, Badr’s intent to commit the charged crimes was clear from the violent acts themselves. The prior misconduct evidence, therefore, served only to bolster the complainant’s credibility by portraying Badr as a person likely to commit such acts, which is impermissible character evidence. Quoting People v. Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d 40, 56, the court noted the evidence tended to show only that “‘if defendant did it once * * * he would do it again; therefore, he probably abused the other children.’” The Court found that presenting two starkly different scenarios where credibility was the only issue made the prior misconduct evidence irrelevant to any issue other than criminal propensity. The Court concluded that the trial court’s ruling, which led Badr to abandon his consent defense, denied him a fair trial. Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Simons, Titone, Bellacosa, Smith, Levine and Ciparick concurred.

  • People v. Spotford, 85 N.Y.2d 593 (1995): Defendant’s Waiver of Right to Be Present at Ventimiglia Hearing

    People v. Spotford, 85 N.Y.2d 593 (1995)

    A defendant has a right to be present at a Ventimiglia hearing, but this right can be waived, either expressly or impliedly, if the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

    Summary

    Spotford was convicted of assault. He appealed, arguing he was wrongly absent from his Ventimiglia hearing, where the admissibility of prior bad acts was discussed. The Court of Appeals held that while defendants have a right to be present at Ventimiglia hearings because they can contribute valuable information, Spotford had waived this right. The waiver was express, as he requested to be excused, and implied, as he was aware the hearing would proceed without him and failed to object later when given the chance. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for consideration of facts and issues not previously determined.

    Facts

    Spotford was charged with assault for attacking his girlfriend and her mother with a baseball bat. The prosecution intended to use four prior bad acts as evidence. A Ventimiglia hearing was scheduled to determine the admissibility of this evidence. Spotford, wanting to avoid work conflicts, requested through his attorney to waive his appearance at the hearing. The court granted this request. The hearing proceeded in his absence, and the court ruled the prosecution could only use the evidence in rebuttal.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Spotford of assault in the second degree after a bench trial. Spotford appealed, arguing he was entitled to a new trial because he was not present at the Ventimiglia hearing. The Appellate Division agreed and reversed the conviction. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant has a right to be present at a Ventimiglia hearing regarding the admissibility of prior bad acts. And, if so, whether the defendant validly waived that right in this case.

    Holding

    Yes, a defendant has a right to be present at a Ventimiglia hearing because the defendant may have peculiar knowledge of the facts surrounding the prior bad acts that would be useful in advancing the defense. Yes, the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to be present at the Ventimiglia hearing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a defendant has a statutory and constitutional right to be present at all material stages of trial, as well as ancillary proceedings where they can contribute valuable information. Citing People v. Dokes, 79 N.Y.2d 656 (1992), the court emphasized that a defendant’s presence is crucial when the proceeding involves factual matters about which the defendant has unique knowledge. Just as in Sandoval hearings, a defendant is best positioned to deny or controvert allegations, point out errors, and provide details about prior bad acts. In this case, the court found that Spotford had indeed waived his right to be present. The waiver was express because Spotford requested it in open court through his attorney and to avoid a work conflict. This indicated he knew the hearing would proceed without him. Furthermore, the waiver was implied because, after the hearing, Spotford was given the opportunity to object to his absence but did not, implying acquiescence. The court stated: “A valid waiver of presence at trial will be implied if the record reflects that the defendant is ‘aware that trial will proceed even though he or she fails to appear’ (People v Parker, 57 NY2d 136, 141).” The Court of Appeals emphasized that the trial court wasn’t obligated to engage in further inquiry after Spotford’s express waiver, citing People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 9 (1983), stating there is no requirement for a “pro forma inquisition.” The Court prioritized a sound discretion on individual bases over a ritualistic procedure.

  • People v. Dokes, 79 N.Y.2d 656 (1992): Defendant’s Right to Be Present at Sandoval Hearing

    People v. Dokes, 79 N.Y.2d 656 (1992)

    A defendant has a right to be present at a Sandoval hearing because it is a material stage of the trial where the defendant’s peculiar knowledge about prior bad acts is essential for a fair determination of the permissible scope of cross-examination.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of drug sale and possession. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendant’s right to be present at all material stages of the trial was violated when the trial court conducted a Sandoval hearing in his absence. The Court reasoned that a Sandoval hearing requires the defendant’s presence because the defendant possesses unique knowledge about their prior bad acts that is crucial for determining the permissible scope of cross-examination, thus impacting the decision whether to testify. This right is protected by both statute and due process.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale and possession of a controlled substance following a “buy and bust” operation. Prior to jury selection, the court held a conference in the judge’s robing room regarding the defendant’s Sandoval motion to preclude the prosecution from cross-examining him about prior crimes. The defendant was not present during this conference.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial, finding that the defendant’s absence from the Sandoval hearing violated his right to be present at a material stage of the trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s right to be present at all material stages of a trial is violated when a Sandoval hearing, determining the permissible scope of cross-examination regarding prior bad acts, is conducted in the defendant’s absence.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Sandoval hearing is a material stage of the trial where the defendant’s presence is necessary to ensure a fair determination of the permissible scope of cross-examination, as the defendant possesses unique knowledge about the underlying facts of prior bad acts.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that a defendant has a statutory and due process right to be present at all material stages of a trial, including instances where their presence has a reasonably substantial relation to their opportunity to defend against the charge. CPL 260.20 mandates the defendant be present during the trial of an indictment. The Court distinguished this case from precharge conferences involving only questions of law or procedure, where the defendant’s presence is not required. The court emphasized that the Sandoval hearing is a crucial proceeding because it determines the extent to which the defendant will be subject to impeachment by cross-examination about prior bad acts if he testifies. “Given the number of factors that are relevant to the court’s decision, the potential for meaningful participation by the defendant during the determination of the merits of a Sandoval motion is apparent.” The defendant is best positioned to point out errors in the DCJS report, controvert assertions by the prosecutor regarding uncharged acts, and provide counsel with details about the underlying facts. The Court noted, “[T]he defendant’s presence will help to ensure that the court’s determination will not be predicated on the prosecutor’s ‘unrebutted view of the facts’.” Furthermore, the court’s ruling on the permissible scope of cross-examination often significantly influences the defendant’s decision to testify. Therefore, unless the defendant’s criminal history and the issues at the hearing render their presence superfluous, the hearing should not be conducted in their absence. The court concluded that the Sandoval hearing was a material stage of the trial in this case, and the defendant’s presence was required.

  • People v. Dawson, 64 N.Y.2d 1024 (1985): Scope of Cross-Examination on Prior Bad Acts

    64 N.Y.2d 1024 (1985)

    A defendant who testifies on their own behalf can be cross-examined regarding prior criminal or immoral acts that bear on credibility, provided the inquiry is made in good faith and has a reasonable basis in fact; the burden is on the defendant to seek a pretrial ruling to preclude such questioning if they believe it would be unduly prejudicial.

    Summary

    Dawson was convicted of robbery. On appeal, he argued that the prosecutor unfairly surprised him by questioning him about an unrelated bank robbery during cross-examination. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the prosecutor’s inquiry was permissible because Dawson was aware of the dismissed federal charges and could have sought a protective order before testifying. The court declined to shift the burden to the prosecutor to obtain prior court approval before questioning a defendant about unrelated criminal acts during cross-examination, distinguishing such situations from the introduction of evidence of other crimes as part of the prosecutor’s direct case.

    Facts

    Two men robbed a bar in Syracuse, New York. One of the men, identified as Dawson, took money from the bartender while the other robbed patrons. As they fled, Dawson fired at police officers. Dawson was arrested and indicted on multiple charges, including robbery and attempted murder. While awaiting trial, Dawson was released and subsequently charged in federal court with robbing a bank in Atlanta, Georgia. The federal charges were later dismissed pending the outcome of the New York indictment. The New York prosecutor was aware of the federal charges and informed Dawson’s attorney.

    Procedural History

    Dawson was convicted in the trial court on multiple counts of robbery and attempted aggravated assault. He appealed, arguing the prosecutor’s cross-examination regarding the Georgia bank robbery was prejudicial error. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Dawson then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecutor should be required to obtain prior court approval before cross-examining a defendant about unrelated criminal acts.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant is in control of the decision to testify and can seek a protective order to prevent prejudicial questioning.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished between the use of prior bad acts as evidence-in-chief and their use for impeachment purposes. When the prosecutor intends to introduce evidence of other crimes as part of the direct case, they must seek a ruling outside the jury’s presence, as established in People v. Ventimiglia. However, when the evidence is used for impeachment during cross-examination, the burden remains on the defendant to seek a protective order. The court reasoned that because the defendant controls the decision to testify, they can anticipate cross-examination on prior bad acts and seek a ruling to prevent prejudicial questioning before taking the stand. The court noted that Dawson knew about the Georgia robbery charge, even though it was dismissed, and could have raised an objection in a Sandoval motion before testifying. By failing to do so, he waived his right to an advance ruling. The court cited People v. Vidal, noting that the underlying act of a dismissed charge is a proper subject for inquiry on cross-examination. The court emphasized that a defendant cannot claim surprise when questioned about charges they were already aware of. The court found no reason to shift the burden to the prosecutor in cases where the evidence is used for impeachment purposes, as the defendant can generally prevent prejudice by seeking a pretrial ruling.

  • In re Estate of Brandon, 55 N.Y.2d 206 (1982): Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts to Prove Intent

    In re Estate of Brandon, 55 N.Y.2d 206 (1982)

    Evidence of prior similar acts is admissible to prove intent or the absence of mistake, but the degree of similarity required depends on whether the evidence is used to prove intent or the existence of a common scheme or plan.

    Summary

    In a discovery proceeding to recover property allegedly obtained through fraud and undue influence, the New York Court of Appeals considered the admissibility of evidence of prior judgments against one of the appellants for similar conduct with other elderly individuals. The Court held that while the evidence was improperly admitted under the “common scheme or plan” exception, because there was no direct connection between the acts, it was admissible to show intent, as the prior acts were sufficiently similar to negate an innocent state of mind. The Court affirmed the lower court’s order directing the appellants to return the improperly obtained assets from the decedent’s estate.

    Facts

    Alice Brandon, a frugal 75-year-old widow with terminal cancer, moved into Ann Murphy’s home, adjacent to the Friendly Acres Home for Adults, paying $600/month for room and board. Over the next eight months, Ms. Brandon became dependent on Mrs. Murphy, and her personality changed drastically. She began giving Mrs. Murphy large “gifts,” including money to purchase a Mercedes-Benz and finance a trip to Florida. Nearly $130,000 was transferred from Ms. Brandon’s accounts, reducing her net worth from $150,000 to $35,000 by the time of her death less than a year later. The executrix of Brandon’s estate initiated a proceeding to recover these assets, alleging fraud and undue influence.

    Procedural History

    The executrix brought a discovery proceeding in Surrogate’s Court. Over objection, the Surrogate allowed the executrix to introduce evidence of two prior judgments against Mrs. Murphy for similar conduct with other elderly individuals. The jury found that the appellants had obtained a significant portion of Brandon’s estate through fraud and undue influence, and the Surrogate entered a decree directing the return of the assets. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the prior judgments admissible as evidence of a common scheme or plan. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Surrogate Court erred in admitting evidence of two prior judgments decreeing that one of the appellants had engaged in fraud and undue influence in obtaining property from two other elderly individuals.

    Holding

    No, because although the evidence was improperly admitted under the common scheme or plan exception, it was admissible to show intent, and the appellants did not object to the jury charge limiting the use of the evidence to the issue of intent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the general rule against proving an act by showing similar acts on other occasions, but recognized exceptions for motive, intent, absence of mistake, common scheme/plan, and identity. The Court distinguished between the intent exception and the common scheme or plan exception. For intent, the focus is on the actor’s state of mind, and the key is the degree of similarity between the acts, not their connection. The court quoted Wigmore, stating: “the instinctive recognition of that logical process which eliminates the element of innocent intent by multiplying instances of the same result until it is perceived that this element cannot explain them all.” Conversely, the common scheme or plan exception requires a clear connection between the acts, demonstrating a common purpose. The court emphasized the difference by quoting Wigmore again: “But where the very act is the object of proof, and is desired to be inferred from a plan or system, the combination of common features that will suggest a common plan as their explanation involves so much higher a grade of similarity as to constitute a substantially new and distinct test.”

    In this case, the Court found no direct connection between the Sullivan-Metz incidents and the Brandon case, making the common scheme or plan exception inapplicable. However, the Court found that the evidence was admissible on the issue of intent because in all three situations, Mrs. Murphy brought elderly and infirm individuals into her home, gained their trust, and then stripped them of their life savings. Though these acts occurred over a period of years, the court determined that the prior acts were not so remote in time that the potential for prejudice outweighed the probative value of the evidence on the issue of intent. The court noted that the Surrogate ultimately instructed the jury to only consider the evidence of prior judgments to determine intent. Because no objection was made to that charge, the issue could not be raised for the first time before the Court of Appeals.

  • People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350 (1981): Trial Court Discretion in Sandoval Rulings

    People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350 (1981)

    A trial court retains broad discretion to determine the permissible scope of cross-examination regarding a defendant’s prior bad acts for impeachment purposes, provided that discretion is exercised after balancing probative value against the risk of prejudice.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction, holding that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in ruling that the prosecution could impeach the defendant’s credibility with prior criminal acts if he testified. The Court clarified that People v. Sandoval established a procedural mechanism for advance rulings on cross-examination scope but did not alter the fundamental principle that trial courts have broad discretion in this area. The Court emphasized appellate review is typically limited to whether the trial court committed an error of law in the pre-Sandoval sense, not whether a particular balancing process was mandated. The Court also found no error in closing the courtroom during testimony of undercover witnesses, as defense counsel did not request a hearing or dispute the need for closure.

    Facts

    The specific facts of the underlying crime are not detailed in this decision, as the appeal focuses on the admissibility of prior bad acts for impeachment purposes and the closure of the courtroom during certain testimony.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at the trial level. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then came before the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the prosecution could impeach the defendant’s credibility by cross-examining him about his prior criminal acts if he testified.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in granting the People’s request to close the courtroom during the testimony of undercover witnesses.

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court properly exercised its discretion after carefully balancing the probative worth of the evidence against the risk of prejudice, as required by People v. Sandoval.
    2. No, because defense counsel did not request a hearing or dispute the People’s contention that the witnesses would be in danger if the courtroom remained open to the public.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that People v. Sandoval did not change the pre-existing law regarding the scope of cross-examination for impeachment, which had always been committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Sandoval merely provided a procedural method for a defendant to obtain an advance ruling on the permissible scope of cross-examination. The Court emphasized that appellate review is generally limited to determining whether the trial court’s ruling was based on an error of law in the pre-Sandoval sense. The Court stated, “It is only when the ruling of the trial court has been based on an error of law in the pre-Sandoval sense that reversal in our court is warranted.”

    Regarding the courtroom closure, the Court found that defense counsel’s general objection, without requesting a hearing or disputing the People’s claim of danger to the witnesses, was insufficient to establish error on the part of the trial court. The attorney for the defendant voiced a general objection to the People’s request to close the courtroom during the testimony of the undercover detective and an informant. However, defense counsel made no request for a hearing nor did she dispute the People’s contention that the witnesses would be in danger if the general public was not excluded.

  • People v. Preston, 41 N.Y.2d 505 (1977): Admissibility of Prior Criminal Conduct Evidence

    People v. Preston, 41 N.Y.2d 505 (1977)

    Evidence of prior criminal conduct is inadmissible to show criminal propensity, but it may be admissible if directly probative of the crime charged and its probative value outweighs the potential prejudice to the defendant.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. The prosecution presented evidence of a prior transaction between the defendant and an undercover officer, as well as testimony that the defendant had previously directed the officer to pay a third party. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence of the prior transaction was admissible because it was inextricably interwoven with the crime charged and highly probative. The court also found that while the testimony regarding payments to a third party was inadmissible, the trial court’s prompt curative instruction to the jury was sufficient to prevent prejudicial error. The court emphasized the importance of balancing the probative value of prior bad acts evidence against its potential for prejudice.

    Facts

    An undercover officer arranged a drug purchase from the defendant through two intermediaries. During the transaction, the defendant and the officer referred to a prior drug deal, with the defendant claiming the officer owed him money from that earlier transaction. This conversation was taped and introduced as evidence. The officer eventually purchased cocaine and heroin from the defendant, with the intermediaries facilitating the exchange.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted and convicted by a jury for criminal sale of a controlled substance. The defendant appealed, arguing that the admission of evidence of prior criminal conduct constituted reversible error. The Appellate Division sustained the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting the undercover officer’s testimony regarding a prior drug transaction with the defendant.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the undercover officer to testify that, on prior occasions, the defendant directed him to make payments to a third party.

    Holding

    1. No, because the evidence of the prior transaction was inextricably interwoven with the present crime charged and was highly probative, outweighing any potential prejudice.
    2. No, because the trial court recognized the inadmissibility of the statement regarding payments to a third party and immediately directed the jury to disregard it, thereby curing any potential prejudice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while evidence of uncharged criminal conduct is generally inadmissible to show criminal propensity, it can be admissible if offered for a relevant purpose other than to show a criminal disposition. Citing People v. Molineux, the court noted that such evidence might be admissible to prove motive, intent, absence of mistake, a common scheme or plan, or identity. The court emphasized that the Molineux categories are illustrative, not exclusive. In this case, the conversation about the prior transaction was “intrinsic to the bargaining between defendant and Officer Molfetta” and concerned the price to be paid and the quality of the drugs. This evidence was deemed highly probative and directly related to the crime charged. As the court stated, “[w]hen the conversation is so inextricably interwoven with the crime charged in the indictment it may be received in evidence…where, as in this case, the value of the evidence clearly outweighs any possible prejudice.”

    Regarding the officer’s testimony about prior payments to a third party, the court found that this evidence did not adequately demonstrate a common plan or scheme. However, the trial court’s prompt curative instruction to the jury was sufficient to negate any prejudice to the defendant. The court noted that the trial judge sustained the objection and directed the jury to disregard the statement, declaring, “[i]t is not evidence in this case.” The court concluded that, considering the admissibility of the initial conversation and the curative instruction, there was no prejudicial error warranting a new trial.

  • People v. Watts, 35 N.Y.2d 261 (1974): Limits on Cross-Examination Regarding Prior Immoral Acts

    People v. Watts, 35 N.Y.2d 261 (1974)

    A defendant who testifies may be cross-examined about prior immoral, vicious, or criminal acts relevant to credibility, provided the questioning is in good faith and based on reasonable facts, but not to show a propensity for the charged crime.

    Summary

    Watts was convicted of robbery and grand larceny. On appeal, he argued that the prosecution improperly cross-examined him about his prior heroin use. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that questioning Watts about his prior heroin use was permissible to assess his credibility, as it demonstrated a willingness to prioritize self-interest over societal norms. The court emphasized the trial court’s broad discretion in allowing such cross-examination, absent clear abuse, and distinguished between using prior acts to impeach credibility versus showing criminal propensity.

    Facts

    Salvatore Di Gangi sought help starting his car at a train station and offered money to Watts and the defendant. After Watts left, the defendant allegedly demanded Di Gangi’s money, threatening harm and simulating a weapon. Di Gangi gave him $5 and some change. Walking toward a police officer, Di Gangi reported the robbery, leading to the defendant’s arrest. A search revealed the money, but no weapon. The defendant testified he only asked for money to get a jump start and denied threats or weapon simulation.

    Procedural History

    The County Court denied the defendant’s pre-trial motion to prevent the prosecution from questioning him about his prior criminal record. The defendant was convicted of robbery in the third degree and grand larceny in the third degree. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether it was permissible for the prosecution to cross-examine the defendant regarding prior heroin use.
    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecution to question the defendant about the source of funds for his prior heroin habit.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the inquiry was directed at widespread illegality regarding narcotics, so as to reveal a disposition or willingness on his part to place self-interest ahead of principle and society.
    2. No, because the trial court has wide latitude and broad discretion in this regard, and no objection was properly lodged to the questions at trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that cross-examination about prior immoral, vicious, or criminal acts is permissible to assess a witness’s credibility, provided it’s done in good faith and with a reasonable basis in fact. However, such questioning is impermissible if intended to show a propensity to commit the crime charged, citing People v. Molineux. The court found that inquiring about the defendant’s heroin use was proper, as it revealed a willingness to prioritize self-interest over societal norms and honesty, which are relevant to credibility. The court distinguished this from inquiring about addiction itself. Addressing the extent of permissible disparaging questions, the court cited People v. Sorge, emphasizing the trial court’s broad discretion, only reviewable for “plain abuse and injustice.” The court noted the defendant’s failure to object properly to specific questions about his income versus his drug habit. The court also addressed the pre-trial motion to preclude cross-examination about the defendant’s “prior criminal record,” holding that while youthful offender adjudications themselves cannot be used for impeachment, the underlying illegal and immoral acts may be, citing People v. Vidal.