People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225 (1981)

When police know a suspect has been recently arrested by the same agency on an unrelated charge, they have a duty to inquire whether the suspect has counsel on that charge before interrogating the suspect; failure to inquire is equivalent to knowing the suspect has counsel, precluding interrogation without counsel present.

Summary

Bartolomeo was arrested for arson and represented by counsel. Days later, officers from the same police department arrested him for murder, aware of the arson arrest but not the representation. After waiving his rights, Bartolomeo made incriminating statements. The court held that because the police knew of the recent arrest, they had a duty to ask if he had counsel. Failing to do so, they were charged with that knowledge, rendering the waiver invalid. Thus, the statements were suppressed. However, the court upheld the search warrant for Bartolomeo’s car, finding probable cause existed based on an accomplice’s sworn statement.

Facts

On May 27, 1978, Bartolomeo was arrested for arson and arraigned with attorney Joseph Stabile representing him.
On June 5, 1978, officers from the same police department arrested Bartolomeo for the April murder of John McLaughlin.
The officers, Detectives Rafferty and Donohue, knew of the arson arrest but not that Bartolomeo had counsel in that case.
Bartolomeo was advised of his Miranda rights and waived his right to counsel, not mentioning he had an attorney on the arson charge.
After being confronted with an accomplice’s statement, Bartolomeo made incriminating statements about the McLaughlin homicide.
About 45 minutes into the interrogation, an attorney contacted by Stabile informed police he represented Bartolomeo and demanded questioning cease, which it did.

Procedural History

Bartolomeo was convicted of second-degree murder after a jury trial.
Prior to trial, Bartolomeo moved to suppress his statements and evidence seized from his car, which was denied.
The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion.
Bartolomeo appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether statements obtained during a police interrogation must be suppressed when the interrogating officers knew the suspect was recently arrested by the same law enforcement agency on an unrelated charge, and failed to inquire whether the suspect had counsel on the prior charge, when, in fact, the suspect was represented by counsel on that charge.
Whether a search warrant for a vehicle was properly issued based on an accomplice’s sworn statement providing details of the crime.

Holding

Yes, because when the interrogating detectives possessed actual knowledge of the outstanding arson charge against the defendant, they were obligated to inquire whether defendant was represented by an attorney on that charge. Having failed to make such inquiry, the officers were chargeable with what such an inquiry would have disclosed.
No, because an ample showing of probable cause was made based on the accomplice’s sworn statement, and the Aguilar test does not apply when the warrant application includes a sworn statement from someone with firsthand knowledge of the facts.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that police knowledge of a suspect’s representation by counsel on a separate charge precludes interrogation without counsel present. “Knowledge that one in custody is represented by counsel, albeit on a separate, unrelated charge, precludes interrogation in the absence of counsel and renders ineffective any purported waiver of the assistance of counsel when such waiver occurs out of the presence of the attorney.”
The court extended this principle to situations where police know of a recent prior arrest by the same agency. “Hence, the interrogating detectives here, with actual knowledge of the outstanding arson charge against defendant, were under an obligation to inquire whether defendant was represented by an attorney on that charge.”
The court distinguished the case from situations with remote prior arrests or arrests by different agencies.
The court rejected the argument to suppress evidence seized from the car because the warrant was based on a sworn statement from an accomplice, Caprisecca, providing firsthand details of the crime. The warrant recited that probable cause had been shown that the Volkswagen constituted evidence of a crime and tended to show that a particular person had committed a crime.
The court found the Aguilar v. Texas two-pronged test inapplicable here because it applies when an officer’s affidavit relies on information from an informant, not when there’s a sworn statement from someone with direct knowledge.
The court also rejected the argument to extend the accomplice corroboration rule (CPL 60.22) to the issuance of search warrants, citing the difference between proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and establishing probable cause.
The court noted the significant difference in kind between the determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as the predicate for the imposition of criminal sanctions, on the one hand, and the demonstration of probable cause sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirements for search and seizure as the warrant for police investigation, on the other, justifies a differentiation (Brinegar v United States, 338 US 160).