New York Law Review

Tag: Prima Facie Tort

  • Curiano v. Suozzi, 63 N.Y.2d 113 (1984): Limits on Prima Facie Tort for Retaliatory Lawsuits

    Curiano v. Suozzi, 63 N.Y.2d 113 (1984)

    New York courts disallow retaliatory lawsuits based on prima facie tort predicated on the malicious institution of a prior civil action, emphasizing the need for open access to courts without fear of reprisal.

    Summary

    Curiano sued Suozzi, alleging prima facie tort and abuse of process due to Suozzi’s prior defamation suit against them. The defamation suit stemmed from campaign literature criticizing Suozzi. The New York Court of Appeals held that Curiano could not maintain a separate action for prima facie tort based on the malicious institution of the prior defamation action. The court reasoned that allowing such retaliatory suits would misuse the doctrine of prima facie tort, create inconsistent results, and undermine the policy of open access to the courts.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs, government officials, published campaign literature criticizing Defendant Suozzi. The literature alleged Suozzi had engaged in speculative real estate purchases and profited from his brother’s decisions as Mayor while Suozzi was a judge. Suozzi, through his law firm, sued the plaintiffs for libel (Suozzi v. Parente). Plaintiffs then initiated a second lawsuit alleging that the Suozzi v. Parente action was brought maliciously to harm them and punish them for exercising their right to free speech.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the prima facie tort claim, citing Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Assn. The Appellate Division reversed, characterizing the claim as abuse of process and dismissing it for failure to allege improper use of process after issuance. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision to dismiss the action.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the plaintiffs’ complaint states a cause of action for abuse of process based on the malicious institution of a prior lawsuit.

    2. Whether the plaintiffs’ complaint states a cause of action for prima facie tort based on the malicious institution of a prior lawsuit.

    Holding

    1. No, because the mere institution of a civil action by summons and complaint is not legally considered process capable of being abused.

    2. No, because New York courts consistently refuse to allow retaliatory lawsuits based on prima facie tort predicated on the malicious institution of a prior civil action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding abuse of process, the court stated that the process used must involve “an unlawful interference with one’s person or property.” The court found that issuing a summons to begin a lawsuit is not considered an abuse of process. The court emphasized that the “ ‘gist of the action for abuse of process’ ” is “ ‘the improper use of process after it is issued’ ”, and the plaintiffs only alleged malicious motive in bringing the action, which is insufficient. Quoting Hauser v. Bartow, the court stated that “[a] malicious motive alone, however, does not give rise to a cause of action for abuse of process.”

    Regarding prima facie tort, the court acknowledged the elements: (1) intentional infliction of harm, (2) causing special damages, (3) without excuse or justification, (4) by an act or series of acts that would otherwise be lawful. However, the court emphasized the strong public policy against allowing retaliatory lawsuits based on prima facie tort predicated on the malicious institution of a prior civil action. The court reasoned that allowing such actions would undermine the principle of open access to the courts. The court stated that “[p]rima facie tort is designed to provide a remedy for intentional and malicious actions that cause harm and for which no traditional tort provides a remedy.” The court considered the gravamen of the plaintiffs’ claim to sound in malicious prosecution, which requires the underlying action to have ended in failure. The court feared a situation where litigation could continue ad infinitum with each party claiming the other’s action was malicious.

  • Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 59 N.Y.2d 314 (1983): Private Right of Action Under the Taylor Law

    59 N.Y.2d 314 (1983)

    The Taylor Law, which prohibits strikes by public employees, does not create a private right of action for damages resulting from illegal strikes, nor does it preempt existing common-law remedies, although the elements of those common law torts must still be proven independently.

    Summary

    Two law firms sued unions for damages caused by an illegal transit strike, alleging causes of action including violation of the Taylor Law, prima facie tort, public nuisance, and interference with business. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Taylor Law does not create a private right of action, as the legislative intent was to provide public remedies and maintain labor peace, not to create new avenues for private lawsuits. However, the Court also determined that the Taylor Law did not preempt common-law tort claims, but the plaintiffs failed to adequately state claims for prima facie tort (lack of disinterested malevolence), public nuisance (damages not distinct from the public at large), and intentional interference with business (interference was incidental).

    Facts

    In April 1980, a transit strike occurred in New York City, violating the Taylor Law and a preliminary injunction. Two law firms, Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer (“Burns Jackson”) and Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler and Krupman (“Jackson, Lewis”), separately sued the Transport Workers Union of America (TWU) and other related unions and officers, seeking damages for losses sustained due to the strike. Burns Jackson filed a class action seeking $50 million per day in damages, alleging prima facie tort and public nuisance. Jackson, Lewis sued TWU, seeking $25,000 in damages, alleging violation of the Taylor Law, prima facie tort, intentional interference with business, willful injury, conspiracy, and breach of contract as a third-party beneficiary.

    Procedural History

    The Jackson, Lewis action was moved to Queens County and consolidated with the Burns Jackson action. The defendants moved to dismiss both actions for failure to state a cause of action. Special Term denied the motions, except for the Jackson, Lewis contract claim. The Appellate Division modified the order, dismissing both complaints entirely. The plaintiffs appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Taylor Law either preempts common-law private damage actions for injuries caused by public employee strikes or creates a new private right of action for such damages?

    2. Whether the complaints adequately state a cause of action for (a) prima facie tort, (b) public nuisance, (c) intentional interference with business, or (d) breach of plaintiffs’ rights as third-party beneficiary of defendants’ contracts with NYCTA or MABSTOA?

    Holding

    1. No, because the Taylor Law was intended to be cumulative, not exclusive, and it was not intended to establish a new private cause of action.

    2. No, because (a) the plaintiffs failed to allege disinterested malevolence for the prima facie tort claim, (b) the damages alleged for the public nuisance claim were not distinct from those suffered by the public at large, (c) the interference with business was merely incidental, and (d) the contracts had expired before the strike, and the plaintiffs were merely incidental beneficiaries.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that legislative intent is paramount in determining whether a statute creates a private right of action or preempts existing remedies. The Court found no explicit statement in the Taylor Law regarding exclusivity or intent to create a private cause of action. Examining the legislative history, the Court concluded that the Taylor Law was intended to be cumulative, not exclusive, and was not meant to create a new cause of action. The Court emphasized that implying a private action would impose a crushing burden on unions and employees, undermining the legislative goal of defusing tensions in public employer-employee relations and maintaining labor peace. The Court noted that the elaborate enforcement provisions within the Taylor Law suggested that the Legislature provided precisely the remedies it considered appropriate.

    Regarding the common-law claims, the Court held that the prima facie tort claim failed because the plaintiffs did not allege that the defendants’ sole motivation was “disinterested malevolence.” The Court clarified that a malicious motive must be unmixed with any other and exclusively directed to the injury of another. The public nuisance claim failed because the damages alleged were not “of a different kind from that suffered by other persons exercising the same public right.” The injury was common to the entire community. The intentional interference with business claim failed because the interference was an incidental result of the strike, and the Court declined to recognize a common-law cause of action for such incidental interference where the Legislature has established a comprehensive labor plan. Finally, the third-party beneficiary claim failed because the underlying contracts had expired before the strike, and the plaintiffs were merely incidental beneficiaries of those contracts.

    The Court cited Wyandotte Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 204 for the principle of not permitting a wrongdoer to shift responsibility for their actions onto their victim, but distinguished that case as being predicated on a comprehensive legislative scheme for redressing labor disputes.

  • Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778 (1978): Attorney Liability for Baseless Lawsuits

    Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778 (1978)

    An attorney is not liable to third parties for initiating baseless legal proceedings on behalf of a client unless the factual situation falls within established categories of tort or contract liability.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that an attorney is not liable to third parties for initiating a baseless lawsuit on behalf of a client, absent a recognized tort or contract cause of action. The court declined to create a new cause of action for such conduct, leaving the remedy for baseless lawsuits to professional disciplinary measures and potential legislative action. This decision emphasizes judicial restraint in expanding attorney liability beyond established legal frameworks.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Drago, sued attorney Brownstein (Buonagurio’s predecessor) for initiating a lawsuit against him on behalf of a client. Drago alleged that the lawsuit was baseless and brought without justification, causing him harm.

    Procedural History

    The Special Term granted Brownstein’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The Appellate Division reversed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Special Term’s dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an attorney may be held liable to a third party for initiating a baseless legal proceeding on behalf of a client, absent circumstances falling within an established category of tort or contract liability.

    Holding

    No, because the factual situation did not fall within one of the acknowledged categories of tort or contract liability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the lower courts that the complaint failed to state a cause of action in negligence, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. The court also rejected the argument that the complaint stated a cause of action for “prima facie tort,” which is defined as “the intentional malicious injury to another by otherwise lawful means without economic or social justification, but solely to harm the other.” The court stated that remedies for baseless lawsuits are best addressed through professional discipline and potential legislative action, rather than creating new causes of action. The court emphasized judicial restraint, noting pending legislative proposals to create new liabilities in such circumstances. As the court noted, the complaint failed to state a cognizable cause of action because the existing factual situations had not fallen within one of the acknowledged categories of tort or contract liability. The court declined to recognize what might be a “new, novel or nameless” cause of action, stating that it would be better suited for the legislature to consider.

  • ATI, Inc. v. Ruder & Finn, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 454 (1977): Prima Facie Tort and Justification in Public Interest Advocacy

    ATI, Inc. v. Ruder & Finn, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 454 (1977)

    A cause of action for prima facie tort requires a showing that intentional harm was inflicted without excuse or justification, and conduct aligned with public interest concerns, even if motivated by malice, can constitute sufficient justification to defeat such a claim.

    Summary

    ATI, Inc., an aerosol product packager, sued Ruder & Finn, a public relations firm, alleging they intentionally caused ATI financial losses by orchestrating adverse publicity regarding the ozone depletion theory to coerce ATI into hiring them. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, holding that even if defendants intended to harm ATI, their actions were justified because they contributed to a public debate about a potential environmental hazard, which led to government scrutiny and regulation of aerosols. The court emphasized the need to protect public discourse on matters of public concern, even if motivated by self-interest.

    Facts

    ATI, Inc. was a contract packager of aerosol products. Ruder & Finn was a public relations firm. William Ruder, president of Ruder & Finn, founded PIPR, Inc., a non-profit public relations organization. NRDC, an environmental organization, sought to ban certain aerosol products due to the ozone depletion theory. PIPR was retained by NRDC to promote this position. Ruder offered ATI public relations services to combat the negative publicity, disclosing his firm’s involvement with NRDC. ATI declined to hire Ruder & Finn and subsequently suffered financial losses due to decreased aerosol sales. ATI alleged a conspiracy to intimidate them into hiring Ruder & Finn.

    Procedural History

    ATI sued Ruder & Finn and related parties. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, construing the pleadings as attempting to frame causes of action for conspiracy, duress, defamation and prima facie tort and rejecting each of these. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. ATI appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendants’ conduct, in publicizing concerns about the environmental impact of aerosols, constitutes a prima facie tort in the absence of excuse or justification, even if the defendants were allegedly motivated by a desire to coerce the plaintiff into hiring them.

    Holding

    No, because even if the defendants intended to harm the plaintiff, their conduct was justified by the broader public interest in exploring and addressing potential environmental hazards, outweighing the harm to the plaintiff’s business. The court held that no cause of action for intentional tort was stated and the complaint was insufficient as a matter of law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that a prima facie tort requires intentional infliction of harm without excuse or justification. Even if defendants intended to harm ATI, their actions were related to a legitimate public concern – the potential harm of aerosols to the ozone layer. The court emphasized the social justification in alerting the public to a potential health hazard, even if the scientific basis was uncertain. “Underlying the question of excuse or justification, it has been noted, is the question of whether the public’s gain outweighs the harm to another.” The court stated, “since use of plaintiff’s product may be injurious, that perhaps some defendants were motivated to harm plaintiff by alerting the public as to the potential hazard does not require a conclusion that these defendants’ conduct is without justification.” The court also noted the risk of chilling public discourse if such lawsuits were allowed to proceed, stating that the greater injustice would be to the public if controversies such as this are not expeditiously considered and acted upon by all concerned. The court therefore affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, finding no basis for a cause of action.