New York Law Review

Tag: prima facie evidence

  • People v. Schroeder, 24 N.Y.3d 507 (2014): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Blood Alcohol Content (BAC)

    People v. Schroeder, 24 N.Y.3d 507 (2014)

    In a prosecution for driving while intoxicated (DWI), expert testimony estimating the defendant’s blood alcohol content (BAC) is not considered “prima facie evidence” under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1195(2), but the jury may consider such evidence when determining intoxication.

    Summary

    The case clarifies the admissibility and probative value of expert testimony regarding blood alcohol content (BAC) in DWI cases. The defendant, convicted of common law DWI, appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that expert testimony estimating her BAC below the legal limit constituted “prima facie evidence” of non-intoxication. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that only BAC results from chemical tests, not expert opinions, are entitled to the statutory “prima facie evidence” weight. However, the Court also noted that a defendant is entitled, upon request, to an instruction that if the jury believes the expert’s estimation of BAC was below the legal limit, the jury may consider that fact when determining whether the defendant was intoxicated.

    Facts

    The defendant was stopped for speeding and subsequently given a breathalyzer test, which showed a BAC of .09%. At trial, the prosecution presented this evidence along with the arresting officer’s testimony regarding the defendant’s behavior (smell of alcohol, glassy eyes, failed field sobriety tests). The defense presented expert testimony from a pharmacologist who opined, based on the defendant’s testimony, that her BAC at the time of the stop was between .03% and .04%.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was acquitted of per se DWI but convicted of common law DWI in Town Court. The County Court affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defense expert’s testimony estimating the defendant’s BAC below the statutory threshold constitutes “prima facie evidence” that the defendant was not intoxicated, thus entitling the defendant to a corresponding jury instruction.

    Holding

    No, because Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1195(2) explicitly limits the “prima facie evidence” effect to BAC results obtained from chemical tests administered pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court based its reasoning on a strict interpretation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1195, which states that the specified probative value (including “prima facie evidence”) applies to “evidence of blood-alcohol content, as determined by such tests.” The Court emphasized that “such tests” refers to chemical tests administered under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194. Because the defense expert’s testimony was an opinion, not a chemical test result, it did not qualify for the statutory “prima facie evidence” weight.

    However, the Court clarified that juries should not be kept unaware of the BAC thresholds specified in the statute. The Court suggested that the jury should be instructed that if they find the defendant’s BAC was below 0.08%, based on the expert’s testimony, they *may* find that she was not in an intoxicated condition, although they are not required to do so. The Court highlighted the difference between this “if you find” instruction and the “prima facie evidence” charge, explaining that the former allows the jury to evaluate the evidence for itself, while the latter improperly instructs the jury on the weight to be given to the evidence.

    The Court states, “The difference between our ‘if you find’ formulation and the ‘prima facie evidence’ charge that defendant here requested is substantive, not just verbal. The ‘prima facie’ charge instructs the jury on the weight to be given certain evidence — an instruction that is appropriate only when the evidence consists of chemical tests. The ‘if you find’ charge allows the jury to evaluate the evidence for itself — i.e., lets it choose to believe the expert or not — but instructs it as to the inferences it may draw after it has made that evaluation.”

    In effect, the court allows the jury to consider expert testimony about BAC, but clarifies that it does not carry the same statutory weight as a chemical test. This permits the defense to present evidence challenging intoxication without mandating a specific inference from that evidence, leaving the jury to determine the credibility and impact of the expert’s opinion.

  • People v. Van Buren, 77 N.Y.2d 879 (1991): Sufficiency of Evidence for Prior Conviction in Felony DWI Indictment

    People v. Van Buren, 77 N.Y.2d 879 (1991)

    A certificate of conviction, standing alone, is insufficient to establish a prior conviction element of a felony driving while intoxicated (DWI) charge before a grand jury without additional evidence linking the defendant to the prior conviction.

    Summary

    Van Buren was indicted for felony DWI. The prosecution presented a certificate of conviction showing a “Robert L. Van Buren” had a prior DWI conviction within ten years. The defense moved to dismiss the felony count, arguing insufficient proof of the prior conviction. The County Court reduced the charge to misdemeanor DWI, finding no competent evidence identifying the defendant as the person named in the certificate. The Appellate Division reversed, but the Court of Appeals reversed again, holding that the certificate of conviction alone was insufficient to establish the prior conviction element of felony DWI without additional evidence linking the defendant to that prior conviction.

    Facts

    Defendant Van Buren was indicted for felony DWI. The prosecution presented evidence to the Grand Jury, including a certificate of conviction indicating that a “Robert L. Van Buren” had been convicted of DWI within the past 10 years in Genesee County. No other evidence was presented to establish that the defendant was the same Robert L. Van Buren named in the certificate.

    Procedural History

    The Genesee County Court granted the defendant’s motion to reduce the felony DWI charge to a misdemeanor, finding insufficient evidence of the predicate conviction. The Appellate Division reversed this decision, reinstating the felony DWI count. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the County Court’s decision to reduce the charge.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a certificate of conviction, without additional evidence linking the defendant to the prior conviction, is sufficient to establish the prior conviction element of a felony DWI charge before a grand jury.

    Holding

    No, because a certificate of conviction alone, without further connecting evidence, is insufficient to establish every element of the felony DWI offense, specifically the defendant’s identity as the person with the prior conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that CPL 190.65 requires that the evidence before the Grand Jury be legally sufficient to establish a prima facie case. CPL 70.10(1) defines legally sufficient evidence as “competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant’s commission thereof.” The court reasoned that the certificate of conviction only established that a person named Robert L. Van Buren had a prior DWI conviction. It did not, without more, prove that the *defendant* Robert L. Van Buren was the *same* person. The court emphasized that the certificate of conviction, standing alone, lacked the necessary connecting evidence to link the defendant to the prior conviction. As such, the prosecution failed to establish a prima facie case for felony DWI, and the indictment was properly reduced. The court distinguished this case from People v. Vollick, 148 A.D.2d 950 (4th Dept. 1989), aff’d 75 N.Y.2d 877 (1990), without elaborating on the distinguishing facts.

  • People v. Deegan, 69 N.Y.2d 976 (1987): Standard for Evidence Sufficiency to Support an Indictment

    People v. Deegan, 69 N.Y.2d 976 (1987)

    The standard for reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support an indictment is whether the evidence is legally sufficient, meaning competent evidence that, if accepted as true, would establish every element of the offense charged; it requires a prima facie showing, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Summary

    Defendant, an elected official, was indicted for allegedly changing his vote on a waste removal rate increase in exchange for promised campaign contributions. The lower courts dismissed the indictment, finding the evidence insufficient by applying an incorrect standard requiring exclusion of every hypothesis but guilt to a moral certainty. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the proper standard for an indictment is legal sufficiency, meaning a prima facie case. The Court emphasized that it is the Grand Jury’s role to determine reasonable cause, and the ‘moral certainty’ standard applies only at trial.

    Facts

    The defendant, an elected official, allegedly changed his vote on a proposed rate increase for waste removal services. This change purportedly occurred after a promise of future campaign contributions from members of the waste removal industry. The Grand Jury subsequently indicted the defendant based on this evidence, including declarations of an alleged co-conspirator.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the indictment, deeming the evidence insufficient. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstated the indictment, and remitted the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented to the Grand Jury was legally sufficient to support the indictment against the defendant for changing his vote in exchange for promised campaign contributions.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence before the Grand Jury was legally sufficient, meaning it constituted competent evidence that, if accepted as true, would establish every element of the offense charged, thereby meeting the prima facie standard for an indictment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the lower courts erred by applying an incorrect standard of proof for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the indictment. The lower courts had relied on a standard requiring the exclusion of every hypothesis but guilt to a moral certainty, which is not the standard for evaluating indictments. The Court explicitly stated, “As we held in People v Jennings (supra, at 114-116), the proper standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support an indictment is ‘legal sufficiency,’ which is defined in CPL 70.10 (1) as ‘competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged’ (see, CPL 190.65 [1]).” The court further clarified that “legally sufficient means prima facie, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt” (quoting People v Mayo, 36 NY2d 1002, 1004). The Court emphasized that the Grand Jury is responsible for determining whether there is reasonable cause to believe a crime was committed and that the ‘moral certainty’ standard is applicable only to the trier of fact at trial. The court found that even excluding the alleged coconspirator’s declarations, the remaining evidence was sufficient to infer the defendant changed his vote for a promise of future campaign contributions. The Court declined to rule on the admissibility of other disputed evidence, deeming it premature. Because the inquiry on a motion to dismiss an indictment for insufficient evidence is purely legal, the court rejected remitting the appeal to the Appellate Division for further factual review, since the Grand Jury evidence met the legal sufficiency standard.