New York Law Review

Tag: Prevailing Wage Law

  • Ramos v. SimplexGrinnell LP, 22 N.Y.3d 145 (2013): Agency Deference and Statutory Interpretation in Prevailing Wage Cases

    Ramos v. SimplexGrinnell LP, 22 N.Y.3d 145 (2013)

    When interpreting a statute, a court will not give an administrative agency more deference than the agency itself claims, and a party’s agreement to pay prevailing wages pursuant to a statute binds it to pay those wages for all work activities ultimately deemed covered by the statute, regardless of the parties’ initial understanding.

    Summary

    This case addresses the extent to which a court should defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute, particularly when the agency limits its interpretation to prospective application. It also clarifies whether a contractual agreement to pay prevailing wages requires payment for all work ultimately deemed covered by the statute, or only for work the parties initially understood to be covered. The Court of Appeals held that courts should not give an agency more deference than it claims for itself and that an agreement to comply with a statute means complying with its correct interpretation, regardless of the parties’ initial understanding.

    Facts

    A dispute arose over whether workers engaged in testing and inspection of fire protection equipment were covered by New York’s “prevailing wage” statute. The Department of Labor’s Commissioner issued an opinion letter stating that the workers were covered but that this opinion would apply prospectively only. A lawsuit was filed, and the Second Circuit sought clarification from the New York Court of Appeals regarding the deference owed to the Department of Labor’s decision and the scope of the prevailing wage agreement.

    Procedural History

    The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York initially ruled against the plaintiffs. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals then certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals. The New York Court of Appeals accepted the certified questions for review and decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. What deference, if any, should a court pay to an agency’s decision, made for its own enforcement purposes, to construe section 220 of the New York Labor Law prospectively only, when the court is deciding the meaning of that section for a period of time arising before the agency’s decision?

    2. Does a party’s commitment to pay prevailing wages pursuant to New York Labor Law section 220 bind it to pay those wages only for work activities that were clearly understood by the parties to be covered by section 220, or does it require the party to pay prevailing wages for all the work activities that are ultimately deemed by a court or agency to be “covered” by that portion of the statute?

    Holding

    1. No, because the Court will not give the agency more deference than it is asking for.

    2. It requires the party to pay prevailing wages for all the work activities that are ultimately deemed by a court or agency to be “covered” by that portion of the statute, because an agreement to comply with a statute is an agreement to comply with it as correctly interpreted, regardless of whether the parties knew the correct interpretation when contracting.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the first issue, the Court emphasized that deference to an administrative agency hinges on the agency’s own assessment of whether its legal interpretation merits deference. Since the Department of Labor, in its amicus brief, renounced any claim to deference in this specific litigation, the Court held that it would not grant the agency more deference than it requested. The Court explicitly limited its holding, leaving open the possibility that the agency could seek deference in its own enforcement actions.

    As to the second issue, the Court adopted the Second Circuit’s “at least as plausible” reading of the statute. It reasoned that an agreement to comply with a statute inherently implies compliance with the statute as correctly interpreted. This is especially true when the statute mandates a contractual clause agreeing to comply, as in Labor Law § 220(2). The Court concluded that the legislature intended parties to comply with the law’s correct interpretation, regardless of any prior misunderstandings.

    The court reasoned that “An agreement to comply with a statute is an agreement to comply with it as correctly interpreted, whether or not the correct interpretation was known to the parties at the time of contracting.” The Court further noted that the legislative intent behind Labor Law § 220(2) was to ensure compliance with the law as correctly understood, not as the parties may have misunderstood it.

  • R-J Taylor General Contractors, Inc. v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 20 N.Y.3d 473 (2013): Applying Prevailing Wage Laws to Public Entities

    R-J Taylor General Contractors, Inc. v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 20 N.Y.3d 473 (2013)

    Prevailing wage laws apply only to construction contracts entered into by specific public entities enumerated in the statute; volunteer fire departments, absent explicit statutory inclusion or agency relationship, are not subject to these laws.

    Summary

    R-J Taylor General Contractors, Inc. contracted with the Bath Volunteer Fire Department (BVFD) for the construction of a new firehouse. The New York State Department of Labor (DOL) determined that the project was subject to prevailing wage laws. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that BVFD, a not-for-profit fire corporation, did not fall under the definition of a public entity as contemplated by Labor Law § 220. The Court clarified that the prevailing wage law applies only to contracts involving the state, a public benefit corporation, a municipal corporation, or a commission appointed pursuant to law. The Court rejected the argument that the BVFD was the “functional equivalent” of a municipal corporation, emphasizing the need for explicit statutory inclusion.

    Facts

    The Bath Volunteer Fire Department (BVFD), a not-for-profit fire corporation, decided to build a new firehouse after the Village of Bath declined to do so. BVFD obtained its own financing, acquired land, and hired R-J Taylor General Contractors, Inc. (Taylor) as the general contractor in September 2006. Taylor then hired subcontractors. The Department of Labor (DOL) issued an opinion letter stating the project was a public work subject to prevailing wage laws, halting construction until BVFD agreed to indemnify Taylor and its subcontractors against any liability for not paying prevailing wages. Construction then resumed and was completed.

    Procedural History

    An administrative hearing was held to determine if the prevailing wage law applied. The Hearing Officer determined it did, based on the Erie County test. Petitioners commenced an Article 78 proceeding for review. The Appellate Division confirmed the determination and dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals granted petitioners’ motion for leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prevailing wage requirement of Labor Law § 220 applies to a construction contract entered into by the Bath Volunteer Fire Department, a not-for-profit fire corporation not explicitly listed as a public entity in the statute.

    Holding

    No, because BVFD is not one of the public entities enumerated in Labor Law § 220, nor was it acting as an agent on behalf of a covered public entity at the time the contract was executed. The Court emphasized that the “functional equivalent” test was rejected in Matter of New York Charter School Assn. v Smith.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Labor Law § 220 specifically enumerates the types of public entities to which the prevailing wage law applies: the state, a public benefit corporation, a municipal corporation, or a commission appointed pursuant to law. The BVFD, as a fire corporation defined by the Not-For-Profit Corporation Law, does not fall into any of these categories. The Court rejected the argument that BVFD could be deemed the “functional equivalent” of a municipal department, citing Matter of New York Charter School Assn. v Smith, (15 NY3d 403 [2010]), where it rejected the same argument regarding charter schools. The Court stated: “Had the legislature intended to include volunteer fire corporations under the statute, it could easily have done so.” The service agreements between the BVFD and the Village of Bath were deemed insufficient to trigger the prevailing wage requirement because they pertained to emergency services, not the construction of a new firehouse, stating, “The service agreements do not include any provision contemplating the work involved here: the construction of a new firehouse.” Therefore, the service agreements are not a contract for public work within the meaning of the prevailing wage law. Because the first prong of the Erie County test (public entity) was not met, the Court did not need to address the second prong (public work).

  • New York Charter School Assn. v. Smith, 16 N.Y.3d 73 (2010): Determining if Charter Schools Are Subject to Prevailing Wage Laws

    New York Charter School Assn. v. Smith, 16 N.Y.3d 73 (2010)

    Charter schools are generally not considered public entities subject to New York’s prevailing wage laws under Labor Law § 220, unless they are acting directly on behalf of a public entity in a contractual capacity for public work.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether New York’s prevailing wage laws apply to charter schools. The New York State Department of Labor reversed its prior position and declared that these laws applied to all charter school projects. Charter schools and supporting foundations challenged this determination. The Court of Appeals held that charter schools are generally not public entities under Labor Law § 220 and are therefore not subject to prevailing wage laws unless they act directly on behalf of a public entity in a contractual capacity. The Court emphasized that charter schools typically contract for their own benefit, not for the benefit of the state.

    Facts

    In 2007, the New York State Department of Labor (DOL) issued an opinion letter stating that prevailing wage laws applied to all charter school projects, reversing its prior 2000 opinion that charter schools were generally not public entities and therefore not subject to these laws. The Commissioner of Labor notified the Charter Schools Institute and the Commissioner of the State Education Department that it would begin enforcing prevailing wage laws on charter school projects for which bids were advertised on or after September 20, 2007. Foundations supporting charter schools and individual charter schools then commenced legal proceedings challenging the DOL’s new position.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the petitions, holding that the charter agreement was a contract between a public entity and a third party, thus subjecting charter school construction to prevailing wage laws. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the petitions and declaring that charter schools are not subject to prevailing wage laws. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether charter schools are considered public entities or third parties acting on behalf of public entities, thus subjecting them to the prevailing wage requirements of Labor Law § 220 for construction and renovation projects.

    Holding

    No, because charter schools are not explicitly identified as public entities under Labor Law § 220 and typically contract for construction and renovation projects on their own behalf, not on behalf of a public entity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court applied the two-pronged test from Matter of Erie County Indus. Dev. Agency v Roberts, which requires (1) a contract involving the employment of laborers, workmen, or mechanics to which a public agency is a party, and (2) that the contract concern a public works project. The Court found that charter agreements themselves are not contracts for public work. While charter schools possess some characteristics similar to public entities, they are governed by self-selecting boards of trustees and are exempt from many state and local laws governing public schools. The Court noted that the legislature knows how to subject charter schools to laws governing public entities when it intends to do so. Referencing Education Law § 2853 (1)(g), the court also noted that neither the local school district, the charter entity nor the state is liable for the debts or financial obligations of a charter school. The Court distinguished this situation from Matter of Pyramid Co. of Onondaga v New York State Dept. of Labor, where a private entity was acting to benefit the State. Here, a renovation contract by a charter school is primarily for the benefit of the school itself. The court emphasized that its holding should not be interpreted to mean that every contract involving a charter school is exempt from prevailing wage laws, as there may be situations where the school is acting directly on behalf of a public entity. The Court stated, “[w]hen an education corporation enters into a facilities contract for a charter school, it typically does so on its own behalf, in its own name, and at its own risk.”

  • Chesterfield Associates v. Department of Labor, 4 N.Y.3d 597 (2005): Permissibility of Annualizing Pension Contributions Under Prevailing Wage Law

    4 N.Y.3d 597 (2005)

    Under New York’s prevailing wage law, the Commissioner of Labor may reasonably annualize a contractor’s contributions to a profit-sharing plan when calculating the hourly cash equivalent of supplement obligations, especially when the contributions are allocated without regard to the employee’s work on public projects.

    Summary

    Chesterfield Associates challenged the Department of Labor’s (DOL) use of the annualization rule to determine if Chesterfield met its prevailing wage obligations for public works projects. The DOL determined that Chesterfield underpaid wages and supplements. The key dispute was whether Chesterfield’s contributions to a profit-sharing pension plan should be annualized, or credited dollar-for-dollar. Annualization significantly increased Chesterfield’s liability. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commissioner’s decision to annualize, holding that it was a reasonable method to prevent cost-shifting and ensure employees receive the full value of required supplements.

    Facts

    Chesterfield Associates performed work on five public projects between 1994 and 1997. The Department of Labor investigated complaints that Chesterfield was not paying prevailing wages and supplements. Chesterfield provided supplements via paid time off, health insurance, and pension plans. Chesterfield’s contributions to its profit-sharing pension plan were allocated to employees based on total earnings, irrespective of time spent on public projects. The rights to those contributions vested over five years. The parties stipulated to most figures, but disagreed on whether pension contributions should be annualized.

    Procedural History

    Following an investigation and hearings, the Commissioner of Labor determined that Chesterfield had underpaid supplements. Chesterfield filed an Article 78 proceeding challenging the determination. The Appellate Division confirmed the Commissioner’s determination and dismissed the proceeding. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Commissioner of Labor’s decision to annualize Chesterfield’s contributions to its profit-sharing plan, to determine compliance with prevailing wage supplement obligations, was a reasonable application of Labor Law § 220(3).

    Holding

    Yes, because the Commissioner’s annualization method reasonably prevents cost-shifting that could unfairly advantage contractors and deny employees the full value of supplements, especially when pension contributions are allocated without regard to an employee’s time spent on public projects.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that the prevailing wage law aims to ensure fair labor costs on public projects. The annualization rule (12 NYCRR 220.2[d]) is a method used to calculate the hourly cash equivalent of supplements. The court distinguished this case from Tom Mistick & Sons, Inc. v. Reich, noting that Chesterfield did not maintain separate benefit plans for public and private work. The Court stated, “construction given statutes and regulations by the agency responsible for their administration, if not irrational or unreasonable, should be upheld.” The Court reasoned that without annualization, Chesterfield could shift costs to overstate payments on behalf of public hours, gaining an unfair competitive advantage and depriving employees of their rightful supplements. Annualization ensures a proportionate credit, reflecting the fact that pension benefits are tied to both public and private work. The court emphasized that annualization is simply a valuation methodology and does not regulate private work or force contractors to pay cash supplements. The court directly quoted Rondout Elec., Inc. v New York State Dept. of Labor, stating, “New York’s annualization regulation does not require prevailing wages or benefits for any employee who works on a private contract. The only time the prevailing wage standard is imposed is when an employee works on a public project.”

  • Brukhman v. Giuliani, 94 N.Y.2d 387 (1999): Prevailing Wage Law and Public Assistance Beneficiaries

    Brukhman v. Giuliani, 94 N.Y.2d 387 (1999)

    The prevailing wage provision of the New York State Constitution does not apply to public assistance beneficiaries participating in a Work Experience Program (WEP) as a condition of receiving benefits.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether public assistance recipients participating in New York City’s Work Experience Program (WEP) are entitled to be paid at the prevailing wage rate for their work assignments. These recipients were required to participate in WEP as a condition of receiving public assistance benefits. The plaintiffs argued that the city’s calculation of required work hours, based on the federal minimum wage rather than the higher prevailing wage, violated the state constitution. The New York Court of Appeals held that the constitutional prevailing wage provision does not extend to these public assistance recipients, because they are not “employees” of “contractors or subcontractors” engaged in “public work” as those terms are understood in the constitution.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs were public assistance recipients in New York City required to participate in a Work Experience Program (WEP) to continue receiving benefits. They were assigned to various not-for-profit organizations and city agencies, performing tasks ranging from skilled labor to clerical work. The city calculated their required participation hours by dividing the amount of their benefits by the federal minimum wage. The plaintiffs argued this violated the state constitution because the prevailing wage rate was higher and should have been used to calculate required hours, resulting in fewer hours worked.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted class certification and a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiffs. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint, finding no violation of the prevailing wage provision or equal protection. The Court of Appeals granted an appeal as of right.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prevailing wage provision of the New York State Constitution (Article I, § 17) applies to public assistance beneficiaries required to participate in a Work Experience Program (WEP) as a condition of receiving monetary grants.

    Holding

    No, because the constitutional prevailing wage provision does not extend to these public assistance recipients as they are not considered “employees” of “contractors or subcontractors” engaged in “public work” within the meaning of the constitutional provision.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the state constitution’s prevailing wage provision protects laborers, workmen, or mechanics in the employ of a contractor or subcontractor engaged in public work. The court emphasized the limited scope of this protection based on the language and historical context of the constitutional provision. The court stated that the plaintiffs were not “in the employ of” anyone, nor were the agencies to which they were assigned “contractors or subcontractors.” Furthermore, the court determined that the work performed by the plaintiffs was not “public work” as contemplated by the constitution. The court reviewed the Record of the 1938 Constitutional Convention, noting that the prevailing wage protection was intended for “employees of contractors and subcontractors engaged in the performance of public work.” The court emphasized the importance of the term “employees” as deliberately chosen to limit the scope of the protection. The court cited Matter of Corrigan v. Joseph, 304 N.Y. 172 (1952), to support its narrow interpretation. The court stated that “Program participants simply are not ‘in the employ of’ anyone — that is the very reason they are receiving welfare benefits and required to participate in the Program.” The court further cited Varsity Tr. v Saporita, 71 A.D.2d 643 (2d Dept. 1979), aff’d, 48 N.Y.2d 767 (1979) which held “It is hornbook law that the Labor Law provision applies only to workers involved in the construction, replacement, maintenance and repair of ‘public works’ in a legally restricted sense of that term”. The court concluded that applying the prevailing wage requirement to WEP participants would broaden the scope of the constitutional provision beyond its intended limits. The Court explicitly stated, “That provision is New York’s proud enforcement of the value of work and the dignity of earned wages.”

  • Cayuga-Onondaga Counties Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs. v. Sweeney, 89 N.Y.2d 395 (1996): Public Interest Exception to Notice of Claim Requirements

    Cayuga-Onondaga Counties Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs. v. Sweeney, 89 N.Y.2d 395, 676 N.E.2d 854, 654 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1996)

    When the Commissioner of Labor brings a proceeding to enforce prevailing wage laws on public work projects, the action falls under the public interest exception, making the notice of claim requirements under Education Law § 3813(1) inapplicable.

    Summary

    Cayuga-Onondaga Counties Board of Cooperative Educational Services (BOCES) appealed a decision by the Commissioner of Labor finding BOCES failed to pay prevailing wages to employees working on a lighting project for a member school district. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the Commissioner’s enforcement action was to vindicate a public interest. Because of the strong public policy considerations underlying prevailing wage laws, the notice of claim requirements of Education Law § 3813(1) and its statute of limitations do not apply to enforcement actions brought by the Commissioner of Labor.

    Facts

    BOCES contracted with the Auburn City School District to provide labor for a lighting improvement project. BOCES hired 41 full-time employees of the school district to perform the work after hours. The employees were classified as temporary, seasonal laborers of BOCES. Their pay rates were the same as their regular school district pay, but they were not paid overtime, which they would have received if they had worked directly for the school district. A complaint was filed with the Department of Labor alleging BOCES was required to pay the prevailing wage rate for electricians.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner of Labor issued a notice of hearing to BOCES, alleging violations of Labor Law § 220. The Hearing Officer determined BOCES violated Labor Law § 220 by failing to pay prevailing wages and that BOCES was not exempt due to the employees’ civil service classification. The Commissioner adopted the Hearing Officer’s report. The Appellate Division confirmed the Commissioner’s determination. BOCES appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Commissioner of Labor’s determination is invalid because the Department of Labor failed to file a timely notice of claim against BOCES in compliance with Education Law § 3813(1).

    Holding

    No, because the proceeding initiated by the Commissioner of Labor falls under the public interest exception to the notice of claim requirements of Education Law § 3813(1).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that proceedings seeking to vindicate a public interest are exempt from the notice of claim requirement. The prevailing wage mandate is rooted in the State Constitution and Labor Law § 220 serves a strong public policy. Labor Law § 220 establishes a powerful administrative mechanism for enforcing the state’s policy of prevailing wages on public work projects. The Commissioner can initiate investigations and hearings independently of any private complaints and has various enforcement tools, including criminal sanctions and civil penalties. Subjecting the Commissioner’s jurisdiction to the notice of claim requirements would weaken their ability to enforce prevailing wage policies against school districts.

    The court distinguished this case from cases like Mills v. County of Monroe, where the action sought only personal redress. Here, the Commissioner’s action aims to enforce a broad public policy. The dissent argued that the notice of claim requirement should apply because the remedy sought inures strictly to the personal benefit of the aggrieved claimants. However, the majority emphasized that the Commissioner’s enforcement powers and the purpose of Labor Law § 220 extend beyond individual claims, serving a broader public interest.

    The court also rejected BOCES’ argument that the employees were exempt from the prevailing wage requirement because they were classified as temporary seasonal employees, noting that awarding them prevailing wages would not violate Civil Service Law principles.

    The Court emphasized the importance of the Commissioner’s role in enforcing prevailing wage laws, stating that the enforcement mechanisms are designed to uphold a standard of social justice. As Chief Judge Cardozo wrote in Austin v. City of New York, §220 is “an attempt by the State to hold its territorial subdivisions to a standard of social justice in their dealings with laborers, workmen, and mechanics.”

  • Matter of Joint Industry Board v. Commissioner of Labor, 68 N.Y.2d 794 (1986): Apprenticeship Requirements under NY Labor Law

    Matter of Joint Industry Board v. Commissioner of Labor, 68 N.Y.2d 794 (1986)

    Under New York Labor Law § 220, workers on public works projects must be paid the journeyman’s prevailing wage unless they are individually registered in a state-approved apprenticeship program, even if they are enrolled in a federally-approved trainee program with similar standards.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether contractors violated New York Labor Law § 220 by paying “trainee” electricians, enrolled in a federally-approved program, less than the prevailing wage for journeymen on a state-funded project. The Commissioner of Labor found that because the trainees were not registered in a state-approved apprenticeship program, they were owed the difference in wages. The contractors argued that the federal trainee program was functionally equivalent. The Court of Appeals upheld the Commissioner’s decision, emphasizing the statute’s clear requirement of state registration while suggesting legislative re-examination of the law’s impact on policies aimed at reducing discrimination in the construction industry.

    Facts

    Petitioners, contractors on a State-funded project at the Manhattan Psychiatric Center, employed electricians classified as “trainees” who were paid less than the prevailing wage for journeymen electricians. These trainees were part of a program registered with the U.S. Department of Labor but not with the New York State Department of Labor. The Commissioner of Labor determined that the contractors violated Labor Law § 220 by failing to pay the prevailing wage. The trainee programs were designed to encourage participation by individuals traditionally excluded from the skilled trades, such as women and minorities.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner of Labor adopted the Hearing Officer’s findings that the contractors had violated Labor Law § 220. The Commissioner directed that the wage difference and a civil penalty be paid from moneys the State owed the contractors. The contractors appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed the Commissioner’s order. This appeal followed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Labor Law § 220 requires workers on public works projects to be paid the journeyman’s prevailing wage if they are not individually registered in a state-approved apprenticeship program, even if they are enrolled in a federally-approved trainee program with similar standards designed to promote equal opportunity.

    Holding

    Yes, because Labor Law § 220 unambiguously requires individual registration in a state-approved apprenticeship program to be paid apprentice-level wages on public works projects, regardless of enrollment in similar federally-approved programs. The Court was constrained to affirm the decision based on the unambiguous language of the statute, despite the laudable policy goals of the federal trainee programs.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the 1966 amendments to Labor Law § 220 were enacted to prevent the subversion of prevailing wage laws by contractors using sham training programs. The amendments established a clear standard: only state-registered apprentices could be paid less than journeyman wages. The court acknowledged the importance of the federally-approved trainee programs in combating discrimination in the construction industry, noting that such programs served goals consistent with the State’s equal opportunity policies. However, the Court found the statutory language to be clear and unambiguous: “Serving laborers, helpers, assistants and apprentices shall not be classified as common labor and shall be paid not less than the prevailing rate of wages * * * No employee shall be deemed to be an apprentice unless he is individually registered in an apprenticeship program which is duly registered with the industrial commissioner”. The Court also reasoned that allowing federally-approved trainees to be paid apprentice wages without state registration could lead to wage debasement by allowing contractors to exceed the permissible ratio of learning-level employees to journeymen. The court suggested that the Legislature should re-examine Labor Law § 220 to address the unexpected frustration of policies aimed at reducing discrimination in the construction labor force, given the potential impact of the decision on the operation of trainee programs in the State.

  • Guercio v. Gerosa, 15 N.Y.2d 142 (1965): Prevailing Wage Laws and Actual Work Performed

    Guercio v. Gerosa, 15 N.Y.2d 142 (1965)

    Under New York Labor Law § 220, the prevailing wage rate for public works laborers must be based on the specific type of work they actually perform, even if they share the same civil service title.

    Summary

    Laborers employed by the City of New York filed complaints to have their wages fixed according to the prevailing rate under Labor Law § 220. The Comptroller subclassified the laborers into groups (A-E) based on their duties, recognizing different tasks merited different pay. However, when fixing the “prevailing rate,” the Comptroller considered rates for all laborers in outside employment, regardless of the actual work performed, and fixed an average rate for all city laborers. The Court of Appeals held that the Comptroller must fix separate rates commensurate with the work actually performed, even within the same civil service title. The case was remitted for further proceedings consistent with this principle.

    Facts

    Five groups of laborers employed by the City of New York filed verified complaints pursuant to Labor Law § 220(7) to have their wages fixed by the Comptroller according to the prevailing rate. The Comptroller subclassified the laborers into five groups (A through E) based on their assigned duties, which ranged from common labor to specialized tasks like highway maintenance, water repair, and sewer work. The Comptroller fixed a “prevailing rate” for Group A laborers and recommended wage differentials for Groups B through E, acknowledging different duties warranted different pay. The Comptroller determined the prevailing rate by considering rates of all laborers in outside employment, regardless of their specific tasks. The laborers in Groups C, D, and E argued that separate rates should have been computed for each group based on rates paid to laborers performing similar tasks in outside employment.

    Procedural History

    The laborers filed complaints under Labor Law § 220(7). The Supreme Court, New York County, consolidated the proceedings. After a hearing, the Comptroller determined the sub-classifications and corresponding wage rates. The laborers appealed, arguing that the Comptroller erred in not fixing separate rates for each group based on the specific work performed. The Appellate Division’s order was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Comptroller, in fixing prevailing rates of wages for laborers under Labor Law § 220, must fix separate rates commensurate with the work actually performed within the civil service title, or whether it is sufficient to fix a single rate based on the general civil service classification of “Laborer”.

    Holding

    Yes, the Comptroller must fix and pay prevailing rates of wages based on the work actually performed within the civil service title because individuals, though in the same generic employment, may not be in the same “trade or occupation” as defined by Labor Law § 220(5).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the key inquiry is whether laborers performing different tasks (e.g., sewer laborers, highway maintenance laborers) are engaged in the same “trade or occupation” under Labor Law § 220(5). While the laborers all share the same civil service title, the nature of the work actually performed is the pivotal question. The court cited Matter of Watson v. McGoldrick, 286 N.Y. 47 (1941), emphasizing that differences in the field in which work is performed can divide workers performing similar tasks into different “trades and occupations.” The Comptroller himself recognized a distinction in duties by classifying laborers into groups and establishing wage differentials. The court also noted the policy underlying Labor Law § 220 is to ensure those on public works receive the prevailing wage paid to those doing the same work in the private sector. The court dismissed the argument that this was an attack on the civil service classification, stating that the laborers were not challenging their inclusion in the “Laborer” classification, but rather asserting that those doing different tasks on the outside are paid different wages. As the State Comptroller has concluded: “All laborers employed by a village must be paid at least the prevailing rate of wage in the locality for the particular type of work they are performing.” The court held that the Comptroller must fix prevailing rates of wages based on the work actually performed within the civil service title.