New York Law Review

Tag: Pretrial Publicity

  • People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 770 (1981): Demonstrating Prejudice from Pretrial Publicity

    People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 770 (1981)

    A defendant seeking a change of venue due to pretrial publicity must demonstrate, through the jury selection process, that a fair and impartial jury could not be selected because of the publicity.

    Summary

    Ventimiglia was convicted of murder, robbery, and burglary. He appealed, arguing that extensive pretrial publicity prevented a fair trial. His initial motion for a change of venue was denied before trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the defendant failed to create a record during jury selection demonstrating the inability to select an impartial jury due to the publicity. The court emphasized the necessity of a detailed record of jury selection, including questions, answers, and the use of peremptory challenges, to support a claim of prejudice from pretrial publicity.

    Facts

    Defendant Ventimiglia was convicted of second-degree murder, first-degree robbery, and first-degree burglary.

    Prior to trial, there was extensive pretrial publicity concerning the homicide and the defendant’s alleged involvement.

    The defendant moved for a change of venue based on this pretrial publicity, which was denied.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved for a change of venue before trial, which was denied by the Appellate Division.

    Following his conviction, the defendant appealed the judgment, renewing his claim that pretrial publicity prevented a fair trial.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant demonstrated that he was unable to select a fair and impartial jury due to widespread pretrial publicity, thus warranting a change of venue.

    Holding

    No, because the record on appeal did not contain a transcript of the jury selection proceedings, making it impossible to determine whether the extensive publicity prevented the selection of a fair and impartial jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of creating a proper record during jury selection to demonstrate prejudice from pretrial publicity. The court stated that after the initial motion for a change of venue is denied, the defendant must attempt to select an impartial jury, and these proceedings must be recorded stenographically.

    The court noted, “At that time counsel could have attempted to establish by his questions and the answers to them that the extensive publicity made it impossible to select an impartial jury, if such was the fact, and upon said record the motion for change of venue could have been renewed and given proper consideration by the court.”

    The court also mentioned the importance of whether the defendant used all of his peremptory challenges during jury selection, as this could indicate the difficulty in finding an impartial jury.

    Because the record lacked a transcript of the jury selection, the court could not determine whether the defendant was prejudiced by the pretrial publicity. The absence of this record was fatal to the defendant’s claim on appeal.

  • People v. Sepos, 21 N.Y.2d 906 (1968): Determining if Pretrial Publicity Compelled a Guilty Plea

    People v. Sepos, 21 N.Y.2d 906 (1968)

    A guilty plea may be vacated if pretrial publicity was so extensive and prejudicial that it effectively coerced the defendant into pleading guilty, thus denying them a fair trial.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether extensive pretrial publicity surrounding a juvenile gang killing pressured the defendant, Sepos, into pleading guilty to avoid the death penalty. The court held that the defendant was entitled to a hearing to determine whether the publicity was so overwhelming that it effectively compelled his guilty plea, thereby denying him a fair trial. The court reasoned that if the publicity was indeed the “dominant or exclusive reason” for the plea, the plea should be vacated. This case emphasizes the importance of ensuring that guilty pleas are made freely and voluntarily, without undue influence from external factors such as pervasive negative publicity.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged in connection with a juvenile gang killing that generated significant media attention. The publicity surrounding the case was described as “widespread intensive emotional publicity.” The trial was initiated while the publicity was at its peak. The defendant ultimately entered a guilty plea.

    Procedural History

    Following his conviction based on the guilty plea, the defendant sought post-conviction relief, arguing that the extensive pretrial publicity had coerced him into pleading guilty. The lower courts denied relief without a hearing. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case for a hearing.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the extensive pretrial publicity surrounding the defendant’s case was so prejudicial that it effectively compelled him to plead guilty, thereby violating his right to a fair trial?

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant raised a factual issue as to whether the pretrial publicity was so extensive as to preclude the right to a fair trial and was the dominant or exclusive reason for the defendant’s plea of guilty. The case was remanded for a hearing on this issue.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the intense and widespread publicity surrounding the juvenile gang killing, especially during the period leading up to the trial, raised a legitimate concern that the defendant’s guilty plea was not entirely voluntary. The court emphasized that the relevant inquiry was not merely the defendant’s or his counsel’s subjective state of mind, but rather “the objective facts and the inferences which may be drawn from them.” The court acknowledged that the defendant could not solely rely on his own feelings or those of his counsel to prove coercion; he had to present objective evidence showing the publicity was so overwhelming that it essentially forced him to plead guilty. The court distinguished between issues that could be raised on direct appeal after a guilty plea and those that could not, stating that the defendant could raise the issue of whether his plea was coerced by pretrial publicity in a post-conviction proceeding because it was not clear he could have raised issues regarding change of venue or continuance on direct appeal after pleading guilty. This ruling underscores the court’s commitment to ensuring that criminal defendants are not pressured into forfeiting their right to a fair trial due to external pressures like pervasive media coverage. The court stated, “The widespread intensive emotional publicity about a juvenile gang killing with trial pressed upon defendant while the flood of publicity was at the crest raises an issue of fact whether defendant was circumstantially compelled to plead guilty or face the death penalty.”

  • People v. Jackson, 25 N.Y.2d 83 (1969): Admissibility of Psychiatric Testimony and Change of Venue

    People v. Jackson, 25 N.Y.2d 83 (1969)

    A motion for change of venue based on pretrial publicity is properly denied where the publicity is largely objective, the jury selection process demonstrates a lack of pervasive prejudice, and the defense expresses satisfaction with the selected jury. Additionally, psychiatric expert testimony is admissible, even if based on hospital records not presented to the jury, provided the expert is thoroughly cross-examined, and incriminating statements made during a court-ordered psychiatric examination are admissible if the defendant raises an insanity defense.

    Summary

    The defendant, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed, arguing that pretrial publicity and the denial of a change of venue deprived him of a fair trial, and that errors were committed in the admission and exclusion of evidence regarding his sanity. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the pretrial publicity was not so prejudicial as to warrant a change of venue, especially since the defense expressed satisfaction with the selected jury. The court also found no reversible error in the admission of psychiatric testimony or statements made by the defendant during a court-ordered examination, given that the defense raised the issue of insanity and the statements were not directly incriminating.

    Facts

    The defendant was accused of murdering Noreen Jones, after having harassed her for three years due to her lack of romantic interest in him. Prior to the murder, the defendant assaulted Jones and her father, leading to an assault charge and probation. On the day of the shooting, the defendant threatened Jones before following her to the police station and shooting her multiple times in front of witnesses. He made incriminating statements shortly after his arrest. The defense pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted for first-degree murder and pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. He was committed to Marcy State Hospital for a mental examination. The defendant’s motion for a change of venue was denied by the Appellate Division. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of first-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant was deprived of a fair trial by reason of the publicity attending it and by denial of his motion for a change of venue.

    2. Whether the court erred in admitting certain evidence regarding the defendant’s mental condition, and in excluding other evidence bearing thereon from the jury.

    Holding

    1. No, because the pretrial publicity was not so sensational as to excite local popular passion and prejudice, and the defense expressed satisfaction with the selected jury.

    2. No, because the strict rules regarding expert psychiatric testimony had been satisfied, the psychiatric report was not improperly admitted, and the defendant waived his rights against self-incrimination and to counsel by requesting the mental examination and raising the insanity defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the change of venue, the Court of Appeals emphasized that it must be shown that the defendant could not obtain a fair trial in the original county. Newspaper comment alone, even if extensive, is insufficient. The court highlighted the objective nature of the pretrial publicity, the thorough jury selection process where jurors asserted their impartiality, and the defense’s failure to use all peremptory challenges, indicating satisfaction with the jury. The court cited People v. Bonier, 189 N.Y. 108, 110-111, for the principle that a defendant cannot complain about the denial of a change of venue if satisfied with the jury.

    Regarding the defendant’s sanity, the court addressed the admissibility of psychiatric expert testimony. Although prior precedent required the presentation of hospital records upon which experts relied, the court noted that CPLR 4515 modified this rule, allowing experts to state opinions and reasons without first specifying the data, subject to cross-examination. The court noted that the tests served simply to rule out organic brain damage. The court also rejected the argument that the psychiatrists’ report was admitted “by indirection,” finding no evidence of this. The court found no violation of the defendant’s right against self-incrimination or right to counsel because the defendant requested the mental exam and introduced the issue of his sanity, and the statements ultimately admitted were not incriminating. The court stated, “It would violate judicial common sense to permit a defendant to invoke the defense of insanity and foreclose the Government from the benefit of a mental examination to meet this issue.”

  • People ex rel. Rohrlich v. Warden, 20 N.Y.2d 279 (1967): Judicial Discretion in Waiving Jury Trials

    People ex rel. Rohrlich v. Warden, 20 N.Y.2d 279 (1967)

    A trial judge’s discretion to deny a defendant’s request to waive a jury trial is limited to cases where compelling grounds arising out of the attainment of the ends of justice require denial; habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy to test whether prejudicial pre-trial publicity violated a defendant’s right to a fair trial.

    Summary

    Bernard Rohrlich, convicted of robbery, grand larceny, and assault, sought habeas corpus relief six years post-conviction, alleging the trial court’s denial of his jury trial waiver request violated his constitutional rights. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the trial court erred in denying the waiver without compelling reasons related to justice, this error alone wasn’t grounds for habeas corpus. However, Rohrlich’s additional claim of prejudicial pretrial publicity warranted a hearing to determine if it deprived him of a fair trial, making habeas corpus an appropriate remedy. The court emphasized the importance of a fair fact-finding process.

    Facts

    Bernard Rohrlich was convicted of robbery, grand larceny, and assault after a jury trial. Prior to the trial, Rohrlich requested to waive his right to a jury trial, but the trial judge denied the request, stating he needed the assistance of jurors to determine the facts. Rohrlich’s attorney objected to the denial. Rohrlich did not raise the issue of the denial of his request to waive a jury trial on direct appeal.

    Procedural History

    Rohrlich was convicted, and the conviction was affirmed by the appellate courts. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Six years later, Rohrlich filed two petitions for writs of habeas corpus, both of which were dismissed by the Supreme Court (Special Term). The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissals. Rohrlich appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by leave of the court.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court’s denial of Rohrlich’s request to waive his right to a trial by jury constituted a violation of his constitutional rights, warranting habeas corpus relief?
    2. Whether Rohrlich’s claim of prejudicial pretrial publicity, raised for the first time in his habeas corpus petition, warrants a hearing to determine if it deprived him of a fair trial?

    Holding

    1. No, because while the trial court erred in denying the waiver request without compelling grounds related to the attainment of justice, this error alone does not affect the integrity of the fact-finding process to the extent necessary for habeas corpus relief.
    2. Yes, because if Rohrlich can establish that prejudicial pretrial publicity prevented him from receiving a fair trial, habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged that the trial judge’s reason for denying the waiver (needing the aid of jurors to determine the facts) was insufficient and outside the permissible discretion outlined in previous cases like People v. Duchin. The constitutional amendment permitting waiver of a jury trial was not intended to allow judges to avoid responsibility for fact-finding. However, the court emphasized that habeas corpus is not a substitute for direct appeal, and is appropriate only when a fundamental constitutional right has been violated to such an extent that it affected the integrity of the fact-finding process and deprived the defendant of a fair trial.

    The court referred to People ex rel. Keitt v. McMann, which clarified that habeas corpus is appropriate to test the deprivation of a fundamental constitutional or statutory right. The court reasoned that being forced to have a jury trial, while perhaps against the defendant’s wishes, does not, in itself, undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial. The denial of the request to waive a jury trial is not a violation that affects the “integrity of the fact-finding process”.

    However, the court found Rohrlich’s claim of prejudicial pretrial publicity more compelling. Citing People v. Sepos, the court stated that allegations of prejudicial pretrial publicity, if proven, could entitle a defendant to collateral relief. Therefore, the court held that Rohrlich was entitled to a hearing to determine if the pretrial publicity prevented him from receiving a fair trial. The court emphasized that it is the violation of the right to a fair trial that allows for collateral relief via habeas corpus.