New York Law Review

Tag: pretrial identification

  • People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327 (1990): Scope of Compulsory Process at Pretrial Wade Hearings

    People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327 (1990)

    A defendant does not have an unqualified right to call an identifying witness at a pretrial Wade hearing to challenge the suggestiveness of a lineup; the decision to allow such testimony rests within the sound discretion of the hearing court.

    Summary

    Chipp was convicted of sexual abuse and related crimes. At a combined Huntley-Wade hearing, the trial court denied Chipp’s request to call the 10-year-old complaining witness to testify about the suggestiveness of the pre-trial lineup. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while defendants have the right to call witnesses at criminal proceedings, this right is not absolute at a Wade hearing, which is meant only to determine the suggestiveness of a pretrial identification, and is subject to the discretion of the hearing judge.

    Facts

    Shanica F., a 10-year-old girl, was sexually abused and nearly sodomized by a man she later identified as Chipp. The incident occurred on April 7, 1986, in a building on West 131st Street in Manhattan. Shanica described her attacker to the police. Shermain Thompson, a tenant in the building, recognized the description as matching “Apache,” a friend of her brother, whom she had seen in the building earlier that day. Two days later, police found civilians holding Chipp at the same building. They were told that Chipp was the man who had “raped” the girl. Detective Francisci, who was assigned to the case, arranged a lineup where Shanica identified Chipp within 10 seconds.

    Procedural History

    Chipp was convicted in the trial court. Prior to trial, a combined Huntley-Wade hearing was held regarding the admissibility of Chipp’s statements and Shanica’s lineup identification. The hearing court denied Chipp’s request to call Shanica as a witness at the hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the hearing court’s refusal to allow the defendant to call the complaining witness to testify at a combined Huntley and Wade hearing denied him a constitutional or statutory right to present relevant evidence on the issue of the suggestiveness of a pretrial lineup identification procedure.

    Holding

    No, because any right of compulsory process at a Wade hearing may be outweighed by countervailing policy concerns, properly within the discretion and control of the hearing judge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that while CPL 60.15(1) affords a defendant the right to call witnesses at a criminal proceeding, that right is not absolute. The Court emphasized that a Wade hearing, unlike a trial, does not involve a determination of guilt or innocence but rather determines whether a pretrial identification procedure was unduly suggestive. The Court reasoned that according an absolute right to call an identifying witness at a Wade hearing would enable defendants to harass identifying witnesses and transform the hearing into a discovery proceeding. The court noted that no indicia of suggestiveness was presented to the hearing court. The court reasoned that the complainant’s testimony on the varied complexions of the subjects of the lineup would only have been cumulative, as the court already had a photograph of the lineup before it. The court held that the hearing judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the defendant’s request to call the complainant at the Wade hearing. The Court stated, “Indeed we have held in respect to pretrial hearings more directly addressing the guilt or innocence of an accused that a defendant’s right to require the production of a witness with relevant testimony could be outweighed by countervailing policy considerations (People v Petralia, 62 NY2d 47, 52-53).”

  • People v. Blake, 64 N.Y.2d 730 (1984): Admissibility of Pretrial Identifications

    People v. Blake, 64 N.Y.2d 730 (1984)

    Pretrial identification procedures do not require per se suppression if there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that the procedures were not unduly suggestive, even if some improprieties occurred.

    Summary

    Blake was convicted of grand larceny. He appealed, arguing that pretrial identification procedures were unduly suggestive, warranting suppression. The victim identified Blake in a photo array and a subsequent lineup, despite changes in his appearance. The police made some suggestive remarks during the identification process. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the identification procedures, while not perfect, were not so suggestive as to require automatic suppression. The court emphasized that there was sufficient evidence to support the lower court’s finding that the identifications were based on the victim’s independent recollection.

    Facts

    Joann Blaha was robbed of a gold chain. She chased the thief and directly faced him before he escaped in a taxi. Blaha described the thief to Officer Murphy, who indicated he had a suspect fitting the description. Murphy showed Blaha a photo array containing Blake’s picture, which she identified within 20 seconds. She was then shown the original color photo of Blake, which she also identified. Two months later, she identified Blake in a lineup despite his changed appearance (hair, beard, weight).

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Blake’s motion to suppress the pretrial and in-court identifications, finding that the victim’s identification was based on her independent recollection. The jury convicted Blake of grand larceny. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and Blake appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the pretrial identification procedures used by the police were so unduly suggestive as to require per se suppression of the identifications and taint the in-court identification.

    Holding

    No, because there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that the identification procedures were not unduly suggestive, and the identifications were based on the victim’s independent recollection despite some improprieties by the officer.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Adams, where the identification was undeniably suggestive. Here, the court found sufficient evidence to support the lower court’s finding that the procedures were not unduly suggestive. While Officer Murphy made suggestive remarks (mentioning a suspect was in custody, showing a color photo after the initial identification, and indicating the chosen person would be in the lineup), these improprieties did not automatically contaminate the identifications. The court cited People v. Logan, noting that informing a victim that a suspect is in custody does not automatically taint an identification. The court emphasized that the victim had ample opportunity to observe the defendant during the crime and the subsequent chase. The court noted the significant changes in Blake’s appearance between the photo and the lineup, suggesting the victim’s identification was based on her memory, not just the suggestive procedures. Unlike People v. Rahming, where the police presented the defendant alone after the photo identification, Blake was identified in a lineup. Regarding the denial to display defendant’s tattooed hands, the court stated that the defendant offered no proof regarding the presence of the tattoos on the date in issue. The court also stated there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to allow defendant to testify on the tattoo point, without being subject to cross-examination concerning his past convictions.

  • People v. Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d 40 (1979): Admissibility of Voice Identification Testimony Based on Prior Familiarity

    48 N.Y.2d 40 (1979)

    Due process considerations regarding suggestive pretrial identification procedures are relaxed when a witness identifies a defendant’s voice based on prior familiarity, provided the witness’s ability to observe and recall events is not impaired and police suggestion is minimal.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of voice identification testimony where a witness, Ruby Cohen, identified the defendant, Allweiss, as a participant in a crime after hearing recorded phone calls. Ruby knew Allweiss through the victim’s daughter. The court held that the identification was admissible because Ruby was familiar with Allweiss’s voice, and the circumstances of the identification at the police station were not unduly suggestive. The court emphasized that due process concerns are lessened when a witness identifies someone based on a prior relationship and familiarity.

    Facts

    Mrs. Otti Cohen received threatening phone calls demanding money. She initially recognized the caller as Bobby Stephenson, but the caller later denied being Bobby. Mrs. Cohen contacted the police, who recorded subsequent calls. Mrs. Cohen’s daughter, Ruby, knew the defendant, Allweiss, through Stephenson. Allweiss was arrested after Mrs. Cohen paid the money. Ruby was asked to come to the police station to listen to the recorded calls and identify the voices.

    Procedural History

    Allweiss was convicted of attempted grand larceny. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Allweiss appealed, arguing that Ruby Cohen’s voice identification testimony should have been suppressed because seeing Allweiss at the police station before the identification was unduly suggestive.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the testimony of a witness identifying the defendant’s voice on recorded phone calls should be excluded because the witness saw the defendant at the police station prior to making the voice identification, thus potentially tainting the identification process.

    Holding

    No, because the witness was already familiar with the defendant’s voice from prior interactions, and the circumstances surrounding the identification were not so suggestive as to create a substantial risk of misidentification.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the due process concerns associated with suggestive pretrial identification procedures, citing United States v. Wade and People v. Adams. However, it distinguished the case from typical eyewitness identification scenarios. The court reasoned that when a witness is familiar with the defendant prior to the crime, the risk of misidentification due to police suggestion is significantly reduced. The Court highlighted the relationship between Ruby Cohen and Allweiss, noting that Ruby knew Allweiss and could identify her voice based on prior conversations. The court emphasized that the primary purpose of pretrial notice requirements is to alert the defendant to possible constitutional violations in identification procedures. In cases where the witness is familiar with the defendant, such notice may be unnecessary. The court stated, “When a crime has been committed by a family member, former friend or long-time acquaintance of a witness there is little or no risk that comments by the police, however suggestive, will lead the witness to identify the wrong person.” The Court also noted that the existing identification procedures were designed for eyewitnesses, and may be unsuitable in other contexts, such as voice identification from prior relationships. Because the lower courts found that the witness was well acquainted with the defendant and that there was no impermissible police suggestion or risk of irreparable mistaken identification, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

  • People v. Rivera, 27 N.Y.2d 286 (1970): Coram Nobis and Retroactive Application of Identification Procedures

    People v. Rivera, 27 N.Y.2d 286 (1970)

    A defendant seeking to vacate a conviction via coram nobis based on a tainted pretrial identification procedure must demonstrate that the opportunity to assert the due process violation was substantially impaired or denied at the time of the original trial.

    Summary

    Rivera sought to vacate his 1963 conviction through coram nobis, arguing that the pretrial identification procedure tainted his subsequent in-court identification, violating his due process rights. He argued that he should have been afforded a hearing on the issue of taint, even though his trial predated People v. Ballott. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of coram nobis, holding that while the pretrial identification procedure was improper, Rivera failed to demonstrate that his due process rights could not have been vindicated under the law existing at the time of his trial. The court emphasized that coram nobis requires a showing that the opportunity to assert a fundamental constitutional right was substantially impaired or denied.

    Facts

    Rivera was convicted in 1963. He later sought to vacate the conviction via coram nobis, alleging that the pretrial identification procedure was “unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification,” thereby tainting the in-court identification. The facts supporting this claim of a suggestive pretrial identification procedure were uncontested by the prosecution.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was originally convicted in 1963. He then filed a coram nobis proceeding to vacate that conviction. The coram nobis court denied the writ without a hearing. This denial was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can successfully challenge a conviction via coram nobis based on a pretrial identification procedure that allegedly tainted a subsequent in-court identification, when the trial predated the establishment of a specific procedural remedy (a preliminary hearing on the issue of taint), if the defendant had other avenues to challenge the identification procedure at the time of trial?

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to demonstrate that his due process rights related to the allegedly tainted identification could not have been vindicated under the law existing at the time of his original trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while United States v. Wade and its progeny established stricter standards for pretrial identification procedures and provided for preliminary hearings to determine taint, these standards are not automatically applicable retroactively via coram nobis. The court acknowledged that in direct appeals, it had required that the issue of taint be resolved at a separate hearing outside the presence of the jury. However, the court emphasized that this procedure is not constitutionally required and that coram nobis requires a showing that the opportunity to assert a fundamental constitutional right was substantially impaired or denied. The court stated, “coram nobis requires, in addition to the assertion of a fundamental constitutional right, that the opportunity to assert the same has been substantially impaired or denied”.

    The court noted that Rivera could have challenged the identification procedure at trial, even without the benefit of a formal Wade hearing. He could have excepted to the identification and developed its alleged suggestiveness off the record. His decision to forego these routes suggested a trial strategy. Therefore, the court concluded that the alleged due process violation could have been vindicated under the law as it existed prior to the decision in Ballott. Absent such a showing that the claimed due process violation could not have been vindicated under the law as it existed prior to Ballott, the conviction cannot be disturbed.

    The court distinguished between direct appeals and collateral attacks via coram nobis, emphasizing the intrinsic limitations of the writ itself. The court implicitly balances the need to correct potential injustices against the need for finality in judgments, particularly where the defendant had opportunities to raise the issue at trial.

  • People v. Ganci, 27 N.Y.2d 418 (1971): Admissibility of In-Court Identification After Pretrial Identification

    People v. Ganci, 27 N.Y.2d 418 (1971)

    An in-court identification is admissible if the prosecution establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the witness’s ability to recognize the defendant is based on an independent source and is not tainted by an earlier suggestive pretrial identification procedure, but the admissibility of prior photographic identification, when elicited by the defendant, is not preserved for review.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of an in-court identification following a pretrial identification. The court held that the in-court identification was permissible because the trial court correctly determined, after a voir dire, that the witness’s identification ability was independent of potentially suggestive pretrial procedures (photographic display and a showup). Additionally, the court declined to address the admissibility of prior photographic identification since the defense counsel initially elicited that information during cross-examination, failing to preserve the issue for appeal.

    Facts

    The complaining witness identified the defendant in court. Prior to trial, the witness had identified the defendant through photographs shown by the police and in a showup in the courthouse corridor.

    Procedural History

    The trial judge conducted a voir dire to determine the admissibility of the in-court identification. The trial court found the in-court identification admissible. The defendant appealed, arguing that the in-court identification was tainted by the prior photographic display and showup. The defendant also argued that the fact that the witness had previously identified the defendant through photographs was improperly brought before the jury.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the in-court identification was admissible, considering the witness had previously identified the defendant through photographs and a showup?

    2. Whether the admission of evidence regarding the witness’s prior photographic identification of the defendant is grounds for reversal when that evidence was first elicited by the defendant’s counsel?

    Holding

    1. No, because the record clearly and convincingly supports the trial court’s finding that the witness’s ability to recognize the defendant was not the product of, or affected by, the prior photographic display or the showup.

    2. No, because the question of its admissibility against the defendant has not been preserved for appellate review since this fact was first elicited by the defendant’s own counsel upon cross-examination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, emphasizing that the trial judge had properly conducted a voir dire to assess the basis of the witness’s in-court identification. The court found that the evidence clearly and convincingly supported the determination that the in-court identification was based on an independent source, untainted by the pretrial identification procedures. Citing People v. Ballott, the court reiterated the importance of determining whether the witness’s recognition of the defendant stemmed from an independent recollection. As the Court stated, the record supported the finding that the witness’s ability to recognize the defendant was not the product of, or affected by, either the photographs she saw or by the showup. Regarding the photographic identification, the court noted that since defense counsel first elicited the information about the witness identifying the defendant through photographs, the defendant could not later claim it as grounds for reversal. The court declined to reconsider its prior holdings on this matter, noting that the issue had not been properly preserved for review. The court effectively applied the invited error doctrine, preventing a party from raising an issue on appeal that they themselves introduced at trial.