New York Law Review

Tag: Pretrial Hearing

  • People v. Turaine, 78 N.Y.2d 871 (1991): Defendant’s Right to Be Present at Material Stages of Trial

    People v. Turaine, 78 N.Y.2d 871 (1991)

    A defendant has the right to be present at any material stage of the trial, including preliminary hearings where adverse testimony is received, to confront witnesses and advise counsel.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and mandated a new trial. The court held that the defendant’s exclusion from a pretrial hearing, where a witness testified about alleged intimidation by the defendant, constituted reversible error. The Court of Appeals reasoned that such a hearing is a material stage of the trial, as the defendant’s presence is essential for confronting adverse witnesses and assisting counsel in identifying inconsistencies or falsehoods in their testimony, impacting the defendant’s ability to defend himself effectively.

    Facts

    The defendant was on trial. A witness against him, detained on separate charges, was mistakenly placed in the courthouse holding pen with the defendant. The prosecutor sought to introduce testimony that the defendant threatened or intimidated the witness in the holding pen to prevent him from testifying.

    Procedural History

    During the trial, the court held a hearing outside the jury’s presence to determine the admissibility of the witness’s testimony regarding the alleged intimidation. The defendant was excluded from this hearing over objection. The Appellate Division upheld the original trial court decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s exclusion from a pretrial hearing, where a witness testifies about alleged intimidation by the defendant, constitutes a violation of the defendant’s right to be present at all material stages of the trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because proceedings where testimony is received are material stages of the trial, and the defendant’s presence is necessary to confront adverse witnesses and advise counsel of any inconsistencies, errors, or falsehoods in their testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that a defendant has a fundamental right to be present at any material stage of the trial. It cited precedent, including People v. Velasco and People v. Mullen, to support this principle. The court reasoned that a hearing where testimony is received qualifies as a material stage because it directly impacts the defendant’s ability to defend themselves. The court noted, “Proceedings where testimony is received are material stages of the trial because defendant’s presence is necessary so that he or she may confront adverse witnesses and advise counsel of any inconsistencies, errors or falsehoods in their testimony.”

    The court distinguished the hearing from the witness’s subsequent testimony before the jury, stating, “At that stage of the trial, the court had already decided the evidence had probative value and would be received for the jury’s consideration.” Thus, the defendant’s presence at the later stage did not cure the error of their exclusion from the earlier hearing, where the admissibility of the evidence was being determined. The Court relied on the principle that a defendant’s absence from such hearings could have a substantial effect on their ability to defend, referencing Snyder v. Massachusetts.

  • People v. Rahming, 26 N.Y.2d 786 (1970): Right to a Pretrial Hearing on Identification Procedures

    People v. Rahming, 26 N.Y.2d 786 (1970)

    A defendant is entitled to a pretrial hearing to determine whether improper pretrial identification procedures tainted a witness’s in-court identification, especially when the defendant is unaware of the prior identification.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the County Court for a post-trial hearing. The hearing was ordered to determine whether improper pretrial identification procedures tainted the victim’s in-court identification of the defendant. The Court emphasized that a trial judge must affirmatively find that taking proof on the main trial attacking the identification will not prejudice the defendant. Where the defendant was unaware of a prior photographic identification, prejudice was likely, warranting a separate hearing to ensure fairness.

    Facts

    The victim identified the defendant in court as the perpetrator of the crime.

    The prosecution had previously shown the victim a photographic lineup where the victim identified the defendant.

    The defendant was unaware of the photographic identification before trial.

    Procedural History

    The case proceeded to trial, where the victim identified the defendant.

    The defendant was convicted.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in not holding a pretrial hearing to determine if the victim’s in-court identification was tainted by an impermissibly suggestive prior photographic identification, especially when the defendant was unaware of the prior identification.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial court made no finding that it would not prejudice the defendant to take proof on the main trial attacking the identification, and prejudice arising out of presenting proof on the main trial in this case was almost inevitable due to the defendant’s lack of knowledge about the prior photographic identification.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while People v. Ganci (27 N.Y.2d 418) allows a trial judge to direct that proof regarding identification be taken at trial if it won’t be prejudicial, in this case, prejudice was “almost inevitable.” The defendant’s lack of knowledge of the photographic identification created a situation where cross-examination on that point would risk improperly bolstering the identification with otherwise inadmissible evidence. The Court highlighted that the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL 710.30, subd. 1, par. [b]), though not effective at the time of trial, requires pretrial notice to the defendant of testimony identifying the defendant by a witness who previously identified him. This underscores the importance of ensuring fairness in identification procedures. Since identification goes to guilt or innocence, the court found it unfair to deny the defendant a hearing on the possibility that the in-court identification was based on suggestive procedures. The court implied the importance of a pretrial hearing outweighed judicial efficiency in this case. As the court stated, “Since identification of the accused goes to the determination pf guilt or innocence, it would be unfair not to extend to this defendant the right to a hearing where there is the unexplored possibility that the in-court identification was based on suggestive procedures.”