New York Law Review

Tag: Presumptive Evidence

  • Matter of Sigety v. Leventhal, 42 N.Y.2d 947 (1977): Upholding Civil Penalties Based on Presumptive Evidence in Rent Control Cases

    Matter of Sigety v. Leventhal, 42 N.Y.2d 947 (1977)

    In administrative proceedings involving civil penalties, the application of a presumptive evidence rule is constitutional if there is a rational connection between the facts proved and the facts presumed.

    Summary

    This case concerns two separate proceedings consolidated on appeal. The first involves Sigety and Cohen, challenging a determination that was upheld based on substantial evidence. The second involves Investors Funding Corporation, challenging a determination regarding violations of the Administrative Code of the City of New York. The Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of applying a presumptive evidence rule in the first proceeding and reviewed the evidence supporting the administrative determination in the second. The court ultimately affirmed the order in the first proceeding and modified the order in the second, reducing the civil penalties imposed.

    Facts

    In the first proceeding, Sigety and Cohen challenged an administrative determination. The specific nature of the determination is not detailed, but it was made by the respondents. The key factual point is that the determination was supported by substantial evidence.

    In the second proceeding, Investors Funding Corporation of New York and Relocation & Management Associates, Inc., challenged the Commissioner of the Department of Rent and Housing Maintenance’s determination of violations concerning deprivation of heat and hot water. Specifically, Investors Funding was penalized for violations on March 3, 1972, and September 24, 1972, among other dates. Investors Funding acquired title after March 3, 1972.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division upheld the determination against Sigety and Cohen. Investors Funding also had an unfavorable determination at the Appellate Division. Both cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the application of the presumptive evidence rule in subdivision b of section 74 of the Rent, Eviction and Rehabilitation Regulations was unconstitutional in the proceeding against Sigety and Cohen.
    2. Whether the determination of the Commissioner of the Department of Rent and Housing Maintenance was supported by substantial evidence in the proceeding against Investors Funding Corporation of New York and Relocation & Management Associates, Inc., specifically regarding violations before the acquisition of title by Investors Funding.

    Holding

    1. No, because there is a rational connection between the facts proved and the facts presumed, and the proceeding involves the imposition of civil penalties.
    2. No, the determination was supported by substantial evidence except as to the violations of subdivision a of section Y51-10.0 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York in respect to deprivation of heat, hot water or both for the date of March 3, 1972, which was prior to the acquisition of title by Investors Funding, and for the date of September 24, 1972.

    Court’s Reasoning

    In the case of Sigety and Cohen, the court relied on Matter of Pell v. Board of Educ., 34 N.Y.2d 222, 230, 233, stating that the respondents’ determination was supported by substantial evidence. The court then addressed the constitutional question regarding the presumptive evidence rule, citing McCormick on Evidence (2d ed, pp 817-819) and cases such as People v. Kirkpatrick, 32 NY2d 17, 24-25 and People v. McCaleb, 25 NY2d 394, 400-401. The court emphasized that because the proceeding involved civil penalties and there was a rational connection between the facts proved and the facts presumed, the rule’s application was not unconstitutional.

    In the case of Investors Funding Corporation, the court found that the commissioner’s determination was supported by substantial evidence, except for violations occurring before Investors Funding acquired title. Specifically, Investors Funding was penalized for violations on March 3, 1972, prior to their acquisition of title, and also for September 24, 1972. The court modified the Appellate Division’s order to reinstate the commissioner’s determination except for these two dates, reducing the total civil penalties by $100. The court implicitly reasoned that it is inappropriate to hold a property owner liable for violations that occurred before they owned the property.

  • Town of Clay v. Mathews, 15 N.Y.2d 505 (1964): Presumptive Evidence of Zoning Ordinance Adoption

    15 N.Y.2d 505 (1964)

    A town clerk’s certificate regarding the adoption, posting, and publication of a town ordinance, as required by the Town Law, constitutes presumptive evidence of those facts, shifting the burden to the challenger to offer contrary proof.

    Summary

    This case concerns the evidentiary weight given to a town clerk’s certificate regarding the adoption and publication of a zoning ordinance. The Town of Clay sought to enforce its zoning ordinance against Mathews. Mathews challenged the validity of the ordinance’s enactment. The Town relied on a certificate from the Town Clerk attesting to the proper adoption, posting, and publication of the ordinance. The Court of Appeals held that under Section 134 of the Town Law, the clerk’s certificate serves as presumptive evidence of proper enactment, and the burden shifts to the challenging party to present contradictory evidence. Since Mathews failed to offer any such evidence, the ordinance was deemed validly enacted.

    Facts

    The Town of Clay, Onondaga County, sought to enforce its zoning ordinance. Mathews challenged the ordinance’s validity, arguing it wasn’t properly enacted. The Town presented a certificate from the Town Clerk. The certificate attested to the correctness of the zoning ordinance transcript and confirmed its publication and posting, as mandated by law.

    Procedural History

    The Town Court initially heard the case concerning the zoning ordinance violation. The Town introduced the Town Clerk’s certificate as evidence of proper enactment. The defendant objected to the exhibit’s admission. The court admitted the certificate into evidence. The defendant offered no evidence to rebut the certificate’s claims. The Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court’s decision regarding the validity of the ordinance based on the evidentiary value of the clerk’s certificate.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a Town Clerk’s certificate, attesting to the adoption, posting, and publication of a town ordinance, constitutes presumptive evidence of these facts under Section 134 of the Town Law, shifting the burden to the challenger to offer contrary proof.

    Holding

    Yes, because Section 134 of the Town Law explicitly states that such a certificate is presumptive evidence of the ordinance’s proper adoption, posting, and publication; therefore, the burden shifts to the party challenging the ordinance to present evidence to the contrary.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the plain language of Section 134 of the Town Law, which states that the Town Clerk’s certificate regarding the adoption, posting, and publication of a town ordinance is “presumptive evidence” of those matters. The Court emphasized that this section was enacted to streamline the process of proving the formal procedures underlying the enactment of public ordinances. The statute was designed to alleviate the need for extensive proof of formal procedures. It places the onus on the challenger to present evidence contesting the certificate’s claims. Since Mathews objected to the exhibit but failed to present any evidence to contradict the certificate’s assertions, the Court concluded that the Town had met its burden of proof regarding the validity of the zoning ordinance. The court noted, “This section, adopted in 1932 (ch. 634), was designed to obviate the sometimes troublesome and inconvenient need to prove formal procedures underlying the enactment of public ordinances and to require one who challenges the formal adoption or publication to offer proof on this subject.”