New York Law Review

Tag: Presumption of Regularity

  • People v. Cruz, 12 N.Y.3d 815 (2009): Rebutting the Presumption of Regularity in Jury Deliberations

    People v. Cruz, 12 N.Y.3d 815 (2009)

    A defendant can rebut the presumption of regularity in judicial proceedings by presenting substantial evidence of a significant, unexplained irregularity, such as a jury receiving an exhibit not admitted into evidence without the knowledge or consent of the court or parties.

    Summary

    Cruz was convicted of assault. During deliberations, the jury requested a written statement made by Cruz to the police, which, although marked as a court exhibit, was not admitted into evidence. The trial judge had no recollection of the note and did not inform counsel. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Cruz rebutted the presumption of regularity because the jury requested and may have received an exhibit not in evidence, a fact not brought to the judge’s attention. The error was not harmless because the statement contradicted Cruz’s defense.

    Facts

    Cruz was charged with assault for stabbing two men. His defense was misidentification. During the trial, a police officer referred to a written statement signed by Cruz. The statement was marked as an exhibit but was only intended to refresh the officer’s recollection and was not admitted as evidence. During deliberations, the jury requested to see the statement, believing it was in evidence. The trial judge later stated that he had no recollection of the jury’s request.

    Procedural History

    Cruz was convicted of assault. He appealed, arguing a violation of CPL 310.30 and People v. O’Rama. The Appellate Division initially reserved decision and remitted the case for a reconstruction hearing to determine if a jury note existed and what action was taken. After the reconstruction hearing, the Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, applying the presumption of regularity. Cruz appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant met his burden of rebutting the presumption of regularity in judicial proceedings by presenting substantial evidence that the jury requested and potentially received an exhibit that was not admitted into evidence, without the knowledge of the judge or counsel.

    Holding

    Yes, because the record showed a significant, unexplained irregularity: the jury requested an exhibit not in evidence, and the request was never brought to the judge’s attention. Furthermore, it was reasonable for the jury to believe the exhibit was in evidence since it was initially received by the court, but the jury was not privy to the court’s subsequent reversal of that ruling.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that while a “presumption of regularity attaches to judicial proceedings” (People v. Velasquez, 1 NY3d 44, 48 [2003]), the Appellate Division erred in holding that the presumption had not been overcome. The court reasoned that Cruz established a significant, unexplained irregularity: the jury requested an exhibit not in evidence, it was reasonable for the jury to believe it was in evidence, and the request was never brought to the judge’s attention. The court emphasized the trial judge’s statement at the reconstruction hearing that he never saw the note, did not reconvene with counsel, and did not know if the exhibit was ever shown to the jury. The court also disagreed with the Appellate Division’s determination that the error was harmless, noting that the exhibit contradicted Cruz’s misidentification defense. The court cited People v Bouton, 50 NY2d 130, 137 in stating the error was not harmless. The key point is that the defendant presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that a deviation from standard procedure occurred and that it prejudiced the defendant’s case.

  • People v. Velasquez, 1 N.Y.3d 44 (2003): Presumption of Regularity in Criminal Proceedings

    People v. Velasquez, 1 N.Y.3d 44 (2003)

    A criminal defendant must present substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity that attaches to all criminal proceedings, including the issuance of supplemental jury instructions.

    Summary

    Velasquez was convicted of assault in the first degree. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by redacting a portion of the complainant’s hospital record and violated his right to be present during supplemental jury instructions. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court properly redacted the hospital record because the defendant had access to toxicology results and did not rely on the complainant’s intoxication. The Court also found that the defendant failed to present substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity in criminal proceedings regarding his presence during jury instructions.

    Facts

    Velasquez and the complainant resided in the same rooming house. An incident occurred, and Velasquez was charged with assault in the first degree. At trial, Velasquez raised a defense of justification, arguing that he acted in self-defense. The complainant’s hospital record was admitted into evidence. The trial court redacted a resident physician’s notation stating that complainant was too drunk to consent to surgery.

    Procedural History

    Velasquez was convicted of first-degree assault based on a jury verdict in the trial court. He appealed the conviction, arguing that the redaction of the hospital record and his absence during supplemental jury instructions constituted reversible error. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and Velasquez appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in redacting a portion of the complainant’s hospital record stating that the complainant was too drunk to consent to surgery.

    2. Whether the court violated the defendant’s right to be present during the issuance of supplemental jury instructions.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant had access to the complainant’s toxicology results and did not rely on the complainant’s intoxication as part of his defense.

    2. No, because the defendant failed to come forward with substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity that attaches to all criminal proceedings.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the trial court acted within its discretion in redacting the hospital record. The Court noted that the defendant possessed the laboratory results showing the complainant’s toxicology level. Critically, the Court highlighted that the defendant did not base his defense on the complainant’s intoxication. Therefore, the redacted information was not essential to the defense. Regarding the defendant’s presence during supplemental jury instructions, the Court emphasized the “presumption of regularity that attaches to all criminal proceedings.” The burden was on the defendant to present “substantial evidence” to overcome this presumption. Since Velasquez failed to do so, his claim was rejected. The Court cited *People v. Harris, 61 NY2d 9, 16 [1983]* and *People v. Richetti, 302 NY 290, 298 [1951]*, reaffirming the long-standing principle of presumed regularity in court proceedings. The Court found no basis to overturn the conviction, upholding the decisions of the lower courts.

  • People v. Velasquez, 1 N.Y.3d 44 (2003): Establishing Valid Waiver of Antommarchi Rights

    1 N.Y.3d 44 (2003)

    A defendant’s right to be present at sidebar conferences with prospective jurors (Antommarchi right) can be waived by counsel, and the trial court is not required to engage in an on-the-record colloquy with the defendant to ensure a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether defendants’ rights to be present at sidebar conferences with prospective jurors were violated. In People v. Foster, the Court held that the defendant failed to provide sufficient evidence of his absence from a robing room conference. In People v. Velasquez, the Court found that the defendant validly waived his right to be present, even without a direct colloquy with the court. The Court affirmed both convictions, emphasizing that while a direct colloquy wasn’t required for a valid waiver, greater attention should be paid to recording a defendant’s presence or absence to avoid future disputes.

    Facts

    In People v. Foster, during jury selection, the trial court informed prospective jurors that those with concerns would be invited individually into the robing room with the attorneys. The transcript didn’t explicitly record Foster’s presence. In People v. Velasquez, after a bench conference, defense counsel stated, “Waived,” to which the court responded, “Antommarchi waived.” A prospective juror was questioned at a sidebar conference outside Velasquez’s presence.

    Procedural History

    Both defendants were convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed both convictions, with two justices dissenting in Velasquez. The cases were then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. In People v. Foster: Whether the defendant presented substantial evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity and establish his absence from a material stage of the trial.

    2. In People v. Velasquez: Whether the defendant validly waived his right to be present at sidebar conferences without a direct colloquy with the court.

    Holding

    1. In People v. Foster: No, because the defendant failed to provide substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity of court proceedings.

    2. In People v. Velasquez: Yes, because a trial court is not required to engage the defendant in an on-the-record colloquy to ensure the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    In People v. Foster, the Court relied on the presumption of regularity that attaches to judicial proceedings, which can only be overcome by substantial evidence. The Court stated that the absence of a specific record of the defendant’s presence, by itself, is insufficient to rebut this presumption. The Court declined to speculate based on the lack of explicit notation of presence.

    In People v. Velasquez, the Court held that defense counsel’s waiver, announced in open court, was sufficient. The Court reasoned that requiring a specific colloquy in every case would be overly burdensome. The court stated, “[T]here is no requirement that the Judge conduct a pro forma inquisition in each case on the off-chance that a defendant who is adequately represented by counsel . . . may nevertheless not know what he is doing” (quoting People v. Francis, 38 NY2d 150, 154 [1975]). The Court emphasized that the waiver occurred in the defendant’s presence, and the defendant didn’t object. The court emphasized, “While the better practice would have been to state the substance of the right being waived, nothing in the record calls into question the effectiveness of defendant’s waiver as announced by counsel…”

    The dissenting judge argued that a hearing should be held to determine if the defendants were present or made adequate waivers, as the record did not clearly show a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to be present during juror questioning. The dissent argued the presumption of regularity should not substitute for reconstructing the record.

  • People v. Yavrucak, 98 N.Y.2d 56 (2002): Effect of Lost Evidence on Appeal

    People v. Yavrucak, 98 N.Y.2d 56 (2002)

    The loss of a trial exhibit does not automatically warrant reversal of a conviction; an appellate court must determine the exhibit’s importance and whether the information it contained can be gleaned from the existing record.

    Summary

    A dentist was convicted of sexual abuse. A key piece of evidence, a tape recording of a phone call where the victim confronted the dentist, was lost before the appeal. The Appellate Term reversed the conviction due to the lost evidence, stating meaningful appellate review was impossible. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term’s decision, holding that the loss of a trial exhibit does not automatically warrant reversal. The Court outlined a process for determining if the lost evidence was critical and whether its contents could be reconstructed or found elsewhere in the record.

    Facts

    A 17-year-old girl accused her dentist, Yavrucak, of sexual abuse during a dental appointment. Months later, she reported the incident. Police had her call Yavrucak while recording the conversation. At trial, the recording was admitted as evidence. Yavrucak testified that he was shocked by the allegations and could not freely discuss them during the call due to others being present. He admitted to telling the complainant that “there is a misunderstanding; there is a mistake… I am sorry for the way you feel, okay” and “it was not my intent.”

    Procedural History

    The trial court found Yavrucak guilty of sexual abuse. Yavrucak appealed to the Appellate Term, arguing the trial court erred in denying his request to admit expert testimony on a polygraph exam and that the evidence was legally insufficient. The Appellate Term reversed the conviction sua sponte due to the loss of the tape recording, deeming it “critical”. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the loss on appeal of a trial exhibit—a tape recording of a conversation in which the defendant responded to the victim’s allegations of abuse—warranted summary reversal of the defendant’s conviction.

    Holding

    No, because the loss of a trial exhibit does not automatically deprive a defendant of effective appellate review. An appellate court must determine whether the exhibit has “substantial importance” to the issues in the case and whether the record otherwise reflects the information contained within the exhibit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on precedent, particularly People v. Strollo and People v. Glass. The court emphasized that there is a presumption of regularity in judicial proceedings, and the unavailability of an exhibit does not automatically rebut that presumption. The defendant has the burden to show that alternative methods to provide an adequate record are unavailable. The Court outlined a framework for appellate courts to use when a trial exhibit is lost. First, the court must determine if the exhibit has “substantial importance” to the issues on appeal. If so, the court must then determine if the record otherwise reflects the information in the exhibit. If the information is in the record and its accuracy is undisputed, the loss of the exhibit does not prevent appellate review. If the information is important but not in the record, a reconstruction hearing should be ordered unless the defendant shows it would be futile. The Court found it was not clear that the tape recording was necessary for effective appellate review, given the victim’s testimony and the trial court’s characterization of the tape as “the icing on the cake.” The Court also noted that the defendant himself testified to his responses on the tape, and the Appellate Term failed to consider whether the tape’s contents could have been reconstructed. The case was remitted to the Appellate Term to determine the need for the tape and whether a reconstruction hearing would be futile.

  • People v. Jones, 73 N.Y.2d 902 (1989): Presumption of Regularity in Competency Examinations

    People v. Jones, 73 N.Y.2d 902 (1989)

    In the absence of contrary evidence, a court will presume that a director’s designation of a psychiatrist and psychologist, instead of two psychiatrists, to conduct a competency examination was regular and in accordance with the statutory directive if the director believed the defendant might be mentally defective.

    Summary

    Defendant Jones was convicted of sexual abuse, and during sentencing, his counsel requested a competency examination. The director of Community Mental Health Services designated a psychiatrist and a psychologist, who found Jones competent. Jones’s counsel raised no objection at the time. On appeal, Jones argued the examination was defective because it didn’t involve two psychiatrists, as seemingly required by CPL 730.20(1). The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the court would presume the director acted properly under the statute, which allows for a psychologist if the director believes the defendant may be mentally defective. Since Jones raised the objection for the first time on appeal, there was no factual record to review the contention.

    Facts

    • Defendant was convicted of sexual abuse.
    • During sentencing, defense counsel requested a competency examination under CPL Article 730.
    • The director of Community Mental Health Services designated a psychiatrist and a psychologist to conduct the examination.
    • The psychiatrist and psychologist reported that the defendant was competent.
    • Defense counsel did not object to the court adopting the report.

    Procedural History

    • The trial court convicted and sentenced the defendant for sexual abuse.
    • On appeal from his conviction, the defendant argued the competency examination was defective.
    • The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    • The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the designation of a psychiatrist and a psychologist, instead of two qualified psychiatrists, renders a competency examination defective under CPL 730.20(1).

    Holding

    1. No, because in the absence of contrary evidence, the court presumes the director acted in accordance with the statutory directive, which allows for a psychologist to participate in the examination if the director is of the opinion that the defendant may be mentally defective.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the presumption of regularity, stating, “In the absence of any contrary evidence, we presume that the director’s designation of a psychiatrist and a psychologist to examine defendant was regular and in accordance with statutory directive (Richardson, Evidence § 72, at 49 [Prince 10th ed]).” The court noted that CPL 730.20(1) requires two qualified psychiatrists but allows for a psychologist if the director believes the defendant may be mentally defective. The court reasoned that because the defendant raised the objection for the first time on appeal, there was no factual record to determine if the director believed the defendant was mentally defective. Therefore, the court would presume the director acted properly. The court effectively placed the burden on the defendant to raise a timely objection and create a factual record, preventing him from challenging the designation on appeal. This ruling highlights the importance of raising objections at the trial level to preserve issues for appellate review and to allow the trial court to develop a complete record.