New York Law Review

Tag: Presumption Against Suicide

  • Infante v. Dignan, 13 N.Y.3d 332 (2009): Medical Examiner Determinations and the Presumption Against Suicide

    Infante v. Dignan, 13 N.Y.3d 332 (2009)

    New York’s common-law presumption against suicide is not applicable to a medical examiner’s determination of the cause and manner of death, nor to judicial review of that determination.

    Summary

    This case concerns a father’s challenge to a medical examiner’s determination that his daughter’s death was a suicide, based on findings of multiple drug intoxication. The father argued the determination was arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals held that the common-law presumption against suicide, typically used in life insurance claim disputes, does not apply to medical examiners’ determinations. The Court emphasized that medical examiners must make determinations for the public benefit, and applying the presumption would compromise the medical and scientific quality of their work. The Court reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the petition, finding the medical examiner’s determination was not arbitrary.

    Facts

    Rosemary A. Infante died on April 16, 2006. The Monroe County Office of the Medical Examiner investigated the cause of death. An autopsy report dated August 8, 2006, concluded that the decedent died of multiple drug intoxication, and the manner of her death was suicide. The autopsy and toxicology report, along with information from the scene, formed the basis of the determination. Toxicological analysis revealed an extremely high concentration of fluoxetine (Prozac) in the heart blood, far exceeding normal therapeutic levels, and a comparatively high level of a fluoxetine metabolite in the liver. The medical examiner found this consistent with intentional excessive consumption, not accidental overdose.

    Procedural History

    George Infante, the decedent’s father, commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the medical examiner’s classification of the death as suicide. Supreme Court dismissed the petition, citing Matter of Mitchell v. Helpern, and holding that the determination was not arbitrary because there was sufficient information for a reasonable person to find suicide. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the evidence insufficient to rebut the presumption against suicide. Two dissenting justices argued the presumption was inapplicable and the determination was not arbitrary or irrational. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the Supreme Court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the common-law presumption against suicide should be applied in a CPLR article 78 proceeding reviewing a medical examiner’s determination of the cause and manner of death.

    Holding

    No, because New York’s common-law presumption against suicide has no role to play in a medical examiner’s determination of the cause or manner of a decedent’s death, or the judicial review of such a determination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the presumption against suicide is an evidentiary rule specifically relevant to resolving disputes over life insurance proceeds and has never been considered in any other context. The County Law mandates that medical examiners determine the means or manner of death for the public benefit. Applying the presumption would compromise the medical and scientific integrity of these determinations. The Court emphasized that the medical examiner’s determination was supported by evidence, including the toxicology report indicating extremely high levels of fluoxetine, which the examiner reasonably interpreted as evidence of intentional overdose. The Court cited Mitchell v. Helpern, stating, “[i]n … an arguable situation capable of sustaining different inferences, the determinations of the Medical Examiners must be sustained . . . unless [they] are arbitrary” (17 AD2d at 922). The Court found the medical examiner’s determination was not arbitrary, as he set forth a reasonable basis for his determination in an area involving specialized medical and scientific expertise. The Court also cited Flacke v Onondaga Landfill Sys., noting that judicial deference is appropriate where an agency’s judgment involves factual evaluations within its area of expertise and is supported by the record. Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division erred in applying the presumption against suicide and reversed the order.

  • Schelberger v. Eastern Savings Bank, 60 N.Y.2d 569 (1983): The Presumption Against Suicide in Life Insurance Cases

    Schelberger v. Eastern Savings Bank, 60 N.Y.2d 569 (1983)

    In an action to recover life insurance proceeds, a presumption exists against suicide, and a finding of suicide is warranted only if the jury is satisfied that no conclusion other than suicide may reasonably be drawn from the evidence.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute over life insurance proceeds where the insurer claimed the insured committed suicide within the policy’s two-year suicide clause. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the jury’s verdict in favor of the beneficiary, reiterating the enduring presumption against suicide in such cases. The court held that the insurer failed to prove conclusively that the insured’s death was a suicide, emphasizing that the evidence presented allowed for other reasonable conclusions. The court upheld the jury instruction regarding the presumption against suicide and declined to alter existing state law on the matter, finding no compelling reason to do so.

    Facts

    Edward Schelberger was insured under a life insurance policy issued by Eastern Savings Bank on May 1, 1978, with his wife as the beneficiary. The policy included a standard clause limiting liability to premiums paid if the insured died by suicide within two years of the policy’s issue date. Schelberger died on December 25, 1979, within this two-year period, from an overdose of Tuinal, a barbiturate. The insurer denied the beneficiary’s claim for the policy’s face amount, alleging suicide, and tendered only the premiums paid.

    Procedural History

    The beneficiary sued to recover the policy proceeds. The trial court denied the insurer’s motion for a directed verdict. The jury found in favor of the beneficiary. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted review and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury regarding the presumption against suicide in a life insurance claim.

    Whether the insurer was entitled to a directed verdict based on the evidence presented, arguing the death was conclusively a suicide.

    Holding

    Yes, the trial court’s instruction regarding the presumption against suicide was proper because it accurately reflected New York law.

    No, the insurer was not entitled to a directed verdict because the evidence did not conclusively establish suicide, allowing for other reasonable inferences about the cause of death.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court held that the jury instruction correctly stated New York law, citing Begley v. Prudential Ins. Co., 1 N.Y.2d 530. The court reaffirmed the presumption against suicide, noting it “springs from strong policy considerations as well as embodying natural probability.” The court rejected the insurer’s argument to modify the law, stating that neither statistical data nor the decriminalization of suicide warranted a change. The court also pointed out that the legislature was considering the issue of presumptions in the Proposed Code of Evidence, suggesting that any changes should come from the legislature, if at all.

    Regarding the directed verdict, the court emphasized that a finding of suicide is warranted only if “no conclusion other than suicide, may reasonably be drawn.” The court found that the evidence did not compel such a conclusion. While the insured died from a drug overdose, evidence showed he was a frequent user of the drug, and his prior overdose recovery suggested the possibility of accidental overdose rather than intentional self-destruction. The court also noted the absence of a suicide note, financial troubles, or any debilitating physical condition. A neighbor’s testimony indicated the insured appeared happy and friendly shortly before his death, further undermining the claim of suicide. The court stated that autopsy and death certificates listing suicide were merely the opinion of the physician and not conclusive evidence.

    The court concluded that the question of whether the death was a suicide was properly submitted to the jury, and there was no basis for disturbing the jury’s verdict in favor of the beneficiary. The court briefly addressed the insurer’s claims of trial errors, finding none warranted reversal.

  • Stein v. New York, 367 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1975): Presumption Against Suicide Applies Only When Death Results

    Stein v. New York, 367 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1975)

    The presumption against suicide applies only when death results from the incident; it does not apply in cases of attempted suicide where the injured party is available to testify.

    Summary

    Stein sued New York for personal injuries sustained when he was struck by a subway train. Stein claimed he was pushed, while the defense argued he attempted suicide. The jury found for the defendant. The key issue was whether the plaintiff was entitled to a jury instruction on the presumption against suicide, given the defense’s evidence of a suicide attempt. The court held that such a presumption applies only when death results, as the injured party is then unavailable to testify, creating an imbalance of proof. Here, Stein could testify, negating the need for the presumption. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    Facts

    Plaintiff, Stein, was severely injured after being struck by a New York City subway train. Stein testified he was pushed onto the tracks. The defendant presented evidence, including testimony from the motorman and a witness, that Stein intentionally threw himself in front of the train. Hospital records shortly after the incident indicated Stein was in a “suicidal frame of mind.” Evidence was also presented that Stein was recently separated from his wife, who had moved away with their children.

    Procedural History

    The trial court found in favor of the defendant, New York. Stein appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the trial court’s decision without opinion. Stein then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a plaintiff in a personal injury action is entitled to a jury charge on the presumption against suicide when the defense offers proof that the plaintiff was injured as a result of an unsuccessful suicide attempt.

    Holding

    No, because the presumption against suicide is designed to address an imbalance of proof that exists when the injured party is deceased and therefore unable to testify. When the injured party survives and can testify, the presumption is not necessary.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the presumption against suicide is well-established in cases where death results from violence. However, it declined to extend this presumption to cases of attempted suicide. The rationale behind presumptions is to correct imbalances in access to proof. In cases where death results, the deceased cannot provide their version of events, creating an imbalance. The presumption against suicide helps the next of kin prove their case. In cases of attempted suicide, the injured party is available to testify. “Under such circumstances, neither party has superior access to the proof and there is no need to assist the court evidentially as there would be where death has resulted from the accident, preventing the jury from hearing the decedent’s version.” Therefore, the court found no need for a presumption against attempted suicide. The court also addressed the plaintiff’s argument regarding the jury instruction on the last clear chance doctrine, finding that the charge, when read as a whole, allowed the jury to consider all the evidence and properly apply the doctrine.