New York Law Review

Tag: Preservation of Issues

  • People v. Beasley, 16 N.Y.3d 289 (2011): Preserving Speedy Trial Arguments in CPL 30.30 Motions

    People v. Beasley, 16 N.Y.3d 289 (2011)

    A defendant must specifically identify any legal or factual impediments to the People’s reliance on statutory exclusions in a CPL 30.30 speedy trial motion to preserve the issue for appellate review.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance. He argued that the People failed to bring him to trial within the statutory speedy trial period, specifically challenging a 42-day period. He argued for the first time on appeal that a specific 13-day portion of that period should be charged to the People due to a delay in producing grand jury minutes. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant failed to preserve this specific argument by not raising it with sufficient particularity in his initial motion or a reply before the Supreme Court. The Court emphasized that it is the defense counsel’s responsibility to draw the court’s attention to discrete periods of delay and explain why they are chargeable to the People.

    Facts

    Defendant was arraigned on felony drug charges on May 5, 2005. The People announced readiness for trial on May 27, 2005. On June 15, 2005, the defendant was arraigned on the indictment, and the court ordered open file discovery and production of the grand jury minutes. On August 17, 2005, the People failed to produce the grand jury minutes and said they would produce them “off calendar.” The court adjourned the matter to September 28, 2005. The People provided the minutes to chambers on August 30, 2005.

    Procedural History

    Defendant moved to dismiss on speedy trial grounds (CPL 30.30) in Supreme Court, arguing that the People exceeded the 184-day limit. Supreme Court denied the motion, charging the People with 173 days of delay. The Appellate Division affirmed. A dissenting opinion argued that 13 days should have been added to the delay. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant preserved for appellate review the argument that a specific 13-day period should be charged to the People in a CPL 30.30 speedy trial motion, when that specific argument was not raised before the Supreme Court.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to specifically identify the legal and factual impediments to the People’s claim that the time was excludable when he made his CPL 30.30 motion before the Supreme Court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the defendant failed to preserve his argument that the 13-day period between August 17th and August 30th should be charged to the People because it was not raised with sufficient specificity before the Supreme Court. The Court cited People v. Goode, stating that a defendant preserves challenges to the People’s reliance on statutory exclusions “by identifying any legal or factual impediments to the use of those exclusions.” The Court emphasized that the defendant never argued that the 42-day period should be broken down into smaller periods. The Court stated, “[I]t is defense counsel who is charged with the single-minded, zealous representation of the client and thus, of all the trial participants, it is defense counsel who best knows the argument to be advanced on the client’s behalf.” The Court concluded that it was defendant’s duty to draw the court’s attention to the discrete periods that he now claims should have been chargeable to the People pursuant to CPL 30.30 and to explain why.

  • People v. Windham, 10 N.Y.3d 801 (2008): Preservation of SORA Eligibility Challenges

    People v. Windham, 10 N.Y.3d 801 (2008)

    A challenge to a Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) risk-level determination must be raised at the hearing court to be preserved for appellate review, as it is a collateral consequence of a conviction, not part of the sentence itself.

    Summary

    Defendant Windham, convicted of robbery and sexual abuse, was designated a level three sex offender under SORA in 2005. On appeal, he argued for the first time that he was not subject to SORA because he completed the sex offense portion of his sentence before SORA’s effective date. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that Windham failed to preserve his claim by not raising it at the initial SORA hearing. The Court clarified that SORA determinations are collateral consequences, distinct from the sentence itself, and therefore require timely objection at the hearing level.

    Facts

    Joseph Windham was sentenced in 1991 for first-degree robbery and first-degree sexual abuse, receiving concurrent prison terms. He was paroled in 1996 but reincarcerated for a parole violation in 1997. In 2005, at a SORA risk level reassessment hearing, the People successfully argued that Windham should be designated a level three (high risk) sex offender.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court designated Windham a level three sex offender. Windham appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing he was not subject to SORA. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision, citing both a failure to preserve the issue and a lack of merit. Windham then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant must raise the issue of their SORA eligibility at the initial hearing to preserve that issue for appellate review, or whether a challenge to SORA eligibility falls under the exception to the preservation rule for unauthorized or illegal sentences.

    Holding

    No, because a SORA risk-level determination is a collateral consequence of a conviction, not part of the defendant’s sentence, and therefore must be contested at the hearing court to be preserved for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals grounded its decision on the principle of preservation of issues for appellate review. The Court distinguished SORA determinations from sentencing, emphasizing that SORA is a collateral consequence designed for public protection, not punishment. The court stated that “a SORA risk-level determination is not part of a defendant’s sentence.” The Court reasoned that because Windham did not contest his SORA eligibility at the Supreme Court hearing, he could not raise the issue for the first time on appeal. By failing to object initially, he waived his right to appellate review of the SORA eligibility question. The Court cited People v. Stevens, 91 NY2d 270, 277 (1998) to support the position that SORA determinations are separate from sentencing. The court also noted SORA’s purpose, quoting Doe v. Pataki, 120 F3d 1263 (2d Cir 1997), stating SORA is designed “not to punish, but rather to protect the public.”

  • People v. Nieves, 2 N.Y.3d 310 (2004): Appealability and Preservation of Challenges to Orders of Protection Issued at Sentencing

    People v. Nieves, 2 N.Y.3d 310 (2004)

    Permanent orders of protection issued at sentencing are appealable as part of the judgment of conviction, but unpreserved challenges to those orders are generally not reviewable by the Court of Appeals unless they fall within the narrow ‘illegal sentence’ exception.

    Summary

    Defendant Nieves was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon. At sentencing, the court issued orders of protection for the two men he shot, ordering him to stay away from them until a date three years after his expected release. Nieves appealed, arguing the orders (1) exceeded the permissible duration under CPL 530.13(4) because jail time credit would result in an earlier release and (2) were improperly issued to the shooting victims because he was acquitted of assault charges. The Court of Appeals held the orders were appealable as part of the judgment but that Nieves’s challenges were unpreserved and did not fall within the illegal sentence exception. Therefore, the Court of Appeals could not review the merits of those challenges.

    Facts

    Nieves shot and injured two men after an altercation outside a nightclub. He was charged with multiple offenses, including assault. At trial, Nieves claimed he acted in self-defense, but he was acquitted of the assault charges and convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. During the sentencing proceeding, the trial court issued orders of protection for the two men Nieves shot, directing him to stay away from them until October 12, 2007 – three years from his expected release date. Nieves did not object to the orders at sentencing.

    Procedural History

    At the Appellate Division, Nieves argued the orders of protection were improper in duration and scope. He argued the orders should reflect his jail time credit, which would result in an earlier release date and should not have included the shooting victims as they were not victims, but witnesses, because of the acquittal on the assault charges. The Appellate Division modified the judgment to reflect the jail time credit but rejected Nieves’s other arguments. Both Nieves and the People appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order with respect to Nieves’s appeal and dismissed the People’s appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether orders of protection issued during a sentencing proceeding in a criminal case can be challenged on direct appeal from the judgment of conviction.

    2. Whether the defendant’s arguments on appeal to the Court of Appeals had to be raised before the sentencing court to be preserved for review.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because CPL 530.13(4) authorizes a court to issue permanent orders of protection for victims and witnesses “[u]pon conviction of any offense,” indicating the legislature intended such orders to be part of the final adjudication.

    2. Yes, because the defendant’s claims did not fall within the narrow exception to the preservation requirement for illegal sentences.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the appealability of determinations in criminal cases is purely statutory. While CPL 530.13 does not explicitly address the appealability of orders of protection, CPL 450.10 authorizes appeals from a judgment in a criminal case, which brings up for review many preceding orders and rulings.

    Distinguishing from People v. Stevens, where the Court held that post-judgment SORA determinations were not appealable because they were not part of the criminal action, the Court relied on People v. Hernandez, which held that SORA certification at sentencing *was* appealable. The Court stated that, like the SORA certification in Hernandez, CPL 530.13(4) authorizes a court to issue permanent orders of protection for the benefit of victims and witnesses “[u]pon conviction of any offense.” The use of this language indicates the Legislature viewed orders of protection as part of the final adjudication.

    Addressing the preservation issue, the Court acknowledged the “narrow exception to the preservation rule” (People v. Samms, 95 N.Y.2d 52, 56 [2000]) where a court exceeds its powers and imposes a sentence that is illegal. However, the Court found that CPL 530.13(4) does not characterize permanent orders of protection as a component of sentencing, and the statute authorizes temporary orders during the pendency of criminal proceedings, indicating that the Legislature did not intend orders of protection to be punitive.

    The Court noted the primary intent of the statute is to ensure that victims and “witnesses who have the courage and civic responsibility to cooperate with law enforcement officials are afforded the maximum protection possible” (Governor’s Mem approving L 1998, ch 610, 1998 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, at 1485).

    The Court observed that orders of protection are an “ameliorative measure intended to safeguard the rights of victims and witnesses both prior to and after conviction—it is not a part of the sentence imposed.” Therefore, the Court held defendant’s challenges did not fall within the illegal sentence exception and were unpreserved.

    As a practical matter, the Court noted that seeking adjustment of the order of protection from the issuing court is the most desirable means for resolving an expiration date issue. The Court stated, “Because sentencing courts are in the best position to amend permanent orders of protection, the better practice—and best use of judicial resources—is for a defendant seeking adjustment of such an order to request relief from the issuing court in the first instance, resorting to the appellate courts only if necessary.”

  • People v. Matthews, 88 N.Y.2d 1047 (1996): Preservation of Speedy Trial Claims

    People v. Matthews, 88 N.Y.2d 1047 (1996)

    A defendant must specifically identify legal or factual impediments to the People’s reliance on statutory exclusions under CPL 30.30 to preserve a challenge to a speedy trial claim for appellate review.

    Summary

    Matthews was indicted on August 20, 1991, but not arraigned until April 2, 1992, when the People declared readiness. He moved to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds, arguing the delay was chargeable to the People. The People argued a 35-day medical quarantine of Matthews was excludable under CPL 30.30 (4)(c) and (g). The Supreme Court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Matthews failed to preserve his argument that the People needed to establish a causal relationship between his quarantine and their delay in declaring readiness. The Court emphasized the importance of providing the lower court with an opportunity to address and remedy any potential errors.

    Facts

    Matthews was indicted on August 20, 1991, for unauthorized use of a vehicle and criminal possession of stolen property.
    He was arraigned on April 2, 1992, at which time the People declared their readiness for trial.
    During the period between February 27, 1992, and April 2, 1992, Matthews was under medical quarantine.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of speedy trial rules.
    The Supreme Court denied the motion.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision, citing CPL 30.30 (4)(c) and (g).
    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant preserves a challenge to the People’s reliance on CPL 30.30 (4)(c) and (g) exclusions by merely arguing general causation principles, without specifically arguing that the exclusions are unavailable absent a causal link between the defendant’s condition and the People’s delayed readiness.

    Holding

    No, because once the People identify statutory exclusions, the defendant must specifically identify legal or factual impediments to the use of those exclusions to preserve the issue for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that to preserve a speedy trial claim for appellate review, a defendant must do more than simply allege a failure to declare readiness within the statutory period. According to the court, once the People identify the statutory exclusions they intend to rely on, the defendant must specifically identify any legal or factual impediments to the use of those exclusions. The Court stated that “[t]he purpose of adhering to strict rules of preservation in this context is to provide the court with an ‘opportunity to remedy the problem and thereby avert reversible error.’” The Court found that Matthews’ argument focused on general causation principles and did not specifically argue that the medical quarantine exclusions required a causal link between the quarantine and the People’s delay. Because he did not raise this specific argument before the motion court, he failed to preserve the issue for appellate review. The Court referenced People v. Luperon, stating that the defendant must alert the court to the claim that lack of causation was an impediment to the People’s reliance on CPL 30.30(4)(c) and (g).

  • People v. Miller, 69 N.Y.2d 842 (1987): Establishing Standing to Challenge a Search and Valuation of Stolen Property

    People v. Miller, 69 N.Y.2d 842 (1987)

    A defendant must assert a present possessory interest or a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched to have standing to challenge a warrantless search, and objections must be specific enough to alert the trial court to the argument being raised on appeal to preserve the issue for review.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the defendant’s suppression motion was appropriately denied because he failed to sufficiently assert a present possessory interest or reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment searched. The Court also held that the defendant’s challenge to the valuation of stolen checks was unpreserved for appellate review because his trial objection was not specific enough to alert the trial court to the argument he was now raising on appeal. The Court reasoned that a mere reference to an allegation in the felony complaint was insufficient to establish standing and that general objections do not preserve specific valuation arguments for appeal.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with criminal possession of stolen property. The evidence the People sought to admit was found in the defendant’s apartment. In his suppression motion, the defendant, through counsel, referred to the allegation in the felony complaint that the evidence was found “in defendant’s apartment” but did not allege any present possessory interest in the apartment. The defendant was subsequently convicted of criminal possession of stolen property in the second degree. The value of the stolen checks at the time they were recovered (with amounts filled in) exceeded $250.

    Procedural History

    The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, which was denied. He was subsequently convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s suppression motion was properly denied due to his failure to assert a sufficient factual basis demonstrating a reasonable expectation of privacy in the searched apartment.
    2. Whether the defendant’s challenge to the valuation of the stolen checks was preserved for appellate review.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant’s reference to the allegation in the felony complaint was insufficient to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the searched apartment, necessitating a hearing on the suppression motion.
    2. No, because the defendant’s objection at trial was not specific enough to alert the trial judge to the argument he now presents on appeal regarding the valuation of the stolen checks at the time of the theft.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the suppression motion, the Court of Appeals found that the defendant’s mere reference to the allegation in the felony complaint that the evidence was found in his apartment did not amount to a sufficient factual assertion that he had an expectation of privacy in the area searched. The Court cited CPL 710.60 [1] and [3], noting that the defendant needed to allege a present possessory interest to warrant a hearing. The Court also rejected the defendant’s argument that his failure to allege facts supporting standing was justified by a fear of self-incrimination in Canada, as this argument was not raised in the suppression motion itself.

    Regarding the valuation of the stolen checks, the Court held that the defendant failed to preserve the issue for appellate review because his objection at trial was not specific enough. The Court cited People v. Dekle, 56 NY2d 835, emphasizing that the trial judge must be alerted to the specific argument being raised on appeal. The Court stated that the defendant’s objection that “the People failed to establish a value exceeding $250” did not alert the trial judge to the argument that value must be established at the time of the theft. The court reasoned that a general objection is not sufficient to preserve a specific argument for appellate review.

    The court emphasized the importance of raising specific objections at trial to allow the trial court to address the issue and potentially correct any error. “[T]he suppression court appropriately concluded that defendant’s suppression motion should be summarily denied.” The court also implicitly highlights the burden on the defendant to demonstrate standing to challenge a search.

  • People v. Adams, 56 N.Y.2d 825 (1982): Preserving Speedy Trial Claims for Appeal

    People v. Adams, 56 N.Y.2d 825 (1982)

    To preserve a speedy trial claim for appellate review, the defendant must raise the issue in the trial court during the criminal action; raising it only in a prior habeas corpus petition is insufficient.

    Summary

    The defendant, convicted of criminal possession of a weapon, appealed, arguing he was denied his constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial. He had previously raised these claims in a pretrial habeas corpus petition, which was denied. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that because the defendant failed to raise the speedy trial claims in the Supreme Court during the criminal action itself, there was no ruling of the trial court to be reviewed on appeal. The Court emphasized the importance of presenting the issue to the trial court to allow for a proper ruling and record development.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.

    Prior to trial, the defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging a denial of his constitutional right to a speedy trial (CPL 30.20) and that the prosecution was not ready for trial within the statutory timeframe (CPL 30.30).

    The Appellate Division denied the habeas corpus petition.

    The defendant did not raise the speedy trial issues before or during the trial itself (CPL 210.45).

    Procedural History

    Defendant was convicted in Supreme Court.

    Defendant appealed directly to the Court of Appeals from his conviction.

    The Court of Appeals had previously dismissed the appeal from the denial of the habeas corpus petition (51 NY2d 1007).

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction; the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can preserve a speedy trial claim for appellate review when the claim was raised in a pretrial habeas corpus petition but not raised in the Supreme Court during the criminal action itself.

    Holding

    No, because as a matter of appellate procedure, there was no ruling of the trial court in the criminal action to be reviewed, as the defendant failed to properly raise the issue there.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on established appellate procedure. It cited People v. Whisby, 48 NY2d 834, and People v. Adams, 38 NY2d 605, emphasizing the requirement that issues be presented to the trial court to preserve them for appellate review.

    The Court reasoned that without a ruling by the trial court on the speedy trial claim within the context of the criminal action, the appellate courts lack a proper foundation for review. The prior habeas corpus petition, while addressing the same issue, was a separate proceeding and did not satisfy the requirement of raising the issue in the Supreme Court during the criminal action.

    The Court stated that “No application for the relief now sought having been made in Supreme Court in the criminal action and accordingly there having been no denial of a request for such relief, as a matter of appellate procedure, as the Appellate Division recognized, there was no ruling of the trial court in this action to be reviewed by the Appellate Division, or now in our court.”

  • People v. Reynoso, 59 N.Y.2d 682 (1983): Warrantless Entry and Preservation of Issues for Appeal

    People v. Reynoso, 59 N.Y.2d 682 (1983)

    An appellate court will not review an issue raised for the first time on appeal if it was not properly preserved in the lower court.

    Summary

    Police officers, acting on overheard incriminating conversations, entered the defendant’s apartment without a warrant. The defendant argued that probable cause was lacking because the officers were not lawfully present in the hallway of the restricted-access building. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the defendant failed to preserve the argument regarding the legality of the officers’ presence in the building by not raising it during the suppression hearing. Additionally, the court found no reviewable issue of law concerning probable cause and exigent circumstances, given the affirmance of the suppression court’s findings. Thus, the warrantless entry was upheld.

    Facts

    Federal agents and police officers overheard incriminating conversations emanating from the defendant’s apartment.

    Based on these conversations, the officers entered the defendant’s apartment without obtaining a warrant.

    The building was a locked, restricted-access, multiple-unit dwelling.

    Procedural History

    The defendant sought to suppress evidence obtained from the warrantless entry.

    The suppression court upheld the warrantless entry.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the suppression court’s decision.

    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the officers’ entry into the common areas of the locked, restricted access multiple-unit dwelling was lawful, thereby establishing probable cause for the warrantless entry into the defendant’s apartment.

    2. Whether the information available to the officers was sufficient to support a finding of probable cause and exigent circumstances for the warrantless entry.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant failed to preserve the issue of the legality of the officers’ presence in the building by not questioning it during the suppression hearing.

    2. No, because the affirmance of the suppression court’s findings on probable cause and exigent circumstances leaves no reviewable issue of law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the principle of preservation of issues for appellate review. It emphasized that arguments not raised at the suppression hearing cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. The court stated, “Examination of the record of the suppression hearing reveals, however, that the legality of these officers’ presence in the building was never questioned by defendant and that argument is thus not preserved for review by this court.” The court cited People v. Martin, 50 NY2d 1029 as precedent. Because the defendant did not challenge the officers’ presence in the building during the suppression hearing, the court declined to consider the argument on appeal.

    Regarding the sufficiency of the information to support probable cause and exigent circumstances, the court found no reviewable issue of law because the suppression court’s findings on these issues had been affirmed. The court cited People v. Harrison, 57 NY2d 470. The court effectively deferred to the lower courts’ factual findings, as its appellate jurisdiction is generally limited to questions of law.

    The court’s decision underscores the importance of raising all relevant arguments at the trial level to preserve them for appellate review. Failure to do so can result in the appellate court declining to address the merits of the argument, as occurred in this case. This rule promotes judicial efficiency and fairness by ensuring that the trial court has the first opportunity to address and resolve the issues presented.

  • People ex rel. McGee v. Walters, 62 N.Y.2d 317 (1984): Sufficiency of Evidence in Parole Revocation Hearings

    People ex rel. McGee v. Walters, 62 N.Y.2d 317 (1984)

    In parole revocation hearings, the statutory presumption of firearm possession in a vehicle, coupled with observations of suspicious behavior by the parolee, can provide sufficient evidence to support a finding of parole violation, and the failure to request production of documents or an adjournment to obtain them waives the right to raise that issue on appeal.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that sufficient evidence supported the hearing officer’s determination that McGee violated his parole by possessing firearms. The court relied on the statutory presumption concerning firearm possession in automobiles, along with testimony from arresting officers about McGee’s suspicious movements in the vehicle after being pulled over. Furthermore, because McGee did not request the production of police reports or an adjournment to obtain them at the hearing, the court found that he could not raise this issue on appeal. The hearing officer’s express statement that the decision did not rely on hearsay further solidified the Court’s reasoning.

    Facts

    McGee, a parolee, was in a car that was pulled over by police. After being signaled to stop, McGee bent forward beneath his seat and then leaned toward the passenger. A search of the vehicle revealed two firearms. At the parole revocation hearing, arresting officers testified about McGee’s movements. The hearing officer determined that McGee violated his parole by possessing the firearms.

    Procedural History

    Following the parole revocation hearing, the hearing officer found that McGee violated the terms of his parole. The Appellate Division affirmed the hearing officer’s decision. McGee appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the statutory presumption regarding firearm possession in automobiles, combined with the arresting officers’ testimony, was sufficient to support the determination that McGee violated his parole.

    2. Whether McGee’s failure to request the hearing officer to direct the production of the police report or an adjournment to obtain it, waived his right to raise that issue on appeal.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the statutory presumption concerning possession of firearms in automobiles (Penal Law, § 265.15, subd 3), especially when coupled with the testimony of the arresting officers regarding McGee’s suspicious behavior, was sufficient to support the hearing officer’s determination.

    2. Yes, because in view of McGee’s failure to request the hearing officer to direct that Police Officer Boorman produce his crime report or that the hearing be adjourned for that purpose, the question McGee wished to raise in that regard was not preserved for review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the statutory presumption of firearm possession in an automobile, combined with the officers’ testimony about McGee’s suspicious movements, provided sufficient evidence to support the parole violation determination. The court emphasized that McGee bent forward beneath his seat and then leaned over towards the passenger after being signaled to pull over, strengthening the inference of possession. The court explicitly stated that the hearing officer’s decision did not rely on hearsay evidence, thus avoiding any issues related to the admissibility of such evidence under Morrissey v. Brewer. Furthermore, the Court emphasized a procedural default: because McGee failed to request the production of the police report or an adjournment to obtain it during the hearing, he waived his right to raise that issue on appeal. The court reasoned that parties must preserve issues for review by raising them at the appropriate time in the lower proceedings. The court noted that McGee did not apply for relief regarding the “notes or memorandum” referred to in a letter, further supporting the waiver. This case highlights the importance of timely raising evidentiary objections and requests for document production at administrative hearings to preserve those issues for appellate review.

  • Di Bella v. Di Bella, 48 N.Y.2d 790 (1979): Constitutionality of Alimony Statutes and Preservation of Issues for Appeal

    Di Bella v. Di Bella, 48 N.Y.2d 790 (1979)

    An appellate court will not consider constitutional arguments raised for the first time on appeal, especially when the Attorney General has not been notified as required by statute, and factual determinations regarding alimony and counsel fees are outside the scope of appellate review.

    Summary

    In a divorce proceeding, the husband appealed the alimony and counsel fee awards, arguing that they were excessive and that sections of the Domestic Relations Law were unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Orr v. Orr. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that there was no basis in the record to eliminate alimony in futuro, and that the constitutional argument was not properly preserved for review as it was not raised in the trial court and the Attorney General was not notified. The court also stated that factual determinations regarding the alimony and counsel fees were outside its scope of review.

    Facts

    The husband and wife were involved in a divorce proceeding. The trial court granted the wife a divorce and awarded her alimony and counsel fees. The husband appealed, contending that the alimony award was excessive and that certain sections of the Domestic Relations Law were unconstitutional. The husband asserted he was unable to attend a scheduled hearing, but the court proceeded. The trial was conducted in two stages based on counsel agreement: first, entitlement to divorce, second, entitlement to alimony.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted the wife a divorce and awarded alimony and counsel fees. The husband appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the trial court’s decision. The husband then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Appellate Division did not address the constitutional arguments raised by the husband. (71 AD2d 625)

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Appellate Division erred in determining there was no basis to eliminate alimony in futuro.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in denying the husband’s request for an adjournment.
    3. Whether the awards of alimony and counsel fees were excessive.
    4. Whether sections 236 and 237 of the Domestic Relations Law are unconstitutional.

    Holding

    1. No, because the Appellate Division correctly determined that the record lacked a basis for eliminating alimony in futuro.
    2. No, because the husband had ample opportunity to respond to the testimony and the hearing date had been previously set without objection.
    3. The Court of Appeals does not address this as such issues are outside the scope of review.
    4. No, because the constitutional issue was not raised in the trial court, and the Attorney General was not notified, precluding review by the Court of Appeals.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. Regarding alimony, the court found no error in the determination that there was no basis to eliminate alimony in futuro based on the record. As to the adjournment request, the court noted that the husband had ample opportunity to respond to testimony. The court declined to review the excessiveness of alimony and counsel fee awards, stating these were factual issues outside the scope of its review.

    Critically, the court refused to consider the constitutional challenge to the Domestic Relations Law. It emphasized that the issue was not raised in the trial court. Moreover, although the husband claimed to have raised it in the Appellate Division, he failed to notify the Attorney General as required by CPLR 1012(b) and Executive Law § 71. The court stated, “In this circumstance the constitutional arguments will not be considered in our court.” This is consistent with the general principle that appellate courts will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.

  • People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 27 N.Y.2d 376 (1971): Preserving Issues for Appellate Review

    27 N.Y.2d 376 (1971)

    An appellate court will generally not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal that were not presented in the lower courts.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the relator, Menechino, could not raise the issue of the standard of proof used by the State Board of Parole for the first time before the Court of Appeals. Menechino argued that the Board used a constitutionally impermissible standard (preponderance of evidence). The Court of Appeals found that because this issue wasn’t raised in the Supreme Court or at the Appellate Division, it couldn’t be considered at this stage. The court further noted, even if they were to consider a related argument about the sufficiency of the evidence, there was substantial evidence to support the Board’s determination.

    Facts

    The relator, Menechino, was adjudged in violation of parole by the State Board of Parole. He then sought relief, arguing that the parole revocation was improper. The Supreme Court initially granted his petition on grounds that were later rejected by the Appellate Division. Menechino appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially granted Menechino’s petition. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision. Menechino then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the New York Court of Appeals can consider an argument that the State Board of Parole employed a constitutionally impermissible standard of proof when that argument was not raised in the lower courts (Supreme Court and Appellate Division)?

    2. Whether the determination of the Board of Parole was supported by substantial evidence?

    Holding

    1. No, because this issue was not raised in the Supreme Court or at the Appellate Division, it may not be raised for the first time in the Court of Appeals.

    2. Yes, because there was substantial evidence in the record to sustain the determination of the Board of Parole.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the established principle that issues must be preserved for appellate review. It cited Cohen and Karger, Powers of the New York Court of Appeals, stating that arguments not raised in lower courts are generally barred from consideration on appeal. As the court stated, “Inasmuch as this issue was not raised in the Supreme Court or at the Appellate Division it may not be raised in our court.” The court also briefly addressed Menechino’s argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, finding that even if it were properly before them, there was substantial evidence to support the Board’s decision. The court noted the relator abandoned the original argument on which the Supreme Court had granted relief.