New York Law Review

Tag: preservation of error

  • Manglass v. General Motors Corp., 66 N.Y.2d 1 (1985): Inconsistent Verdicts and Preservation of Error

    66 N.Y.2d 1 (1985)

    When a jury renders apparently inconsistent verdicts, the inconsistency must be raised before the jury is discharged to allow the trial court an opportunity to correct the error; failure to do so forfeits the right to appellate review of the inconsistency.

    Summary

    In this product liability case stemming from a car accident, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether jury verdicts finding General Motors (GM) liable for negligence but not strictly liable were inconsistent. The Court held that because GM failed to timely object to the alleged inconsistency before the jury was discharged, the issue was not preserved for appellate review. The court emphasized the importance of providing the trial court an opportunity to correct potential errors during the trial. The decision underscores the need for timely objections to preserve legal issues for appeal.

    Facts

    Gary Manglass, driving a Chevrolet Nova (owned by his wife, Janice), made a high-speed left turn, causing the car to weave and collide head-on with another vehicle. The accident injured Manglass and the occupants of the other car. Plaintiffs sued Gary Manglass and General Motors (GM), alleging negligence and strict products liability due to a defective engine mount in the Nova. Janice Manglass also sued GM for negligence and breach of warranty.

    Procedural History

    The jury found Gary Manglass and GM liable on the negligence claims, apportioning fault 35% to Manglass and 65% to GM. The jury found GM not liable on the strict products liability claim. The jury also found against GM for the value of the Nova on Janice Manglass’ negligence and breach of warranty claims. GM argued the verdicts were inconsistent but only after the jury was discharged. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s judgment, and GM appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the jury verdicts finding GM liable for negligence but not strictly liable were inconsistent.

    2. Whether the verdict for Janice Manglass on her breach of warranty claim was inconsistent with the verdicts on the strict products liability cause of action, and whether that inconsistency was properly preserved for appellate review.

    Holding

    1. No, because the alleged inconsistency was not raised before the jury was discharged, thus precluding appellate review.

    2. No, because GM failed to raise this inconsistency before the jury was discharged, thereby failing to preserve the issue for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that an inconsistency exists only when a verdict on one claim necessarily negates an element of another. Examining the trial court’s charge, the court noted that to find GM liable on the strict products liability claims, the jury had to find both a defect and that the Nova was not being misused. The negligence charge did not require an absence of misuse. Because GM did not object to this charge, it became the law of the case. The Court stated, “A finding by the jury that Gary Manglass misused the Nova in making the high-speed turn would account for the differing verdicts on the negligence and strict products liability causes of action, and the verdicts were therefore not inconsistent.”

    Regarding the breach of warranty claim, the Court held that GM waived its right to challenge the alleged inconsistency because it failed to raise the issue before the jury was discharged. By failing to do so, GM deprived the trial court of the opportunity to correct the error by resubmitting the matter to the jury. The Court quoted: “[The function of a timely exception] is to give the court and the opposing party the opportunity to correct an error in the conduct of the trial.”

  • People v. De Renzis, 51 N.Y.2d 426 (1980): Requirement for Timely Objection to Preserve Right to Counsel Claim

    People v. De Renzis, 51 N.Y.2d 426 (1980)

    A defendant must make a timely objection to a trial court’s ruling that allegedly interferes with the right to counsel to preserve the issue for appellate review as a question of law.

    Summary

    De Renzis was convicted of second-degree murder. During the trial, the judge instructed the defendant and his counsel not to discuss the defendant’s testimony during recesses. Defense counsel did not object at the time. Later, counsel protested, arguing his client’s right to counsel was being violated. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding a denial of the right to counsel. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the failure to timely object to the trial court’s restriction on communication between the defendant and his attorney waived the right to raise the issue on appeal. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to consider exercising its discretionary power to review the alleged error in the interest of justice.

    Facts

    De Renzis was on trial for the murder of Sandra Zahler.
    During De Renzis’s direct testimony, the trial judge instructed De Renzis and his counsel not to discuss his testimony during recesses.
    Defense counsel did not object to these instructions at the time they were given.
    The following day, defense counsel requested to speak with his client and protested that his client’s right to access counsel was being interfered with.
    The court initially denied the request but later reversed its ruling and allowed the consultation.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted De Renzis of second-degree murder.
    The Appellate Division reversed the judgment, concluding that De Renzis had been denied his constitutional right to assistance of counsel.
    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstated the conviction, and remitted the case to the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s failure to timely object to the trial court’s instructions prohibiting communication between the defendant and his counsel during recesses waived the right to raise the issue on appeal as a question of law.

    Holding

    No, because to preserve a question of law for appellate review, a protest must be registered at the time of the ruling or when the court has an opportunity to change it. Counsel’s silence when the instruction was given constituted a waiver of the claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party claiming error must register a protest at the time of the ruling or at a subsequent time when the court has an opportunity to change it, as per CPL 470.05(2). The court distinguished this case from People v. Arthur and People v. Felder, where the absence of counsel at a critical time was determinative. Here, counsel was present and could have objected to the trial court’s instructions. The court stated that “[t]o create and preserve a question of law amendable to appellate review, a defendant in a criminal case normally must raise that issue before the court of original jurisdiction.” The court emphasized the importance of a timely protest, stating it affords the trial court an opportunity to correct the error. The Court found that the belated protest on the following day was insufficient to preserve the error related to the prior day’s restrictions because the court had already acted, and counsel’s silence implied acceptance of the court’s instruction. As the Appellate Division’s reversal was based at least in part on the June 14 rulings, the case was remitted to that court to determine whether to exercise its discretionary power to review alleged errors even absent a timely objection. The Court of Appeals explicitly refrained from expressing any opinion on the merits of De Renzis’s right to counsel claim, focusing solely on the procedural issue of preservation.

  • People v. Thomas, 53 N.Y.2d 913 (1981): Preserving Objections to Jury Instructions for Appeal

    People v. Thomas, 53 N.Y.2d 913 (1981)

    To preserve an objection to a jury instruction for appellate review, counsel must distinctly state the matter objected to and the grounds for the objection at the time the instruction is given.

    Summary

    The defendant appealed his conviction for criminal possession of a weapon, arguing that the trial court’s instruction to the jury on the presumption of intent was erroneous. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant failed to properly preserve the issue for review because he did not object to the instruction when it was initially given. His later comments during a colloquy with the court were based on an inaccurate assumption, and he never explicitly raised the error he now asserted on appeal.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. During jury instructions, the trial court stated, “it is a fundamental rule of evidence that a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts.” The defendant did not object to this instruction at the time it was given.

    During deliberations, the jury requested further instructions, including definitions of “reasonable doubt” and “intent.” The court repeated the challenged instruction on presumed intent. This time, defense counsel engaged in a colloquy, assuming the court had already charged that the presumption could be overcome by evidence to the contrary. Counsel then requested a charge that the presumption had been overcome in this case, which the trial court denied.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. He appealed the conviction, arguing the jury instruction on intent was erroneous. The Appellate Division affirmed. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant preserved his objection to the jury instruction on the presumption of intent for appellate review, given that he did not object when the instruction was initially given and his later comments were based on an inaccurate assumption about prior instructions.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to register a protest to the asserted error at any time. Defense counsel advanced the inaccurate assumption that instructions concerning overcoming the presumption had already been included. Rather than invite the court’s attention to the omission, defense counsel, in effect, assured the court that there had been no such omission.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make a timely and specific objection. The court noted that the defendant did not object to the instruction when it was initially given. When the instruction was repeated, defense counsel’s comments were based on the inaccurate assumption that the jury had already been instructed on how to overcome the presumption. The court stated that “No protest, however, was registered to this asserted error at any time. It was defense counsel who advanced the inaccurate assumption that instructions with reference to overcoming the presumption had been included. He premised his request to charge on that assumption, and the trial court denied the request on the same hypothesis. Instead of inviting the court’s attention to the omission to charge with respect to overcoming the presumption, defense counsel in effect assured the court that there had been no such omission.” Because the defendant did not clearly object to the lack of instruction on overcoming the presumption, the issue was not preserved for review.

  • People v. Satloff, 56 N.Y.2d 745 (1982): Preserving Issues for Appellate Review

    People v. Satloff, 56 N.Y.2d 745 (1982)

    To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must raise a specific objection at trial when the error can still be corrected.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, upholding the defendant’s conviction. The Court held that several of the defendant’s claims were not preserved for appellate review because the defendant failed to raise specific objections during the trial when the alleged errors could have been addressed. This case emphasizes the importance of timely and specific objections to preserve legal issues for appeal.

    Facts

    The defendant, Satloff, was convicted on multiple counts after a jury trial. During the trial, certain evidence and testimony were presented, and the defendant now claims these were admitted in error. Specifically, the defendant argued (1) failure of proof that a conversation occurred; (2) error in refusing an offer of proof from a judicial witness; and (3) that the jury verdicts were “repugnant”.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. On appeal to the Appellate Division, the conviction was affirmed. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the defendant had failed to preserve several issues for appellate review.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s claim regarding the failure of proof that a conversation occurred was preserved for appellate review, given the absence of a specific objection at trial.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing the defendant’s offer of proof from a proposed judicial witness.

    3. Whether the defendant’s claim that the jury verdicts were repugnant was preserved for appellate review, given the failure to object before the jury was discharged.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant failed to specifically object to the lack of proof of the conversation at trial.

    2. No, the Court of Appeals did not find the trial court’s refusal to admit the testimony of the judicial witness to be in error.

    3. No, because the defendant failed to raise an objection regarding the alleged repugnancy of the verdicts before the jury was discharged.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the defendant did not properly preserve the issue regarding the lack of proof of the conversation because the defendant’s motion for a trial order of dismissal was general and did not specifically reference this deficiency. The Court cited People v. Cona, 49 NY2d 26, 33, 2. Further, the defendant did not protest the trial court’s omission to charge the jury regarding the need for such proof. The Court noted that this argument was first raised on a motion for reargument in the Appellate Division, which is too late to preserve an issue for appeal.

    Regarding the offer of proof from the judicial witness, the Court stated simply, “We cannot say that it was error to refuse the offer of proof made by defendant with respect to the testimony of the proposed judicial witness.”

    Finally, concerning the claim of repugnant verdicts, the Court emphasized that the defendant failed to object before the jury was discharged. This prevented the trial court from resubmitting the case to the jury for reconsideration, which would have been the appropriate remedy had the issue been raised in a timely manner. The Court cited People v. Bruckman, 46 NY2d 1020. The Court stated, “The contention that the verdicts of the jury were ‘repugnant’ was not preserved for our review in consequence of the failure to register any protest concerning this issue prior to the discharge of the jury when the infirmity in the verdicts, if any, might have been remedied by resubmission to the jury for reconsideration of its verdicts.”

  • People v. Brown, 46 N.Y.2d 953 (1979): Preserving Objections for Appellate Review

    People v. Brown, 46 N.Y.2d 953 (1979)

    To preserve an issue for appellate review, a defendant must obtain a definitive ruling from the trial court, either by requesting a curative instruction or moving for a mistrial after an objection is sustained.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of a crime related to a cocaine sale. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in preventing him from learning the identity of a confidential informant and that the prosecutor made improper remarks during summation. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant failed to preserve these issues for appellate review. Because the defendant did not seek a judicial ruling after the prosecution objected to revealing the informant’s identity and did not request a curative instruction or move for a mistrial after the prosecutor’s comments, the appellate court was precluded from considering these alleged errors.

    Facts

    An informant arranged a cocaine sale and subsequently provided information to the police that led to the defendant’s arrest.

    During the trial, defense counsel attempted to elicit the identity of the informant from a People’s witness.

    The District Attorney objected, and the trial judge sustained the objection, preventing the witness from revealing the informant’s name.

    During summation, the prosecutor made comments to which defense counsel objected. The trial judge sustained the objection and directed the prosecutor to refrain from making similar statements.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant properly preserved for appellate review the issue of the trial court’s refusal to compel disclosure of the informant’s identity.

    2. Whether the defendant properly preserved for appellate review the issue of the prosecutor’s allegedly improper summation remarks.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant failed to seek a judicial ruling on the question after the District Attorney’s objection was sustained.

    2. No, because the defendant failed to request a curative instruction or move for a mistrial after the trial judge sustained the objection to the prosecutor’s remarks.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that when the District Attorney objected to revealing the informant’s identity, it was the defendant’s responsibility to seek a judicial ruling if he believed the disclosure would be helpful to his case. Failing to do so precluded him from raising the issue on appeal. The court cited CPL 470.35, subd 1 and 470.05, subd 2 in support of this conclusion.

    Regarding the prosecutor’s summation remarks, the court noted that the trial judge sustained the defense counsel’s objection and directed the prosecutor to stop making similar statements. However, the defense counsel did not request a curative instruction or move for a mistrial. The Court of Appeals emphasized that, without such a request, no error of law was preserved for appellate review.

    The court implicitly relied on the principle that a trial court must be given the opportunity to correct any alleged errors before they can be raised on appeal. A simple objection is insufficient; the party must seek further action by the court to remedy the perceived error.

    The court’s decision highlights the importance of contemporaneous objections and the need to seek definitive rulings from the trial court to preserve issues for appeal. As the court suggested, a defendant must do more than simply object; they must actively seek a remedy from the trial court, such as a curative instruction or a mistrial, to preserve the issue for appellate review.

  • People v. Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61 (1982): Defining ‘Lesser Included Offense’ and Preservation of Fourth Amendment Claims

    People v. Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61 (1982)

    A crime is a ‘lesser included offense’ only if it is impossible to commit the greater offense without also committing the lesser offense; furthermore, failure to raise a specific legal argument at trial, such as a Fourth Amendment violation, forfeits the right to raise it on appeal.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the defendant’s statements and eyewitness identification were properly admitted. The Court also found that the trial court did not err in refusing to submit a charge of assault in the third degree to the jury. The Court reasoned that assault in the third degree is not a lesser included offense of robbery in the second degree or felony assault because one can commit the latter offenses without necessarily committing the former. Additionally, the Court emphasized that the defendant’s failure to object to the admission of evidence based on Fourth Amendment grounds at the suppression hearing precluded appellate review of that issue.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with robbery in the second degree and felony assault. Prior to trial, the defendant sought to suppress statements he made to the police and an eyewitness identification, arguing a violation of his right to counsel and the unreliability of the identification. The defendant did not argue that his detention or the evidence obtained violated his Fourth Amendment rights. At trial, the defendant requested that the court instruct the jury on assault in the third degree as a lesser included offense.

    Procedural History

    The trial court rejected the defendant’s suppression arguments and refused to submit the charge of assault in the third degree to the jury. The Appellate Division affirmed. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s failure to object to the admission of evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds at the suppression hearing precluded appellate review of that issue.

    2. Whether assault in the third degree is a lesser included offense of robbery in the second degree or felony assault, such that the trial court was required to submit that charge to the jury.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the defendant failed to object to the admission of the evidence on the ground that it was obtained in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment, the issue is beyond the Court’s power to review.

    2. No, because it is possible to commit robbery in the second degree and felony assault without concomitantly committing assault in the third degree.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the Fourth Amendment claim, the Court relied on the principle that issues not raised at the trial level are generally not preserved for appellate review. Citing People v. Martin, 50 N.Y.2d 1029, the Court emphasized the importance of timely objections to allow the trial court to address the alleged error.

    On the lesser included offense issue, the Court applied CPL 300.50 subds 1, 2, which requires the defendant to show both that the offense is a lesser included offense and that a reasonable view of the evidence would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater. The Court focused on the first prong, relying on CPL 1.20 (subd 37), which defines a lesser included offense as one where “it is impossible to commit a particular crime without concomitantly committing, by the same conduct, another offense of lesser grade or degree.”

    The Court reasoned that robbery in the second degree (Penal Law, § 160.10, subds 1, 2, par [a]) and felony assault (Penal Law, § 120.05, subd 6) can be committed without the specific intent or recklessness required for assault in the third degree (Penal Law, § 120.00). Specifically, robbery only requires forcible stealing, and felony assault requires causing physical injury during the commission of a felony, but neither inherently requires the specific intent or recklessness that defines assault in the third degree. Thus, the statutory elements of the greater offenses do not necessarily include the elements of the purported lesser offense.

    The Court acknowledged its prior holdings in People v. Lett, 39 N.Y.2d 966 and People v. Warren, 43 N.Y.2d 852, where assault in the third degree was considered a lesser included offense of robbery in the second degree. However, the Court explicitly stated that those cases were wrongly decided because they did not adequately consider whether it was impossible to commit the robbery without also committing the assault.

  • People v. Lloyd, 51 N.Y.2d 820 (1980): Right to Counsel at Lineups Can Be Raised for the First Time on Appeal

    People v. Lloyd, 51 N.Y.2d 820 (1980)

    The denial of the fundamental constitutional right to counsel, including at a pre-trial lineup, may be raised for the first time on appeal, even if a different basis for suppression was argued at trial.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of armed robbery based on eyewitness identification at trial. The pre-trial lineups violated the defendant’s right to counsel because they were conducted pursuant to a court order, but in the absence of counsel and without a valid waiver. Although the defendant did not specifically argue at trial that the court order triggered his right to counsel, the New York Court of Appeals held that the issue was preserved for appeal because the right to counsel is fundamental. The court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, agreeing that the erroneous admission of the lineup identification testimony was not harmless error.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of two supermarket armed robberies. At trial, two prosecution witnesses, each a cashier at one of the supermarkets, testified about her prior lineup identification of the defendant. The lineups were conducted pursuant to a court order but without counsel present for the defendant and without a valid waiver of counsel.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the violation of the right to counsel at the lineup was not harmless error, and that the issue was properly preserved for appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the denial of the right to counsel at a pre-trial lineup can be raised for the first time on appeal, even if a different basis for suppression was argued at the trial level.

    Holding

    Yes, because the constitutional right to counsel is fundamental and its denial may, therefore, be raised for the first time on appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the constitutional right to counsel is fundamental, and therefore, its denial can be raised for the first time on appeal, even if the defendant did not specifically argue the right to counsel issue at the trial level. The Court acknowledged prior cases where it had articulated this principle with respect to the suppression of confession evidence, citing People v Samuels, 49 NY2d 218, 221. The court reasoned that this principle has no less vitality where the suppression of identification evidence is sought. The court stated: “That the specific right to counsel issue here urged on appeal was not urged at the trial level is immaterial. The constitutional right to counsel is fundamental and its denial may, therefore, be raised for the first time on appeal”. The court agreed with the majority below that the receipt of the lineup identification testimony was not harmless error. The court’s holding emphasizes the importance of the right to counsel in protecting the fairness and reliability of criminal proceedings.

  • People v. Brown, 48 N.Y.2d 921 (1979): Appellate Review of Unpreserved Trial Errors

    People v. Brown, 48 N.Y.2d 921 (1979)

    A reversal by the Appellate Division based on claimed trial error to which objection is not taken presents no questions of law for appellate review by the Court of Appeals.

    Summary

    The Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal because the Appellate Division’s reversal, though stated to be on the law, was actually based on an asserted repugnancy of the trial court’s verdicts, a point to which timely objection had not been made. The Court of Appeals held that such a reversal does not satisfy the jurisdictional predicate for review, which requires a determination made on the law alone or on the law and such facts that would necessitate reversal regardless of the legal determination. Because the issue was unpreserved, no question of law was presented for the Court of Appeals to review.

    Facts

    The specific facts of the underlying criminal trial are not detailed in the Court of Appeals memorandum opinion. The core issue stems from the defendant’s trial, where the jury rendered a verdict that the Appellate Division deemed repugnant.

    Procedural History

    The trial court rendered a verdict. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision, stating that the reversal was “on the law.” However, the Court of Appeals determined that the Appellate Division’s reversal was based on the repugnancy of the verdicts, an issue not properly preserved at trial. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division’s reversal, ostensibly on the law but actually based on an unpreserved error (repugnancy of verdicts), presents a question of law reviewable by the Court of Appeals.

    Holding

    No, because a reversal by the Appellate Division based on claimed trial error to which objection is not taken presents no questions of law for appellate review in the Court of Appeals.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the principle that appellate review is limited to questions of law that have been properly preserved. CPL 450.90(2) requires that the Appellate Division’s determination to reverse be made on the law alone, or on the law and such facts which, absent the legal determination, would still lead to reversal. The court emphasized that because a timely objection to the alleged repugnancy of the verdicts was not made at trial, the issue was not preserved for appellate review. Citing People v. Johnson, the court stated that a reversal by the Appellate Division based on claimed trial error to which no objection was taken presents no question of law for the Court of Appeals. The court also referenced People v. Cona, reinforcing the principle that the Court of Appeals’ review cannot extend beyond the singular point of law regarding preservation, and the case may be remitted to the Appellate Division for discretionary review if appropriate. The court explicitly stated that its dismissal did not imply endorsement of the Appellate Division’s rulings.

  • People v. Lennon, 42 N.Y.2d 321 (1977): Preserving Error for Appellate Review

    People v. Lennon, 42 N.Y.2d 321 (1977)

    To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make a specific request or exception to the court’s ruling or failure to rule at the trial level.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of grand larceny for operating a Ponzi scheme. On appeal, she argued that the trial court erred in its jury instructions regarding the larceny charges, specifically concerning Penal Law § 155.05(2)(d). However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction because the defendant’s counsel failed to request the specific charge she now claimed was necessary or to object to the court’s omission. The Court held that this failure to register a timely protest meant the issue was not preserved for appellate review. The Court also found the defendant’s other contentions to be either unpreserved or without merit.

    Facts

    The defendant operated a Ponzi scheme, convincing victims to invest in Spanish real estate and Indonesian imports (automobiles, trucks, and parts).
    The defendant was subsequently charged and convicted on seven counts of grand larceny in the second degree.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of grand larceny in the trial court.
    The defendant appealed to the Appellate Division.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court’s alleged error in failing to charge the jury in accordance with Penal Law § 155.05(2)(d) was preserved for appellate review when the defendant’s counsel neither requested the specific charge nor objected to its omission.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s counsel failed to either request the desired charge or except to the court’s failure to so charge, the issue has not been preserved for review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the fundamental principle that errors must be preserved at trial to be raised on appeal. This means that a party must bring the alleged error to the trial court’s attention, giving the court an opportunity to correct it. In this case, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by not including a specific instruction related to Penal Law § 155.05(2)(d) in its charge to the jury.

    However, the defendant’s counsel did not request this specific instruction, nor did they object to the court’s failure to include it. Because of this omission, the Court of Appeals held that the issue was not properly preserved for appellate review. The court essentially stated that it would not consider an argument raised for the first time on appeal. The court summarily dismissed the defendant’s other claims, finding them either unpreserved or without merit.

  • People v. Borrello, 52 N.Y.2d 952 (1981): Jury Instructions on Intent for Burglary

    52 N.Y.2d 952 (1981)

    In a burglary trial, where the court instructs the jury that the defendant must have entered the premises with the intent to commit a crime, the court’s refusal to specify that the intended crime must be a felony or misdemeanor is not reversible error, absent a specific request to charge that trespass cannot be the underlying intended crime.

    Summary

    John Borrello and Efrain Arroyo were convicted of third-degree burglary. On appeal, they argued that the trial court erred by not specifying to the jury that the crime they intended to commit upon entering the premises had to be a felony or misdemeanor, and by failing to instruct that the lesser included offense of trespass could not be the underlying intended crime for burglary. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the trial court charged the jury that the defendants needed to have intent to commit a crime when entering the building, its refusal to further specify the nature of the crime was not reversible error. The court also held that the defendants failed to preserve the argument regarding trespass for appellate review because they did not specifically request such a charge.

    Facts

    The defendants, John Borrello and Efrain Arroyo, were tried and convicted of burglary in the third degree. During the trial, the court instructed the jury that to convict the defendants, they had to find that the defendants entered the premises with the intent to commit a crime. The defendants requested the court specify that the intended crime must be a felony or a misdemeanor, a request which the court denied.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted of burglary in the third degree in the trial court. They appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed their convictions. The defendants then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by refusing the defendants’ request to specify that the intended crime for burglary had to be a felony or misdemeanor, given that the court instructed the jury that the defendants needed to have intent to commit a crime when entering the building?

    2. Whether the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that trespass could not be the underlying intended crime for burglary?

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court charged the jury that the defendants needed to have intent to commit a crime when entering the building, its refusal to further specify the nature of the crime was not reversible error.

    2. No, because the defendants failed to preserve the argument regarding trespass for appellate review by not specifically requesting such a charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court’s instruction that the defendants had to enter the premises with the intent to commit a crime was sufficient. The court noted that the defendants’ request for further specification was refused, but this refusal did not constitute reversible error in light of the initial charge. The court emphasized that the core element of burglary is the intent to commit a crime within the premises.

    Regarding the issue of trespass as the underlying intended crime, the court found that the defendants failed to properly preserve this argument for appellate review. Although defense counsel alluded to the point during a colloquy with the trial judge after the charge, he never formally requested a specific instruction that trespass could not be the underlying crime. Because the defense did not make a clear and explicit request for this specific charge, the Court of Appeals declined to consider the argument on appeal. The court thus applied the general rule that a party must make their position known to the trial court to preserve an issue for appellate review.

    The court does not provide specific quotes, but the holding relies on established principles of criminal law regarding the elements of burglary and the preservation of legal arguments for appeal.