New York Law Review

Tag: preservation of error

  • People v. Carter, 86 N.Y.2d 721 (1995): Preserving Fourth Amendment Claims on Appeal

    86 N.Y.2d 721 (1995)

    A defendant’s failure to assert standing to challenge a search at the suppression hearing forfeits the right to raise that Fourth Amendment claim on appeal.

    Summary

    Defendant Carter was convicted of drug offenses. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding Carter lacked standing to contest the search of a vehicle. Carter appealed, arguing he had standing under the “automatic standing” rule of People v. Millan. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because Carter failed to raise the standing issue at the suppression hearing, the claim was unpreserved for appellate review. A defendant must assert standing to challenge a search and seizure to preserve the issue for appeal.

    Facts

    Police stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation. Carter was a passenger. A search of the vehicle, conducted with the driver’s consent, revealed a small quantity of powder cocaine in the back seat. All occupants, including Carter, were arrested. A subsequent search of another passenger, Porter, revealed a large amount of crack cocaine. Porter pleaded to a reduced charge and testified before the grand jury. Carter, along with others, was indicted on conspiracy and felony possession charges related to the crack cocaine. Carter was also charged with possession of the powder cocaine found in the car.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Carter. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding Carter lacked standing to contest the vehicle search. Carter appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, who fails to assert standing to challenge a vehicle search at the suppression hearing, can raise that Fourth Amendment claim for the first time on appeal.

    Holding

    No, because a defendant must assert standing to challenge a search and seizure in order to preserve the issue for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the established rule that a defendant seeking to suppress evidence obtained via an illegal search must allege standing to challenge the search. If standing is disputed, the defendant bears the burden of establishing it. The Court cited Jones v. United States, People v. Ponder, and People v. Gonzalez in support of this principle. The Court noted that Carter never asserted standing in his omnibus motion or at any point during the suppression proceedings, despite the prosecution consistently contesting his standing. Because Carter failed to raise the standing issue at the trial level, the Court deemed the argument unpreserved for appellate review. The court stated, “In general, a defendant seeking to suppress evidence, on the basis that it was obtained by means of an illegal search, must allege standing to challenge the search and, if the allegation is disputed, must establish standing”. The court emphasized that appellate courts are generally limited to reviewing issues that were properly raised and preserved in the lower courts. The Court considered Carter’s remaining arguments and found them to be without merit, thus affirming the lower court’s decision.

  • People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10 (1995): Preservation of Error Required for Weight of Controlled Substance Conviction

    People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10 (1995)

    To preserve a claim on appeal that the prosecution failed to establish the defendant’s knowledge of the weight of drugs in a controlled substance offense, a defendant must raise a specific objection during trial.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant must specifically object at trial to the lack of evidence regarding their knowledge of the weight of a controlled substance to preserve that issue for appellate review. The Court held that preservation is indeed required. The Court reasoned that the preservation rule is essential for bringing claims to the trial court’s attention, allowing for potential cures during trial, alerting parties to evidentiary deficiencies, and promoting swift, final determinations. The Court reversed the Appellate Division orders in three cases where the issue was not properly preserved and affirmed in two others.

    Facts

    These cases involved convictions for controlled substance offenses where the defendants argued on appeal that the prosecution failed to prove they knew the weight of the drugs they possessed. In each case, the defendant’s knowledge of the weight of the controlled substance was a necessary element for the specific crime charged.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division in some cases reduced the convictions, finding the evidence insufficient to prove the defendants knew the weight of the drugs. These decisions relied on an interpretation of New York Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) § 470.15, suggesting that a specific objection was not necessary to preserve the issue of evidentiary sufficiency for appeal. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to resolve the conflict regarding the preservation requirement.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant must specifically object at trial to the lack of evidence regarding their knowledge of the weight of a controlled substance to preserve that issue for appellate review.

    Holding

    Yes, because the preservation rule is necessary to bring the claim to the trial court’s attention, allow for potential cures during trial, alert parties to evidentiary deficiencies, and promote swift and final determinations.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of the preservation rule, rooted in Article VI, § 3 of the New York State Constitution, which limits the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction to questions of law. The Court stated, “The chief purpose of demanding notice through objection or motion in a trial court, as with any specific objection, is to bring the claim to the trial court’s attention.” A general motion to dismiss is insufficient because it doesn’t specifically address the alleged error. A specific motion could allow the trial court to correct the error before the verdict. The Court rejected the argument that a lack of evidence violates the proper “mode of proceedings,” an exception to the preservation rule, because that exception is narrowly applied to fundamental procedural defects, not to evidentiary deficiencies.

    The Court distinguished its holding from the Appellate Division’s interpretation of CPL 470.15(4), clarifying that a specific objection is needed to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence regarding knowledge of weight. The court noted that even with a failure to preserve, the Appellate Division retains the power to review such issues in the interest of justice. The Court stated, “We also note that concerns that defendants’ rights are diminished by the holding here are misplaced. It should be emphasized that even where defendants have failed to adequately preserve claims for appellate review, they may request that the Appellate Divisions apply their ‘interest of justice’ jurisdiction under CPL 470.15 (3). Nothing we hold here intrudes upon that jurisdiction.”

  • People v. Flores, 84 N.Y.2d 951 (1994): Preserving Arguments for Appeal and Lesser Included Offenses

    People v. Flores, 84 N.Y.2d 951 (1994)

    A defendant’s failure to raise a specific argument for dismissal at trial, such as the lack of evidence of a bona fide offer to sell drugs, forfeits the right to raise that argument on appeal; furthermore, a defendant is not entitled to a jury charge on a lesser included offense unless there is a reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that the elements of the greater offense were not met.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted on multiple counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance. The charges stemmed from a completed sale and two separate offers to sell cocaine to an undercover officer. The Appellate Division reduced some convictions due to a lack of independent weight evidence. On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, the defendant argued that the convictions based on the offers should be reversed because the prosecution failed to prove that the offers were bona fide. He also argued he was entitled to a jury charge on a lesser-included offense for the completed sale. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the defendant’s argument regarding the offers was not preserved for appeal and that no reasonable view of the evidence supported a lesser-included offense charge.

    Facts

    On March 28, 1990, the defendant sold over four ounces of cocaine to an undercover police officer for $3,700. On April 5, 1990, and May 23, 1990, the defendant offered to sell specific quantities of cocaine to the same undercover officer for agreed-upon prices; however, no exchange of money or drugs occurred on either of these latter occasions.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted on five counts, including criminal sale in the first degree for the April 5 transaction and criminal sale in the second degree for the May 23 transaction. He was convicted on two counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree (March 28 and April 5 transactions) and one count of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree (May 23 transaction). The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reducing the April 5 and May 23 convictions to criminal sale in the third degree because there was no independent evidence of the drugs’ weight offered for sale. The defendant then appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s argument that the prosecution failed to prove a knowing sale (i.e., bona fide offers) for the April 5 and May 23 transactions was preserved for appellate review, given that the argument raised at trial was that there were no consummated sales.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree for the March 28 transaction.

    Holding

    1. No, because the argument now raised on appeal (lack of evidence of a bona fide offer to sell) was not the ground for dismissal argued at trial.
    2. No, because there was no reasonable view of the evidence that could support a finding that the weight of the drugs was less than two ounces, which is a necessary element for the lesser included offense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the unpreserved argument, the Court noted the defendant argued at trial only that the People had not proven consummated sales. The Court reasoned that this argument was inconsistent with the argument now raised on appeal. The Court stated, “If, as defendant now asserts, the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate the mens rea element for criminal sale, it also would have been insufficient to sustain a conviction for attempt…” Because the defendant did not raise the issue of mens rea at trial, the Court deemed it unpreserved and thus not reviewable on appeal.

    Regarding the lesser included offense charge, the Court applied CPL 300.50 (1), (2) noting that a defendant is only entitled to a charge on a lesser included offense if there is a reasonable view of the evidence which could support a finding that the weight of the drugs was less than two ounces. The forensic evidence and the undercover officer’s testimony indicated that the cocaine sold on March 28 weighed over four ounces. Because there was no evidence to suggest a weight less than two ounces, the Court concluded that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser included offense.

  • People v. Garcia, 83 N.Y.2d 817 (1994): Preserving Objections for Appellate Review

    People v. Garcia, 83 N.Y.2d 817 (1994)

    To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must raise a specific objection at trial; a general objection, or an objection on other grounds, does not preserve the issue.

    Summary

    The defendant, Garcia, was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. At trial, the prosecution presented expert testimony on street-level drug transactions. Garcia objected, arguing the testimony would prejudice the jury by suggesting involvement in a larger narcotics organization. On appeal, Garcia argued the expert testimony was unnecessary and improperly bolstered the prosecution’s witnesses. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Garcia’s initial objection did not preserve the new arguments raised on appeal. The Court emphasized the importance of specific objections to allow the trial court to address the alleged error.

    Facts

    Garcia was arrested during a buy-and-bust operation in the Bronx and charged with criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.

    At trial, a detective involved in the arrest testified about the circumstances.

    The detective was permitted to testify as an expert on street-level drug transactions, defining terms like “hawker,” “money man,” and “hand-to-hand.”

    Garcia objected to the expert testimony, arguing it would mislead the jury into believing he was involved in a larger narcotics organization, even though only a single sale was at issue.

    Procedural History

    The jury convicted Garcia.

    The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the judgment.

    One of the dissenting Justices at the Appellate Division granted Garcia leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s objection at trial, based on the potential for the jury to infer involvement in a larger narcotics organization, preserved the defendant’s appellate claims that the expert testimony was unnecessary and improperly bolstered the testimony of the prosecution’s witnesses.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s objection at trial was based on a different ground than the arguments raised on appeal. The Court of Appeals held that the initial objection did not preserve the defendant’s current claims that the expert testimony was inadmissible because it was unnecessary and that it improperly bolstered the testimony of the prosecution’s witnesses.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the principle of preservation of error. To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make a specific objection at trial, giving the trial court an opportunity to address the alleged error.

    Garcia’s objection at trial was that the expert testimony would prejudice the jury by suggesting he was involved in a larger drug trafficking operation. On appeal, Garcia argued the expert testimony was unnecessary and improperly bolstered the prosecution’s case. These were distinct arguments.

    The Court stated that “That objection does not preserve defendant’s current claims that the expert testimony was inadmissible because it was unnecessary and that it improperly bolstered the testimony of the prosecution’s witnesses…We therefore may not address these claims.”

    Because Garcia’s initial objection did not alert the trial court to the specific errors he now alleged, the Court of Appeals declined to review those claims.

    The Court also found that the preserved claim, that the expert testimony implied Garcia’s involvement in extensive drug trafficking, was without merit, especially since the trial court limited the testimony to defining specific terms.

  • People v. Ely, 82 N.Y.2d 353 (1993): Admissibility of Uncharged Conduct to Prove Intent

    People v. Ely, 82 N.Y.2d 353 (1993)

    Evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible to prove the defendant’s intent to commit the charged crime, provided that the evidence is relevant and its probative value outweighs its potential for prejudice.

    Summary

    Defendant, a secretary, was convicted of grand larceny and forgery for stealing from her legally blind employer. The prosecution introduced evidence of 146 additional forged checks, discovered after the indictment, to demonstrate the defendant’s intent. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence was properly admitted to prove intent, and the defendant’s other claims were unpreserved or without merit. The court emphasized that this evidence did not amend the indictment but served as evidentiary support for the larceny charge.

    Facts

    The defendant, a secretary to the complainant, was charged with grand larceny and forgery for stealing money from her employer. The indictment stated that the defendant stole over $700,000 between December 1981 and October 1989. The defendant was also accused of forging the complainant’s signature on checks without authorization. An audit revealed discrepancies between the complainant’s income and bank deposits exceeding $700,000.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted by a jury of grand larceny and multiple counts of forgery. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, holding that the defendant’s claim that the indictment was duplicitous was unpreserved and that evidence regarding public assistance received by the defendant’s mother was properly admitted. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of 146 uncharged forged checks to prove the defendant’s intent.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in precluding evidence of insurance coverage to demonstrate bias on the part of the complainant.
    3. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the People to cross-examine the defendant on the collateral issue of her mother’s receipt of public assistance.

    Holding

    1. No, because the evidence of the uncharged forged checks was offered to prove the defendant’s intent to commit the crimes charged, and it did not amend or add to the charges in the indictment.
    2. No, because the defendant’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion in precluding the introduction of evidence of insurance coverage was not preserved for appellate review.
    3. No, because the defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in allowing the People to cross-examine her on the collateral issue of whether her mother had received public assistance was also unpreserved.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the evidence of the 146 uncharged forged checks was admissible to prove the defendant’s intent to commit the charged crimes, citing People v. Molineux, 168 NY 264. The court emphasized that this evidence did not amend or add to the charges in the indictment or submitted to the jury, but rather served only as evidentiary support for the larceny count. The court found that the defendant’s arguments regarding the preclusion of insurance coverage evidence and the cross-examination about her mother’s public assistance were unpreserved because the defendant did not properly raise these objections at trial. As such, the Court of Appeals declined to review them. The Court stated, “Here, the evidence of the 146 uncharged forged checks was offered to prove defendant’s intent to commit the specific crimes charged.”

  • People v. Starling, 85 N.Y.2d 509 (1995): Preserving Objections for Appellate Review

    People v. Starling, 85 N.Y.2d 509 (1995)

    To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must raise a specific objection at the time of the alleged error, giving the trial court an opportunity to correct it; a new or different objection cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon and assault after shooting his neighbor. During jury deliberations, the jury requested a written list of elements for each charge, which the court declined, offering them the opportunity to take notes instead. Later, jurors orally requested instructions on intoxication, intent, and other issues. Defendant moved for a mistrial, objecting to the oral questions but not to the note-taking or the lack of opportunity to discuss the supplemental instructions beforehand. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant failed to preserve his appellate claims by not raising timely and specific objections at trial.

    Facts

    The defendant argued with his neighbor about his dog and subsequently shot the neighbor. The jury rejected the defendant’s alibi defense and convicted him of criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees, as well as assault in the second and third degrees. During deliberations, the jury requested a written list of elements for each charge.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted after a jury trial. He appealed, raising issues related to the jury’s note-taking during supplemental instructions and the court’s handling of oral questions from the jury. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant preserved for appellate review the issue of the jury taking notes during supplemental instructions when he failed to object at the time the court permitted note-taking and, in fact, objected to a subsequent cautionary instruction on note-taking.

    2. Whether the defendant preserved for appellate review the issue that he was denied an opportunity to discuss with the court supplemental instructions before they were given to the jury, when his only objection at trial was that the oral questions did not permit him to preserve the jury’s queries.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant did not object to the note-taking when it occurred and later objected to a cautionary instruction, thereby waiving any claim regarding the need for such instructions.

    2. No, because the defendant’s objection at trial was based on a different ground than the argument he raised on appeal, specifically that he was denied the opportunity to discuss the supplemental instructions with the court before they were given.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of raising timely and specific objections at trial to preserve issues for appellate review. The court stated that, regarding the note-taking, “at the time the court permitted the jurors to take notes, there was no objection and no request for cautionary instructions.” Furthermore, when the prosecutor requested cautionary instructions, “the defendant objected, thereby waiving any claim he might have had regarding the need for cautionary instructions.”

    Regarding the supplemental instructions, the court cited People v. O’Rama, 78 N.Y.2d 270, which indicates a defendant should have an opportunity to discuss proposed answers to jurors’ questions. However, the court found that the defendant’s objection at trial only pertained to the lack of a clear record of the jury’s questions, not the denial of an opportunity to confer on the instructions. The court cited People v. DeRosario, 81 N.Y.2d 801, to reinforce the principle that a claim must be properly preserved to be reviewable on appeal. The court reasoned that the purpose of requiring a specific objection is to give the trial court the opportunity to correct the error. By failing to raise the specific objection at trial, the defendant deprived the court of that opportunity, and the issue was therefore not preserved for appellate review. The Court of Appeals thus reinforced the idea that objections need to be clear and contemporaneous to the error to allow for proper judicial consideration and correction at trial.

  • People v. Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56 (1986): Preserving Rosario Violations for Appellate Review

    People v. Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56 (1986)

    To preserve a Rosario violation for appellate review, the defendant must object at a time when the trial court can provide a remedy.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division order and remitted the case because the defendant failed to preserve the Rosario violation claim for appellate review. The defendant argued that the prosecution failed to produce Rosario material related to a witness’s videotaped testimony. However, the defense counsel did not raise the Rosario issue before the trial court or a hearing court in a timely manner when a remedy could have been implemented, such as excluding the videotaped testimony. Thus, the Court of Appeals held that the issue was not properly preserved for appellate review.

    Facts

    The prosecution presented videotaped testimony of a witness who was later deported.

    Defense counsel alleged the People failed to produce certain Rosario material pertinent to the videotaped testimony.

    At a Wade hearing, defense counsel brought the omission to the judge’s attention, but the judge stated that their jurisdiction was limited to the Wade hearing and the objection should be made before the trial court.

    Defense counsel acknowledged the court’s limited role and stated she only wanted to record when she received the material.

    At a CPL 670.20 hearing and at trial, defense counsel made several motions, some directly relating to the videotaped testimony, but did not raise the Rosario issue.

    Procedural History

    The case was heard in a Wade hearing, then a CPL 670.20 hearing, and then at trial.

    The Appellate Division issued an order, which was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for a determination of the facts and consideration of issues not previously reached.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant preserved the Rosario violation claim for appellate review when the defense counsel failed to object at a time when the trial court could have provided a remedy.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s failure to object at a time when the Rosario violation could have been redressed constituted a failure to preserve the issue for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the defendant’s claim regarding the failure to produce Rosario material was not preserved for review because the defense counsel did not raise the issue before the trial court or hearing court at a time when a remedy could have been implemented. By failing to object when the trial court could have taken action, such as excluding the videotaped testimony, the defendant lost the opportunity to have the Rosario violation addressed. The Court emphasized the importance of raising objections at the trial level to allow the court to correct any errors. The court stated, “Defendant’s failure to object at a time when any Rosario violation could have been redressed — as, for example, by excluding the videotaped testimony — constituted a failure to preserve the issue for appellate review.”

  • People v. Jackson, 76 N.Y.2d 908 (1990): Preserving Objections on Jury Instructions for Appellate Review

    76 N.Y.2d 908 (1990)

    To preserve an objection to a jury instruction for appellate review, the objection must be specific enough to alert the trial court to the alleged error and allow for corrective action.

    Summary

    In People v. Jackson, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the defendant adequately preserved his objection to the trial court’s jury instruction on reasonable doubt. The trial court had defined reasonable doubt as a doubt for which jurors could give a reason. On appeal, the defendant argued that this instruction diluted the prosecution’s burden of proof. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s objection at trial was insufficient to preserve the specific argument he raised on appeal, because the original objection was not based on the same grounds raised on appeal.

    Facts

    During the trial, the judge instructed the jury on the concept of reasonable doubt, stating twice that a reasonable doubt was a doubt for which the jurors would be able to give a reason. The judge further illustrated this point by using the jurors’ names in an example.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. On appeal to the Appellate Division, the conviction was affirmed. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s objection to the trial court’s jury instruction on reasonable doubt was sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review, specifically regarding his claim that the instruction diluted the People’s burden of proof.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s objection at trial did not specifically argue that the instruction diluted the People’s burden of proof by conveying a requirement that the doubting juror must give reasons supported by evidence. The argument made on appeal was different than the grounds for objection raised at the trial level.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make a specific objection at trial. The objection must be sufficiently detailed to alert the trial court to the perceived error and provide an opportunity for correction. The Court found that the defendant’s objection at trial, which focused on the instruction unfairly punishing less articulate jurors, was distinct from his appellate argument that the instruction diluted the People’s burden of proof. Because the defendant’s initial objection did not fairly apprise the court of the argument he later raised on appeal, the issue was not preserved for review. The court essentially held that an objection must be based on the same legal grounds at trial as it is on appeal.

  • People v. Autry, 75 N.Y.2d 836 (1990): Preserving Objections to Jury Instructions on Defendant’s Right to Silence

    People v. Autry, 75 N.Y.2d 836 (1990)

    A defendant must object to a trial court’s jury instructions regarding the defendant’s failure to testify in order to preserve the issue for appellate review, unless the instruction expressly or unambiguously suggests the defendant should have testified.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a defendant must object to a trial court’s jury instructions regarding the defendant’s right not to testify in order to preserve the issue for appeal. The New York Court of Appeals held that absent a timely objection, the alleged error is unpreserved for review, unless the charge expressly or unambiguously conveys to the jury that the defendant should have testified. The Court reasoned that without a specific objection, it’s unclear whether the defense counsel strategically chose not to object, believing an extended instruction might benefit the defendant.

    Facts

    The defendants in these consolidated cases (Autry, Lara, Brown, and Fehr) claimed the trial courts’ jury instructions regarding their decision not to testify were overly expansive and violated their Fifth Amendment rights. They argued that the instructions should have been limited to the bare statutory language, and that the courts unduly emphasized their silence.

    Procedural History

    In *People v. Autry, People v. Lara,* and *People v. Brown*, the Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. In *People v. Fehr*, the Appellate Division reversed the defendant’s conviction on the law. The People appealed the *Fehr* decision. In all four cases, the defendants appealed, arguing the jury instructions were improper. The New York Court of Appeals consolidated the cases to resolve the common legal issue.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant must object to a trial court’s jury instructions concerning the defendant’s decision not to testify in order to preserve a claim of error for appellate review.

    Holding

    Yes, because an objection is required to preserve a point of law for appellate review except in a very small class of cases where the error results in a trial “at basic variance with the mandate of law prescribed by Constitution or statute.” In the context of a charge error implicating a defendant’s right against self-incrimination, this exception applies only where the instruction expressly or unambiguously conveys to the jury that the defendant should have testified.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the alleged errors were not preserved for review because the defendants did not object to the instructions at trial. The Court applied the general rule that objections to jury charges must be made at trial to preserve the issue for appeal, citing *People v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 167 (1965)* and *People v. Thomas, 50 N.Y.2d 467 (1980)*. The Court clarified that an exception exists for errors that result in a trial fundamentally at odds with constitutional or statutory mandates, but this exception only applies where the jury instruction explicitly or unambiguously implies the defendant should have testified. The court stated, “An objection is required to preserve a point of law for appellate review except in a very small class of cases where the error results in a trial ‘at basic variance with the mandate of law prescribed by Constitution or statute.’” The Court distinguished the case from *People v. McLucas*, noting that the instructions in these cases were facially correct and the defendants only complained about possible nuances and inferences. The Court also suggested that the lack of objection might have been a strategic decision by defense counsel. In *People v. Fehr*, the Court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the Appellate Division erred in reviewing the unpreserved claim. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to exercise its fact review and interest of justice jurisdiction.

  • People v. Mayers, 74 N.Y.2d 931 (1989): Preserving Claims of Defective Plea Allocutions

    74 N.Y.2d 931 (1989)

    A defendant’s claim that the trial court failed to explicitly advise him of potential second felony offender sentencing at the time of a guilty plea must be preserved by a motion to withdraw the plea or a motion to vacate the judgment of conviction; otherwise, the claim is unpreserved for appellate review unless it implicates fundamental fairness.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the defendant, Mayers, could not be relieved of his guilty plea because he failed to preserve his claim that the trial court did not explicitly advise him of the potential for second felony offender sentencing. The Court reasoned that because Mayers was informed of the potential sentence enhancement before entering his plea and received the bargained-for sentence, the claimed error was not a matter of fundamental fairness and was subject to standard preservation rules, which he did not follow by moving to withdraw his plea or vacate the judgment.

    Facts

    Defendant Mayers pleaded guilty. On appeal, Mayers claimed that the trial court committed a per se error by failing to explicitly advise him at the time of his guilty plea that he might be sentenced as a second felony offender. The record indicated that Mayers was informed of the potential sentence and enhancement before entering his plea and received the precise sentence bargained for.

    Procedural History

    The lower courts did not find error in the plea allocution. The case reached the Court of Appeals after Mayers appealed the lower court decisions upholding his conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, who was informed of potential sentencing enhancements and received the bargained-for sentence, can challenge his guilty plea on appeal based on the trial court’s failure to explicitly advise him of second felony offender sentencing at the time of the plea, when he did not move to withdraw his plea or vacate the judgment of conviction.

    Holding

    No, because the claimed error, under these specific circumstances, is not a matter of fundamental fairness and is governed by standard preservation rules, which require the defendant to move to withdraw the plea or vacate the judgment to preserve the issue for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of preserving legal arguments at the trial level. It noted that CPL 220.60(3) and CPL 440.10 provide mechanisms for a defendant to challenge a guilty plea, either by moving to withdraw it before sentencing or by moving to vacate the judgment of conviction after sentencing. By failing to utilize these mechanisms, Mayers failed to give the trial court an opportunity to address the alleged error. The court distinguished the alleged error from claims implicating fundamental fairness. The Court highlighted that Mayers was informed of the potential sentence and enhancement before entering his plea and received the precise sentence for which he bargained. The court reasoned that under these circumstances, the alleged error did not rise to the level of fundamental unfairness requiring the court to overlook the lack of preservation. The court implicitly determined that the error did not affect the voluntariness or intelligence of the plea given that the defendant was aware of the potential consequences and received the agreed-upon sentence. The decision serves as a reminder that procedural rules and preservation requirements are strictly enforced unless the alleged error rises to the level of fundamental unfairness, thus undermining the integrity of the proceedings.