New York Law Review

Tag: preservation of error

  • People v. Pilgrim, 52 N.Y.2d 730 (1980): Preserving Objections for Appellate Review

    People v. Pilgrim, 52 N.Y.2d 730 (1980)

    A defendant must object to errors at trial to preserve those errors for appellate review.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. On appeal, he argued that venue was improperly laid in Nassau County and that the trial court erred in failing to submit the venue issue to the jury. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that there was sufficient evidence of transactions in Nassau County to support the convictions. The Court further held that the defendant failed to preserve the venue issue for appellate review because he neither requested that the issue be submitted to the jury nor took exception to the court’s failure to do so.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted on multiple counts, including criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first and second degrees. Counts 1 and 4 of the indictment were submitted to the jury on theories both of completed sale and agreements to sell. The defendant was convicted on these counts. The defendant appealed, arguing that venue was improperly laid in Nassau County.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s application to dismiss the counts on the ground that venue was improperly laid in Nassau County. The defendant appealed this decision to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether there was sufficient evidence of transactions in Nassau County to support the convictions for criminal sale of a controlled substance based on agreements to sell made in that county.

    2. Whether the defendant preserved the issue of the trial court’s failure to submit the venue issue to the jury for appellate review.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the record contained sufficient evidence of transactions in Nassau County to support convictions on the basis of agreements to sell made in that county.

    2. No, because the defendant neither requested that the issue be submitted to the jury nor took exception to the court’s failure to do so.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the record contained sufficient evidence of transactions in Nassau County to support the convictions. The court reasoned that the trial court did not err when it denied the defendant’s application to dismiss the counts on the ground that venue was improperly laid in Nassau County.

    Regarding the failure to submit the venue issue to the jury, the court emphasized the importance of preserving issues for appellate review. The court stated that “defendant neither requested such submission nor took exception to the court’s failure to submit the issue to the jury, his claim of error, if any, has not been preserved for our review.” This highlights the general rule that errors must be brought to the trial court’s attention, giving the court an opportunity to correct them. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the right to raise the issue on appeal. This rule promotes efficiency in the judicial process and prevents defendants from strategically withholding objections only to raise them later if they are convicted. The absence of a request or an exception indicated to the trial court that the defendant was satisfied with the charge as given and thus, the defendant could not later claim error.

  • People v. Fellman, 35 N.Y.2d 918 (1974): Preserving Objections to Jury Instructions

    People v. Fellman, 35 N.Y.2d 918 (1974)

    A defendant’s timely written request for a specific jury instruction, accurately reflecting the law, preserves the objection to the court’s failure to provide that instruction, even if not explicitly reiterated after the charge.

    Summary

    Fellman was convicted of perjury. He appealed, arguing the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the corroboration required for perjury convictions as per CPL 210.50. Fellman’s attorney had submitted a written request for a specific jury instruction on corroboration, but the court did not give the instruction. The New York Court of Appeals held that the written request sufficiently preserved the objection, even though it wasn’t reiterated verbatim after the jury charge, and reversed the perjury conviction due to the omission of the critical corroboration instruction. The court found the error not harmless.

    Facts

    The defendant, Fellman, was prosecuted for perjury. During the trial, Fellman’s attorney submitted a written request to the trial court asking the court to instruct the jury that the falsity of the alleged statement of defendant that he met Tut Robinson on East Falls Street may not be established by the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness. This request was timely.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Fellman. Fellman appealed, arguing the trial court erred by failing to provide the requested jury instruction. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Fellman appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s timely written request for a specific jury instruction, that accurately reflects the law, is sufficient to preserve an objection to the court’s failure to provide that instruction, even if the request is not explicitly reiterated or an exception taken after the charge.

    Holding

    Yes, because the written request, if sufficiently faithful to the law, preserves the objection under CPL 470.05, regardless of whether a literal exception was registered. The court stated that by submitting the written request, “defendant must be ‘deemed to have thereby protested the court’s ultimate * * * failure to * * * instruct’ sufficiently ‘to raise a question of law * * * regardless of whether any actual protest thereto was registered’ (CPL 470.05).”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 470.05 deems a written request for a jury instruction as sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal, provided the request accurately reflects the law. The court emphasized the importance of the corroboration rule in perjury cases. The court also found the defense counsel’s general reiteration of all “previously requested” requests sufficient to preserve the issue, even though the corroboration request was not explicitly mentioned in the post-charge colloquy. The court stated, “Taken as a whole, without more, this hardly demonstrated a clear intent to waive a position already preserved with respect to a request on which the verdict could very well have turned.” Because the requested charge related to a central element of the crime (perjury), the omission was not harmless error. The policy consideration is to ensure defendants receive proper jury instructions on critical elements of the charges against them and to give effect to CPL 470.05, lessening burdens on defense counsel to repetitively reiterate points already raised.

  • Barry v. Root, 58 N.Y.2d 992 (1983): Preservation of Error and Jury Verdicts

    Barry v. Root, 58 N.Y.2d 992 (1983)

    A party must properly preserve issues of law for appellate review by taking specific exceptions to jury instructions and assisting the trial judge in clarifying legal issues; otherwise, the appellate court will not review the factual determinations underlying a general jury verdict.

    Summary

    In a commercial case, the appellant argued that consequential damages were improperly awarded. The jury returned general verdicts on the plaintiff’s causes of action, and the defendant did not request special verdicts or interrogatories. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s order, holding that it could not review the factual determinations underlying the lump-sum jury verdicts because the appellant failed to properly preserve its legal objections. The appellant did not take sufficient exceptions to the jury charge, and its requests to charge were erroneous. Therefore, the court was unable to determine whether the jury considered impermissible elements of damages.

    Facts

    The specifics of the commercial dispute are not detailed in this memorandum opinion, but the plaintiff successfully obtained jury verdicts on four causes of action. The defendant appealed, contending that consequential damages were improperly awarded.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals after a jury trial resulted in verdicts for the plaintiff. The Appellate Division’s order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Court of Appeals can review alleged errors in a jury’s damages award when the party challenging the award failed to properly preserve its objections to the jury instructions at trial by taking specific exceptions and assisting the trial judge in clarifying the legal issues.

    Holding

    No, because the appellant failed to preserve the legal issues for review by not taking sufficient exception to the jury charge and not assisting the trial judge in clarifying or distilling the legal issues.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that its appellate jurisdiction is generally limited to reviewing issues of law, not questions of fact. Because the jury returned lump-sum general verdicts without special interrogatories, the court stated that any analysis of how the jury arrived at those numbers would be speculative, a process in which the court could not engage. The court found that the jury instructions were not a “model of either clarity or completeness.” The court stated, “However, other than restating requests to charge that had previously been submitted to the court (which requests themselves were erroneous in significant detail), defendant took no sufficient exception to the charge as given and did not otherwise assist the Trial Judge in clarifying or distilling the legal issues as to which it now seeks our review.” The court held that because the defendant failed to address the charge with particularity, it failed to preserve the legal issues for appeal. The court also noted that the appellant’s other contentions regarding evidentiary rulings and prejudgment interest were without merit.

  • People v. Thomas, 50 N.Y.2d 467 (1980): Preserving Jury Instruction Errors for Appeal

    People v. Thomas, 50 N.Y.2d 467 (1980)

    A defendant must object to jury instructions at trial to preserve a claim of error for appellate review unless the instruction expressly shifts the burden of proof to the defendant or explicitly relieves the prosecution of proving every element of the crime.

    Summary

    Thomas was convicted of murder for the stabbing deaths of a woman and her two children. On appeal, he argued that the trial court’s instruction on intent, stating that a person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of their acts, violated due process under Sandstrom v. Montana. The Appellate Division reversed, but the Court of Appeals reversed again, holding that because Thomas’s attorney did not object to the instruction at trial, the error was not preserved for appellate review. The court emphasized the importance of preserving errors at trial to allow for correction and avoid unnecessary appeals.

    Facts

    The defendant, Thomas, was accused of murdering Deborah Williams and her two young daughters in their apartment. Thomas initially denied involvement, but later confessed to stabbing the victims after an argument with Williams. He claimed she was seeing another man. The victims suffered numerous stab wounds, and the children’s skulls were fractured. At trial, Thomas recanted his confession, claiming coercion by the police.

    Procedural History

    Thomas was convicted of three counts of second-degree murder in the Bronx County Supreme Court. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding the jury instruction on intent violated Sandstrom v. Montana and was reviewable despite the lack of objection at trial. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s failure to object to a jury instruction at trial precludes appellate review of the instruction, even if the instruction allegedly violates due process by creating an impermissible presumption of intent.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant did not object to the jury instruction at trial, and the instruction did not expressly shift the burden of proof to the defendant or relieve the prosecution of its burden; therefore, the alleged error was not preserved for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the general rule that issues not raised at trial are waived on appeal. While there is a narrow exception for fundamental constitutional rights deprivations, this exception only applies when the trial procedure deviates in a basic way from constitutional or statutory mandates. The Court distinguished this case from People v. Patterson, where the defendant challenged the constitutionality of a statute that explicitly placed the burden of proving an affirmative defense on the defendant. Here, the trial court specifically instructed the jury that the People had the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and there was no explicit shifting of the burden. The court noted that while the instruction regarding the presumption of intent could be interpreted as shifting the burden, this did not rise to the level of a fundamental defect requiring no preservation. The court acknowledged Sandstrom v. Montana, but stated that this case did not change New York law because the court has held similar charges to be erroneous as a matter of State law for over a century. Because the Appellate Division erroneously reversed on the law, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for review of the facts.

  • People v. Burns, 41 N.Y.2d 851 (1977): Preserving Issues for Appeal with Specific Objections

    People v. Burns, 41 N.Y.2d 851 (1977)

    To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must specifically raise the issue at trial; a general objection or an objection on other grounds is insufficient.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder for the killing of his wife. A key piece of evidence was the wife’s dying declaration, which included statements from the assailant implicating the defendant in a conspiracy to commit the murder. On appeal, the defendant argued that these statements were inadmissible hearsay because they were not made in furtherance of the conspiracy. However, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant failed to preserve this specific issue for review because his objections at trial were based on different grounds. The court emphasized that objections must be specific to preserve the precise issue for appellate review.

    Facts

    The defendant was accused of plotting to kill his wife. The defendant’s wife was fatally assaulted. Before dying, the wife made a dying declaration which included statements from her assailant that implicated the defendant in a plot to kill her.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s specific objection to the admissibility of the dying declaration, and his objection to the failure to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy, sufficient to preserve for appeal the issue of whether the assailant’s statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy?

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s objections at trial did not specifically raise the argument that the assailant’s statements were not made in furtherance of the conspiracy; therefore, this issue was not preserved for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the defendant’s objections at trial were too narrow to encompass the specific argument he raised on appeal. Although the defendant objected to the dying declaration itself and to the sufficiency of the conspiracy evidence, he did not specifically argue that the assailant’s statements were not made in furtherance of the conspiracy. The court cited Richardson, Evidence, emphasizing that objections preserve only the grounds specified. The court stated, “These objections in this instance preserved only the grounds specified (see, generally, Richardson, Evidence [10th ed— Prince], § 538) and thus the precise issue argued is beyond our power of review.” Because the defendant failed to raise this specific objection at trial, the Court of Appeals deemed the issue unpreserved and declined to review it. This highlights the importance of making precise and specific objections during trial to preserve issues for appeal.

  • People v. Tutt, 38 N.Y.2d 1011 (1976): Preserving Issues for Appellate Review

    People v. Tutt, 38 N.Y.2d 1011 (1976)

    An appellate court will generally not review an issue raised for the first time on appeal if it was not properly preserved at the trial level.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s order, holding that the defendant’s claim regarding the failure to provide Miranda warnings was not properly preserved for appellate review because it was not the basis of the motion to suppress the gun at trial. The Court distinguished this case from others where the issue could be reviewed despite the failure to timely raise it. Additionally, the Court found that the trial court’s instruction to the jury to disregard a witness’s testimony, due to her inability to withstand cross-examination, was sufficient to protect the defendant’s right of confrontation.

    Facts

    During the trial, the defendant moved to suppress a gun. The basis for the motion was not related to Miranda warnings. At some point during trial, a witness for the prosecution became unable to withstand intensive cross-examination due to her physical condition. The defendant moved for a mistrial. The court denied the motion but instructed the jury to disregard the witness’s testimony.

    Procedural History

    The defendant appealed the lower court’s decision. The Court of Appeals reviewed the lower court’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s claim regarding the failure to provide Miranda warnings is reviewable on appeal, despite not being the basis for the motion to suppress the gun at trial.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in not granting the defendant’s motion for a mistrial when a prosecution witness could not be subjected to intensive cross-examination.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant’s failure to preserve this issue for review precludes his reliance upon it upon this appeal.

    2. No, because the court’s instruction to the jury to disregard her testimony altogether sufficed in the circumstances to avoid any violation of defendant’s right of confrontation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the defendant’s motion to suppress the gun was not based on the failure to provide Miranda warnings. The Court distinguished this case from cases where the issue could be reviewed despite the failure to timely raise it, citing People v. Michael, 48 N.Y.2d 1. Because the issue was not properly raised at the trial level, the Court of Appeals declined to review it. Regarding the motion for a mistrial, the Court held that the trial court’s instruction to the jury to disregard the witness’s testimony was sufficient to protect the defendant’s right of confrontation. The court determined this instruction was adequate in the circumstances, implying that the witness’s testimony was not so prejudicial that it could not be cured by the instruction. The court considered the specific facts and circumstances when evaluating the potential prejudice and the efficacy of the curative instruction. The Court emphasizes the importance of raising legal arguments at the trial level to allow for proper fact-finding and legal analysis. Failure to do so generally waives the right to raise the issue on appeal. The case also demonstrates that curative instructions can be an effective tool to mitigate potential prejudice from inadmissible evidence or a witness’s inability to complete their testimony.

  • People v. Argibay, 45 N.Y.2d 45 (1978): Preservation of Error and Appellate Review

    People v. Argibay, 45 N.Y.2d 45 (1978)

    To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make a specific objection or request at the time of the alleged error; otherwise, the appellate court has discretion to review the unpreserved error.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the defendant preserved the argument of entitlement to an agency defense instruction for appellate review after being convicted of sale and possession of controlled substances. The Court of Appeals found that the defendant failed to properly preserve the issue because defense counsel did not request the agency defense instruction, mention it in summation, or object to its omission in the court’s charge. Therefore, the court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to allow the Appellate Division to decide whether to exercise its discretionary power to review the unpreserved claim.

    Facts

    The defendant was on trial for the sale and possession of controlled substances. The defendant’s attorney made reference to the possibility of establishing an agency defense during arguments regarding cross-examination limits should the defendant testify. However, at the close of evidence, the defense attorney did not request an agency defense instruction, mention it in their summation, or object to the judge’s failure to include it in the charge to the jury.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the issue was preserved and the failure to charge agency constituted reversible error. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant preserved the argument that they were entitled to an agency defense instruction for appellate review by failing to request the instruction, mention it in summation, or object to its omission from the court’s charge.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant did not register a protest to the omission to charge with respect to the agency defense and therefore failed to preserve the error for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the defendant failed to preserve the issue for appellate review. The court emphasized that the defendant’s initial reference to the agency defense during arguments about cross-examination was insufficient to preserve the issue. To properly preserve an issue, a party must make a specific request or objection at the time of the alleged error. Because the defendant did not request the instruction, mention it in summation, or object to its omission, the issue was not preserved. The court relied on the principle that appellate courts generally do not review errors that were not brought to the trial court’s attention. The court remitted the case to the Appellate Division to determine whether to exercise its discretionary power to review the defendant’s claim of reversible error despite the lack of preservation, referencing People v. Cona, 49 NY2d 26, 33-34. The Court of Appeals underscored that it is the responsibility of the parties to raise issues at the trial level to allow the court an opportunity to correct any errors. The court’s decision highlights the importance of proper and timely objections in preserving issues for appeal.

  • People v. Maschi, 49 N.Y.2d 785 (1980): Preserving Objections for Appellate Review

    People v. Maschi, 49 N.Y.2d 785 (1980)

    To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make a timely and specific objection at trial; a general objection is insufficient if the party later raises a different theory of error on appeal.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for further consideration. The central issue was whether the prosecutor improperly impeached a defense witness. The Appellate Division believed the cross-examination was unfair and warranted a new trial. However, the Court of Appeals found that the defendant failed to make a timely and specific objection during the cross-examination, thus not preserving the issue for appellate review. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to determine whether to exercise its discretionary power to review the claim despite the lack of proper objection.

    Facts

    During the trial, the defense called an eyewitness to the defendant’s arrest. The prosecutor cross-examined the witness about their failure to report exculpatory information to law enforcement or the District Attorney’s office prior to the trial testimony. The prosecutor asked approximately 19 questions on this topic without objection. Only after the 20th question did defense counsel offer a simple “objection.”

    Procedural History

    The trial court overruled the defense’s objection. The defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, holding that the cross-examination was improper and impinged on the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant preserved the issue of improper cross-examination of a defense witness for appellate review by making a timely and specific objection at trial.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to make a timely or specific objection to the prosecutor’s line of questioning, thereby failing to preserve the error, if any, for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must register a timely and effective protest. Here, the defense counsel’s objection came only after a significant line of questioning had already occurred without objection. The court noted, “After the prosecutor, without objection, had asked some 19 questions relevant to the failure of the witness to come forward, when he asked the twentieth, capping question defense counsel interposed an unembellished ‘objection’ which was overruled.” Furthermore, the Court pointed out that when the objection was finally made, defense counsel did not assert the specific theory of error that he later advanced on appeal. The Court cited 22 NYCRR 604.1 [d] [4], which addresses the requirements for preserving objections. Because the issue was not properly preserved, the Court remitted the case to the Appellate Division to determine whether to exercise its discretionary power to review the defendant’s claim despite the lack of adequate protest. The court explicitly stated, “In this procedural posture, the case must be remitted to the Appellate Division for that court to determine whether to exercise its discretionary power to review defendant’s claim of reversible error in the absence of adequate protest and, if it so determines, then to rule thereon”.

  • People v. Prescott, 66 A.D.2d 61 (1978): Preserving Statutory Double Jeopardy Claims

    People v. Prescott, 66 A.D.2d 61 (1978)

    A statutory double jeopardy claim under state law must be raised before or during a guilty plea to be preserved for appellate review; a constitutional double jeopardy claim, however, can be raised for the first time on appeal.

    Summary

    Prescott pleaded guilty in federal court to fraud and subsequently pleaded guilty in state court to attempted grand larceny based on similar conduct. She argued on appeal that the state prosecution was barred by New York’s statutory double jeopardy protections (CPL 40.20), claiming it was based on the same criminal transaction as the federal case. The New York Court of Appeals held that because Prescott did not raise this statutory claim before or during her guilty plea in state court, it was waived and could not be raised for the first time on appeal. However, the Court noted a constitutional double jeopardy claim could be raised for the first time on appeal. The court also found the restitution order exceeded the permissible probationary period and remitted the case for modification of the sentence.

    Facts

    Prescott engaged in fraudulent activity between August and September 1974.

    In November 1976, she pleaded guilty in federal court to fraudulently demanding money using a false instrument.

    Prior to the federal plea, in April 1976, Prescott was indicted in Kings County, New York, for possessing stolen property and altering forged instruments with intent to defraud, stemming from the same period in 1974.

    On January 3, 1977, she pleaded guilty in state court to attempted grand larceny in the second degree in satisfaction of the state indictment.

    She received a sentence of five years’ probation conditioned on making restitution of over $22,000 at $25 per week, which would extend beyond the probationary period.

    Procedural History

    Prescott pleaded guilty to a federal charge in the Eastern District of New York.

    She was subsequently indicted and pleaded guilty in Kings County Supreme Court.

    Prescott appealed the state court conviction, raising a statutory double jeopardy claim for the first time.

    The Appellate Division affirmed her conviction.

    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a statutory claim under CPL 40.20 that one may not be separately prosecuted for two offenses based on the same act or criminal transaction is preserved for appellate review when it is not raised prior to or at the time of a guilty plea.

    Whether a restitution order that extends beyond the lawful period of probation is permissible under New York Penal Law article 65.

    Holding

    No, because the statutory previous prosecution claim was waived by appellant’s plea of guilty and therefore has not been preserved for appellate review.

    No, because under article 65 of the Penal Law, restitution may not be ordered beyond the lawful period of probation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished between statutory and constitutional double jeopardy claims. It stated that statutory claims, such as those under CPL 40.20, are subject to the usual rules of preservation, meaning they must be raised at the trial level to be considered on appeal. By pleading guilty without raising the statutory double jeopardy issue, Prescott waived her right to assert it later. The court explicitly contrasted this with constitutional double jeopardy claims, which can be raised for the first time on appeal, citing People v. Michael, 48 NY2d 1.

    Regarding the restitution order, the court found that the sentencing court erred by ordering restitution that would extend beyond the five-year probationary period. The court noted that the People conceded this point, acknowledging that article 65 of the Penal Law limits restitution to the duration of probation. Therefore, the case was remitted for modification of the sentence to comply with the law.

    The court provided a clear procedural rule: a statutory double jeopardy claim must be raised before or during the guilty plea to preserve it for appeal. A failure to raise it constitutes a waiver. This case emphasizes the importance of raising all potential legal challenges early in the proceedings to preserve them for appellate review. It also highlights the distinction between statutory and constitutional claims in terms of preservation requirements.

  • People v. Michael, 48 N.Y.2d 1 (1979): Double Jeopardy Must Be Raised at Trial to Be Preserved for Appeal

    48 N.Y.2d 1 (1979)

    A defendant’s failure to raise a double jeopardy claim at trial constitutes a waiver of that defense for appellate review unless the error affects the organization of the court or the mode of proceedings prescribed by law.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s failure to raise a double jeopardy defense before or during the second trial waived the right to assert it on appeal. The Court reasoned that the double jeopardy defense, while constitutionally significant, is a personal right that must be timely asserted. The majority distinguished this case from errors affecting the court’s organization or mode of proceedings, which can be raised for the first time on appeal. The dissent argued that established precedent required preservation of the double jeopardy defense at trial and that the majority’s decision undermined the state’s interest in efficient criminal procedure.

    Facts

    The defendant was initially tried for a crime, but the outcome of that trial is not specified in this excerpt. The defendant was then retried for the same crime. Before or during the second trial, the defendant did not raise a defense of double jeopardy, arguing that being tried again for the same offense violated his constitutional rights.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division’s order was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The specific ruling of the Appellate Division is not detailed in this excerpt. The Court of Appeals considered whether the defendant’s failure to raise the double jeopardy defense at trial precluded him from raising it on appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s failure to assert a double jeopardy defense prior to or during trial waives the right to raise that defense on appeal.

    Holding

    No, because the constitutional immunity from double jeopardy is a personal right which if not timely interposed at trial may be waived.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that the “constitutional immunity from double jeopardy is a personal right which if not timely interposed at trial may be waived.” The court relied on prior case law, including People v. La Ruffa, which reaffirmed the principle that a double jeopardy defense can be waived if not raised at trial. The court distinguished the double jeopardy claim from errors affecting the organization of the court or the mode of proceedings, such as trial by a jury of fewer than 12 members or prosecution by information for an infamous crime when a Grand Jury indictment is constitutionally required. The court reasoned that permitting a defendant to raise a double jeopardy claim for the first time on appeal would undermine the State’s interest in enforcing its criminal law efficiently. As the dissent stated, “[a] defendant cannot be permitted to sit idly by while error is committed, thereby allow the error to pass into the record uncured, and yet claim the error on appeal.” The court also distinguished Menna v. New York, noting that while a guilty plea does not automatically waive a double jeopardy claim that was unsuccessfully raised before the plea, it does not preclude a finding that the defendant waived the claim by failing to raise it timely and preserve it for appellate review.