New York Law Review

Tag: preservation of error

  • Sabine v. State of New York, 2024 NY Slip Op 06288: Preservation Requirement for Appeals and Prejudgment Interest in Personal Injury Cases

    2024 NY Slip Op 06288

    The Court of Appeals will not review an issue raised for the first time on appeal, unless a recognized exception to the preservation rule applies.

    Summary

    In Sabine v. State of New York, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that it could not review the plaintiff’s argument regarding the accrual date of prejudgment interest. The plaintiff claimed that interest should run from the date the court determined the defendant’s liability rather than the date a serious injury was established. However, the Court of Appeals found that this issue was not preserved for review because the plaintiff failed to raise it in the trial court. The Court rejected the application of an exception to the preservation rule, emphasizing that the argument could have been avoided by legal countersteps in the trial court, a necessary condition for the exception to apply. The dissent argued that the issue was preserved because it was a purely legal question subject to binding precedent, but the majority maintained the importance of the preservation doctrine to ensure a complete record for appeal.

    Facts

    Michael Sabine sued the State of New York for injuries from an automobile collision. The Court of Claims granted partial summary judgment to Sabine on the issue of liability in 2018. A bench trial followed, in which the court found that Sabine sustained a serious injury as defined by Insurance Law § 5102(d) and awarded damages in 2021. Prejudgment interest was calculated from the date of the damages award. Sabine appealed, arguing that prejudgment interest should have accrued from the earlier date when liability was established. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court, and granted Sabine leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    Sabine initiated the lawsuit in the Court of Claims. The Court of Claims granted partial summary judgment on liability, followed by a bench trial determining serious injury and awarding damages. The court calculated prejudgment interest from the date of the damages award. Sabine appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing that the interest should have accrued earlier. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling. Sabine was granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the issue of the accrual date for prejudgment interest was properly preserved for review by the Court of Appeals.

    2. If the issue was preserved, whether prejudgment interest should accrue from the date liability was established or from the date a serious injury was determined.

    Holding

    1. No, the issue was not preserved because it was not raised in the trial court.

    2. Not answered, because the first issue was decided in the negative.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that it could not address the merits of Sabine’s argument because he had not preserved it for appellate review. The court underscored that the question of prejudgment interest was not raised in the Court of Claims. The court emphasized that, with rare exceptions, it does not review questions raised for the first time on appeal, as to do so undermines the need for fully developed records at the trial court and intermediate appellate levels. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that an exception to the preservation rule applied, finding that the alleged error could have been avoided through “factual showings or legal countersteps” in the trial court. The dissent maintained that this exception applied since binding precedent blocked plaintiff from receiving relief in the Court of Claims. The Court found the record inadequate to assess the merits because the issue was not addressed at the trial level.

    Practical Implications

    This case highlights the importance of preserving legal issues at the trial court level. Attorneys must ensure that all arguments, including those related to prejudgment interest, are raised and developed in the lower courts to be considered on appeal. The decision reinforces the general rule against reviewing issues raised for the first time on appeal, even when those issues involve questions of law. This case underscores that arguments not raised at the trial level cannot be reviewed on appeal. Litigators must be diligent in raising all legal arguments and objections at trial and seek clarification from the trial court as the court’s record might be critical in any subsequent appeal.

  • People v. Pena, 28 N.Y.3d 727 (2017): Preservation of Constitutional Challenges to Sentencing

    People v. Pena, 28 N.Y.3d 727 (2017)

    A defendant must preserve a claim that an aggregate sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment by raising the constitutional argument before the sentencing court; otherwise, the claim is not properly before the appellate court.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the defendant’s claim of an unconstitutionally excessive sentence was not preserved for appellate review. The defendant, convicted of multiple counts of predatory sexual assault and criminal sexual act, received consecutive sentences resulting in a lengthy aggregate term. The Court found that because the defendant did not raise an Eighth Amendment challenge before the sentencing court, the issue was not preserved, and the appellate court could not consider it. The Court emphasized the importance of giving the trial court the opportunity to address constitutional challenges, which aligns with the preservation rule and prior case law.

    Facts

    An off-duty police officer, the defendant, was convicted of three counts of predatory sexual assault and three counts of criminal sexual act in the first degree. He was sentenced to consecutive terms, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 75 years to life. On appeal, he argued that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, claiming it constituted cruel and unusual punishment. He also raised, for the first time, a claim under the New York State Constitution. The defendant had generally objected to the length of his sentence, arguing it was draconian, but did not specifically alert the court to his constitutional argument.

    Procedural History

    The trial court imposed the sentence. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, holding that the sentencing court lawfully imposed consecutive sentences and that the defendant failed to preserve his Eighth Amendment claim. The Appellate Division declined to review the constitutional claim in the interest of justice. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s claim that his aggregate sentence violated the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution was properly preserved for appellate review.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant failed to raise the constitutional challenge before the sentencing court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the well-established rule that a constitutional challenge to a sentence must be preserved by raising it before the sentencing court. The court found that the defendant’s general objection to the sentence’s length did not adequately preserve his Eighth Amendment claim because he did not alert the sentencing court to the constitutional argument. The Court cited People v. Ingram, reiterating that a failure to raise the constitutional issue at the trial level prevents appellate review. The Court distinguished the case from situations where fundamental sentencing power is challenged or where an illegal sentence is evident from the record. The Court reasoned that preserving the issue allows the trial court to address the constitutional claims and create a proper record for appellate review.

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the critical importance of properly preserving issues for appeal, especially constitutional challenges. Attorneys must ensure that specific constitutional arguments, such as those based on the Eighth Amendment, are clearly and explicitly raised before the trial court. Failing to do so will likely result in a waiver of the issue on appeal, preventing appellate courts from reviewing the merits of the claim. This decision also reinforces the need for thoroughness in raising all potential legal issues at the trial court level to avoid procedural bars on appeal. This principle affects all stages of a criminal case from the initial arraignment to the sentencing phase. Future cases will need to consider whether objections made at sentencing were specific enough to raise any constitutional claims. Counsel should also anticipate the appellate court’s potential application of the Fuller and Morse exceptions, ensuring the record adequately reflects the legal basis of the constitutional challenge.

  • People v. Garcia, 27 N.Y.3d 601 (2016): Preservation of Error and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Grand Jury Proceedings

    <strong><em>People v. Garcia</em></strong>, 27 N.Y.3d 601 (2016)

    To preserve an issue for appellate review in New York, a defendant must make a timely and specific objection at the trial level; failure to do so generally results in the issue being unpreserved and not reviewable on appeal, unless a mode of proceedings error occurred.

    <strong>Summary</strong>

    In <em>People v. Garcia</em>, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether various errors during grand jury proceedings required dismissal of an indictment. The court held that the defendant’s claims, including being shackled, improper questioning, and the failure to present a witness, were unpreserved because his attorney did not make timely objections. The court also rejected the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, finding that the attorney’s actions were reasonable under the circumstances, particularly given the defendant’s decision to proceed pro se. The ruling underscores the importance of preserving legal issues at the trial court level for appellate review and clarifies the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel.

    <strong>Facts</strong>

    Defendant was charged with first-degree robbery. During grand jury proceedings, he was represented by counsel and shackled. The prosecutor failed to inform the grand jury about the defense’s request for a witness to testify. Defendant’s counsel raised concerns about the shackling and the missing witness. The defendant then requested to proceed pro se, and the court granted the request. A jury later found the defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to a 20-year term.

    <strong>Procedural History</strong>

    Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment based on the insufficiency of evidence, which was denied. After the guilty verdict, the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that most of the defendant’s challenges were unpreserved. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    <strong>Issue(s)</strong>

    1. Whether the defendant’s challenges to the grand jury proceedings (shackling, improper questioning, and the failure to present a witness) were preserved for appellate review.

    2. Whether defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to preserve these claims.

    <strong>Holding</strong>

    1. No, the challenges were not preserved because the defense counsel did not make timely and specific objections.

    2. No, the defense counsel’s performance was not ineffective.

    <strong>Court’s Reasoning</strong>

    The court emphasized the importance of the preservation rule in New York law. A failure to object at the trial level generally prevents appellate review, unless the error is a mode of proceedings error. The court found that none of the alleged errors (shackling, questioning, and the witness issue) constituted a mode of proceedings error. It reasoned that the shackling issue did not automatically qualify as a mode of proceedings error, and that defendant’s counsel did not preserve the other issues by objecting. Regarding ineffective assistance, the court applied the standard of “meaningful representation” and considered the totality of the circumstances. The court found that the counsel’s actions were reasonable, especially considering the defendant’s decision to proceed pro se. The court noted counsel had attempted to raise certain errors prior to being relieved as counsel.

    <strong>Practical Implications</strong>

    This case reinforces the necessity of making timely and specific objections during trial proceedings to preserve issues for appeal. For attorneys, this means being vigilant in identifying and objecting to potential errors as they arise. The case also provides guidance on the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, demonstrating that strategic decisions, even if they result in unpreserved arguments, may not constitute ineffective assistance, especially if the defendant’s actions complicate the situation. This case suggests that it is important for trial counsel to create a complete record of objections. Furthermore, this case highlights the significance of a defendant’s decision to represent themselves and its potential effect on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

  • People v. Taylor, 25 N.Y.3d 149 (2015): Preserving Objections to Jury Selection Procedures and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

    People v. Taylor, 25 N.Y.3d 149 (2015)

    A trial court’s procedure for excusing potential jurors for hardship before formal voir dire is not a mode of proceedings error, and any objections to the procedure must be preserved for appeal; ineffective assistance of counsel claims are evaluated based on the meaningful representation standard.

    Summary

    In People v. Taylor, the New York Court of Appeals addressed several issues arising from a conviction for burglary and assault. The court held that the trial court’s procedure for excusing potential jurors for hardship before formal voir dire did not constitute a mode of proceedings error, and thus, the defendant’s failure to object waived the issue on appeal. The court also addressed the defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, finding that the representation, viewed in its totality, was meaningful, despite the counsel’s failure to object to improper remarks during the prosecutor’s summation. The court affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of burglary and assault following an attack on the victim. Prior to voir dire, the trial court informed prospective jurors that they could be excused for hardship, and some were excused. The defendant sought to introduce third-party culpability evidence, which the court rejected. During summation, the prosecutor made improper comments appealing to gender bias. The defense counsel did not object to the comments. The jury convicted the defendant.

    Procedural History

    The defendant appealed the conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant was granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court’s procedure for excusing prospective jurors for hardship constituted a mode of proceedings error requiring no objection for appellate review.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in precluding the admission of third-party culpability evidence.

    3. Whether the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s summation remarks.

    Holding

    1. No, because the procedure did not constitute a mode of proceedings error.

    2. No, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

    3. No, because the defendant received meaningful representation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished the case from People v. Ahmed and People v. Toliver, where mode of proceedings errors occurred, emphasizing that those cases involved the judge’s absence or delegation of judicial functions during critical stages like jury deliberations or voir dire related to fitness to serve. Here, the hardship questioning occurred before formal voir dire related to fitness to serve, and thus, the trial court’s actions did not deprive the defendant of her right to a jury trial. The court stated that the defendant was required to preserve her objection to the trial court’s procedure. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding the third-party culpability evidence because the evidence was speculative. Addressing the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court found that the representation was meaningful, as counsel presented an alibi defense, attacked witness credibility, and sought to introduce third-party culpability evidence. While acknowledging the prosecutor’s improper gender-biased remarks, the court found that counsel’s failure to object did not render the representation ineffective.

    The court referenced the following: “So long as the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of a particular case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation, reveal that the attorney provided meaningful representation, the constitutional requirement will have been met” (People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]).

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the importance of preserving objections, particularly regarding jury selection procedures. Attorneys must object to trial court procedures related to jury selection or potential error will be waived on appeal. The case highlights that the trial judge’s role in jury selection, particularly during voir dire related to fitness, is critical, and any delegation of this duty is subject to stricter scrutiny. However, the procedure for excusing potential jurors for hardship before formal voir dire is not considered a fundamental error. The case also reinforces the ‘meaningful representation’ standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims, requiring a review of the trial as a whole, and acknowledges strategic decisions that counsel may make, even if those decisions involve forgoing certain objections.

  • People v. Mack, 27 N.Y.3d 152 (2016): Jury Note Procedures and the Requirement of Objection for Appellate Review

    People v. Mack, 27 N.Y.3d 152 (2016)

    A trial court’s failure to follow the procedure outlined in <em>People v. O’Rama</em> when handling substantive jury inquiries does not constitute a mode of proceedings error requiring reversal if defense counsel was made aware of the note’s contents and did not object to the procedure.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court committed a mode of proceedings error by deviating from the <em>O’Rama</em> procedure for handling jury notes. The court held that because the trial court read the contents of the jury notes verbatim into the record in the presence of the parties and counsel, the deviation from the <em>O’Rama</em> procedure, while error, did not constitute a mode of proceedings error. Consequently, the defendant was required to object to the procedure to preserve the issue for appeal. The court emphasized the importance of adhering to the <em>O’Rama</em> guidelines to maximize counsel’s participation in the trial and to ensure a clear record for appellate review. The Appellate Division’s reversal was reversed, and the case was remitted for consideration of other factual issues.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with robbery and related offenses. During jury deliberations, the jury sent three notes to the court requesting clarification on the charges. The trial court read the notes aloud in the presence of the parties, counsel, and the jury before responding to the jury’s inquiries. The defense counsel did not object to either the procedure followed by the trial court or to its responses to the jury. The jury subsequently reached a guilty verdict. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court had violated the <em>O’Rama</em> procedure and that this constituted a mode of proceedings error, which did not require preservation. The People appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was found guilty in the Supreme Court, Queens County. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment, holding that the trial court had committed a mode of proceedings error by violating the <em>O’Rama</em> procedure and that preservation was not required. The Court of Appeals granted the People leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a trial court commits a mode of proceedings error when it fails to discuss a substantive jury note with counsel outside the presence of the jury, but reads the note into the record in the presence of the parties, counsel, and the jury before providing a response.

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court complied with its core responsibility to give counsel meaningful notice of the jury’s notes by reading them into the record in open court in the presence of counsel, defendant, and the jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analyzed the trial court’s deviation from the <em>O’Rama</em> procedure in light of prior cases such as <em>People v. Starling</em>, <em>People v. Ramirez</em>, and <em>People v. Williams</em>. The court emphasized that the <em>O’Rama</em> procedure aims to maximize counsel’s participation in the trial. The Court distinguished the case from those where the court’s failure to provide the actual content of the jury note, resulting in counsel’s inability to effectively participate. The court held that because defense counsel was made aware of the contents of the notes (they were read verbatim in open court), and did not object to the procedure followed by the trial court, the issue was not preserved for appeal. The Court noted that the trial court’s action, while a deviation from the preferred <em>O’Rama</em> procedure, did not fall within the narrow category of mode of proceedings errors.

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the importance of the <em>O’Rama</em> procedure in handling jury notes. The central message is that when a court provides meaningful notice by reading the contents of a jury note in open court and counsel does not object, any claims of error based on deviation from the <em>O’Rama</em> procedure are not preserved for appellate review. This highlights the need for counsel to be vigilant during jury deliberations and to make timely objections if the trial court’s procedure deviates from the established guidelines. This case may also lead to more precise application of the distinctions between substantive and ministerial jury inquiries.

  • People v. Turner, 24 N.Y.3d 237 (2014): When Post-Release Supervision Must Be Disclosed Before Plea

    24 N.Y.3d 237 (2014)

    A defendant must be notified of a post-release supervision (PRS) term sufficiently in advance of its imposition to allow the defendant an opportunity to object to the deficiency in the plea proceeding; otherwise, preservation of the issue for appeal is unnecessary.

    Summary

    Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted murder, and the court did not mention post-release supervision (PRS) at the plea hearing. At sentencing, the prosecutor raised the issue of PRS, and the court stated its intention to impose a five-year PRS term. The prosecutor asked the defendant if she had discussed PRS with her attorney and if she understood it was part of her plea, to which the defendant replied affirmatively. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendant did not have sufficient knowledge of the terms of the plea at the plea allocution, and when later advised, did not have sufficient opportunity to move to withdraw her plea. Thus, preservation was unnecessary.

    Facts

    Defendant assaulted her friend with a knife and fled. A police officer found her nearby, and without questioning, handcuffed her and placed her in the patrol car. Defendant offered to show the officer where she hid the knife. After recovering the knife, the officer conducted a show-up identification where the victim identified the defendant. Later, after waiving her Miranda rights, defendant confessed to the crime, stating she committed it to be killed in prison.

    Procedural History

    The County Court suppressed evidence found during the arrest because it lacked probable cause, but it did not suppress the interrogation statements, deeming them attenuated from the illegal arrest. Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted murder with a promised sentence of 15 years. The court failed to mention PRS at the plea hearing, but imposed a five-year PRS term at sentencing. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the defendant’s claim unpreserved because she had the opportunity to object. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether defendant was required to preserve her claim that her plea was not knowing and voluntarily entered where she first received notice of the imposition of a term of postrelease supervision (PRS) at sentencing, and submitted to sentencing with the PRS addition.

    Holding

    Yes, in part. The court must notify the defendant of a term of PRS sufficiently in advance of its imposition so that the defendant has the opportunity to object to the deficiency in the plea proceeding. In the absence of such an opportunity, preservation is unnecessary because a defendant cannot be expected to object to a constitutional deprivation of which she is unaware.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the constitutional duty of a trial court to ensure a defendant fully understands the plea and its consequences before pleading guilty, citing People v. Catu, 4 N.Y.3d 242, 244-245 (2005). The Court distinguished this case from People v. Murray, 15 N.Y.3d 725 (2010), where the defendant knew that PRS would be part of the sentence when accepting the plea. In Turner, the defendant was only notified of the PRS term in the middle of sentencing and therefore, did not have sufficient knowledge of the plea terms at the plea allocution, nor sufficient opportunity to withdraw the plea later.

    The court stated, “Here, the court did not advise defendant at the time of her plea that her sentence would include any PRS, and only notified her of her PRS term in the middle of sentencing. The same reasoning that applied in Catu and Louree applies here: the defendant did not have sufficient knowledge of the terms of the plea at the plea allocution and, when later advised, did not have sufficient opportunity to move to withdraw her plea.”

    Regarding the confession, the Court found record support for the attenuation from the illegal arrest and declined to disturb the lower court’s ruling.

    The dissent argued the Catu argument required preservation similar to challenges to a guilty plea’s voluntariness and that, similar to People v. Murray, preservation is required where the defendant has a sufficient opportunity to object to PRS or withdraw the plea.

  • People v. Alcide, 21 N.Y.3d 687 (2013): Judge’s Participation in Testimony Readback

    People v. Alcide, 21 N.Y.3d 687 (2013)

    While a trial judge should generally avoid participating in readbacks of testimony to the jury, doing so is not a mode of proceedings error requiring reversal absent preservation, unless the judge’s actions demonstrate bias that deprives the defendant of a fair trial.

    Summary

    James Alcide was convicted of murder and weapon possession. During jury deliberations, the jury requested readbacks of testimony from two key witnesses. The trial judge, in an effort to expedite the process, participated in the readbacks by reading either the questions or the answers. Alcide argued that this participation constituted a mode of proceedings error, requiring reversal even without an objection. The New York Court of Appeals held that while it’s generally advisable for a judge not to participate in readbacks, doing so does not constitute a mode of proceedings error unless it demonstrates bias, and that Alcide’s claim was unpreserved.

    Facts

    Alcide was convicted of fatally shooting a man in a grocery store. Key evidence included testimony from a bystander who identified Alcide as the shooter and the victim’s friend who saw Alcide fleeing the scene with a gun. The defense attacked the reliability and credibility of these witnesses, citing inconsistencies and potential biases. During deliberations, the jury requested readbacks of the testimony of the bystander and the first police officer on the scene.

    Procedural History

    Alcide was convicted in the trial court. He appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing that the trial judge committed mode of proceedings errors. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Alcide appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial judge’s participation in the readback of testimony to the jury, by reading either the questions or answers, constituted a mode of proceedings error requiring reversal even in the absence of a timely objection.

    Holding

    1. No, because while it is generally advisable for a judge not to participate in readbacks of testimony, doing so does not constitute a mode of proceedings error unless it demonstrates bias that deprived the defendant of a fair trial, and Alcide’s claim was unpreserved.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. O’Rama, where the trial judge withheld the contents of a jury note from counsel. Here, the content of the jury’s requests for readbacks was disclosed in open court, and defense counsel had the opportunity to object to the judge’s proposed procedure. Because counsel did not object, the claim was unpreserved. The Court acknowledged the Second Department’s dictum in People v. Brockett that a trial judge should not participate as a reader during a read-back of testimony, as it might convey the impression that the court is aligned with a particular party. However, the Court clarified that such participation, while generally inadvisable, does not constitute a mode of proceedings error unless it creates a situation analogous to People v. De Jesus, where the judge’s conduct demonstrated clear bias against the defense. The court noted, “Not every procedural misstep in a criminal case is a mode of proceedings error”; rather, this narrow exception to the preservation rule is “reserved for the most fundamental flaws.” Here, the judge’s stated reasons for participating in the readbacks were to expedite the process and make it easier for the jury to follow, not to demonstrate bias. Because defense counsel failed to object to the judge’s participation in the readbacks at a time when the error could have been cured, the Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order affirming Alcide’s conviction.

  • People v. White, 16 N.Y.3d 726 (2010): Preserving Fourth Amendment Standing Arguments for Appeal

    People v. White, 16 N.Y.3d 726 (2010)

    To preserve for appellate review a challenge to a defendant’s standing to contest a search, the People must raise a timely objection in the suppression court.

    Summary

    Defendant White was convicted of drug charges, and sought to suppress evidence found during a warrantless search of an apartment. The People argued the search was justified by exigent circumstances, hot pursuit, and consent. The suppression court denied the motion. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed, finding White lacked standing to challenge the search, an argument not raised at the suppression hearing. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the People must timely object to a defendant’s failure to prove standing in order to preserve that issue for appellate review. This requirement ensures the defendant has notice and an opportunity to develop the record on standing.

    Facts

    Police officers conducted a warrantless entry into an apartment and arrested White. The arrest stemmed from a “buy and bust” operation where White sold drugs to an undercover officer. Incident to the arrest, officers recovered “buy money” from White. White moved to suppress the buy money, arguing the warrantless entry and search were unlawful. The People argued the entry was justified under the exigent circumstances and hot pursuit exceptions to the warrant requirement, and also that the tenant (White’s mother) had consented to the search.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied White’s suppression motion, holding that the warrantless entry was justified under the exigent circumstances and hot pursuit exceptions. The issue of White’s standing was not raised at the suppression hearing. White pleaded guilty and appealed his conviction, arguing the suppression ruling was erroneous. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding White failed to establish standing to challenge the search, and thus did not reach the other arguments. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People must timely object to a defendant’s failure to prove standing to challenge a search in order to preserve that issue for appellate review.

    Holding

    Yes, because the People are required to alert the suppression court if they believe that the defendant has failed to meet his burden to establish standing. The preservation requirement also serves the purpose of alerting the adverse party of the need to develop a record for appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reiterated its holding in People v. Stith, that the People cannot raise a defendant’s lack of standing for the first time on appeal. The Court acknowledged conflicting rulings from the Appellate Division, and clarified that those decisions should no longer be followed to the extent they suggest the People need not timely object to preserve the standing issue. The Court emphasized that the primary reason for requiring a timely objection is to bring the claim to the trial court’s attention, allowing it to make a ruling on the issue. Quoting People v. Gray, the court stated that “demanding notice through objection or motion in a trial court, as with any specific objection, is to bring the claim to the trial court’s attention.” The court also noted that the preservation requirement alerts the defendant to the need to develop a record on appeal. The court emphasized that a defendant “must allege standing to challenge the search and, if the allegation is disputed, must establish standing.” Because the People did not challenge White’s claim of a legitimate expectation of privacy in his mother’s apartment at the suppression hearing, they failed to preserve the issue for appeal, and the Appellate Division erred in considering it.

  • People v. Kadarko, 14 N.Y.3d 426 (2010): Preserving Error Related to Jury Note Disclosure

    People v. Kadarko, 14 N.Y.3d 426 (2010)

    To preserve a claim of error relating to the disclosure of a jury note, defense counsel must object to the procedure employed by the trial court after being given notice of the contents of the note and knowledge of the court’s intended response.

    Summary

    Kadarko was convicted of robbery. During jury deliberations, the jury sent a note indicating their division on each of the alleged robberies. The trial judge informed counsel of the note’s contents but withheld the specific numerical breakdown until after giving an Allen charge. Defense counsel did not object to this procedure. The Appellate Division reversed, finding a mode of proceedings error. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that while the trial court’s initial withholding of the numerical breakdown may have been error, it was not a mode of proceedings error because the court later corrected itself, and defense counsel failed to object.

    Facts

    Kadarko was indicted for robbing food deliverymen on five occasions. During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court indicating their division on each robbery charge.

    Procedural History

    The trial court informed counsel of the contents of the jury note but withheld the specific numerical breakdown. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, which was denied. After giving an Allen charge, the court showed counsel the complete note. The jury convicted Kadarko on one count, leading to a mistrial on the remaining counts. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding a mode of proceedings error. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial judge committed a mode of proceedings error when he initially failed to inform counsel of the verbatim contents of the jury’s note, including the numerical divisions, and whether the defendant preserved the error for appeal.

    Holding

    No, because the judge informed counsel of the note’s contents, defense counsel voiced no objection to the procedure, and the court later corrected itself by revealing the entire note without objection. The error, if any, was not preserved for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. O’Rama and People v. Kisoon, where the trial courts completely failed to provide counsel with meaningful notice of the jury’s note or an opportunity to respond. Here, the trial judge informed counsel of the contents of the note and the decision to withhold the numbers temporarily. The court emphasized that defense counsel failed to object to the procedure before or after the entire note was revealed. The Court cited People v. Starling, noting that when defense counsel is given notice of the contents of a jury note and knows the substance of the court’s intended response, counsel must object to preserve the claim for appellate review. The Court stated that while the initial withholding of information “may have been error, it was not a mode of proceedings error and the court later corrected itself, without objection or request for further instruction by either party.” The failure to object constituted a failure to preserve the issue for appeal.

  • People v. Ford, 11 N.Y.3d 875 (2008): Evaluating Sufficiency of Evidence Based on Jury Charge Absent Objection

    People v. Ford, 11 N.Y.3d 875 (2008)

    When a jury instruction is not objected to, the legal sufficiency of a conviction must be viewed in light of the charge as given, even if the charge incorrectly states the law; the appellate court must evaluate whether there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction under the erroneous jury charge.

    Summary

    Defendant Ford was convicted of first-degree robbery. On appeal, he argued insufficient evidence of “actual possession” of a dangerous instrument (knife) and erroneous denial of his severance motion. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reducing the first-degree robbery conviction to third-degree robbery, concluding that the evidence of actual possession was legally insufficient, even though the charge, as given, alerted the jury to the “actual possession” element. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the jury charge was not objected to, the legal sufficiency of the conviction must be viewed in light of that charge, and the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction under the given charge. The Court also rejected the severance claim.

    Facts

    Ford was indicted on robbery charges related to two successive robberies in elevators. Before trial, he unsuccessfully sought to sever the trials. At one of the robberies, Ford stated, “I got a knife,” while moving his hand toward his pants pocket.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Ford of two counts of first-degree robbery. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reducing the conviction for first-degree robbery to third-degree robbery. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted both the People and defendant leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for first-degree robbery, given the jury charge as given, even though that charge did not explicitly require a finding of “actual possession” of a dangerous instrument.
    2. Whether the trial court erroneously denied the defendant’s severance motion.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because there was no objection to the jury charge, the legal sufficiency of the conviction must be viewed in light of that charge, and the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant “used or threatened the immediate use” of a knife under the charge as given.
    2. No, because the defendant failed to establish good cause for severance, and the evidence as to the two crimes was presented separately and was readily capable of being segregated in the minds of the jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that the jury charge did not adequately convey the “actual possession” requirement because it did not use the term “actual possession” or otherwise communicate that requirement. The court distinguished its recent decision in People v. Jean-Baptiste, where the defendant’s motion to dismiss apprised the trial judge of the error in the charge, rendering an objection superfluous. Here, by contrast, the legal sufficiency objection was based on the perceived inadequacy of proof, not an interpretation of an element of the offense. Because the defense failed to object to the jury charge, the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction had to be evaluated in light of the charge as given. The Court found that the evidence, specifically Ford’s statement “I got a knife,” while simultaneously moving his hand toward his pants pocket, was sufficient to establish that Ford “used or threatened the immediate use” of a knife as the trial court charged. The Court emphasized that under CPL 200.20 (3)(a), severance was not warranted because there was no material variance in the quantity of proof for the separate incidents and the evidence of each was easily segregated by the jury.