New York Law Review

Tag: prescriptive easement

  • Spiegel v. Ferraro, 73 N.Y.2d 622 (1989): Extinguishment of Easement by Adverse Possession

    Spiegel v. Ferraro, 73 N.Y.2d 622 (1989)

    An easement, once definitively located and developed through use, can be extinguished by adverse possession without a prior demand for the removal of obstructions, provided the adverse use is exclusive, open, notoriously hostile, and continuous for the prescriptive period.

    Summary

    This case concerns the extinguishment of a granted easement by adverse possession. Spiegel sued to enjoin Ferraro’s tenant, Ernie’s Auto Body (Ernie’s), from obstructing an easement on Ferraro’s property that benefitted Spiegel’s land. Ernie’s had fenced off and used the easement for parking wrecked cars for over ten years. The Court of Appeals held that Ernie’s adverse use of the easement, which was open, notorious, exclusive, and continuous for more than ten years, extinguished the easement, even without a prior demand from Spiegel to remove the obstructions. The Court distinguished easements definitively located and used from ‘paper’ easements, where a demand might be required.

    Facts

    In 1954, the Masone brothers sold a parcel of land with a non-exclusive easement for access to Broadway. In 1970, Jerry Spiegel acquired this parcel along with the easement. In 1964, Frank Boni and Michael Pavone bought the servient parcel and later sold it to Nicholas and Stephan Ferraro in 1982. In 1966, Boni and Pavone leased the servient premises to Ernie’s Auto Body, Inc. Ernie’s erected gates, regraded and paved the easement, installed lights, used guard dogs, and parked wrecked cars on the easement, effectively blocking Spiegel’s access. Spiegel did not use the easement after Ernie’s tenancy began.

    Procedural History

    In 1977, Spiegel demanded Ernie’s remove the obstructions. In 1982, Spiegel sued to enjoin Ernie’s from obstructing the easement. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, finding the easement extinguished by Ernie’s adverse possession. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the prescriptive period did not begin to run until Spiegel demanded the easement be opened in 1977. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the Supreme Court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an easement that has been definitively located and developed through use must have a demand for removal of obstructions before it may be extinguished by adverse possession?

    Holding

    No, because where an easement has been definitively located and developed through use, there is no requirement that its owner demand the removal of obstructions blocking the easement before it may be extinguished by adverse possession.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that an easement created by grant can be extinguished by adverse possession if the use is adverse, under a claim of right, open and notorious, exclusive, and continuous for 10 years. The court distinguished this case from situations involving “paper” easements (easements not definitively located or used), where a demand to open the easement might be required before adverse possession can begin. Here, the easement was definitively located and had been used prior to Ernie’s obstruction. Ernie’s actions (erecting gates, parking cars, etc.) were sufficient to put Spiegel on notice of the adverse claim. The court emphasized that Ernie’s exclusive use of the easement, affirmed by lower courts and supported by the record, demonstrated a claim of right that was open and notoriously adverse to Spiegel’s interest for over 10 years. The court stated that “an easement may be lost by adverse possession if the owner or possessor of the servient estate claims to own it free from the private right of another, and excludes the owner of the easement, who acquiesces in the exclusion for [the prescriptive period]”. Finally, the Court stated that Ernie’s use of the easement was not an assertion of an interest hostile to its landlord. By statute such a use could not be deemed adverse (see, RPAPL 531). Rather, Ernie’s use is adverse only to plaintiff and that use satisfied the requirements of adverse possession and operated to extinguish that easement.

  • Di Leo v. Pecksto Holding Corp., 304 N.Y. 505 (1952): Prescriptive Easements and the Effect of Statutory Prohibition

    Di Leo v. Pecksto Holding Corp., 304 N.Y. 505 (1952)

    A statute prohibiting the presumption of a grant or justification of a prescriptive right based on the attachment of wires or cables to property precludes the establishment of a prescriptive easement for utility lines, even if the physical poles supporting the lines are located on the property.

    Summary

    Di Leo sued Pecksto Holding Corp. seeking to remove telegraph poles and wires from her property. Pecksto claimed a prescriptive easement, arguing it had maintained the lines for a sufficient period. Di Leo argued that Section 261 of the Real Property Law barred the acquisition of a prescriptive easement. The Court of Appeals held that Section 261 precluded Pecksto from claiming a prescriptive easement, affirming the lower court’s judgment in favor of Di Leo. The court reasoned that even though the statute specifically mentioned ‘wires’ and ‘cables’ rather than ‘poles’, the entire apparatus of poles and wires was covered by the statute’s intent, preventing any prescriptive right from arising.

    Facts

    From 1883 to 1925, a public street ran over property now owned by Di Leo. In 1883, Pecksto erected poles, wires, and related fixtures in the street to carry telegraph messages, without obtaining permission from the property owner. In 1925, the road was discontinued as a public highway, but the use of a portion of it over Di Leo’s property was never wholly discontinued. In 1931, Di Leo’s attorney notified Pecksto of the highway’s abandonment and demanded removal of the poles and wires.

    Procedural History

    Di Leo brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the rights of the parties. The trial court ruled in favor of Di Leo, finding that Section 261 of the Real Property Law barred Pecksto from acquiring a prescriptive easement. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the trial court’s decision. Pecksto appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Section 261 of the Real Property Law, which prohibits the presumption of a grant or prescriptive right for wires or cables attached to property, also applies to the poles and other equipment supporting those wires, thereby preventing the establishment of a prescriptive easement for the entire utility line.

    Holding

    Yes, because the wires are attached to the ground by the poles and other equipment, thereby bringing the whole equipment within the clearly indicated purpose of the statute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that Section 261 of the Real Property Law effectively barred Pecksto from acquiring a prescriptive easement. The court reasoned that although the statute specifically referred to “wire or cable,” the intent of the statute was to prevent the acquisition of rights based on the presence of such equipment on another’s property. The court dismissed Pecksto’s argument that the statute didn’t apply because it mentioned poles but not wires, calling the argument without force. The court stated, “Plaintiff has not confined the relief asked to removal of the poles, and how defendant would be benefited by a determination that it might leave its poles but not its wires is not indicated. The wires are attached to the ground by the poles and other equipment, thereby bringing the whole equipment within the clearly indicated purpose of the statute.” The court cited Eels v. American T. & T. Co., which held that erecting poles and stringing wires on a highway where the abutting owner owns the fee is unlawful. The court also referenced federal cases, including St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co. and Western Union Tel. Co. v. City of Richmond, which stated that the Post Roads Act does not grant telegraph companies the right to use private land without consent. The Court emphasized that the Post Roads Act is “permissive and the privilege granted by it does not carry the unrestricted right to appropriate the public property of a state. It is like any other franchise, to be exercised in subordination to public as to private rights.”

  • Wiseman v. Lucksinger, 84 N.Y. 31 (1881): Enforceability of Parol Agreements for Easements

    Wiseman v. Lucksinger, 84 N.Y. 31 (1881)

    An easement, which is an interest in land, requires a written conveyance (deed) or a legally sufficient substitute like prescription; a mere parol agreement or license, even with consideration, is generally revocable and does not create a permanent easement.

    Summary

    Wiseman sued Lucksinger to enforce an easement for a drain running through Lucksinger’s property. Wiseman claimed he purchased the right for $7 and enjoyed it for over 25 years until Lucksinger blocked the drain due to nuisance issues caused by Wiseman’s alterations. The court found no written conveyance existed, only a lost receipt. The Court of Appeals held that the oral agreement, even with consideration, was a mere revocable license, not an enforceable easement. Wiseman’s use was permissive, not adverse, precluding a prescriptive easement claim. Equity will not enforce a parol agreement absent clear terms, acts of part performance unequivocally related to a permanent easement, and circumstances making reliance on the agreement reasonable. Therefore, Lucksinger was within his rights to revoke the license.

    Facts

    • Wiseman and Lucksinger owned adjoining lots in Syracuse.
    • Lucksinger built a drain across his and Stern’s land to the street sewer.
    • Wiseman paid Lucksinger $7 for the right to connect his drain to Lucksinger’s drain.
    • Wiseman connected his drain and used it for 25 years.
    • Wiseman replaced his plank sewer with a larger tile sewer which, combined with changes to his privy vault, caused waste to flow back into Lucksinger’s basement.
    • Lucksinger cut off the connection to stop the nuisance.
    • No deed or written agreement for the easement existed, only a lost receipt for the $7 payment.

    Procedural History

    Wiseman sued Lucksinger in equity court seeking to restore his drainage rights and restrain Lucksinger from interference. The trial court ruled in favor of Wiseman, declaring an easement and enjoining Lucksinger. The General Term affirmed. Lucksinger appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a parol agreement supported by consideration can create an enforceable easement allowing Wiseman to drain his property through Lucksinger’s land in perpetuity.
    2. Whether Wiseman acquired a prescriptive easement based on 25 years of usage.

    Holding

    1. No, because an easement requires a written conveyance or a legally sufficient substitute; the parol agreement created a revocable license, not an easement.
    2. No, because Wiseman’s use was permissive and not adverse; therefore, no prescriptive right was established.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts, holding that the right to drain through Lucksinger’s land constituted an easement, which is an interest in land. The statute of frauds requires such interests to be created by a written conveyance. A parol agreement, even with consideration, constitutes a mere license, which is revocable at will. Citing Hewlins v. Shippam, the Court emphasized that an easement cannot be conferred except by deed.

    The court acknowledged that equity might enforce parol agreements in certain circumstances, but only where the contract is complete and sufficient, its terms are well-defined, and there are acts of part performance unequivocally related to the agreement. Here, the receipt was equivocal, and the circumstances did not suggest a permanent arrangement. The court noted the lack of specificity regarding the duration of the agreement and the heavy burden a perpetual easement would place on Lucksinger’s property.

    The Court distinguished the case from those where significant, permanent improvements were made in reliance on an agreement, creating an equitable estoppel. Wiseman’s temporary plank sewer was not a substantial enough improvement to justify equitable intervention.

    The Court also rejected Wiseman’s claim of a prescriptive easement because his use was permissive, not adverse. The initial agreement purchased permission for use. Quoting St. Vincent Orphan Asylum v. City of Troy, the court stated, “The occupation of a grantee of the fee is perhaps hostile to his grantor, but not so as to a licensee.” Permissive use cannot ripen into a prescriptive right.

    The court concluded that Lucksinger had merely exercised his legal rights and had not acted fraudulently. Therefore, the judgments were reversed, and a new trial was ordered.