New York Law Review

Tag: premises liability

  • Gordon v. American Museum of Natural History, 67 N.Y.2d 836 (1986): Establishing Constructive Notice in Premises Liability Cases

    Gordon v. American Museum of Natural History, 67 N.Y.2d 836 (1986)

    To establish constructive notice in a premises liability case, the defect must be visible, apparent, and exist for a sufficient length of time prior to the accident to permit the defendant’s employees to discover and remedy it.

    Summary

    The plaintiff, Gordon, sued the American Museum of Natural History for injuries sustained after slipping on a piece of paper on the museum’s steps. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, dismissing the complaint because the plaintiff failed to prove that the museum had either actual or constructive notice of the paper. The court held that the mere presence of the paper, without evidence of how long it had been there or its condition suggesting prolonged existence, was insufficient to establish constructive notice. This case underscores the evidentiary burden on plaintiffs in premises liability cases to demonstrate that a defendant had adequate opportunity to discover and remedy a dangerous condition.

    Facts

    Gordon slipped and fell on the front entrance steps of the American Museum of Natural History. He testified that he slipped on the third step from the top and noticed a piece of white, waxy paper near his foot while falling. He alleged the paper came from a concession stand on the plaza and that the museum was negligent for failing to remove it.

    Procedural History

    The case was tried before a jury, which found the museum liable. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. The Court of Appeals granted the museum leave to appeal, certifying the question of whether the Appellate Division’s order was properly made.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant had either actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition (the piece of paper) that caused the plaintiff’s fall.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiff failed to provide evidence that the defendant had actual notice of the paper. Further, the plaintiff did not show that the paper was visible and apparent and existed long enough for the defendant’s employees to discover and remedy it, which is necessary to prove constructive notice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found no evidence that the museum had actual notice of the paper. To establish constructive notice, the court reiterated the standard: “a defect must be visible and apparent and it must exist for a sufficient length of time prior to the accident to permit defendant’s employees to discover and remedy it.” The court emphasized the absence of evidence indicating how long the paper had been on the steps. The plaintiff didn’t describe the paper as dirty or worn, which could have suggested it had been there for a while. The court concluded that the paper could have been deposited just moments before the accident, making any other conclusion speculative. The court distinguished this case from others where constructive notice was established through additional evidence. The court stated that general awareness of potential litter or other papers in the area was insufficient to establish constructive notice of the specific paper the plaintiff fell on. The defect in the plaintiff’s case was the lack of evidence establishing constructive notice of the particular condition that caused the fall, not the inability to prove causation. As the court of appeals stated, a finding of liability based on the submitted evidence would be pure speculation.

  • Schneider v. Montefiore Hospital, 65 N.Y.2d 729 (1985): Circumstantial Evidence and Negligence

    Schneider v. Montefiore Hospital, 65 N.Y.2d 729 (1985)

    A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of negligence based on circumstantial evidence by showing facts from which the defendant’s negligence and the causation of the accident can be reasonably inferred; the plaintiff’s proof need not exclude every other possible cause, but must render other causes sufficiently remote to allow the jury to reach a verdict based on logical inferences rather than speculation.

    Summary

    In this case, the New York Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff presented enough circumstantial evidence to establish a prima facie case of negligence against the hospital. The plaintiff’s decedent, an elderly patient, fell out of bed. Hospital rules mandated that bed rails be raised for patients over 70. The plaintiff presented evidence suggesting a hospital staff member lowered the rails, leading to the fall. The court emphasized that the plaintiff wasn’t required to eliminate all other possible causes, only to make them sufficiently remote to allow a reasonable inference of negligence. The order of the Appellate Division was reversed, and a new trial was granted.

    Facts

    The plaintiff’s decedent was an elderly patient at Montefiore Hospital. The hospital had a rule requiring side rails on the beds of patients over 70 years of age to be kept raised at all times.
    The patient was found on the floor, having fallen out of bed. She remembered only rolling over before falling.
    The patient was weak, elderly, and required assistance to get out of bed.
    The bed rail on the side of the bed where the patient fell was lowered.
    The spring latch to lower the bedrail was located at the foot of the bed.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially heard the case. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish a prima facie case of negligence against the hospital, considering the hospital’s rule regarding bed rails and the patient’s condition.
    Whether the plaintiff’s proof must exclude every other possible cause of the accident to establish a prima facie case.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plaintiff presented facts and conditions from which the negligence of the hospital and the causation of the accident could be reasonably inferred.
    No, because the plaintiff’s proof must render other causes sufficiently remote or technical to enable the jury to reach its verdict based on logical inferences rather than speculation. As the court stated, “The law does not require that plaintiff’s proof ‘positively exclude every other possible cause’ of the accident but defendant’s negligence.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the plaintiff established a prima facie case by demonstrating the hospital’s rule about bed rails for elderly patients and presenting evidence suggesting a staff member, rather than the patient, lowered the rails. The court emphasized that direct evidence of negligence isn’t required; circumstantial evidence is sufficient if it allows a reasonable inference of negligence.

    The court applied the principle that the plaintiff’s proof doesn’t need to eliminate every other possible cause, only to make them sufficiently remote. “Rather, her proof must render those other causes sufficiently ‘remote’ or ‘technical’ to enable the jury to reach its verdict based not upon speculation, but upon the logical inferences to be drawn from the evidence”.

    The court considered the patient’s deteriorated physical condition and the location and difficulty of releasing the bed rail’s spring latch, suggesting she was unable to lower the rail herself. This supported the inference that a hospital staff member was responsible.

    The court distinguished this case from situations where the cause of the injury is purely speculative. Here, the hospital’s rule, the patient’s condition, and the state of the bed rail provided a logical basis for inferring negligence. This case reinforces the principle that juries can rely on common sense and logical inferences when evaluating circumstantial evidence in negligence cases.

  • Stone v. Williams, 64 N.Y.2d 642 (1984): Proximate Cause and Duty of Care on Business Premises

    Stone v. Williams, 64 N.Y.2d 642 (1984)

    A business owner’s duty to maintain a safe premises does not extend to injuries caused by a sudden, unforeseen malfunction of a customer’s vehicle where the business’s negligence, if any, is too attenuated from the ultimate injury.

    Summary

    Robert Stone was injured at a Merit gas station when struck by a car driven by Kerry Williams. Williams’ car lurched backward due to a stuck accelerator pedal. Stone sued Williams, the car’s owner (Stevens), and Merit. The jury found Williams/Stevens 80% liable and Merit 20% liable. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment against Merit, finding no duty was breached, and any negligence was not the proximate cause of Stone’s injuries. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the malfunction of Williams’ accelerator was the proximate cause of the injury, and any negligence by Merit was too attenuated to establish liability.

    Facts

    Robert Stone was getting gas at a busy Merit service station. After filling his tank, he checked the gas cap at the rear of his car. Kerry Williams pulled into the station intending to get gas behind Stone. Unable to reach the pump, Williams attempted a three-point turn. He then tried to back up slightly. Williams testified the accelerator pedal got stuck due to a loose floor mat, causing the car to lurch backward suddenly, striking Stone.

    Procedural History

    Stone and his wife sued Williams, Stevens (the car’s owner), and Merit. The trial court jury found Williams and Stevens 80% liable and Merit 20% liable, awarding Stone $200,000 and his wife $5,000. The Appellate Division reversed as to Merit, holding Merit owed no duty and that the accident was caused by the accelerator malfunction. Williams, Stevens, and the Stones appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Merit had a duty to control the movement of automobiles on its premises to prevent injuries to patrons.

    Whether any breach of such a duty by Merit was the proximate cause of Stone’s injuries, considering the intervening malfunction of Williams’ accelerator pedal.

    Holding

    No, even if such a duty existed (which the court did not decide), because the malfunction of Williams’ accelerator pedal was the proximate cause of Stone’s injuries, and any negligence by Merit was too attenuated.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the accident was primarily caused by the malfunction of Williams’ accelerator pedal, an unforeseen event. It distinguished the case from Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., where a proper barricade could have prevented the injury. Here, safety measures by Merit would not have prevented the sticking accelerator. The court cited Margolin v. Friedman, where a car wash was not liable when a driver negligently stepped on the accelerator instead of the brake. The court stated, “the accident happened as a result of the driver’s failure to control his vehicle. The premises ‘merely furnished the condition or occasion for the occurrence of the event rather than [being] one of its causes’”. The court found that the location of the accident on Merit’s property alone was insufficient to establish liability. The court emphasized that the failure of the accelerator to function properly so attenuated Merit’s negligence (if any) from the ultimate injury that responsibility for the injury may not be attributed to it. The court concluded that because Merit was not liable to Stone, cross-claims for indemnification and contribution asserted against Merit by Williams and Stevens also failed.

  • Warren v. State of New York, 58 N.Y.2d 1107 (1983): Duty to Warn and Notice of Dangerous Conditions on Public Land

    Warren v. State of New York, 58 N.Y.2d 1107 (1983)

    A property owner’s duty to warn of a dangerous condition requires notice of both the condition itself and the unreasonable risk it presents; notice cannot be inferred solely from the existence of a natural and shifting condition.

    Summary

    Warren sued the State of New York after sustaining injuries from striking a sandbar while swimming at Jones Beach. Warren argued the state had a duty to warn swimmers about the dangerous sandbars. The Court of Claims initially found the state liable, citing prior similar accidents. The Appellate Division reversed, finding no duty to warn due to the natural and transient nature of sandbars. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the state lacked sufficient notice of the dangerous condition to warrant a duty to warn, considering the beach’s heavy usage and the infrequency of similar incidents.

    Facts

    On August 4, 1976, Warren was swimming at Jones Beach. He had frequented this beach numerous times. While wading into waist-deep water, he executed a surface dive and struck his head on a sandbar, which was not visible from the surface. He suffered serious, permanent injuries. The sand bar activity was unusual in that area, caused by a nearby man-made jetty.

    Procedural History

    Warren sued the State of New York in the Court of Claims. The Court of Claims found the state liable and entered judgment for the plaintiff, allocating 50% of the responsibility to the plaintiff’s own culpable conduct. The Appellate Division reversed the Court of Claims’ decision and dismissed the complaint, finding no duty to warn. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State of New York had a duty to warn swimmers of the presence of sandbars at Jones Beach.

    Holding

    No, because the State did not have sufficient notice of the specific dangerous condition to create a duty to warn.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal, holding that the State did not have a duty to warn. The court reasoned that, to be liable for failure to warn, a property owner must have notice of the specific dangerous condition and the unreasonable risk it creates. The court determined that the State could not reasonably anticipate danger to swimmers simply from the existence of natural, shifting sandbars. The court emphasized the natural and highly transitory character of sand bars, making warnings impractical. The court noted that the beach was visited by millions of bathers, and only three similar incidents had occurred in the preceding 24 years. This was insufficient to put the State on notice of a specific danger. The Court distinguished this from cases where the state had notice of a specific, persistent danger. The court stated, “defendant could not anticipate a danger to swimmers simply from the existence of the natural, shifting condition of sand bars in the ocean (cf. Preston v State of New York, 59 NY2d 997) and, on a beach visited by millions of bathers, defendant was not placed on notice of a danger by virtue of three similar incidents over the preceding 24 years.” Because the court found no duty to warn existed, the court did not address the issue of causation.

  • Clapman v. New York Yankees, 63 N.Y.2d 669 (1984): Baseball Spectator’s Limited Right to Protection from Foul Balls

    Clapman v. New York Yankees, 63 N.Y.2d 669 (1984)

    Owners of baseball stadiums have a duty to provide adequately screened seating in the most dangerous areas (behind home plate) and a sufficient number of seats to meet reasonable demand, but they are not insurers of spectator safety from foul balls.

    Summary

    David Clapman, injured by a foul ball at Yankee Stadium, sued the stadium owner, operator, architect, and vendor concessionaire, alleging negligence in failing to extend protective screening, providing insufficient screened seating, and allowing vendors to obstruct views. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ grant of summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the stadium had met its duty by providing adequate screening behind home plate and a sufficient number of seats. The court also found that the plaintiff’s claim of obstructed view was contradicted by his own testimony and that the stadium had no duty to prevent vendors from briefly interfering with views.

    Facts

    David Clapman was seated in the box seat area behind the Yankee dugout at Yankee Stadium during a baseball game. He was struck by a foul ball and sustained personal injuries. Clapman alleged his view was obstructed by vendors moving in the aisles at the time he was struck.

    Procedural History

    Clapman and his wife sued the stadium owner, its lessee and operator, its architect, and its vending concessionaire. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The lower courts granted the motions for summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the respondents were negligent in not extending the protective screen behind home plate to the area where Clapman was seated?
    2. Whether the respondents were negligent in providing insufficient seating behind the existing screen?
    3. Whether the respondents were negligent in allowing Clapman’s view of the play to be obstructed by vendors who moved about the aisles during the game?

    Holding

    1. No, because the stadium owner has a duty to provide adequate screening in the most dangerous areas, and appellants failed to raise an issue of material fact that the stadium failed to do so.
    2. No, because the stadium owner has a duty to provide a sufficient number of seats behind the screen to accommodate those who may reasonably be expected to desire such seating, and appellants failed to raise an issue of material fact that the stadium failed to do so.
    3. No, because given the location of the vendors and Clapman’s seat, respondents had no duty to ensure that vendors moving about in the stadium did not interfere with Clapman’s view.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the principles established in Davidoff v. Metropolitan Baseball Club and Akins v. Glens Falls City School Dist.. These cases articulate that stadium owners must provide adequate protection in areas where the danger of being hit by projectiles is greatest, specifically behind home plate. The court reasoned that the stadium had met this duty by providing a screen in that high-risk area and providing sufficient seating behind the screen for spectators who wished to be protected. The court also noted that Clapman’s own deposition testimony contradicted his claim that vendors obstructed his view of the ball. The court emphasized that stadium owners are not insurers of spectator safety. The court stated, “Appellants failed to raise any issue of material fact concerning a failure to erect a screen providing adequate protection in the area behind home plate, where the danger of being hit by foul balls is greatest, or to provide sufficient seats behind the screen to accommodate as many spectators as reasonably may be expected to desire such seating. In such circumstances there is no breach of duty by respondents.”

  • Miller v. State of New York, 62 N.Y.2d 506 (1984): Landlord’s Duty to Maintain Minimal Security Measures

    62 N.Y.2d 506 (1984)

    When the State acts as a landlord, it has a duty to maintain minimal security measures related to a specific building, like keeping outer doors locked, when there is a foreseeable risk of criminal intrusion.

    Summary

    Madelyn Miller, a SUNY Stony Brook student, was raped in her dormitory after her assailant entered through unlocked doors. She sued the State, alleging negligence in its capacity as a landlord for failing to maintain adequate security. The Court of Claims ruled in her favor, but the Appellate Division reversed, viewing the claim as one for inadequate police protection. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the State, acting as a landlord, has a duty to maintain minimal security measures in the face of foreseeable criminal intrusion, and the failure to lock the outer doors was a breach of that duty and a proximate cause of Miller’s injuries.

    Facts

    Madelyn Miller, a student at SUNY Stony Brook, was attacked and raped in her dormitory. The assailant gained entry through unlocked outer doors. Prior incidents, including reports of strangers in the dorm and nearby crimes, indicated a risk of criminal activity. Despite these reports and the presence of locking mechanisms, dormitory doors remained unlocked at all times. Miller herself had complained about non-residents loitering in the dorm.

    Procedural History

    Miller sued the State in the Court of Claims, which found the State liable as a landlord for failing to protect tenants from foreseeable criminal assaults. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the claim was essentially for inadequate police protection, for which no special relationship existed. Miller appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State, acting as a landlord of a state-operated college dormitory, has a duty to maintain minimal security measures, such as keeping outer doors locked, to protect tenants from foreseeable criminal intrusion.

    Holding

    Yes, because when the State acts in a proprietary capacity as a landlord, it is subject to the same principles of tort law as a private landlord, and this includes a duty to maintain minimal security measures in the face of foreseeable criminal intrusion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished between the State’s governmental function of providing police protection and its proprietary function as a landlord. While the State is generally immune from negligence claims arising from governmental functions unless a special relationship exists, it is subject to the same tort law principles as private landlords when acting in a proprietary capacity. The court stated, “As a landowner, the State ‘”must act as a reasonable [person] in maintaining his property in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk”‘” (quoting Preston v State of New York, 59 N.Y.2d 997, 998). The specific act complained of – failing to lock the outer doors – fell within the State’s proprietary function as a landlord. The court found sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that this failure was a breach of duty and a proximate cause of Miller’s rape. The Court emphasized that this ruling was about minimal security measures related to the specific building and didn’t extend to broader campus security measures that would fall under the State’s police protection capacity. Judge Kaye, in concurrence, emphasized the ruling was specific to the State’s policy of *always* leaving the doors unlocked despite reported crime, stopping short of requiring all doors to always be locked.

  • Sega v. State, 60 N.Y.2d 985 (1983): State’s Duty to Maintain Safe Recreational Areas

    Sega v. State, 60 N.Y.2d 985 (1983)

    When a state invites the public to use its land for recreational purposes, it has a duty to maintain the property in a reasonably safe condition or to warn users of potential hazards.

    Summary

    Claimant Sega was injured while wading in a lagoon specifically reserved for swimming on state-owned land. He tripped on a rusty, jagged pipe embedded in concrete just below the water’s surface. The Court of Appeals held that the State had a duty to either inspect and remove hazards from the swimming area or to warn swimmers of potential dangers. Because the State had neither inspected the lagoon nor posted warning signs, and the hazard had been present for at least four years, the court found the State liable for Sega’s injuries. This case highlights the balance between the State’s responsibility and the public’s assumption of risk in recreational settings.

    Facts

    The State owned an island with an adjacent lagoon specifically reserved for swimming. The State provided amenities such as picnic tables, barbecue pits, and outhouses on the beach. A rusty, jagged pipe embedded in concrete was located in the lagoon, rising to within two inches of the water’s surface. The pipe had been in this condition for at least four years. Claimant Sega, a 10-year-old boy, tripped on the pipe while wading in the lagoon and cut his leg.

    Procedural History

    Sega sued the State in the Court of Claims. The Court of Claims initially found the State liable. The Appellate Division reversed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the interlocutory judgment of the Court of Claims, finding the State liable.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State, by inviting the public to swim in a designated area, had a duty to maintain the area in a reasonably safe condition or to warn users of potential hazards.

    Holding

    Yes, because the State, as a landowner, must act as a reasonable person in maintaining its property in a reasonably safe condition, especially when inviting the public for recreational use. This includes either inspecting for and removing hazards or providing adequate warnings.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the State, having waived its sovereign immunity, is subject to the same liability rules as private citizens. Quoting Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241, the court stated that a landowner “‘must act as a reasonable man in maintaining his property in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk.’” Because the State specifically reserved the lagoon for swimming and provided amenities, it invited the public to use the area. Given the rusty pipe’s presence for at least four years, the State had a duty to inspect and remove hazards or warn swimmers of the risk. The Court emphasized that “inviting the public to swim there does” create a duty, whereas “mere ownership does not give rise to the duty”. The Court distinguished this situation from allowing swimming in primitive areas where users would not expect the State to have removed all hazards. The court also noted that the state is not “an insurer, liable for every injury no matter the nature of the hazard or how long it has been in place. There must be some proof that the potential danger reasonably could have been neutralized and that its existence was or should have been discovered by the State.” Here, the hazard was foreseeable, and the State failed to take reasonable precautions, making it liable for the claimant’s injuries. No dissenting or concurring opinions were mentioned.

  • Bell v. Board of Education of the City of Buffalo, 57 N.Y.2d 1002 (1982): Liability for Unsecured Dangerous Chemicals on School Property

    Bell v. Board of Education of the City of Buffalo, 57 N.Y.2d 1002 (1982)

    A school that negligently fails to secure dangerous chemicals from unsupervised access by children will not be relieved of liability when an injury occurs and it is reasonably foreseeable that the chemicals might be stolen by children.

    Summary

    This case addresses the liability of a school board for injuries sustained by a child who found and played with unsecured chemicals on school grounds. Two student employees stole magnesium powder and potassium nitrate from an unlocked chemistry lab and storeroom. The infant plaintiff, while playing on the school grounds during the summer, found the chemicals, mistook them for sand, and was severely burned when the chemicals exploded. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the jury’s verdict finding the board of education liable, holding that the school had a duty to exercise reasonable care in maintaining its property, and the failure to secure dangerous chemicals was a breach of that duty and the theft of the chemicals was a foreseeable intervening act.

    Facts

    Two 15-year-old student employees, participating in a summer youth program at Kensington High School, stole magnesium powder and potassium nitrate from an unlocked chemistry lab and storeroom while adult supervisors were on a coffee break. The students dropped the chemicals in plastic bags into bushes outside the school, intending to retrieve them later. The eight-year-old infant plaintiff, who regularly played on the school grounds, found the chemicals, believed them to be sand, and began playing with them and matches, causing an explosion that severely burned him.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs brought a negligence action against the Board of Education. A jury found the board liable for the infant plaintiff’s injuries. The Appellate Division affirmed the jury’s verdict. The Board of Education appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Board of Education had a duty to secure dangerous chemicals stored on school premises to prevent access by children?

    Whether the Board breached that duty by failing to adequately supervise student employees and secure the chemicals?

    Whether the Board’s breach of duty proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries, considering the intervening act of the student employees stealing the chemicals?

    Holding

    Yes, the Board had a duty to secure the chemicals because the presence of children on the school grounds was foreseeable, and the chemicals posed a significant risk of harm.

    Yes, the Board breached its duty because it failed to adequately supervise its student employees and secure the dangerous chemicals, which was a violation of the school’s safety regulations.

    Yes, the Board’s breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries because the theft of the chemicals by the student employees was a foreseeable consequence of the Board’s negligence in failing to secure them.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that a landowner has a duty to exercise reasonable care in maintaining its property in a safe condition, considering the likelihood of injury, the severity of potential injuries, the burden on the landowner to avoid the risk, and the foreseeability of a potential plaintiff’s presence on the property. The court found that the presence of children on the school grounds was foreseeable. The court emphasized that the school maintained a store of dangerous chemicals, recognized the potential safety problem, and had regulations requiring the chemicals to be secured. The court stated, “Reasonable care under the circumstances required the securing of the dangerous chemicals in such a way that their unsupervised access could not be readily obtained by children.”

    The court addressed the Board’s argument that the student employees’ theft was an intervening cause, stating, “That doctrine has no application when the intentional or criminal intervention of a third party or parties is reasonably foreseeable.” The court emphasized that the Board’s duty was to secure the chemicals from unsupervised access, and any breach leading to injury would involve an intentional taking of the chemicals. The court quoted Derdiarian v Felix Contr. Co., 51 NY2d 308, 315 stating, “plaintiff must show that defendant’s negligence was a substantial cause of the events which produced the injury.” Since the jury implicitly found the theft foreseeable, and there was sufficient evidence to support that finding, the Board was not relieved of liability.

  • Trimarco v. Klein, 56 N.Y.2d 98 (1982): Admissibility of Custom and Usage Evidence in Negligence Claims

    Trimarco v. Klein, 56 N.Y.2d 98 (1982)

    Evidence of custom and usage within a particular industry, while not dispositive, is admissible and relevant to establish the standard of reasonable care in a negligence action.

    Summary

    In a negligence suit, the plaintiff, Vincent Trimarco, sought damages for injuries sustained when he fell through a glass shower door in his apartment building. Trimarco argued the landlord was negligent for failing to replace the ordinary glass with shatterproof glass, a practice allegedly customary in the industry at the time of the accident. The New York Court of Appeals held that while custom and usage evidence is admissible to demonstrate the standard of care, it is not conclusive. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s dismissal of the complaint and ordered a new trial due to the improper admission of a statute that did not apply to the existing installation, while acknowledging the admissibility of custom and usage evidence.

    Facts

    Vincent Trimarco, a tenant in a multiple dwelling, was injured when he fell through the glass enclosure door of his bathtub in July 1976. The door was made of ordinary, non-shatterproof glass. Trimarco presented evidence that since the early 1950s, shatterproof glazing materials for bathroom enclosures had become a common practice. He also showed bulletins from safety organizations warning against plain glass in “hazardous locations” like bathtub enclosures. The landlord’s managing agent admitted that since 1965, it was customary to use safety glass or plastic for shower enclosures when replacing or installing new doors.

    Procedural History

    The trial court entered judgment for Trimarco. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the complaint, finding no duty to replace the glass without prior notice of danger. Justice Sandler dissented, finding a question of fact for the jury. Justice Fein concurred in part and dissented in part, finding ample evidence of custom and usage but believing the admission of a statute regarding safety glazing was misleading. The New York Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether evidence of custom and usage is admissible to establish the standard of care in a negligence action.
    2. Whether the admission of sections of the General Business Law regarding safety glazing, which were not applicable to the existing installation, was reversible error.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because evidence of custom and usage within a particular industry can demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct fell below the required standard of reasonable care.
    2. Yes, because the statute applied only to new installations, and its admission into evidence prejudiced the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that evidence of custom and usage is admissible to establish the standard of care in a negligence action. The court cited Garthe v. Ruppert, 264 N.Y. 290, 296, stating that “when certain dangers have been removed by a customary way of doing things safely, this custom may be proved to show that [the one charged with the dereliction] has fallen below the required standard.” The court noted that custom and usage reflects the judgment, experience, and conduct of many and bears directly on feasibility and practicality of precautions. The court emphasized, however, that custom and usage is not a conclusive test of negligence; the jury must be satisfied with its reasonableness. As stated in Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470, “[w]hat usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not.” The court found that the trial court erred in admitting sections of the General Business Law requiring safety glazing because the statute applied only to new installations after its effective date and did not apply to the existing glass door in Trimarco’s apartment. The court concluded that introducing the statute prejudiced the defendant. While the court acknowledged the relevance of the statute in supporting the existence of a developing custom to use safety glass, it determined that the prejudice to the defendants outweighed its probative value. Therefore, the court ordered a new trial, excluding the improperly admitted statutory evidence, but upheld the admissibility of other evidence pertaining to custom and usage.

  • Akins v. Glens Falls City School District, 53 N.Y.2d 325 (1981): Extent of Baseball Field Owner’s Duty to Protect Spectators

    Akins v. Glens Falls City School District, 53 N.Y.2d 325 (1981)

    The owner of a baseball field fulfills its duty of reasonable care to spectators by providing screening for the area behind home plate that is sufficient to protect as many spectators as may reasonably be expected to desire such seating during an ordinary game.

    Summary

    The plaintiff, while watching a high school baseball game from an unscreened area along the third base line, was struck by a foul ball and injured. She sued the school district, alleging negligence for failing to provide adequate screening. The New York Court of Appeals reversed a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the school district fulfilled its duty of care by providing adequate screening behind home plate, the area of greatest danger. The court emphasized that a baseball field owner is not an insurer of spectator safety but must exercise reasonable care, and that providing complete screening of the entire field is not required.

    Facts

    The plaintiff attended a high school baseball game at a field owned by the defendant school district. The field had a backstop 24 feet high and 50 feet wide behind home plate. Two three-foot chain link fences ran along the base lines from the backstop. The plaintiff chose to stand behind the three-foot fence along the third base line, approximately 60 feet from home plate. She was struck in the eye by a foul ball about ten minutes after arriving, suffering serious injury.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued the school district for negligence. The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict finding the school district 65% at fault and the plaintiff 35% at fault. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and dismissed the complaint, holding that the school district had fulfilled its duty of care as a matter of law.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the owner of a baseball field is liable for injuries sustained by a spectator struck by a foul ball while standing in an unscreened section of the field, when the owner has provided protective screening for the area behind home plate.

    Holding

    No, because the proprietor of a baseball park need only provide screening for the area of the field behind home plate where the danger of being struck by a ball is the greatest, and that screening must be sufficient to provide adequate protection for as many spectators as may reasonably be expected to desire such seating in the course of an ordinary game.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court stated that a baseball field owner is not an insurer of spectator safety but must exercise “reasonable care under the circumstances.” It acknowledged that many spectators prefer unobstructed views and that owners have a legitimate interest in catering to these preferences. The court adopted the majority rule that an owner must screen the most dangerous section of the field (behind home plate) and provide sufficient screening for those reasonably anticipated to desire protected seats. The court emphasized the practical realities of the sport, stating, “many spectators attending such exhibitions desire to watch the contest taking place on the playing field without having their view obstructed or obscured by a fence or a protective net.” The court found that the school district provided adequate protection behind home plate, and thus could not be liable for failing to provide additional screening along the baselines. The Court distinguished this situation from cases where the adequacy of the screening behind home plate is in question. The court emphasized that it must make a threshold determination of whether the plaintiff has presented adequate evidence to support a favorable jury verdict, and found that the school district had fulfilled its duty of reasonable care as a matter of law. As stated in the opinion, “where a proprietor of a ball park furnishes screening for the area of the field behind home plate where the danger of being struck by a ball is the greatest and that screening is of sufficient extent to provide adequate protection for as many spectators as may reasonably be expected to desire such seating in the course of an ordinary game, the proprietor fulfills the duty of care imposed by law and, therefore, cannot be liable in negligence.”