New York Law Review

Tag: premises liability

  • Pink v. Rome Youth Hockey Ass’n, Inc., 27 N.Y.3d 995 (2016): Duty of Care and Foreseeable Criminal Conduct on Premises

    <strong><em>Pink v. Rome Youth Hockey Ass'n, Inc.</em>, 27 N.Y.3d 995 (2016)</em></strong></p>

    A premises owner or lessee’s duty to control the conduct of third persons on their property and prevent foreseeable criminal acts does not extend to unforeseeable assaults, even with the existence of a “zero tolerance” policy.

    <strong>Summary</strong></p>

    Raymond Pink was injured in an assault following a youth hockey game. Pink sued the Rome Youth Hockey Association, alleging negligence for failing to prevent the assault. The New York Court of Appeals held that the hockey association was not liable because the assault was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the events at the game. The court emphasized that while premises owners have a duty to protect against foreseeable criminal conduct, this duty is not triggered when the specific criminal act is not reasonably predictable based on prior experience or the specific circumstances of the situation. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, granting summary judgment to the defendant.

    <strong>Facts</strong></p>

    The Rome Youth Hockey Association (defendant) rented an arena for a youth hockey tournament. During a game, there were on-ice fights and verbal altercations among spectators. After the game ended, a fight broke out among spectators, and Matthew Ricci struck Raymond Pink, causing a head injury. Ricci pleaded guilty to assault. Pink sued the hockey association, alleging the association was negligent in failing to enforce USA Hockey’s “Zero Tolerance” policy and prevent the assault. The policy required officials to remove spectators using vulgar language or threatening physical violence.

    The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, granting summary judgment in favor of the Whitestown Youth Hockey Association (WYHA). The Appellate Division affirmed the decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted the defendant leave to appeal, certifying the question of whether the denial of summary judgment was proper. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Whether the Rome Youth Hockey Association owed a duty to protect Pink from the assault that occurred after the hockey game.

    Yes, because the criminal assault on Pink was not a reasonably foreseeable result of any failure to take preventive measures.

    The court began by restating the established rule that landowners have a duty to control the conduct of third persons on their premises when they can control such persons and are aware of the need for such control. This includes minimizing foreseeable dangers, including foreseeable criminal conduct. However, the court emphasized that “foreseeability and duty are not identical concepts.” Foreseeability determines the scope of the duty once the duty is found to exist. The scope of the duty is “limited to risks of harm that are reasonably foreseeable.” In this case, the court found that the assault was not reasonably foreseeable because there was no history of similar incidents, and the actions of the fans, though inappropriate, did not create a risk that failure to eject any specific spectator would lead to a criminal assault. The court also noted that violating an organization’s internal rules is not negligence in itself and that the organization’s policy did not create an awareness of the likelihood of the criminal assault. As the court stated: “Defendant was entitled to summary judgment. On this record, the criminal assault on plaintiff was not a reasonably foreseeable result of any failure to take preventive measures.”

    This case emphasizes that premises liability for criminal acts requires a showing of reasonable foreseeability. Attorneys should focus on demonstrating that a particular criminal act was predictable based on past experience or specific circumstances. A premises owner’s internal policies, like the “zero tolerance” policy here, may be relevant but are not dispositive in establishing the scope of duty. A premises owner’s mere awareness of general incidents nationwide does not establish foreseeability. Further, the case reinforces that not every injury is compensable, and courts must consider the limits of the duty to prevent harm, especially where criminal acts are involved. This decision suggests that premises owners should not be held liable for unforeseeable violent acts, even when they have implemented safety measures. Subsequent cases will likely look to this decision for the definition of foreseeability in similar circumstances.

  • Custodi v. Town of Amherst, 20 N.Y.3d 83 (2012): Primary Assumption of Risk Limited to Sponsored or Designated Venues

    Custodi v. Town of Amherst, 20 N.Y.3d 83 (2012)

    The doctrine of primary assumption of the risk, which can negate a defendant’s duty of care, is generally limited to sporting events, sponsored athletic or recreational activities, or activities at designated venues.

    Summary

    Robin Custodi was injured while rollerblading when she fell after her skate struck a two-inch height differential where a driveway met a drainage culvert. She sued the homeowners, alleging negligence. The New York Court of Appeals held that the primary assumption of risk doctrine did not apply because Custodi was not engaged in a sporting event, sponsored activity, or using a designated venue. The court emphasized the need to narrowly circumscribe the assumption of risk doctrine to avoid undermining comparative fault principles. The decision clarifies that landowners owe a general duty of care to maintain their premises in a reasonably safe condition for non-pedestrians like rollerbladers, absent specific circumstances invoking assumption of risk.

    Facts

    Robin Custodi, an experienced rollerblader, was rollerblading in her residential neighborhood. She navigated around a truck blocking the street by skating onto a driveway entrance to reach the sidewalk. She then attempted to re-enter the street using the Muffoletto’s driveway. As she neared the end of the driveway, her skate allegedly struck a two-inch height differential where the driveway met a drainage culvert, causing her to fall and break her hip.

    Procedural History

    Custodi sued the homeowners (Muffolettos) for negligence. The Supreme Court granted the homeowner’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint based on assumption of risk. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the complaint, finding that assumption of risk did not apply and that there was a triable issue of fact regarding proximate cause. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk applies to bar a negligence claim where the plaintiff was injured while rollerblading on a residential driveway and the injury was allegedly caused by a height differential between the driveway and a drainage culvert.

    Holding

    No, because the primary assumption of the risk doctrine is generally limited to sporting events, sponsored athletic or recreational activities, or athletic and recreational pursuits that take place at designated venues.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analyzed the application of the assumption of risk doctrine in light of CPLR 1411, which established comparative negligence. The Court acknowledged that a limited form of assumption of risk, “primary” assumption of risk, survived CPLR 1411. This doctrine operates by negating the defendant’s duty of care to the plaintiff. However, the Court emphasized that the doctrine should be narrowly applied. The Court noted that prior cases applying assumption of risk involved sporting events or recreational activities sponsored or supported by the defendant, or occurring at a designated athletic or recreational venue. Citing Trupia v. Lake George Cent. School Dist., the Court stated that assumption of the risk “must be closely circumscribed if it is not seriously to undermine and displace the principles of comparative causation” (14 NY3d at 395). Extending the doctrine to injuries on streets and sidewalks would unduly diminish the duty of landowners to maintain their premises in a reasonably safe condition. The Court distinguished the case from those involving designated recreational venues, emphasizing that the plaintiff was simply rollerblading in her neighborhood. The court stated, “As a general rule, application of assumption of the risk should be limited to cases appropriate for absolution of duty, such as personal injury claims arising from sporting events, sponsored athletic and recreative activities, or athletic and recreational pursuits that take place at designated venues.” The Court found it unnecessary to decide if any other exceptions existed. The Court emphasized that the defendants did not argue that their duty did not extend to altering the height differential, thus the negligence issue remained for litigation.

  • Gronski v. County of Monroe, 18 N.Y.3d 374 (2011): Landowner Liability When Control Is Shared

    18 N.Y.3d 374 (2011)

    A landowner’s duty to maintain property in a reasonably safe condition extends to situations where the landowner retains or exercises control over the property, even when an independent contractor is also responsible for operations.

    Summary

    John Gronski, an employee of Metro Waste, was injured at a recycling center owned by Monroe County but operated by Metro Waste. A bale of paper fell on him due to allegedly improper stacking. Gronski sued the County, arguing negligence. The County moved for summary judgment, claiming it relinquished control to Metro Waste. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ grant of summary judgment, holding that a question of fact existed regarding the County’s control over the facility, based on the agreement between the County and Metro Waste and the County’s actual conduct. The County’s retained rights and visible presence raised a triable issue as to whether it exercised sufficient control to owe Gronski a duty of care.

    Facts

    Metro Waste operated a recycling center owned by Monroe County under an operations and maintenance agreement. The agreement assigned responsibility for repair, maintenance, and safety to Metro Waste. However, the County retained the right of access, the right to determine authorized users, access to records, termination rights, and approval of Metro Waste’s annual program manual. Gronski was injured when an improperly stacked bale of paper fell on him. An OSHA investigation cited Metro Waste for regulatory violations related to unsecured stacking.

    Procedural History

    Gronski sued the County, alleging negligence. The Supreme Court granted the County’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the County had relinquished control to Metro Waste, like an out-of-possession landlord. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the County relinquished sufficient control over the recycling center to Metro Waste, such that the County owed no duty of care to Gronski for unsafe conditions on the premises.

    Holding

    No, because a question of fact exists as to whether and to what extent the County exercised control over the property, based on the agreement and the County’s conduct.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected the out-of-possession landlord standard, as no leasehold was created. Landowners owe a duty of care to maintain property in a reasonably safe condition based on their exercise of control. The Court distinguished Butler v. Rafferty, noting that the County, unlike the cotenant in Butler, had supervisory rights and access to the facility. The agreement vested the County with ultimate approval authority over Metro Waste’s operating procedures. County personnel conducted regular tours and inspections. The Court emphasized that focusing solely on the written agreement, as the lower courts did, was error; the County’s actual conduct was also relevant. The Court cited Ritto v. Goldberg, emphasizing that a landlord’s intervention in a tenant’s business operations can create a question of fact as to control, even with a lease transferring possession. Viewing the evidence favorably to Gronski, the Court found a triable issue of fact as to whether the County exercised sufficient control to owe him a duty of care to prevent the dangerous condition. The dissent argued that the County did not intervene to the point of inducing reliance by Metro Waste or its employees, and emphasized the agreement’s comprehensive assignment of responsibility to Metro Waste. The majority countered that reliance is not a distinct element required in all control analyses, especially without a leasehold.

  • Haymon v. Pettit, 9 N.Y.3d 324 (2007): No Duty to Protect Non-Patrons Chasing Foul Balls Outside Stadium

    Haymon v. Pettit, 9 N.Y.3d 324 (2007)

    A baseball park operator generally owes no duty to warn or protect non-patron spectators who are injured while chasing foul balls outside the stadium, even if the operator offers an incentive for retrieving such balls.

    Summary

    A 14-year-old, L.H., was injured when struck by a drunk driver after chasing a foul ball into a public street near Falcon Park. The baseball association operating the park offered free tickets for returned foul balls. L.H.’s mother sued the association, arguing its promotion created a duty to protect or warn participants. The New York Court of Appeals held that the association owed no such duty. The inherent dangers of crossing a street, coupled with the association’s lack of control over the street and third parties, negated any duty of care.

    Facts

    L.H., a 14-year-old, regularly retrieved foul balls outside Falcon Park, a baseball stadium operated by the Auburn Community Non-Profit Baseball Association, Inc. (Ball Club). The Ball Club offered free tickets for returning foul balls. L.H. was struck by a vehicle driven by Donald Pettit, who was intoxicated, after L.H. chased a foul ball into a public street adjacent to the stadium while wearing headphones and failing to look for traffic. The parking lot across the street was owned by the City of Auburn and used by baseball fans.

    Procedural History

    L.H.’s mother sued the Ball Club, Pettit, and the City of Auburn. The Supreme Court denied the Ball Club’s motion for summary judgment, finding it had a duty. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint against the Ball Club, holding that no legal duty existed. Two justices dissented. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a baseball park operator owes a duty to warn or protect non-patron spectators who are injured while chasing foul balls that are hit out of the stadium when the operator offers an incentive for retrieving those balls.

    Holding

    No, because an owner or occupier of land generally owes no duty to warn or protect others from a dangerous condition on adjacent property unless the owner created or contributed to such a condition and, here, the dangers of crossing the street exist independent of the Ball Club’s promotion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that landowners generally don’t owe a duty to protect others from dangers on adjacent property unless they created or contributed to the condition. Citing Galindo v Town of Clarkstown, 2 NY3d 633, 636 (2004), the court stated, “The reason for such a rule is obvious—a person who lacks ownership or control of property cannot fairly be held accountable for injuries resulting from a hazard on neighboring property.” Foreseeability alone doesn’t create a duty. The Court distinguished the case from situations where a landowner created a dangerous condition on adjacent property. It drew an analogy to Darby v Compagnie Natl. Air France, 96 NY2d 343 (2001), where a hotel wasn’t liable for a guest’s drowning at a public beach despite encouraging its use. Here, the Ball Club’s promotion, like the hotel’s services, didn’t create a duty to ensure safety in an area they didn’t control. The court observed: “The dangers of crossing the street—and individuals electing to cross it in pursuit of foul balls—exist independent of the Ball Club’s promotion.” Even if the promotion contributed to the risk, the court considered the “practical realities” that “foul balls can land on virtually any square foot of property surrounding a stadium, and imposition of a duty to warn or protect under such circumstances is neither fair nor practical”. Imposing a duty would lead to limitless liability, requiring the stadium to control the conduct of third persons outside its premises, which is unrealistic. The court stated: “[I]t is difficult to imagine what steps the stadium operator could have taken that would have sufficed to meet a duty.”

  • DiBenedetto v. CSX Transp., Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 973 (2007): Duty to Provide Adequate Lighting on Property

    DiBenedetto v. CSX Transp., Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 973 (2007)

    Landowners are generally not required to illuminate their property during all hours of darkness absent a hazardous condition or other circumstance giving rise to such an obligation.

    Summary

    Plaintiff DiBenedetto was injured when he tripped on a ramp in CSX’s railroad yard during a power outage. He sued CSX, alleging negligence for failure to provide adequate lighting. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, holding that CSX was entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that CSX breached a duty of care. The court reasoned that landowners are not generally required to illuminate their property at all times unless a hazardous condition exists. Furthermore, CSX had provided lighting, and the darkness was due to a power outage beyond their control, which the plaintiff was aware of.

    Facts

    Plaintiff DiBenedetto was injured in a railroad yard owned by CSX Transportation, Inc. At the time of the injury, a power outage had caused the yard to be dark. DiBenedetto tripped on the ramp of another truck within the yard. CSX provided lighting in the yard, but it was inoperable due to the power outage. DiBenedetto was aware of the power outage and the resulting darkness when he entered the property.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially ruled in favor of CSX. The Appellate Division reversed that decision. CSX appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CSX, as the owner of the railroad yard, breached a duty of care to DiBenedetto by failing to provide adequate lighting, when the darkness was due to a power outage, a condition CSX did not cause or control, and of which DiBenedetto was aware.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that CSX breached a duty of care it owed him.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that CSX was entitled to summary judgment because DiBenedetto failed to raise a triable question of fact as to whether CSX breached a duty of care. The court relied on the principle that landowners are generally not required to illuminate their property during all hours of darkness unless there is a hazardous condition or other circumstance that creates an obligation to provide exterior lighting. The Court cited Peralta v Henriquez, 100 NY2d 139, 145 (2003) in support of this proposition.

    The Court emphasized that CSX had, in fact, provided lighting in the railroad yard. The darkness was caused by a power outage, a problem CSX did not cause or control. Furthermore, DiBenedetto was aware of the power outage when he entered the property. Because DiBenedetto failed to provide proof that his injury, caused by tripping on the ramp of another truck, was attributable to negligence on the part of CSX, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision and reinstated the initial ruling in favor of CSX.

    The court found no evidence that CSX’s actions or inactions caused the power outage or created a hazardous condition that would require additional lighting beyond what was already provided. The ruling underscores the principle that landowners are not insurers of the safety of individuals on their property, especially when the dangerous condition is readily apparent and beyond the landowner’s control.

  • Rivera v. Nelson Realty, LLC, 7 N.Y.3d 530 (2006): Landlord’s Duty to Provide Radiator Covers

    7 N.Y.3d 530 (2006)

    A landlord has no common-law duty to provide or install radiator covers in a home, even when children reside there, unless such a duty is imposed by statute, regulation, or contract.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a landlord has a duty to provide radiator covers in an apartment where young children live. A three-year-old child was severely burned when he climbed onto an uncovered radiator in his bedroom. The parents had requested radiator covers multiple times, but the landlord refused due to cost. The New York Court of Appeals held that landlords do not have a common-law duty to provide radiator covers and that the New York City Administrative Code did not require them in this instance. The decision emphasizes that imposing such a duty is a legislative or regulatory matter, balancing safety concerns with the costs of rental housing.

    Facts

    Aaron Rivera, a three-year-old, sustained severe burns after climbing onto an uncovered radiator in his parents’ apartment. The landlord and management company knew young children lived in the apartment and that the radiators were uncovered. The parents had repeatedly requested radiator covers from the defendants, citing safety concerns, but the requests were denied due to cost considerations.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding a question of fact as to whether the landlord breached a duty to maintain the premises safely. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint, holding that the landlord had no duty to provide radiator covers. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a landlord has a common-law or statutory duty to provide or install radiator covers in an apartment where young children reside.

    Holding

    No, because neither common law nor the New York City Administrative Code imposes such a duty on landlords in this situation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that Basso v. Miller created a broad duty of “reasonable care under the circumstances” that would require landlords to install radiator covers. The court clarified that Basso eliminated the distinction between invitees, licensees, and trespassers, but did not abolish all common-law rules governing landowner liability. The traditional rule is that landlords are not liable for dangerous conditions on leased premises unless a duty to repair is imposed by statute, regulation, or contract.

    The Court stated, “While the common-law rule of nonliability of a landlord to a tenant was not abolished by Basso, we have recognized significant modifications of that duty by statute and contract.” The Court found that Multiple Dwelling Law §78 requires multiple dwellings to be kept in good repair but does not extend to requiring radiator covers absent a defect in the radiator itself.

    The Court also rejected the argument that New York City Administrative Code § 27-809 required radiator covers. The section mandates insulation for accessible piping carrying fluids exceeding 165 degrees Fahrenheit. The court reasoned that radiators are distinct from “piping” within the meaning of the Code, pointing to other sections that differentiate between the two. Moreover, the Court highlighted the practical implications of such a decision, stating: “The decision whether radiator covers must be supplied by landlords is thus left to legislators and regulators, who are in the best position to balance the harm prevented by this safety measure against its cost—a cost which, if imposed on landlords, becomes part of the overall cost of rental housing.”

  • Solazzo v. New York City Transit Authority, 6 N.Y.3d 734 (2005): “Storm in Progress” Rule for Premises Liability

    6 N.Y.3d 734 (2005)

    A property owner is not liable for injuries sustained as a result of icy conditions during an ongoing storm, or for a reasonable time thereafter, and general awareness of wet conditions during inclement weather is insufficient to establish constructive notice of a specific dangerous condition.

    Summary

    The plaintiff, Solazzo, sued the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) for injuries sustained when he slipped and fell on icy steps leading into a subway station. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the NYCTA, holding that the “storm in progress” doctrine applied. The Court reasoned that because it had been snowing, sleeting, and raining all day, and the steps were exposed to these conditions, the NYCTA could not be held liable. The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the NYCTA’s general awareness of wet conditions constituted constructive notice of the specific icy condition.

    Facts

    On the day of the incident, it had been snowing, sleeting, and raining on and off. The steps leading down into the subway station were exposed to the weather. Solazzo slipped and fell on the icy steps, sustaining injuries. Solazzo then sued the NYCTA, alleging negligence in failing to maintain the steps in a safe condition.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the NYCTA. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a property owner can be held liable for a plaintiff’s injuries sustained as a result of an icy condition occurring during an ongoing storm, or for a reasonable time thereafter.

    Holding

    No, because a property owner will not be held liable in negligence for a plaintiff’s injuries sustained as the result of an icy condition occurring during an ongoing storm or for a reasonable time thereafter. The Court also held that general awareness that the stairs and platforms become wet during inclement weather was insufficient to establish constructive notice of the specific condition causing plaintiff’s injury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the “storm in progress” doctrine, which provides that a property owner is not liable for injuries sustained as a result of icy conditions during an ongoing storm or for a reasonable time thereafter. The Court reasoned that because it had been snowing, sleeting, and raining all day, and the steps were exposed to these conditions, the NYCTA could not be held liable. The Court cited Valentine v City of New York, 86 AD2d 381, 383 (1st Dept 1982), affd 57 NY2d 932 (1982), for the principle that liability is not imposed during an ongoing storm. The Court further stated that a “general awareness that the stairs and platforms become wet during inclement weather was insufficient to establish constructive notice of the specific condition causing plaintiff’s injury”, citing Piacquadio v Recine Realty Corp., 84 NY2d 967, 969 (1994). This highlights that the plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant had notice of the specific dangerous condition that caused the injury, not just a general awareness of potential hazards during bad weather. This case serves as an example of the application of the storm in progress doctrine, protecting property owners from liability when taking immediate remedial action is impractical due to ongoing weather conditions.

  • Gilson v. Metropolitan Opera, 5 N.Y.3d 574 (2005): Duty of Care Owed by Theater Owners to Patrons

    5 N.Y.3d 574 (2005)

    Theater owners have a duty to exercise reasonable care for the protection of their patrons but are not insurers of their safety, and internal policies that require a standard transcending reasonable care cannot be the basis for imposing liability.

    Summary

    Estelle Gilson sued the Metropolitan Opera for negligence after being injured when another patron with Parkinson’s disease fell on her in a darkened theater. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Opera did not breach any duty of care owed to Gilson by failing to escort the infirm patron to his seat. The court reasoned that imposing such a duty would significantly enlarge the scope of a theater owner’s responsibility and that internal guidelines requiring ushers to escort patrons with flashlights when house lights are low exceed the standard of ordinary care and cannot be used as evidence of negligence.

    Facts

    Estelle Gilson attended a performance at the Metropolitan Opera. During the intermission, she left her seat and returned as the second act was about to begin. Another patron, Donald Taitt, who suffered from Parkinson’s disease, also returned late with his wife. Gilson rose to allow the Taitts to pass, and Taitt lost his balance, falling on Gilson and causing her injury.

    Procedural History

    Gilson sued the Metropolitan Opera, alleging negligence. The Supreme Court initially denied the Opera’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint. Gilson appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Metropolitan Opera owed a duty of care to Gilson that required it to escort Donald Taitt, an obviously infirm patron, to his seat.

    Holding

    No, because imposing such a duty would significantly enlarge the duty of theater owners to their patrons beyond exercising reasonable care, and the Opera’s relationship to the parties did not put it in the best position to protect against the risk of harm.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court determined whether the defendant owed a legally recognized duty to the plaintiff by balancing several factors, including the reasonable expectations of parties, the potential for proliferating claims, and public policy considerations. The court stated it is reluctant to extend the duty of care such that a defendant may become liable for the conduct of others. The court reasoned that the Opera’s relationship with both Gilson and Taitt did not put it in the best position to protect against the risk posed by Taitt’s infirmity. The court also addressed the Opera’s internal policy regarding escorting patrons, stating that such internal guidelines requiring a standard that transcends reasonable care, a breach cannot be considered evidence of negligence, quoting Sherman v Robinson, 80 NY2d 483, 489 3 (1992). The dissenting judge argued that a jury should determine whether the Opera’s conduct fell short of reasonable care when employees allowed Taitt into the theater without assistance, given his apparent infirmity, citing Longacre v Yonkers R.R. Co. (236 NY 119, 123 [1923]), however, the majority rejected that argument.

  • Perez v. American Museum of Natural History, 7 N.Y.3d 836 (2006): Establishing Constructive Notice in Slip-and-Fall Cases

    7 N.Y.3d 836 (2006)

    To establish constructive notice in a slip-and-fall case, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the dangerous condition was visible and apparent, and existed for a sufficient period of time prior to the accident to permit the defendant’s employees to discover and remedy it.

    Summary

    In this slip-and-fall case, the New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, finding that the tenant, Perez, failed to present sufficient evidence that the American Museum of Natural History had constructive notice of the dangerous condition that caused his fall. Perez claimed he tripped over a beer bottle on a stairwell at 5:00 a.m. The court emphasized that the beer bottle was not present the previous night at 8:30 p.m., and no evidence suggested the landlord was notified or that the bottle was present long enough for the defendant’s employees to discover and remove it. Therefore, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that any determination that the bottle was there long enough for the museum to remedy it would be pure speculation.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Perez, a tenant, allegedly tripped over a beer bottle while descending the stairs at the American Museum of Natural History at 5:00 a.m.
    Perez admitted that the beer bottle was not present on the steps at 8:30 p.m. the night before his fall.
    There was no evidence indicating that the landlord was notified of the beer bottle or that it had been present for a sufficient duration for the defendant’s employees to discover and address the hazard.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff initially brought a slip-and-fall case against the American Museum of Natural History.
    The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing lack of constructive notice.
    The Appellate Division ruled in favor of the plaintiff.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether the landlord had constructive notice of the dangerous condition (the beer bottle) in the stairwell.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiff failed to present evidence demonstrating that the beer bottle was present for a sufficient period to allow the defendant’s employees to discover and remedy the condition. The court concluded any other determination would be pure speculation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court based its reasoning on the established principle that to demonstrate constructive notice, the dangerous condition must be visible, apparent, and exist for a sufficient length of time before the accident to allow the defendant’s employees to discover and remedy it. The court cited Gordon v American Museum of Natural History, 67 NY2d 836, 837 (1986), emphasizing the plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate that the beer bottle was present for a sufficient period. The court stated, “on the evidence presented, the [beer bottle] that caused plaintiff’s fall could have been deposited there only minutes or seconds before the accident and any other conclusion would be pure speculation” (id. at 838). The absence of evidence regarding the bottle’s duration on the stairs and the lack of notification to the landlord led the court to conclude that any finding of constructive notice would be based on speculation. This case highlights the importance of timing and evidence in establishing constructive notice in premises liability claims. Landlords are not insurers of their property, but they have a duty to maintain their property in a reasonably safe condition; this case emphasizes that a plaintiff must prove the landlord had adequate opportunity to address the specific hazard.

  • Hyman v. Queens County Bancorp, Inc., 3 N.Y.3d 743 (2004): Establishing Proximate Cause and Building Code Violations in Negligence Claims

    3 N.Y.3d 743 (2004)

    A plaintiff opposing summary judgment in a premises liability case must present admissible evidence demonstrating both a defective condition and a causal link between that condition and the injury.

    Summary

    In this personal injury action, the plaintiffs, Alan and Joan Hyman, alleged that Queens County Bancorp’s premises were unsafe due to a missing handrail on a staircase, which allegedly caused Alan Hyman to fall. The plaintiffs argued that this violated city and state building codes and constituted negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order granting summary judgment to the defendant, holding that the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish either a violation of applicable building codes or a causal connection between the missing handrail and Alan Hyman’s fall. The plaintiffs’ claims amounted to speculation, insufficient to defeat summary judgment.

    Facts

    Alan Hyman fell down six or seven stairs on premises owned by Queens County Bancorp. The plaintiffs alleged that the absence of a handrail on both sides of the stairway, violating city and state building codes, created a dangerous condition. The plaintiffs asserted that this missing handrail was the proximate cause of Alan Hyman’s fall.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs sued Queens County Bancorp for personal injuries. The defendant moved for summary judgment. The lower court’s decision is not specified in the provided text. The Appellate Division granted summary judgment in favor of Queens County Bancorp. The plaintiffs appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the plaintiffs presented sufficient admissible evidence to raise a triable issue of fact regarding a defective or dangerous condition on the defendant’s premises due to an alleged violation of city and state building codes regarding stairway handrails.

    2. Whether the plaintiffs presented sufficient admissible evidence to raise a triable issue of fact regarding causation between the alleged defective condition (missing handrail) and Alan Hyman’s fall.

    Holding

    1. No, because the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that the building was subject to the cited codes and that the absence of a handrail constituted a dangerous condition, particularly considering the certificate of occupancy issued to the defendant.

    2. No, because the plaintiffs offered only speculation that the existing handrail was beyond reach, which is insufficient to establish causation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that a party opposing summary judgment must provide admissible evidence that necessitates a trial on material facts. The Court found that the plaintiffs failed to meet this burden. Specifically, they did not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the building was subject to the building codes they cited regarding handrails. The court noted, “not all buildings were subject to the cited codes and plaintiffs offered no evidence of what would have brought the subject building within the purview of those laws.” The existence of a certificate of occupancy issued in 1978 further undermined the claim of a defective condition, distinguishing the case from Lesocovich v 180 Madison Ave. Corp., 81 NY2d 982 (1993). Regarding causation, the court found the plaintiffs’ claims to be speculative, stating that they offered “only speculation that in the circumstances presented the existing handrail was beyond reach.” Because the plaintiffs failed to establish both a defective condition and a causal link, the Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the defendant. The Court thus reinforced the principle that mere allegations or speculation, without supporting evidence, are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.