New York Law Review

Tag: Pregnancy Discrimination

  • Mittl v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 100 N.Y.2d 326 (2003): Employer Liability for Discrimination Influenced by Third-Party Bias

    Mittl v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 100 N.Y.2d 326 (2003)

    An employer can be held liable for pregnancy discrimination when the decision to terminate an employee is influenced by the discriminatory bias of a third party, even if the employer claims to have acted to avoid marital problems.

    Summary

    An ophthalmologist terminated his secretary after his wife became jealous and made accusations about the secretary’s pregnancy. The secretary filed a complaint with the Division of Human Rights (DHR), alleging unlawful termination based on pregnancy. The DHR found in favor of the secretary. The employer sought to annul the DHR’s order, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding no sex discrimination. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that substantial evidence supported the DHR’s determination that the termination was discriminatory. The court emphasized that it is irrelevant if the record could also support the employer’s explanation that he discharged the employee to save his marriage.

    Facts

    An ophthalmologist hired a secretary. Approximately a year later, the secretary informed the ophthalmologist she was pregnant. The ophthalmologist told the secretary his wife suspected the secretary was carrying his child and that her pregnancy was “becoming a problem” in the office. The secretary requested two days off for doctor’s appointments. Minutes after the ophthalmologist granted the time off, his wife called the secretary and made accusatory and threatening statements. Shortly after the phone call, the ophthalmologist terminated the secretary, stating, “it’s going to cause a lot of problems if you stay.”

    Procedural History

    The secretary filed a complaint with the Division of Human Rights (DHR). The DHR Commissioner ruled in favor of the secretary. The employer sought to annul the DHR’s order in the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division granted the petition and annulled the DHR’s determination. The secretary cross-petitioned for enforcement of the order. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for consideration of damages.

    Issue(s)

    Whether substantial evidence supported the DHR Commissioner’s determination that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee based on her pregnancy.

    Holding

    Yes, because the employer’s remark that the employee’s pregnancy was “becoming a problem,” followed by the wife’s objections and the subsequent discharge, constituted sufficient evidence to support the DHR’s finding of a prima facie case of discrimination, and the employer’s proffered reasons for the termination were found to be incredible and unsubstantiated.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court stated that judicial review of the DHR’s determination is limited to whether substantial evidence supports the agency’s decision. Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact” (300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176, 180 [1978]). The court emphasized that it cannot weigh the evidence or reject the DHR’s choice where the evidence is conflicting. The court found that the employer’s remark about the pregnancy becoming a problem, the wife’s objections, and the termination were sufficient to support a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden then shifted to the employer to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination. The court noted the DHR found the employer’s proffered reasons to be unsubstantiated. DHR’s rejection of the employer’s reason that the wife terminated the secretary because they did not get along was supported by evidence that the wife had no supervisory authority over the secretary. DHR’s rejection of the employer’s claim of a time and attendance problem was supported by the employer’s own admission that he was satisfied with the secretary’s job performance and the absence of any documentation of attendance issues. The court stated, “the issue of whether substantial evidence supports an agency determination is solely a question of law.” The court distinguished this case from cases involving consensual sexual relationships, noting that no such relationship was alleged here. The court stated that the Appellate Division misapplied the relevant standards and that its conclusion was, therefore, erroneous.

  • New York City Transit Authority v. State Division of Human Rights, 78 N.Y.2d 207 (1991): Standard for Reviewing Mental Anguish Awards in Discrimination Cases

    New York City Transit Authority v. State Division of Human Rights, 78 N.Y.2d 207 (1991)

    In reviewing compensatory damages awarded by the Commissioner of Human Rights for mental anguish resulting from discrimination, appellate courts must determine whether the relief is reasonably related to the wrongdoing, supported by evidence, and comparable to awards for similar injuries; deference should be given to the Commissioner’s assessment.

    Summary

    This case addresses the proper standard for judicial review of compensatory damages awarded by the New York State Commissioner of Human Rights for mental anguish caused by unlawful discrimination. A female bus driver for the New York City Transit Authority experienced multiple instances of pregnancy-based discrimination. The Commissioner awarded her $450,000 in damages for mental anguish. The Appellate Division reduced the award, finding insufficient evidence of the duration, consequences, or treatment for her condition. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Appellate Division failed to properly defer to the Commissioner’s findings and did not adequately assess the evidence supporting the award. The court remitted the case for further review under the correct standards.

    Facts

    The complainant, a bus driver for the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA), experienced four separate episodes of discriminatory conduct due to her pregnancy. These included: denial of restricted duty (lighter work assignments typically given to temporarily disabled male drivers) early in her pregnancy, a forced leave of absence after a miscarriage, another denial of restricted duty during a subsequent pregnancy, and a mandatory psychiatric examination. The Administrative Law Judge called this “the most shocking instance of abuse of an employee by an employer.” Complainant credibly testified about the anguish, guilt, depression, and anger caused by these acts, which persisted for years.

    Procedural History

    The complainant filed complaints with the New York State Division of Human Rights. An Administrative Law Judge found unlawful discrimination and awarded compensatory damages. The Commissioner of Human Rights adopted the ALJ’s findings and order. The Appellate Division confirmed the finding of discrimination but reduced the damages award. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s order, remitting the case for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division applied the correct standard of review in reducing the Commissioner of Human Rights’ award of compensatory damages for mental anguish resulting from unlawful discrimination.

    Holding

    No, because the Appellate Division substituted its own judgment for that of the Commissioner without properly considering whether the award was reasonably related to the wrongdoing, supported by evidence, and comparable to other awards for similar injuries.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the strong statutory policy against discrimination, giving the Commissioner broad discretion in fashioning remedies. The court clarified the standard for judicial review of mental anguish awards, noting that while medical evidence is helpful, a complainant’s own testimony, corroborated by the circumstances of the discrimination, can suffice. The court stated that beyond the fact of mental anguish, evidence of the magnitude of the injury is necessary to ensure the award is compensatory, not punitive. The court found the Appellate Division erred by substituting its judgment without adequately considering the evidence supporting the Commissioner’s award or comparing it to awards in similar cases. The court quoted Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 77 NY2d 411, 420, stating, “Unless the award is so arbitrary and capricious as to constitute an abuse of discretion, it is not erroneous as a matter of law”. The court also noted that, “[D]ue to the strong anti-discrimination policy spelled out by the Legislature of this State * * * [aggrieved individuals] need not produce the quantum and quality of evidence to prove compensatory damages [they] would have had to produce under an analogous provision, and this is particularly so where, as here, the discriminatory act is intentionally committed.” The court remanded the case to the Appellate Division for review under the proper standards, emphasizing that the relief imposed by the Commissioner need only be reasonably related to the discriminatory conduct.

  • Binghamton GHS Employees Federal Credit Union v. State Division of Human Rights, 77 N.Y.2d 16 (1990): Pregnancy Discrimination as Sex Discrimination in Credit Terms

    Binghamton GHS Employees Federal Credit Union v. State Division of Human Rights, 77 N.Y.2d 16 (1990)

    Excluding disabilities caused by normal pregnancy from an optional credit disability insurance policy offered as part of a loan agreement constitutes unlawful sex discrimination in the terms of credit, violating the New York Human Rights Law.

    Summary

    Theresa Yadlosky obtained a car loan from Binghamton GHS Employees Federal Credit Union, electing an optional credit disability insurance policy that excluded coverage for disabilities due to normal pregnancy. After her claims for disability benefits related to two pregnancies were denied, she filed complaints with the State Division of Human Rights, alleging sex discrimination. The New York Court of Appeals held that the pregnancy exclusion constituted unlawful sex discrimination in the terms of credit, violating the Human Rights Law, even though the insurance was optional. The court reasoned that the insurance was inextricably intertwined with the loan agreement and offered as a term of credit.

    Facts

    Theresa Yadlosky obtained a car loan from Binghamton GHS Employees Federal Credit Union, using a combined application and promissory note. The application included an optional credit health and disability insurance policy. Yadlosky elected the insurance, and the premium was included in the loan principal. The insurance policy, administered by Richard J. Katz & Co., excluded coverage for disabilities caused by normal pregnancy. Yadlosky filed claims for disabilities resulting from two pregnancies, which were denied based on the pregnancy exclusion.

    Procedural History

    Yadlosky filed complaints with the State Division of Human Rights. The Administrative Law Judge ruled in her favor. The Commissioner of the Division of Human Rights affirmed, holding that the insurance policy was a term of credit and violated the Human Rights Law. Binghamton, Katz, and the New York State Insurance Department initiated an Article 78 proceeding to annul the Division’s determination. The Appellate Division initially granted the petition. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the Division of Human Rights’ determination.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an auto loan agreement violates the Human Rights Law when it contains an option to purchase disability insurance for the duration of the loan that excludes coverage for disabilities caused by normal pregnancy.

    Holding

    Yes, because the disability insurance exclusion constitutes unlawful sex discrimination in the terms of credit, violating the Human Rights Law, even though the insurance was optional.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court determined that the Division of Human Rights has jurisdiction over discrimination matters, including claims that the insurance option was a discriminatory term of credit under the Human Rights Law. The court cited previous holdings that singling out pregnancy for different treatment discriminates on the basis of sex. While the insurance was optional, the court found that it was a “term” of the credit included in the credit agreement. The court emphasized that the insurance was offered in the credit agreement, available with every installment loan, keyed to the loan’s duration, and only available as part of a credit transaction. The insurance premium was incorporated into the loan and the creditor profited from it. The court reasoned that a lender cannot offer a disability benefits policy, whether optional or not, that discriminates on the basis of sex. The court stated, “A lender may not, as a part of its regular loan procedures, offer a disability benefits policy, whether optional or not, that discriminates on the basis of sex (see, Executive Law § 296-a [1] [b]).” Therefore, because women could not obtain the same disability protection as men due to the pregnancy exclusion, the credit agreement violated the statutory proscription against discrimination.

  • Board of Education v. State Division of Human Rights, 56 N.Y.2d 257 (1982): Discrimination via Seniority Systems Based on Past, Compelled Pregnancy Resignations

    Board of Education of Farmingdale Union Free School District v. State Division of Human Rights, 56 N.Y.2d 257 (1982)

    A seniority system that appears neutral but perpetuates the effects of past discriminatory practices, such as compelled resignation due to pregnancy, can be found to be discriminatory under the Human Rights Law, even if the original discriminatory practice occurred before the law prohibited such discrimination.

    Summary

    The case addresses whether a facially neutral seniority system that denies credit for service before a resignation, compelled due to a now-illegal pregnancy policy, constitutes present discrimination. Rose Burns was forced to resign in 1959 due to pregnancy. When she was rehired and a new seniority system was implemented in 1976, her prior service was not credited. The NY Court of Appeals held that denying seniority credit for a pregnancy-related forced resignation, even if the resignation occurred before sex-based discrimination was prohibited, constitutes a present discriminatory act because the seniority system perpetuates the effects of past discrimination and disproportionately impacts women. The court emphasized the Division of Human Rights’ expertise in evaluating discrimination claims.

    Facts

    Rose Burns was hired as a probationary teacher in 1956.
    In 1959, she was forced to resign due to a Board of Education policy requiring pregnant, non-tenured teachers to resign.
    The Board assured her that the resignation would not affect her return to work.
    In 1963, she was rehired, and her prior service was credited towards tenure and salary.
    She worked continuously until 1978, except for unpaid maternity leaves.
    In 1975, the forced resignation policy was rescinded.
    In 1976, a collective bargaining agreement eliminated a job security clause, prompting the Board to create a seniority list.
    In 1978, Burns learned she wasn’t credited for her pre-resignation service and filed a complaint.

    Procedural History

    Burns filed a complaint with the State Division of Human Rights (Division).
    The Division ruled in favor of Burns, finding the seniority list perpetuated past discrimination.
    The State Human Rights Appeal Board affirmed the Division’s decision.
    The Board of Education filed a review proceeding in the Appellate Division, which annulled the determination, finding the complaint time-barred.
    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a facially neutral seniority system that denies credit for service preceding a resignation compelled by a discriminatory policy (pregnancy resignation) constitutes a present act of discrimination under the Human Rights Law, even if the original policy was not illegal at the time of the resignation and the statute of limitations has expired for a claim based on that original policy.

    Holding

    Yes, because the seniority system perpetuates the effects of a past discriminatory policy and disproportionately disadvantages women who were subject to that policy. The court found that the Division of Human Rights properly determined that the seniority system currently disadvantages the complainant because of her sex.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged that the 1959 forced resignation was not itself actionable due to the statute of limitations and the fact that sex-based discrimination was not yet prohibited by the Human Rights Law. However, the court emphasized that the discriminatory practice at issue was the current denial of seniority credit for service preceding a pregnancy-related forced resignation. The court deferred to the Division’s expertise in evaluating discrimination claims, noting its broad discretion to weigh evidence and draw inferences.
    The court reasoned that the seniority system, while facially neutral, imposed a distinct burden on women who were forced to resign due to pregnancy, effectively penalizing them again for their prior pregnancy. The court stated that “[t]he facially neutral system cannot mask the unfavorable employment consequences attendant only upon pregnancy. The discrimination at its base need not go uncorrected.”
    The court rejected the Board’s argument that the loss of seniority was merely a latent effect of the 1959 resignation, stating that the complaint sought to redress a distinct discriminatory wrong perpetrated when the new seniority system was devised. The court found the system effectively revived the prior discriminatory policy.
    The court also dismissed the Board’s claim that the loss of seniority occurred upon resignation, noting that Burns was told her return would be unaffected and that her prior service was initially recognized for tenure and salary purposes. The discriminatory impact only became apparent when seniority-based benefits became available and her prior service was not credited. The complaint, filed shortly after she learned of the denial of credit, was deemed timely.

  • Board of Education v. State Division of Human Rights, 39 N.Y.2d 376 (1976): Pregnancy Discrimination Under State Human Rights Law

    Board of Education v. State Division of Human Rights, 39 N.Y.2d 376 (1976)

    Personnel policies, even those resulting from collective bargaining under the Taylor Law, are subject to the constraints of the New York Human Rights Law, and cannot discriminate based on sex, including pregnancy.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a collectively bargained personnel policy that treats childbirth differently from other physical conditions violates the New York Human Rights Law. The Court of Appeals held that such policies are indeed subject to the Human Rights Law and cannot discriminate based on sex, including pregnancy-related conditions. The court emphasized that what the Constitution permits, state statutes may still forbid. Further, the Court clarified that the Division of Human Rights’ procedural delays do not strip it of jurisdiction absent substantial prejudice to the charged party. The case affirms that negotiated agreements do not supersede the protections against discrimination afforded by the Human Rights Law.

    Facts

    A teacher filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights, alleging that the Board of Education’s personnel policy discriminated against her based on sex because it treated childbirth differently from other physical conditions in terms of compensation and return to employment. This policy was the result of collective bargaining under the Taylor Law.

    Procedural History

    The State Division of Human Rights found probable cause and, after a hearing, determined that the school district had engaged in unlawful discrimination. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Board of Education appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that collectively bargained policies should be subject to a less stringent standard of review and that the Division of Human Rights lacked jurisdiction due to procedural deficiencies.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether personnel policies reached through collective bargaining under the Taylor Law are subject to the same scrutiny under the Human Rights Law as unilaterally imposed policies.

    2. Whether the Division of Human Rights lacked jurisdiction due to the complainant’s failure to comply with the notice-of-claim provisions of section 3813 of the Education Law.

    3. Whether the Division of Human Rights’ failure to adhere to the time schedules specified in section 297 of the Executive Law deprives it of jurisdiction.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because personnel policies and practices are no less subject to the constraints of the Human Rights Law because they are the product of negotiations conducted under the Taylor Law.

    2. No, because the proceeding seeks to vindicate a public interest (elimination of discrimination) and is thus not subject to the notice-of-claim requirements applicable to actions enforcing private rights.

    3. No, because the time schedules specified in section 297 of the Executive Law are directory, not mandatory, and noncompliance does not oust the Division of jurisdiction absent a showing of substantial prejudice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the Human Rights Law reflects a “more direct and positive focus” than the constitutional standard under the Equal Protection Clause. What the Constitution does not forbid, state statutes may nonetheless proscribe. Collective bargaining under the Taylor Law does not create an exception to the Human Rights Law’s prohibitions against discrimination. The court cited Syracuse Teachers Assn. v. Board of Educ., Syracuse City School Dist., 35 N.Y.2d 743, clarifying that collective bargaining has a broad scope but is limited by plain and clear statutory prohibitions.

    The court distinguished between actions seeking to enforce private rights and those seeking to vindicate a public interest, holding that the notice-of-claim provisions of section 3813 of the Education Law apply only to the former. Here, the proceeding was triggered by an individual complaint, but its ultimate goal was the elimination of sex-based discrimination, a public interest. The court stated: “[A]dvantages which accrue to these teachers stem not from their rights of contract or other individual entitlement but rather flow as an appropriate and intended consequence of the vindication by the division, acting on behalf of the public, of the public’s interest in the elimination of discrimination based on sex”.

    Regarding the Division of Human Rights’ procedural delays, the court found that the time limits specified in section 297 of the Executive Law are directory, intended for the benefit of complainants. Noncompliance does not oust the Division of jurisdiction absent a showing of substantial prejudice to the charged party. The court concluded that there was substantial evidence to support the commissioner’s determination that the school district’s policy constituted discrimination based on sex. “Absent some showing of substantial prejudice, noncompliance with such schedules does not operate to oust the division of the jurisdiction conferred on it by the Human Rights Law.”