New York Law Review

Tag: Predicate Felonies

  • People v. Smith, 27 N.Y.3d 652 (2016): Retroactivity of Catu and Predicate Felonies

    27 N.Y.3d 652 (2016)

    A conviction obtained in violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights cannot be used to enhance a subsequent sentence, but the rule in People v. Catu, requiring specific advisement of post-release supervision during a guilty plea, does not apply retroactively to cases finalized before the Catu decision.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the rule established in People v. Catu, which mandates that defendants be informed of post-release supervision (PRS) during plea allocutions, applies retroactively to prior convictions used as predicate felonies. The court held that Catu does not apply retroactively. In both consolidated cases, the defendants’ prior convictions from before the Catu decision (2005) were obtained without proper advisement of PRS. However, because the convictions were final before Catu, the court determined that the lack of PRS advisement did not render those convictions “unconstitutionally obtained” under the law at the time. Consequently, the court ruled that those prior convictions could be used to enhance sentences for subsequent offenses.

    Facts

    In People v. Smith, the defendant pleaded guilty to robbery in the first degree in 2002, but the trial court did not advise him of the mandatory PRS term. Later, he was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment with five years of PRS. In 2010, he was indicted on weapon possession charges. Because of his 2002 conviction, he was adjudicated a second violent felony offender and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. Smith moved to set aside the sentence, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel based on his attorney’s failure to challenge the 2002 conviction due to the Catu error. The Appellate Division agreed that the Catu error meant the 2002 conviction could not be a predicate felony. In People v. Fagan, the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted robbery in 2000 and was sentenced without being informed of PRS. He was resentenced in 2009, again without the original PRS. In 2010, he was charged with multiple offenses. Because of his 2000 attempted robbery conviction, he was arraigned as a persistent violent felony offender. Fagan, like Smith, argued that his prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained due to the Catu violation. The Appellate Division agreed, also finding the Catu rule applicable.

    Procedural History

    Both cases involved post-conviction motions under CPL 440.20 challenging sentences based on prior convictions where the courts failed to advise defendants of PRS during plea allocutions. Supreme Court granted the motions, agreeing that the convictions were unconstitutionally obtained under Catu and could not be used as predicates. The Appellate Division affirmed in both cases. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to address the retroactivity of Catu in this context.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the rule established in People v. Catu applies retroactively to convictions that became final before the Catu decision.

    Holding

    1. No, because the Catu rule does not apply retroactively.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals began by reviewing the established principles of retroactivity in criminal procedure, as articulated in Teague v. Lane and People v. Catalanotte. Under Teague, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure generally do not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review unless they fall under specific exceptions. The court determined that the Catu rule, requiring specific advisement of PRS, was a “new rule” that did not fall under the exceptions because the court was departing from existing law. The court emphasized that at the time of the defendants’ original convictions, New York law did not require automatic vacatur for a court’s failure to pronounce PRS. Instead, existing law required a showing of prejudice. The court further reasoned that the Catu rule did not constitute a “watershed rule” because it did not prevent an impermissibly large risk of inaccurate convictions. The court cited that the purpose of Catu did not affect the defendant’s guilt or innocence. Therefore, under Catalanotte and federal retroactivity principles, the court held that the Catu rule should not be applied retroactively in this situation, and the prior convictions could be used as predicate offenses. The Court reversed the Appellate Division rulings and reinstated the original sentences, finding the prior convictions valid for predicate felony purposes.

    Practical Implications

    This decision is crucial for attorneys dealing with cases involving prior convictions as predicates. It clarifies that Catu is not retroactive, which means that convictions that were final before 2005, even if they involved Catu errors, can still be used to enhance sentences in subsequent cases. This impacts how defense attorneys should evaluate prior convictions when negotiating plea deals or preparing for sentencing, and how prosecutors approach cases involving repeat offenders with pre-Catu convictions. It suggests that attorneys cannot simply invalidate older convictions based solely on the failure to advise of PRS at the time of the plea. The court acknowledged the importance of PRS but found that a failure to inform a defendant of that component would not result in an unjust conviction, meaning that the defendant’s original sentence can stand. The decision also supports the validity of sentences imposed under Penal Law § 70.85, which addressed the Catu errors. The court’s emphasis on the finality of convictions underscores the importance of raising direct appeals promptly to preserve challenges to convictions.

  • People v. Usher, 29 N.Y.2d 234 (1971): Scope of Felony Assault Predicate Felonies

    People v. Usher, 29 N.Y.2d 234 (1971)

    The felony assault statute, unlike the felony murder statute, does not limit the predicate felonies to only those that are inherently dangerous; any felony can serve as the basis for a felony assault conviction if physical injury results during its commission.

    Summary

    Usher, while driving a stolen car and being chased by police, crashed into a taxi, injuring the occupants. He was convicted of criminal possession of stolen property, felony assault, and other charges. Usher appealed, arguing that the felony underlying the assault (possession of stolen property) was not a dangerous felony and therefore could not support a felony assault conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the felony assault statute does not limit predicate felonies to only dangerous felonies, distinguishing it from the felony murder statute. The court also rejected Usher’s due process argument, stating that the legislature can hold a felon criminally accountable for injuries proximately caused during the commission of any felony.

    Facts

    Defendant Usher was in possession of a stolen automobile.
    While being pursued by the police, Usher crashed the stolen vehicle into a taxicab.
    Two occupants of the taxicab sustained physical injuries as a result of the collision.

    Procedural History

    Usher was convicted at trial of criminal possession of stolen property, two counts of felony assault, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and possession of a dangerous instrument.
    Usher appealed the conviction, arguing that the felony assault conviction was invalid because the underlying felony (criminal possession of stolen property) was not a dangerous felony.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    Usher appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the felony of criminal possession of stolen property can serve as a predicate for a felony assault conviction under Penal Law § 120.05(6).
    Whether the felony assault statute, as applied to a nonviolent felony such as possession of stolen property, is unconstitutional.

    Holding

    Yes, because the language of the felony assault statute is clear and unambiguous, and does not specify that only violent felonies can serve as a predicate. The legislature intended to distinguish between the felony murder and felony assault statutes.
    No, because due process does not preclude a legislative determination that a felon who proximately causes injury to another during the commission of a felony can be held criminally accountable, regardless of the nature of the underlying felony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the legislative intent could be inferred from the specific language of the statute. The felony assault statute states that a person is guilty of assault in the second degree when, during the commission of a felony, they cause physical injury to another person. The statute does not limit the predicate felonies to violent crimes, unlike the felony murder statute, which specifically enumerates the felonies that can serve as a predicate.

    The Court noted that the felony murder statute was intentionally revised to narrow its scope, while the felony assault statute was not. The court stated that “the change from the former law was deliberate, its effect ameliorative, and brought the law of felony murder into line with that in the vast majority of other jurisdictions by specifically limiting its application to felonies involving violence or substantial risk of serious injury and death.”

    The Court rejected Usher’s argument that the felony assault statute was unconstitutional as applied to nonviolent felonies. The court stated, “we do not think that due process precludes a legislative policy determination that the felon who proximately causes injury to another, irrespective of the nature of the underlying felonious act, may be held criminally accountable.”

    The Court acknowledged the criticism of constructive malice in felony murder, but maintained its permissibility as a legislative policy choice.

    Finally, the Court noted that Usher’s argument regarding error in submitting the criminal possession of stolen property and unauthorized use of a vehicle charges to the jury was not preserved for review because no objection was made at trial.

  • People v. Spencer, 29 N.Y.2d 446 (1972): Requirement of Factual Support for Coram Nobis Relief

    People v. Spencer, 29 N.Y.2d 446 (1972)

    A defendant seeking coram nobis relief based on the unconstitutionality of predicate felony convictions must provide factual support for those claims; a mere allegation of not being advised of the right to challenge the convictions is insufficient to warrant a hearing.

    Summary

    Spencer, a third-felony offender, sought coram nobis relief, arguing he wasn’t advised of his right to challenge the constitutionality of his prior felony convictions during his resentencing. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order for a hearing, holding that Spencer’s petition lacked factual support for his claims of unconstitutionality. The court emphasized that a defendant must present specific facts demonstrating the invalidity of the predicate convictions, not just allege a procedural deficiency in being informed of the right to challenge them. Without such factual allegations, a hearing is unnecessary and a waste of judicial resources.

    Facts

    Spencer pleaded guilty to attempted burglary (1947) and grand larceny (1952). He did not appeal either conviction. These served as predicate felonies for his 1957 robbery conviction, resulting in a 45-60 year sentence as a third-felony offender. In 1969, following a Montgomery hearing, Spencer was resentenced nunc pro tunc. In 1971, Spencer filed a coram nobis petition, seeking a hearing and resentencing, claiming he wasn’t informed of his right to challenge the predicate convictions.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied Spencer’s coram nobis petition without a hearing. The Appellate Division reversed, ordering a hearing on whether Spencer was advised of his right to challenge the predicate convictions. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Supreme Court’s original denial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant seeking coram nobis relief from a third-felony offender sentence is entitled to a hearing based solely on the allegation that he was not advised of his right to attack the constitutionality of his predicate felony convictions, without providing any factual basis for challenging those convictions.

    Holding

    No, because a coram nobis petition requires factual support for any claims of unconstitutionality; a mere allegation of not being informed of the right to challenge the predicate convictions is insufficient to warrant a hearing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that Spencer’s coram nobis petition lacked any factual allegations to support his claim that his predicate felony convictions were unconstitutional. The court distinguished the case from situations where a defendant was not informed of their right to appeal, stating that even in such cases, a defendant must demonstrate a genuine appealable issue existed. Referring to People v. White, 309 N.Y. 636, 641, the court stated “the defendant is not entitled to a hearing on charges lacking factual support.” The court rejected the argument that the failure to advise Spencer of his right to attack his predicate convictions in 1957 constituted a due process violation warranting resentencing. The court found the lack of factual allegations to support the unconstitutionality claims fatal to Spencer’s petition, reasoning that a hearing without such support would be a waste of judicial resources. The court noted Spencer was a third-felony offender who entered pleas on all three indictments without advancing a single cognizable constitutional issue. Extending the rationale of People v. Lynn, the Court implicitly suggested that just as a “genuine appealable issue” is required when claiming a failure to be advised of appeal rights, a “genuine constitutional issue” is required when claiming a failure to be advised of rights regarding predicate felonies. As such, the Court reversed, emphasizing judicial economy and the need for factual grounding in coram nobis proceedings. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions noted.