New York Law Review

Tag: Pre-Trial Motions

  • People v. Fratt, 10 N.Y.3d 491 (2008): On Speedy Trial Rights and Aggregation of Firearm Sales

    People v. Fratt, 10 N.Y.3d 491 (2008)

    When determining if the prosecution has met speedy trial requirements, delays resulting from a defendant’s announced intention to file pre-trial motions are excludable, even if those motions are never actually filed; also, the criminal sale of a firearm statutes do not allow for aggregation of sales to meet the statutory thresholds.

    Summary

    Following an undercover investigation, Fratt was convicted of multiple crimes related to illegal gun sales. He moved to set aside the verdict on two counts of criminal sale of a firearm, arguing insufficient evidence that he sold the requisite number of firearms. The trial court granted the motion. Fratt also argued a speedy trial violation. The Appellate Division affirmed the remaining convictions and the trial court’s order. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the delay resulting from the announced pre-trial motions was excludable for speedy trial purposes, and the firearm statutes do not allow for aggregation of sales.

    Facts

    An undercover investigation targeted an illegal gun selling ring. Fratt was charged with, and convicted of, various crimes, including criminal sale of a firearm in the first and second degrees. The trial court set aside the verdict for the two higher-degree felony counts because the People failed to prove that Fratt sold the requisite number of firearms (“twenty or more” for first-degree criminal sale and “ten or more” for second-degree). The undercover officer bought 15 guns from Fratt in four separate transactions, but never more than five in a single transaction. The officer bought 31 guns from Fratt’s co-conspirators in 12 other transactions.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted Fratt’s motion to set aside the verdict for the first- and second-degree criminal sale of a firearm counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the remaining convictions and the trial court’s order setting aside the verdict. A judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to both Fratt and the People.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in excluding a 47-day period from the time chargeable to the People for speedy trial purposes, when defense counsel announced her intention to file pre-trial motions but ultimately did not do so.

    2. Whether the trial court erred by issuing a missing witness charge for the failure to call Fratt’s half-brother to testify.

    3. Whether the criminal sale of a firearm statutes allow for “aggregation” of various sales to meet the statutory thresholds.

    Holding

    1. No, because the delay resulted from “other proceedings concerning the defendant, including… pre-trial motions” even though the motions were never actually filed.

    2. No, because Fratt failed to preserve his claim that the missing witness charge was error by not raising an argument regarding “control” in the trial court.

    3. No, because nothing in the plain language of the statute supports the People’s aggregation theory.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the speedy trial issue, the Court distinguished People v. Collins, where no pretrial motion was even in prospect, stating that in this case, “defense counsel here clearly announced an intention to file motions, specifically including a CPL 190.50 motion. At the hearing, the trial court set a motion schedule and promised a decision before the next hearing slated for both cases.” The court reasoned that “the pretrial motions in this case were far from hypothetical. Accordingly, it is of no consequence that defendant never actually filed the contemplated motion for which the 47-day adjournment was granted.”

    Regarding the missing witness charge, the court found that the defendant failed to preserve the argument, explaining, “Having never raised an argument regarding ‘control’ in the trial court, defendant failed to preserve his claim that the missing witness charge was error.”

    Regarding the aggregation issue, the Court stated, “Stemming the flow of illegal weapons into this state is a critical law-enforcement goal the achievement of which helps prevent other crimes. We agree with the courts below, however, that nothing in the plain language of Penal Law §§ 265.12 and 265.13 supports the People’s aggregation theory.” The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to the plain language of the statute. Even though the overall goal of preventing illegal gun trafficking is important, the Court refused to expand the statute beyond its clear terms.

  • People v. Thill, 75 N.Y.2d 895 (1990): Enforcing Deadlines for Pretrial Motions

    People v. Thill, 75 N.Y.2d 895 (1990)

    A motion to dismiss based on a defect in the accusatory instrument is waived if not made within the statutory time limit for pretrial motions, unless an extension is granted.

    Summary

    Defendant Thill was convicted in Town Court of speeding and driving while intoxicated. He appealed to the County Court, which reversed both convictions. The Court of Appeals considered whether the County Court properly dismissed the speeding conviction based on an insufficient supporting deposition, given that Thill’s motion to dismiss was untimely under CPL 255.20(1). The Court of Appeals held that because the motion was filed beyond the statutory deadline without a request for an extension, the Town Court’s denial of the motion was proper. The Court of Appeals reinstated the speeding conviction.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested and charged with speeding and driving while intoxicated. The defendant was arraigned. More than three months after his arraignment, the defendant moved to dismiss the speeding charge, arguing the supporting deposition was insufficient because it failed to specify the speed limit he allegedly violated. The defendant did not request an extension of time to file the motion.

    Procedural History

    The Town Court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss as untimely. The defendant was convicted of both speeding and driving while intoxicated in the Town Court. The Chautauqua County Court reversed both convictions. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the County Court erred in dismissing the speeding conviction when the defendant’s motion to dismiss was filed outside the statutory time limit for pre-trial motions without an extension, based on an alleged defect in the supporting deposition.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 255.20(1) requires pre-trial motions to be filed within forty-five days of arraignment, or within such additional time as the court may fix upon application of the defendant, and the defendant did not comply with this requirement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the procedural requirements of CPL 255.20(1), which sets a deadline for pre-trial motions. The court emphasized that the defendant’s motion to dismiss the speeding charge was made over three months after his arraignment. The court noted that the defendant failed to request an extension of time to file the motion, and therefore, the Town Court properly denied the motion as untimely. The Court relied on People v. Key, 45 NY2d 111, 116, which reinforces the importance of adhering to statutory deadlines for pre-trial motions. The Court stated, “CPL 255.20 (1) provides that ‘all pre-trial motions shall be served or filed within forty-five days after arraignment * * * or within such additional time as the court may fix upon application of the defendant’. Defendant’s motion to dismiss was made over three months after his arraignment and he did not request an extension of time. Hence, the Town Court properly denied defendant’s motion as untimely”. By reinstating the speeding conviction, the Court reinforced the principle that procedural rules must be followed, and failure to comply with statutory deadlines can result in waiver of legal arguments.