New York Law Review

Tag: Pre-Trial Identification

  • People v. Lynch, 23 N.Y.2d 262 (1968): Admissibility of Intoxication Defense & Pre-Trial Identification Procedures

    People v. Lynch, 23 N.Y.2d 262 (1968)

    A defendant’s intoxication may negate the specific intent required for first-degree murder, but the burden of proof remains on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and pre-trial identification procedures, while potentially suggestive, do not warrant reversal if harmless error.

    Summary

    Christopher Lynch was convicted of first-degree murder for fatally stabbing Andrew Mormile. The primary evidence was from an accomplice, Terry Toomer, corroborated by other passengers. Lynch argued the trial court erred in its charge on intoxication, refused to recall the jury after a prejudicial newspaper article, and denied discovery of Toomer’s statement to his lawyer. He also challenged pre-trial identification procedures and claimed pre-trial publicity prevented a fair trial. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding no reversible errors. The court held that while the intoxication charge was imperfect, it did not shift the burden of proof. Further, the court reasoned that the defendant’s arguments regarding the newspaper article, discovery denial, and pre-trial identification procedures lacked merit or were harmless errors given the overwhelming evidence against him.

    Facts

    On March 12, 1965, Christopher Lynch, 17, fatally stabbed Andrew Mormile, 17, on a subway train. Terry Toomer, Lynch’s accomplice, testified that they had been drinking together throughout the day. They accosted three girls on the train. Lynch then stabbed Mormile, who was sitting in the corner of the car, multiple times. Passengers corroborated Toomer’s testimony. A subway employee found a blood-stained knife at the station where Lynch and Toomer exited; Toomer identified it as Lynch’s. Lynch testified that while he was present, Toomer’s friend started the fight and he did not stab Mormile.

    Procedural History

    Lynch was convicted of first-degree murder in the Supreme Court and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion. Lynch appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing several errors at the trial level.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court’s charge to the jury on intoxication improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to recall the jury after the verdict to inquire about a prejudicial newspaper article.
    3. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant discovery of a statement made by the accomplice witness to his lawyer.
    4. Whether the pre-trial lineup and showup violated the defendant’s due process rights.

    Holding

    1. No, because the charge, taken in its entirety, did not shift the burden of proof and repeatedly instructed the jury on reasonable doubt.
    2. No, because the defendant did not assert that the jurors had read the article or formed an opinion as a result of reading it.
    3. No, because the attorney-client privilege was not waived and should be preserved, especially with respect to a criminal accomplice.
    4. No, because the errors, if any, were harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, including the defendant’s undisputed presence at the scene and the testimony of multiple eyewitnesses.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found the intoxication charge, although imperfect, did not shift the burden of proof, especially considering the repeated instructions on reasonable doubt. As for the newspaper article, the defendant failed to show that any juror read it or was influenced by it. The court upheld the denial of discovery of the accomplice’s statement to his lawyer, citing attorney-client privilege. The court acknowledged that the lineup and showup procedures may have been suggestive and potentially a denial of due process; however, the court ultimately deemed the error harmless.

    The court reasoned that the in-court identifications and testimony of multiple witnesses, including the girls and Magon, provided overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt. The witnesses were able to distinguish the “tall one” (the defendant) as the assailant. The court emphasized that the defendant’s own testimony placed him at the scene of the crime and, therefore, any error in the pre-trial identification was harmless. The court stated, “In view of the limited character of the testimony of those who had viewed the earlier lineup, the error was not prejudicial (Code Crim. Pro., § 542; cf. People v. Brown, 20 Y 2d 238, 243, 244).”

    Regarding the intoxication defense, the court stated, “The defendant’s testimony as to intoxication, even if uncontradicted, need not have been accepted by the jury (cf. People v. Koerber, 244 N.Y. 147, 155).” The court concluded that inconsistencies in witness testimony did not nullify their agreement on the assailant’s identity and the assault. Considering all evidence, there was no reversible error.

  • People v. Gunner, 27 N.Y.2d 529 (1970): Admissibility of Confessions After Filing of Information and Issuance of Warrant

    People v. Gunner, 27 N.Y.2d 529 (1970)

    Confessions obtained from a defendant after an information has been filed and an arrest warrant issued, in the absence of counsel, are inadmissible unless the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived their right to counsel.

    Summary

    Gunner was convicted of robbery. The conviction was appealed based on the admission of eleven inculpatory statements made without counsel and a police officer’s testimony regarding a pre-trial identification. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the eight statements made to New York officials after the filing of an information and issuance of an arrest warrant were inadmissible due to the absence of counsel, as the defendant’s purported waiver of counsel was invalid. The court also found that the admission of the police officer’s testimony regarding pre-trial identification was prejudicial error, especially given the questionable nature of the victim’s identification.

    Facts

    Seven months after an armed robbery in Westchester County, Gunner appeared at police headquarters in Cheyenne, Wyoming. He was arrested for vagrancy after admitting he “could be wanted for questioning”. Captain Smith and F.B.I. agent Jones interrogated Gunner. Conflicting testimonies emerged regarding whether Gunner requested a lawyer. He allegedly confessed to the robbery but refused to sign a statement. The Westchester police, informed of Gunner’s apprehension, filed an information against him and obtained an arrest warrant. Upon arrival in Cheyenne, they questioned Gunner, who confessed after being promised a meal. He was not provided a lawyer despite asking for one, being told to find one in a phonebook. On the return trip to New York, and upon arrival, Gunner confessed multiple times. He was eventually arraigned.

    Procedural History

    Gunner was convicted of robbery in the second degree. He challenged the voluntariness of his confessions in a post-trial hearing, which was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed both the conviction and the denial of post-conviction relief. Gunner then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the eleven inculpatory statements made by Gunner over the course of three weeks were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights and thus inadmissible as evidence?
    2. Whether the admission of testimony by a police officer regarding the complaining witness’s previous identification of Gunner constituted prejudicial error?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the eight statements made to New York officers after the filing of the information and issuance of an arrest warrant were inadmissible due to the absence of counsel, and Gunner did not validly waive his right to counsel.
    2. Yes, because the bolstering testimony regarding a prior identification was prejudicial, given the circumstances of the robbery and the doubts surrounding the victim’s identification of Gunner.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the vagrancy arrest in Wyoming was a pretext to enable custodial interrogation about the New York robbery charge. The eight statements made to the New York officers after the information was filed and the warrant obtained were inadmissible unless a valid waiver of counsel occurred. The court found no such valid waiver, stating that offering an indigent defendant a telephone book in a strange city does not constitute a meaningful opportunity to obtain counsel. Gunner’s attempts to seek legal assistance further undermined any finding of waiver. The court cited People v. Di Biasi, 7 NY 2d 544 and People v. Waterman, 9 NY 2d 561 to support the inadmissibility of post-indictment/information statements made in the absence of counsel.

    Regarding the identification testimony, the court cited People v. Trowbridge, 305 N.Y. 471 and stated that bolstering testimony is only permissible when identity is not a substantial issue or when the identification is attacked as a recent fabrication. Given the victim’s limited opportunity to view the robber and his uncertainty in identifying Gunner, coupled with the lack of an attack on the identification, the admission of the officer’s testimony was deemed prejudicial error. The court emphasized that if the inculpatory statements were excluded, the identification issue became crucial, exacerbating the prejudice caused by the erroneous admission. As stated by the court, “the right to counsel before defendant is questioned, after information and warrant proceedings but before arraignment, as here, is not waived where the indigent defendant, an adjudicated vagrant, has only the alternatives of proceeding without counsel or retaining a lawyer from a telephone book in a strange city.”