New York Law Review

Tag: Pre-Arraignment Interrogation

  • People v. D’Angelo, 41 N.Y.2d 638 (1977): Attachment of Right to Counsel Before Formal Proceedings

    People v. D’Angelo, 41 N.Y.2d 638 (1977)

    The right to counsel does not automatically attach simply because a suspect is in police custody awaiting arraignment; it requires the commencement of formal adversarial proceedings.

    Summary

    D’Angelo was arrested and, before arraignment, interrogated by an Assistant District Attorney after waiving his Miranda rights. He made an inculpatory statement, which he later sought to suppress, arguing his right to counsel had attached due to being in custody awaiting arraignment. The New York Court of Appeals held that the right to counsel had not attached because no accusatory instrument had been filed, and the delay in arraignment was not a deliberate attempt to circumvent his right to counsel but rather to comply with the terms of a federal grant. The court also rejected the argument that a showup identification was the product of an illegal detention, finding that the defendant consented to return to the scene of the crime.

    Facts

    Following his arrest and processing at the New York County Criminal Courts Building, the arresting officers went to the early case assessment bureau to sign a complaint against D’Angelo.
    Assistant District Attorney Mullady, who was on duty at the bureau, asked the officers to bring D’Angelo to him before any complaint was drawn.
    Mullady identified himself and gave D’Angelo his Miranda warnings, which D’Angelo waived, agreeing to answer questions.
    During this interrogation, D’Angelo made an inculpatory statement.
    D’Angelo was also taken back to Nathan’s restaurant, the scene of the robbery, where a witness identified him in a showup.

    Procedural History

    D’Angelo sought to suppress the inculpatory statement and the showup identification.
    The lower courts denied the motion to suppress.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision.
    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether D’Angelo’s constitutional right to counsel had attached solely because he was in police custody awaiting arraignment, precluding interrogation without counsel.
    Whether the showup identification should be suppressed as the product of an illegal detention.

    Holding

    No, because no accusatory instrument had been prepared or signed, meaning no criminal action had commenced. Furthermore, there was no evidence the delay in arraignment was designed to allow for prearraignment interrogation or to deprive D’Angelo of his right to counsel.
    No, because D’Angelo consented to accompany the officers back to the restaurant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the right to counsel does not attach merely from being in custody awaiting arraignment. The critical factor is the commencement of formal adversarial proceedings, which, under CPL 1.20(17), requires the preparation and signing of an accusatory instrument. The court distinguished the case from situations where delays in arraignment are used to facilitate prearraignment interrogation, finding instead that the delay was for the independent purpose of conforming to the terms of a federal grant.

    Regarding the showup identification, the court deferred to the affirmed finding of fact that D’Angelo had consented to return to the restaurant. This consent negated any claim of illegal detention.

    The court emphasized that “no decision in our court so holds” that the right to counsel attaches merely because a defendant is physically in police custody awaiting arraignment. The court requires some formal step in the adversarial process before this right is triggered. The court implies that the focus should be on preventing deliberate attempts by law enforcement to circumvent the defendant’s right to counsel, not on creating a blanket rule that prohibits any questioning before arraignment.

  • People v. Stanley, 24 N.Y.2d 146 (1969): Admissibility of Confessions After Warrant Issuance But Before Arraignment

    People v. Stanley, 24 N.Y.2d 146 (1969)

    The issuance of an arrest warrant does not automatically preclude police inquiry of the accused before arraignment; absent coercion or deprivation of rights, a confession obtained during this period is admissible.

    Summary

    Stanley was arrested on a warrant for sodomy and impairing a child’s morals. He confessed to the police after his arrest but before arraignment. In a coram nobis proceeding, Stanley argued his confession was inadmissible because it was obtained without counsel present and without him being advised of his rights. The court held that the confession was admissible, clarifying that the issuance of an arrest warrant does not create the same restrictions on police questioning as exist after arraignment. The court emphasized the importance of not discouraging warrant applications and the need to balance individual rights with effective law enforcement.

    Facts

    Defendant Stanley was arrested in January 1963 based on an arrest warrant. He was charged with sodomy in the second degree and impairing the morals of a child. After his arrest, but before being brought before a court for arraignment, the police questioned Stanley. During this interrogation, Stanley made a confession to the crimes he was charged with.

    Procedural History

    Stanley was convicted in 1963 and sentenced to prison. In 1966, Stanley filed a coram nobis proceeding challenging his conviction, arguing that his confession was inadmissible. The trial court denied the coram nobis petition, finding the confession voluntary. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. Stanley then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the issuance of an arrest warrant automatically prohibits police from questioning the accused before arraignment, rendering any confession obtained during that period inadmissible.

    Holding

    No, because treating the issuance of an arrest warrant as a formal commencement of a criminal action that precludes police inquiry without counsel would create an unnecessary distinction between arrests made with a warrant and those made on probable cause without a warrant, potentially discouraging the beneficial practice of obtaining warrants.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the issuance of a warrant does commence a criminal proceeding, it doesn’t automatically equate to the restrictions placed on police questioning after arraignment, where counsel is present. The court distinguished this situation from cases where defendants were questioned after indictment or after counsel had appeared for them, emphasizing that an information used to obtain a warrant is not the same as a formal charging document. The court stated, “If the issuance of an ordinary warrant of arrest by a Magistrate on complaint is to be treated for all purposes as such a formal commencement of the criminal action as to preclude any inquiry by police unless there is a lawyer present (as after an arraignment in court), it would draw an unnecessarily complicated difference between an arrest on warrant and an arrest on probable cause without warrant.” The court also highlighted that both warrant and warrantless arrests serve the same purpose: bringing the accused before a magistrate. Therefore, creating overly technical distinctions could discourage warrant applications, which provide a beneficial layer of judicial oversight. While acknowledging the importance of advising suspects of their rights, particularly in light of future Miranda requirements, the court concluded that a rigid rule prohibiting pre-arraignment questioning after a warrant has been issued would unduly hamper investigations. The court noted, “A rigid rule shutting off police inquiry to the accused arrested on warrant until counsel was present would unnecessarily hamper proper investigation and would throw out of true focus the minor differences between the two kinds of arrests.”