New York Law Review

Tag: Post-Release Supervision

  • People v. Williams, 14 N.Y.3d 198 (2010): Double Jeopardy and Resentencing After Release

    People v. Williams, 14 N.Y.3d 198 (2010)

    The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a court from resentencing a defendant to add a mandatory term of post-release supervision (PRS) after the defendant has served the determinate term of imprisonment and been released from confinement.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether it is permissible to impose post-release supervision (PRS) at resentencing for defendants who have already completed their prison terms and been released. The New York Court of Appeals held that resentencing to add PRS after a defendant has completed their original sentence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court reasoned that once a defendant is released from prison after serving their court-ordered sentence, they have a legitimate expectation of finality in that sentence, and adding PRS constitutes an impermissible second punishment. The Court reversed the Appellate Division orders in four cases and affirmed one case where prohibition was sought, discharging the defendants from PRS.

    Facts

    Five defendants were originally sentenced to determinate prison terms but did not have PRS formally pronounced as part of their sentences. After the defendants served their prison terms and were released, the Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) initiated resentencing proceedings under Correction Law § 601-d to add PRS. Some defendants had signed DOCS certificates acknowledging PRS before release. Defendant Williams had PRS mentioned during his plea, but it was not formally pronounced at sentencing. Defendant Rodriguez did not object at resentencing.

    Procedural History

    In *People v. Williams*, *People v. Hernandez*, *People v. Lewis*, and *People v. Rodriguez*, the sentencing courts resentenced the defendants to include PRS. The Appellate Division affirmed these resentencings. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal. In *Matter of Echevarria v. Marks*, the Appellate Division dismissed Echevarria’s Article 78 petition seeking to prevent resentencing, and the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a court from resentencing a defendant to add a mandatory term of PRS after the defendant has served the determinate term of imprisonment and been released from confinement.

    2. Whether the resentencing courts retained jurisdiction to modify the original judgments when the defendants had completed their original sentences.

    3. Whether Rodriguez preserved his double jeopardy claim for review.

    4. Whether Echevarria properly sought a writ of prohibition to prevent resentencing.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because after release from prison, a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence arises, and the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents reformation to attach a PRS component to the original completed sentence.

    2. No, because the Double Jeopardy Clause protects a defendant from being resentenced to a more severe punishment after serving the sentence of imprisonment and being released into the community, the resentencing courts did not retain jurisdiction.

    3. Yes, because Rodriguez’s double jeopardy claim implicates a fundamental mode of proceedings, it is reviewable absent preservation.

    4. No, because the record in this case does not indicate that the judge had considered whether it was appropriate to impose a term of PRS.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while courts have the inherent authority to correct illegal sentences, this power is limited by the Double Jeopardy Clause. CPL 440.40 does not limit the court’s ability to correct its own errors. Penal Law § 70.85 specifies a court may decline to impose PRS during resentencing only when the People issue the statutorily required consent. CPL 380.30 requires that sentences must be imposed “without unreasonable delay” (CPL 380.30 [1]), and there was no violation of the statute here. After reviewing federal precedent, the court found it persuasive and concluded that a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence arises after release from prison. State law permitted defendants’ release after having served substantial portions of their determinate prison terms. The administrative imposition by DOCS of any additional penalty other than that issued by the sentencing court is a nullity and cannot negate a defendant’s reasonable expectation that, once completed, the imposed sentence will not be increased.

    Since Rodriguez’s double jeopardy claim implicates a fundamental mode of proceedings, it is reviewable absent preservation. In Echevarria’s case, there was no need to seek prohibition relief before the court determined “the lawfulness of the sentence that was imposed” or whether it would accept the served sentence without a term of PRS.

  • People v. Boyd, 12 N.Y.3d 391 (2009): Consequences of Failing to Specify Post-Release Supervision Terms During Plea

    12 N.Y.3d 391 (2009)

    When a defendant pleads guilty to a determinate sentence, awareness of the post-release supervision (PRS) component is crucial for a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea; failure to advise on the specific PRS term requires resentencing, but not necessarily vacatur of the plea if the prosecution consents to removing PRS.

    Summary

    Defendant Boyd pleaded guilty to robbery with a promised 12-year sentence. The court mentioned mandatory post-release supervision (PRS) but didn’t specify the term. The Appellate Division reversed, vacated the plea, and reinstated the indictment, citing lack of understanding of the plea’s implications. The Court of Appeals modified the ruling. While reiterating the need for awareness of PRS, the court acknowledged a new statute allowing resentencing without PRS if the District Attorney consents. It remitted the case to the Supreme Court to consider the applicability and constitutionality of the new statute, potentially avoiding plea vacatur. The key is whether Boyd’s plea can be salvaged under the new law.

    Facts

    Boyd pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree robbery for four separate gunpoint robberies. During the plea allocution, the court mentioned post-release supervision (PRS) but did not specify the duration of the PRS term. At sentencing, the court did not pronounce the PRS terms.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s judgment, vacated Boyd’s plea and sentence, and reinstated the indictments. The Appellate Division held that Boyd did not have a complete understanding of the implications of the guilty plea. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and modified the Appellate Division’s order, remitting the case to the Supreme Court.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a trial court’s failure to specify the term of post-release supervision (PRS) during a plea allocution requires automatic vacatur of the plea and sentence.

    2. Whether Penal Law § 70.85, allowing resentencing to the original determinate term without PRS with the District Attorney’s consent, can be applied retroactively to rectify the omission of the PRS term during the initial sentencing and plea.

    Holding

    1. No, not necessarily because the case was remitted to determine applicability of Penal Law § 70.85.

    2. The court declined to determine the applicability or constitutionality of the statute without further development of the record at the trial court level.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged its prior holdings in People v. Catu and subsequent cases, emphasizing that a defendant must be aware of the PRS component of a determinate sentence to make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea. The Court noted, quoting People v. Catu, “Because a defendant pleading guilty to a determinate sentence must be aware of the postrelease supervision component of that sentence in order to knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently choose among alternative courses of action, the failure of a court to advise of postrelease supervision requires reversal of the conviction.” However, the court then addressed the newly enacted Penal Law § 70.85, designed to address such situations. This statute allows the trial court, with the District Attorney’s consent, to resentence the defendant to the original determinate sentence without PRS. The Court chose not to rule on the constitutionality of this new statute or its applicability to Boyd’s case, stating that these issues should be addressed by the Supreme Court in the first instance. The Court reasoned that the Supreme Court should determine whether Boyd could be granted specific performance of the plea agreement – a determinate sentence without PRS. The dissenting opinions argued both for and against immediate vacatur, highlighting the constitutional implications of the Catu violation versus the potential for the new statute to remedy the defect. Judge Pigott argued that the new law was unconstitutional as applied to this case because the plea was unconstitutionally obtained and the defendant is entitled to vacatur. Judge Smith argued the defendant should have made a motion to withdraw his plea. Ultimately, the majority opted for a remand, emphasizing the need for a fully developed record on the new statute’s application and constitutionality before appellate review.

  • People v. Sparber, 10 N.Y.3d 457 (2008): Consequences for Failure to Pronounce Post-Release Supervision at Sentencing

    10 N.Y.3d 457 (2008)

    When a sentencing court fails to pronounce a mandatory or discretionary term of post-release supervision (PRS) during sentencing, the proper remedy is to remit the case for resentencing so the court can properly pronounce the PRS term, rather than striking the PRS term altogether.

    Summary

    This case addresses the remedy when a sentencing court fails to pronounce a term of post-release supervision (PRS) as required by New York law. Several defendants argued that their PRS terms should be stricken because the sentencing courts did not orally pronounce them. The New York Court of Appeals held that the failure to pronounce the PRS term was a procedural error, but the correct remedy is resentencing to allow the court to properly pronounce the PRS term. Striking the PRS term would result in a sentence not contemplated by statute.

    Facts

    Five defendants were convicted of violent felonies. Under New York law, these convictions required a term of post-release supervision (PRS). In some cases, the PRS term was mandatory, while in others, the court had discretion to set the length of the PRS term within a statutory range. In all five cases, the sentencing courts failed to orally pronounce the PRS term during the sentencing hearing. In some cases, the PRS term was noted on court worksheets or commitment sheets, but not stated aloud in court. Defendant Sparber disavowed vacating his plea, seeking only to strike the PRS term.

    Procedural History

    In all five cases, the defendants appealed, arguing that the PRS term should be stricken from their sentences because it was not orally pronounced by the sentencing court. The Appellate Division rejected these arguments, holding that the PRS term was included by operation of law and that the clerk’s entry of the PRS term on the commitment sheet satisfied due process requirements. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal in all five cases.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a sentencing court’s failure to orally pronounce a term of post-release supervision (PRS) at the time of sentencing entitles the defendant to have the PRS term stricken from the sentence.

    2. Whether notation of the PRS term on court worksheets or commitment sheets, without oral pronouncement, constitutes a proper sentencing pronouncement.

    Holding

    1. No, because striking the PRS term would result in a sentence that does not comply with the statutory requirements for violent felony offenses.

    2. No, because sentencing is a uniquely judicial responsibility that must be carried out by the court in the defendant’s presence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Penal Law §§ 70.00(6) and 70.45(1) mandate a period of PRS for violent felony offenses, and CPL §§ 380.20 and 380.40 require the court to pronounce the sentence in the defendant’s presence. The court emphasized that sentencing is a judicial responsibility, not a clerical one, and that the PRS term must be orally pronounced to ensure transparency and allow the defendant to understand the full consequences of their conviction. The Court rejected the argument that notations on worksheets or commitment sheets could substitute for oral pronouncement. Citing People v. Sturgis, 69 N.Y.2d 816, 818 (1987), the court noted that where a sentence violates CPL 380.20, the proper remedy is vacatur of the sentence and remitter for resentencing.

    The Court stated, “These concerns are particularly acute where, as in the case of defendant Rodriguez, the PRS term may vary and must be set at the court’s discretion (see e.g. Penal Law § 70.45 [2] [b]-[f]). And, even in cases with mandatory PRS terms, the defendant still has a statutory right to hear the court’s pronouncement as to what the entire sentence encompasses, directly from the court.”

  • Garner v. New York State Department of Correctional Services, 10 N.Y.3d 358 (2008): Post-Release Supervision Must Be Judicially Imposed

    10 N.Y.3d 358 (2008)

    Only a sentencing judge, and not the Department of Corrections, has the authority to impose a period of post-release supervision (PRS) as part of a defendant’s sentence.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) can administratively add a mandatory period of post-release supervision (PRS) to a prisoner’s sentence when the sentencing judge did not pronounce that term. The Court of Appeals held that DOCS lacks the authority to impose PRS, as sentencing is a judicial function. The decision emphasizes that CPL 380.20 and 380.40 reserve sentencing authority, including PRS, exclusively to the sentencing judge. This case clarifies the division of power between the judiciary and administrative bodies in the context of criminal sentencing.

    Facts

    Elliott Garner pleaded guilty to second-degree attempted burglary and was sentenced to a five-year determinate prison term. Neither the plea allocution nor the sentencing hearing mentioned a mandatory five-year post-release supervision (PRS) term. The sentencing commitment order also omitted any reference to PRS. Garner signed a conditional release agreement including the PRS “under protest” upon release. His PRS was later revoked due to drug use.

    Procedural History

    Garner filed an Article 78 proceeding challenging DOCS’s authority to add the PRS term. The Supreme Court initially denied the petition as time-barred. The Appellate Division affirmed, arguing that DOCS was merely enforcing a statutorily mandated part of the sentence, not performing a judicial function. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that DOCS acted outside its jurisdiction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) has the authority to administratively add a mandatory period of post-release supervision (PRS) onto a defendant’s sentence when that term was not pronounced by the sentencing judge.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 380.20 and 380.40 collectively provide that only a judge may impose a PRS sentence, DOCS may not do so.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that by imposing the PRS term, DOCS was acting in a judicial capacity, which is beyond its jurisdiction. CPL 380.20 and 380.40 mandate that only the sentencing judge can pronounce the PRS component of a sentence. The court emphasized that sentencing is a judicial function, and DOCS’s authority is limited to inmates and correctional institutions. The court stated, “`prison officials are conclusively bound by the contents of commitment papers accompanying a prisoner’` and therefore DOCS must generally “comply with the plain terms of the last commitment order received” (Matter of Murray v Goord, 1 NY3d 29, 32 [2003]). The court also noted that PRS is a significant punishment component restricting an individual’s liberty, and a defendant has a statutory right to have that punishment imposed by the sentencing judge. The Court found the harm suffered by the petitioner was sufficiently grave and implicated the public interest in ensuring the regularity of sentencing. The court concluded that the petitioner lacked another adequate remedy because a CPL 440.20 proceeding would not apply to sentences imposed administratively by DOCS. The ruling was without prejudice to any ability of the People or DOCS to seek appropriate resentencing in the proper forum.

  • People v. Hill, 9 N.Y.3d 189 (2007): Failure to Advise on Post-Release Supervision Requires Plea Vacatur

    9 N.Y.3d 189 (2007)

    When a defendant pleads guilty to a determinate sentence, the court’s failure to advise the defendant about the mandatory post-release supervision (PRS) component requires vacatur of the plea, even if the ultimate sentence imposed, including PRS, is mathematically equivalent to the originally promised term of incarceration.

    Summary

    Defendant Hill pleaded guilty to first-degree rape and was promised a 15-year determinate sentence. The court did not mention a mandatory post-release supervision (PRS) term. Later, Hill learned from another inmate about the PRS and sought to withdraw his plea, arguing that he would not have pleaded guilty had he known about it. The trial court resentenced Hill to a shorter prison term plus PRS, totaling the original 15 years. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the failure to advise Hill of PRS at the time of the plea rendered the plea involuntary, requiring vacatur. This is required even if the modified sentence with PRS is mathematically equivalent to the original promised sentence because the constitutional defect lies in the plea itself, not merely the sentence.

    Facts

    Defendant was indicted on 32 counts related to the rape and sexual abuse of his daughter. During the trial, after his daughter testified, Defendant chose to plead guilty to first-degree rape in full satisfaction of the indictment. The court promised a 15-year determinate sentence. The court did not mention the mandatory five-year post-release supervision term.

    Procedural History

    The trial court accepted the guilty plea and sentenced Defendant to 15 years. Two years later, Defendant challenged the conviction, arguing his plea was involuntary due to the failure to inform him of the PRS. The trial court modified the sentence to 12.5 years imprisonment plus 2.5 years PRS. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, vacating the plea and remitting the case for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court’s failure to advise a defendant during a plea allocution about the mandatory post-release supervision (PRS) component of a determinate sentence requires vacatur of the guilty plea, even if the resentencing court modifies the sentence such that the total term of incarceration plus PRS equals the originally promised term of incarceration.

    Holding

    Yes, because a defendant pleading guilty to a determinate sentence must be aware of the PRS component of that sentence in order to knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently choose among alternative courses of action. The constitutional defect lies in the plea itself; therefore, harmless error analysis is inapplicable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that due process requires a guilty plea to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. A defendant must be informed of the direct consequences of the plea, which includes PRS for determinate sentences. The court cited People v. Catu, 4 N.Y.3d 242 (2005), stating, “[b]ecause a defendant pleading guilty to a determinate sentence must be aware of the postrelease supervision component of that sentence in order to knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently choose among alternative courses of action, the failure of a court to advise of postrelease supervision requires reversal of the conviction.”

    The Court rejected the argument that resentencing the defendant to a total term (incarceration plus PRS) equivalent to the original promise cured the error. It emphasized that the constitutional defect lies in the plea itself, not the sentence. Therefore, the remedy is vacatur of the plea, restoring the defendant to their pre-plea status. The court stated, “At the time defendant pleaded guilty, she did not possess all the information necessary for an informed choice among different possible courses of action because she was not told that she would be subject to mandatory postrelease supervision as a consequence of her guilty plea. Accordingly, defendant’s decision to plead guilty cannot be said to have been knowing, voluntary and intelligent.” People v. Van Deusen, 7 N.Y.3d 744 (2006).

    The dissent argued that specific performance (modifying the sentence to include PRS while maintaining the total term) should be an option, particularly when vacating the plea would prejudice the People. The majority countered that Catu and subsequent cases establish a bright-line rule requiring vacatur to remedy the constitutional violation in the plea process. The Court emphasized: “Catu, Van Deusen and Louree made clear that the courts violated the defendant’s due process rights—not the defendant’s sentencing expectations. Therefore, we vacated the defendants’ involuntary guilty pleas to remedy the constitutional violations.”

  • People v. Van Deusen, 6 N.Y.3d 744 (2005): Guilty Plea Requires Awareness of Post-Release Supervision

    6 N.Y.3d 744 (2005)

    A defendant pleading guilty to a determinate sentence must be aware of the post-release supervision component of that sentence in order to knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently choose among alternative courses of action.

    Summary

    Tammi Van Deusen pleaded guilty to first-degree robbery in exchange for a sentence of 5 to 15 years. Prior to sentencing, she moved to withdraw her plea, arguing the court failed to advise her she would be subject to mandatory post-release supervision (PRS). The County Court denied her motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed, noting that her actual prison term plus PRS was less than the agreed-upon maximum. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the failure to advise Van Deusen of the PRS component invalidated her guilty plea, regardless of whether the combined sentence was less than the agreed-upon maximum because a defendant must be fully aware of all direct consequences of a guilty plea.

    Facts

    Tammi Van Deusen was indicted on several charges, including felony murder, burglary, robbery, criminal use of a firearm, and conspiracy, related to a home invasion where a victim was killed. She pleaded guilty to first-degree robbery in exchange for a determinate sentence between 5 and 15 years. Prior to sentencing, Van Deusen moved to withdraw her guilty plea because the County Court did not inform her that she would be subject to mandatory post-release supervision (PRS) after her release from prison.

    Procedural History

    The County Court denied Van Deusen’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea and sentenced her to eight years’ imprisonment plus five years of PRS. The Appellate Division affirmed the County Court’s decision, concluding that Van Deusen was not deprived of the benefit of her plea bargain because the total period of punishment (imprisonment plus PRS) was less than the maximum 15 years she had agreed to. The New York Court of Appeals granted Van Deusen leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a guilty plea to a determinate sentence is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent when the defendant is not informed of the mandatory post-release supervision component of the sentence, even if the total period of punishment (imprisonment plus PRS) is less than the agreed-upon maximum period of incarceration?

    Holding

    No, because a defendant pleading guilty to a determinate sentence must be aware of the post-release supervision component to make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent choice among alternative courses of action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holding in People v. Catu, 4 N.Y.3d 242 (2005), which established that post-release supervision is a direct consequence of a conviction for a violent felony offense with a determinate sentence. The court emphasized that a defendant must possess all necessary information for an informed decision when choosing to plead guilty. The failure to inform Van Deusen of the mandatory PRS meant she did not have all the information necessary for an informed choice. Therefore, her decision to plead guilty could not be considered knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The Court stated that “Because a defendant pleading guilty to a determinate sentence must be aware of the postrelease supervision component of that sentence in order to knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently choose among alternative courses of action, the failure of a court to advise of postrelease supervision requires reversal of the conviction.” The court explicitly stated that the total length of the sentence being less than the negotiated maximum was irrelevant, as the key element was the defendant’s awareness of all direct consequences at the time of the plea. The Court’s decision ensures that defendants are fully aware of the consequences of their guilty pleas, thus protecting their due process rights and ensuring the integrity of the plea bargaining process.

  • People v. Catu, 4 N.Y.3d 242 (2005): Duty to Advise on Post-Release Supervision for Guilty Pleas

    4 N.Y.3d 242 (2005)

    A trial court’s failure to advise a defendant during a guilty plea allocution that a determinate sentence includes a mandatory period of post-release supervision requires reversal of the conviction, as such supervision is a direct consequence of the plea.

    Summary

    Defendant Catu pleaded guilty to attempted robbery and operating a vehicle under the influence, receiving a determinate sentence. The sentencing court failed to inform Catu that his sentence included a mandatory five-year period of post-release supervision. The New York Court of Appeals held that this omission was a reversible error because post-release supervision is a direct consequence of a guilty plea to a determinate sentence. A defendant must be fully aware of all direct consequences to make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea.

    Facts

    Catu was indicted on charges of robbery, operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, and related offenses. He pleaded guilty to attempted robbery and felony DWI in exchange for a determinate sentence of three years in prison and a $1,000 fine. As a second felony offender, Catu’s sentence included a mandatory five-year period of post-release supervision. The sentencing court did not advise Catu of this post-release supervision requirement during his plea allocution.

    Procedural History

    After sentencing, Catu appealed, arguing that the court’s failure to advise him of the post-release supervision required vacatur of his plea. The trial court and the Appellate Division refused to vacate the plea, arguing that Catu hadn’t demonstrated that he would have rejected the plea deal if he had known about the post-release supervision. The New York Court of Appeals then granted review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court’s failure to advise a defendant during a guilty plea allocution that a determinate sentence includes a mandatory period of post-release supervision requires reversal of the conviction.

    Holding

    Yes, because a defendant pleading guilty to a determinate sentence must be aware of the postrelease supervision component of that sentence in order to knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently choose among alternative courses of action; therefore, the failure of a court to advise of postrelease supervision requires reversal of the conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished between direct and collateral consequences of a guilty plea. It stated that while a court need not advise a defendant of collateral consequences, it must advise of direct consequences. Citing People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397 (1995), the court defined a direct consequence as one with a “definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on defendant’s punishment.” The court reasoned that post-release supervision, mandated by “Jenna’s Law,” is an integral part of a determinate sentence and therefore a direct consequence. The court emphasized that post-release supervision is significant, imposing conditions and potential re-incarceration for violations. Because a defendant must understand the plea’s consequences to make a voluntary and intelligent choice, the court held the failure to advise Catu of post-release supervision warranted reversal. The court explicitly rejected the lower courts’ requirement that Catu prove he would have rejected the plea had he known of the supervision, noting that “harmless error rules were designed to review trial verdicts and are difficult to apply to guilty pleas”. As the Court stated, “A trial court has the constitutional duty to ensure that a defendant, before pleading guilty, has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequences”.