New York Law Review

Tag: Possession of Stolen Goods

  • People v. Colon, 28 N.Y.2d 1 (1971): Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence in Stolen Property Cases

    People v. Colon, 28 N.Y.2d 1 (1971)

    In a prosecution for criminally buying, receiving, concealing, or withholding stolen property, the element of the property being stolen can be proven by circumstantial evidence, and the recent and exclusive possession of stolen property, if unexplained, justifies the inference that the possessor is a criminal.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the sufficiency of evidence required to convict individuals for receiving stolen property, specifically focusing on whether the element of the property being stolen could be proven circumstantially. The court held that the prosecution was not required to prove that someone other than the defendants committed the theft. Recent and exclusive possession of stolen property, if unexplained or falsely explained, justifies the inference that the possessor is a criminal, and the jury can determine whether the defendant is guilty as a thief or as a receiver.

    Facts

    Richard Lo Cicero, a messenger for Paine, Webber, Jackson and Curtis, left his office with stocks and bonds valued at $370,000 for delivery but never delivered them and disappeared. Detectives, posing as prospective buyers, met with several defendants to negotiate the purchase of securities. The defendants offered to sell securities, claiming they were stolen from a messenger on Wall Street a month prior. During a meeting at an apartment, one detective examined the securities and determined they matched the description of the missing securities. The defendants were later arrested in connection with the stolen securities.

    Procedural History

    Defendants Colon, Lo Ciceros, and Morelli were convicted in a jury trial of criminally buying and receiving stolen property and criminally concealing and withholding stolen property. Carol Bice’s conviction on the same charges was reversed by the Appellate Division, which dismissed the indictment. The defendants appealed their convictions, and the People appealed the reversal of Bice’s conviction, bringing the case before the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the property had been previously stolen by someone other than the accused to sustain a conviction for criminally buying, receiving, concealing, and withholding stolen property.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could consider a violation of Section 1300 of the former Penal Law (appropriating lost property) as the underlying larceny.

    3. Whether the People’s proof was insufficient as a matter of law on the issue of venue.

    Holding

    1. No, because the element of the property being stolen can be established through circumstantial evidence, and the recent and exclusive possession of stolen property, if unexplained, justifies the inference that the possessor is a criminal.

    2. No, because where the defense raises the possibility that the property was lost, the prosecution may comment on that possibility and inform the jury that the appropriation of lost property may constitute the underlying larceny.

    3. No, because the property was found in the defendant’s possession in Kings County, which allows the inference that the criminal receipt took place in that county.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that direct evidence of the theft is not required; circumstantial evidence is sufficient. The court cited People v. Berger, 285 N.Y. 811, and People v. Nazar, 305 N.Y. 751, to support this principle. The court emphasized that the unexplained disappearance of a large value of securities and the defendants’ attempts to sell them provided an adequate basis for the inference of theft. The court stated, “Surely $370,000 worth of securities do not by their own resources work their way into the possession of six individuals in Kings County.”

    The court also held that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on Section 1300 regarding lost property, as the defense had introduced the possibility that the property was lost. The court further stated that under an indictment pursuant to Section 1308, it is not incumbent upon the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the property was not stolen by the accused. “It is the law that the recent and exclusive possession of the fruits of a crime, if unexplained or falsely explained, will justify the inference that the possessor is a criminal,” quoting People v. Galbo, 218 N.Y. 283, 290.

    Addressing the venue issue, the court found that there was no proof of possession or receipt by defendants in New York County, but the defendants were found in possession of the securities and attempted to sell them in Kings County. Thus, the court reasoned, the inference that the receipt took place in Kings County was proper. The court stated, “Spivak simply stands for the proposition, asserted and reasserted by this court, that receiving is a local offense and must be tried in the county where the receipt took place.”

  • People v. Volpe, 20 N.Y.2d 10 (1967): Inference of Guilt from Possession of Stolen Goods

    People v. Volpe, 20 N.Y.2d 10 (1967)

    The inference of guilt arising from the recent and exclusive possession of stolen goods must be cautiously applied and requires evidence of truly substantial character to support a conviction, especially when the defendant provides a plausible explanation for their possession.

    Summary

    John Volpe was convicted of petit larceny based on the alleged theft of a crane. The prosecution relied on the principle that recent and exclusive possession of stolen goods, without adequate explanation, raises a presumption of guilt. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court reasoned that Volpe’s possession of the crane two weeks after the theft, his mounting it on his truck in plain view, and his explanation of purchasing it from a junk yard, weakened the presumption of guilt. The court also found his inconsistent statements to the detective not clearly indicative of guilt, particularly given that he owned two similar cranes.

    Facts

    Collazo and Colon reported a crane attached to their truck stolen. Two weeks later, Collazo identified his crane mounted on a truck belonging to Volpe parked near Collazo’s garage. Detective Hughes questioned Volpe, who initially claimed to have purchased the crane at an Esso station, providing a bill of sale. Volpe later admitted he bought the crane from “Butchy Pantorre” for $75 at a junk yard. Volpe testified he bought the crane from Pantorre for $25 as junk and that his friend, Bastogne, was with him and could corroborate the story. The crane needed significant repair before it was functional.

    Procedural History

    Volpe was convicted of petit larceny in the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Bronx County. He appealed the conviction, arguing insufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and dismissed the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence, specifically the defendant’s possession of the allegedly stolen crane and inconsistent explanations, was sufficient to prove petit larceny beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Holding

    No, because the inference of guilt arising from recent possession of stolen goods was weakened by the circumstances of Volpe’s possession and his explanation for it. The inconsistent statements were not clearly indicative of guilt, and the prosecution offered no substantial corroborating evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that the rule regarding possession of recently stolen goods should be applied cautiously. Citing People v. Richardson, the court noted that the concept of “recent” depends on the circumstances. Volpe’s actions differed from typical thief behavior; he didn’t try to quickly dispose of the crane. Instead, he mounted it on his truck in public view, near the owner’s garage, weakening the presumption of guilt. The court also considered Volpe’s explanation, finding it not entirely inadequate, especially since he presented a corroborating witness. Regarding Volpe’s inconsistent explanations, the court found them not definitively indicative of guilt, stating, “To draw an inference of guilt from inconsistent explanations, it must be absolutely clear that they are inconsistent. An inference may not be based upon another inference.” The court, quoting People v. Leyra, acknowledged the weakness of evidence reflecting a consciousness of guilt when unsupported by other substantial proof. The court concluded that the prosecution’s evidence lacked the “proof of a truly substantial character” required to sustain a conviction. Even if Pantorre testified against Volpe, the evidence’s sufficiency would remain questionable, making a new trial unwarranted.