New York Law Review

Tag: polygraph evidence

  • People v. Scott, 88 N.Y.2d 888 (1996): Specificity of Discovery Requests and Brady Material

    People v. Scott, 88 N.Y.2d 888 (1996)

    When a defendant makes a specific request for Brady material, the prosecution’s failure to disclose such evidence is judged by the “reasonable possibility” standard of prejudice, meaning there’s a reasonable possibility the trial outcome would have differed had the evidence been produced.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of manslaughter and weapons possession. He moved to vacate the conviction, arguing the prosecution failed to disclose Brady material – a “scratch” sheet referencing a polygraph examination of the sole eyewitness, Glenn Shaw. The defense had requested the polygraph report. The trial court granted a new trial, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding the request not specific enough. The Court of Appeals held the request was specific, triggering the “reasonable possibility” standard. However, it ultimately affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal because polygraph results are inadmissible, and evidence suggested the witness was truthful.

    Facts

    Glenn Shaw, the only eyewitness, testified he saw the defendant with a handgun and others running from the victim’s house after hearing a gunshot. Before trial, the defense requested the polygraph exam report of a confidential informant. A “homicide bureau information sheet” (the “scratch sheet”) alluded to Shaw’s polygraph test, stating he was possibly withholding information. This sheet was not disclosed to the defense.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of first-degree manslaughter and weapons possession. He moved to vacate the conviction under CPL 440.10, arguing a Brady violation. The trial court granted the motion for a new trial. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the discovery request not specific, and the stricter “reasonable probability” standard was not met. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defense counsel’s request for “a copy of the report of the polygraph exam(s) given to the confidential informant showing date(s) of exam and all results” constituted a specific request for Brady material.

    2. Whether, assuming a specific request, the failure to disclose the “scratch sheet” warranted a new trial.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the request provided specific notice of the defense’s desire for the witness’s polygraph test results.

    2. No, because polygraph evidence is inadmissible, and other evidence suggested the eyewitness was truthful, so there was no reasonable possibility that the outcome of the trial would have differed had the document been produced.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the defense’s request was specific because it provided particularized notice of the information sought, even if the defense didn’t know the document’s precise form. This specificity triggers the “reasonable possibility” standard for materiality under Brady. The Court cited People v. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 77, emphasizing that “heightened prosecutorial attention is appropriate” when the defense provides specific notice of its interest in particular material. However, the Court found that even under the “reasonable possibility” standard, a new trial was not warranted. The Court emphasized that “[a] polygrapher’s opinions regarding the witness’s veracity are not admissible evidence (see, People v Angelo, 88 NY2d 217).” Additionally, the assistant district attorney who prepared the document had no recollection of its source, and other evidence suggested the witness was truthful. Therefore, the court found no reasonable possibility that the trial outcome would have changed had the document been disclosed.

  • People v. Shedrick, 66 N.Y.2d 1015 (1985): Upholding Jury Selection from Jury Districts Within a County

    People v. Shedrick, 66 N.Y.2d 1015 (1985)

    The division of a county into jury districts for jury selection is permissible, absent a showing that the selection process results in a jury pool unrepresentative of a fair cross-section of the community, or that a particular segment of the community was deliberately excluded.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that selecting grand and petit jurors from jury districts within Steuben County, rather than the county-at-large, did not violate Judiciary Law article 16 or the defendants’ constitutional rights. The Court found that the jury district system, established in 1904, remained valid after the repeal of the enabling legislation in 1942, as the repealing legislation did not explicitly abolish existing districts. Furthermore, the Court stated that the defendants failed to demonstrate that the selected jurors were unrepresentative of the community or that any segment of the community was deliberately excluded. The Court also addressed evidentiary issues, finding no reversible error in the exclusion of polygraph results or evidence of a police scheme to place an informant in a cell.

    Facts

    Defendants in two separate cases, Robert and Wanda Shedrick, appealed their convictions, arguing that the selection of jurors from jury districts within Steuben County violated Judiciary Law article 16. Steuben County had been divided into three jury districts by the Board of Supervisors in 1904. Robert Shedrick also sought to introduce polygraph results, and Wanda Shedrick sought to introduce evidence of a police scheme to place an informant in Robert’s cell.

    Procedural History

    The defendants appealed their convictions, arguing that the jury selection process was flawed and raising evidentiary issues. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and consolidated the cases for review.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the selection of grand and petit jurors from jury districts within Steuben County, rather than the county-at-large, violated Judiciary Law article 16.
    2. Whether the jury selection process resulted in a jury unrepresentative of a fair cross-section of the community, violating the defendants’ constitutional rights.
    3. Whether the trial court erred in excluding the results of a polygraph examination offered by defendant Robert Shedrick.
    4. Whether the trial court denied due process to defendant Wanda Shedrick by refusing to admit evidence of a police scheme.

    Holding

    1. No, because Judiciary Law article 16 does not unequivocally require juries to be drawn from a pool of residents throughout the entire county and does not mandate the abolition of existing jury district systems.
    2. No, because the defendants failed to demonstrate that the selected jurors were unrepresentative or that any segment of the community was deliberately excluded.
    3. No, because the reliability of polygraph examinations has not been demonstrated with sufficient certainty to be admissible in New York State.
    4. No, because the evidence of the police scheme was purely collateral to the issues at trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the 1942 repeal of the legislation enabling the creation of jury districts did not automatically abolish districts already lawfully created. The Court interpreted Judiciary Law article 16 as not explicitly requiring jury pools to be drawn from the entire county. The Court emphasized that the defendants failed to prove the jury selection process resulted in an unrepresentative jury or deliberate exclusion of any community segment.

    Regarding the evidentiary issues, the Court cited established precedent holding polygraph results inadmissible due to their unproven reliability. Regarding Wanda Shedrick’s due process claim, the Court found that evidence of the police scheme was collateral and properly excluded, especially since no information was obtained or introduced as a result of the scheme.

    The court cited People v Guzman, 60 NY2d 403, 409-410, regarding the constitutional claims and People v Tarsia, 50 NY2d 1, 7 and People v Leone, 25 NY2d 511, 517 regarding the inadmissibility of polygraph results. The Court stated, “There is no unequivocal requirement that juries be drawn from a pool of residents from throughout the entire county wherein the court convenes and, moreover, there is no provision in any section of article 16 clearly expressing or implying a legislative mandate that any existing jury district system, previously established pursuant to prior legislation, be abolished.”