White v. Long, 85 N.Y.2d 564 (1995)
Under New York Navigation Law § 181, a current property owner deemed a ‘discharger’ due to contamination can sue a prior owner who actually caused the discharge for cleanup and removal costs, even if the current owner is also strictly liable.
Summary
White purchased property from Long, a prior gas station operator, and discovered a leaking underground storage tank requiring costly remediation. White, considered a ‘discharger’ under the Navigation Law, was denied reimbursement from the New York State Environmental Protection and Spill Compensation Fund. White then sued Long to recover cleanup costs under Navigation Law § 181. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Navigation Law allows a current landowner, even if deemed a ‘discharger’, to sue a prior owner-discharger for cleanup costs. The court reasoned that precluding such suits would undermine the law’s purpose of prompt environmental cleanup by removing the incentive for current owners to remediate promptly.
Facts
Long operated a gas station on the property from approximately 1984 to 1987. White contracted to buy the property from Midstate Enterprises in 1987, with the intention of opening a Kentucky Fried Chicken franchise. The sale contract was contingent on a clean environmental report. Groundwater Technology tested soil samples at locations identified by Long, who disclosed six underground storage tanks. A low level of aromatic hydrocarbons was detected, but the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) did not require remediation at that time. White waived the contract conditions and purchased the property. During excavation for the restaurant, White discovered a seventh, leaking, underground petroleum storage tank. The DEC ordered remediation, and White removed the tank and cleaned up the land at a cost exceeding $100,000.
Procedural History
White’s application for reimbursement from the New York State Environmental Protection and Spill Compensation Fund was denied because White, as the property owner, was considered a ‘discharger’ and thus precluded from recovering from the Fund. White’s CPLR article 78 petition challenging this denial was dismissed by the trial court and affirmed by the Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. White then sued Long in Supreme Court alleging strict liability under the Navigation Law, as well as common-law claims. The Supreme Court dismissed the common law claims but denied summary judgment on the Navigation Law claim. The Appellate Division dismissed all of White’s claims. The Court of Appeals reinstated White’s Navigation Law claim.
Issue(s)
Whether Navigation Law § 181 allows a property owner, deemed a ‘discharger’ due to contamination on their property, to bring a private cause of action against a prior owner who actually discharged the petroleum, to recover cleanup and removal costs.
Holding
Yes, because the Navigation Law provides a private cause of action without denying standing to a property owner deemed a discharger to sue another discharger in strict liability for clean-up costs, particularly when the current owner did not cause or contribute to the discharge.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court focused on the plain language of Navigation Law § 181(1), which imposes liability on any discharger for cleanup costs “no matter by whom sustained,” and subdivision (5), which permits “any injured person” to bring a claim against a discharger. The court noted that subdivision (5) was added in 1991 to establish a private right of action. The court reasoned that while owners of contaminated land may be deemed “dischargers” for their own liability under section 181(1), this does not preclude them from suing those who actually caused or contributed to the discharge, provided they themselves are not responsible for it. To preclude reimbursement in that situation would significantly diminish the reach of section 181(5). The court emphasized the Navigation Law’s purpose of prompt and effective cleanup of environmental pollutants. Allowing a cause of action against other potentially liable parties incentivizes the current owner to promptly effect cleanup. As the court stated, “With the assurance that a cause of action is available against other potentially liable parties, the current owner of contaminated property will have the best incentive to effect cleanup as soon as possible, in order to use the property.” The Court distinguished this case from State of New York v King Serv., noting that the latter involved a claim by the State to recover from the fund. The court clarified that permitting a discharger who has paid for remediation to sue other responsible dischargers does not negate its own liability. The court dismissed the argument that a party who cannot bring a claim against the Fund should not be able to bring private claims against other responsible parties, pointing out that the Legislature amended the definition of “claim” in 1991 to clarify that a party bringing suit against a private party need not first seek recovery from the Fund.