New York Law Review

Tag: Police Officer Injury

  • Matter of Diegelman v. City of Buffalo, 28 N.Y.3d 1011 (2016): Police Officer’s Right to Sue Employer for Duty-Related Injuries Despite Receiving GML 207-c Benefits

    Matter of Diegelman v. City of Buffalo, 28 N.Y.3d 1011 (2016)

    A police officer who receives benefits under General Municipal Law (GML) § 207-c for a duty-related injury is not barred from bringing a claim against their employer under GML § 205-e, particularly when the municipality does not provide workers’ compensation benefits.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a police officer, injured on the job and receiving benefits under GML § 207-c, could sue the City of Buffalo under GML § 205-e for injuries allegedly caused by the City’s negligence. The Court determined that the GML § 205-e proviso, which bars workers’ compensation recipients from suing their employers, does not extend to officers receiving § 207-c benefits. The Court emphasized that the Legislature intended to create a broad right of action for police officers under § 205-e and that the two statutory schemes, § 205-e and § 207-c, are independent, each with distinct purposes and eligibility standards. The ruling clarifies that municipalities that do not provide workers’ compensation are subject to § 205-e claims from officers receiving § 207-c benefits.

    Facts

    James R. Diegelman, a former police officer for the City of Buffalo, was diagnosed with mesothelioma, allegedly due to asbestos exposure during his employment. He and his wife sought permission to file a late notice of claim against the City, claiming the City’s negligence caused his illness. The City opposed, arguing that GML § 207-c provided the exclusive remedy. The Supreme Court granted the application; the Appellate Division reversed, agreeing with the City that the claim was meritless due to § 207-c’s exclusivity. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Procedural History

    1. Supreme Court: Granted claimants’ application for permission to serve a late notice of claim.

    2. Appellate Division, Fourth Department: Reversed the Supreme Court’s decision, holding that the claim was barred by GML § 207-c and denying the application.

    3. Court of Appeals: Granted claimants’ motion for leave to appeal, resulting in the current decision reversing the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a police officer receiving benefits under GML § 207-c is barred from bringing a claim against their employer under GML § 205-e.

    Holding

    1. No, because the proviso in GML § 205-e, which restricts claims by recipients of workers’ compensation, does not extend to those receiving benefits under GML § 207-c.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court focused on the interplay between GML §§ 205-e and 207-c, as well as the Workers’ Compensation Law. It recognized that GML § 205-e allows police officers to sue for injuries caused by statutory or regulatory violations. It contrasted this with GML § 207-c, which provides salary and medical benefits for duty-related injuries. The Court emphasized that while workers’ compensation benefits are generally the exclusive remedy against an employer, the proviso in § 205-e prohibiting such claims does not apply to officers receiving § 207-c benefits. The Court argued that the two statutory schemes are distinct, with different eligibility criteria and purposes. Specifically, it noted that workers’ compensation benefits require an injury “arising out of and in the course of employment” while § 207-c benefits require an injury sustained “in the performance of his or her duties.” The Court observed that since the City of Buffalo did not provide workers’ compensation, the proviso in § 205-e did not preclude Diegelman’s claim. The Court also pointed out the legislative history of § 205-e, which demonstrated an intent to expand the rights of police officers to sue for injuries caused by employer negligence and concluded that the City’s interpretation would undermine the statute’s remedial purpose.

    The Court quoted the statute’s language: “In addition to any other right of action or recovery under any other provision of law” (General Municipal Law § 205-e [1]).

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies the availability of GML § 205-e claims for police officers, particularly in municipalities that do not provide workers’ compensation coverage. It establishes that receiving GML § 207-c benefits does not automatically bar a police officer from suing the employer under § 205-e for injuries caused by the employer’s violations. This means attorneys should advise their clients of this right and must carefully consider the specific statutory violations which are at the heart of a potential GML § 205-e action. Municipalities, especially those without workers’ compensation coverage, face greater potential liability for duty-related injuries to their police officers. Later cases have cited this case to reinforce that the receipt of GML § 207-c benefits does not preclude a police officer from pursuing a claim under GML § 205-e.

  • Gammons v. City of New York, 24 N.Y.3d 189 (2014): Labor Law § 27-a as a Predicate for General Municipal Law § 205-e Actions

    24 N.Y.3d 189 (2014)

    Labor Law § 27-a (3)(a)(1), which mandates employers to provide a workplace free from recognized hazards, can serve as a valid predicate for a cause of action under General Municipal Law § 205-e for police officers injured in the line of duty.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether Labor Law § 27-a, specifically its general duty clause, could serve as a predicate for a police officer’s claim under General Municipal Law (GML) § 205-e. The plaintiff, a police officer, was injured while loading barriers onto a truck. The Court held that Labor Law § 27-a(3)(a)(1), which requires employers to provide a safe workplace, could serve as a valid predicate for a GML § 205-e claim. The Court emphasized the legislative intent behind GML § 205-e to provide broad protection for police officers and the expansive interpretation that the courts must apply to the statute. The Court found that Labor Law § 27-a imposed a clear legal duty, satisfying the requirements for a GML § 205-e predicate. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was denied because the plaintiff’s injury was, at least arguably, caused by the truck being improperly equipped, thus presenting a recognized hazard.

    Facts

    Allison Gammons, a New York City police officer, was injured while working on a "barrier truck detail." She was loading wooden barriers onto a police flatbed truck when another officer pushed a barrier into her, causing her to fall off the truck. Gammons claimed the truck was unsafe because it was too short, lacked a tailgate and adequate side railings. She sued the City of New York and the Police Department, alleging common law negligence and a violation of GML § 205-e, based on the alleged unsafe condition of the truck and violation of Labor Law § 27-a(3)(a)(1). Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the general duty clause of Labor Law § 27-a could not serve as a statutory predicate for a GML § 205-e cause of action, and that the plaintiff failed to establish a “recognized hazard”.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that Labor Law § 27-a (3) (a) (1) may serve as a predicate for a violation of GML § 205-e. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The Appellate Division granted defendants leave to appeal on a certified question whether the court properly affirmed the denial of defendants' summary judgment motion to dismiss plaintiff's GML § 205-e claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Labor Law § 27-a (3) (a) (1), the general duty clause of the Public Employee Safety and Health Act (PESHA), can serve as a predicate for a claim under GML § 205-e.

    2. Whether the plaintiff established a violation of Labor Law § 27-a (3) (a) (1) by demonstrating a “recognized hazard” in the workplace.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Court held that Labor Law § 27-a (3) (a) (1) contains a clear legal duty that may serve as a predicate for a GML § 205-e claim.

    2. The court found that defendants failed to meet their burden to establish that the plaintiff's injuries were not caused by a "recognized hazard."

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analyzed the legislative history and purpose of GML § 205-e. The Court emphasized that the Legislature intended a broad application of GML § 205-e to protect police officers. The Court reviewed prior cases which discussed legislative amendments meant to broaden police officers’ rights to sue for injuries. The Court noted that these amendments were enacted to counteract judicial decisions limiting the application of GML § 205-e, emphasizing the legislative goal of providing a cause of action for police officers. The Court referred to cases, such as Williams v. City of New York, that directed the courts to apply GML § 205-e "’expansively’ so as to favor recovery by police officers whenever possible."

    The Court addressed the question of whether Labor Law § 27-a (3) (a) (1) could serve as a predicate for a GML § 205-e claim. The Court held that it could, reasoning that Labor Law § 27-a contained a clear legal duty. Specifically, it stated that "[e]very employer shall: (1) furnish to each of its employees, employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to its employees and which will provide reasonable and adequate protection to the lives, safety or health of its employees." The Court found that this imposed a clear legal duty, despite being general in nature.

    The Court distinguished the case from Williams, noting that the plaintiff’s claim involved an improperly equipped vehicle, which the Court said could be an occupational injury covered by PESHA. The Court also rejected the argument that Labor Law § 27-a could not serve as a predicate because the Commissioner of Labor had sole authority over enforcement, noting that GML § 205-e allows courts to consider noncompliance with statutes and regulations as evidence of negligence. Dissenting, Judge Pigott argued that a plaintiff should cite to a specific regulation violated to meet the threshold under GML § 205-e when using Labor Law § 27-a as a predicate.

  • Mullen v. City of New York, 14 N.Y.3d 190 (2010): Applying the Firefighter Rule to On-Duty and Off-Duty Police Officers

    Mullen v. City of New York, 14 N.Y.3d 190 (2010)

    The “firefighter rule” bars common-law negligence recovery by firefighters and police officers for injuries resulting from risks associated with their employment, even when not technically on duty, if the injury arises from a risk inherent in police work.

    Summary

    A police officer, while entering the parking lot of the New York City Police Headquarters, was injured when a security gate, designed to prevent car bombs, malfunctioned and lifted his car. The officer sued the City and Police Department for negligence. The New York Court of Appeals held that the “firefighter rule” barred the officer’s recovery because the injury resulted from a risk associated with the inherent dangers of police work, regardless of whether the officer was technically on duty at the time. The court emphasized the heightened risk faced by police officers encountering such security devices.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, a commanding officer, was driving into the parking lot of the New York City Police Headquarters. The parking lot was protected by a retractable concrete barrier designed to stop car bombs. Plaintiff showed his credentials, and the barrier was lowered, but then it unexpectedly rose again while his car was passing over it. The front of the car was lifted approximately four feet, and the plaintiff sustained injuries.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued the City and the Police Department for negligence. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the defendants based on the firefighter rule. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the “firefighter rule” bars a police officer’s recovery for injuries sustained due to the negligent operation of a security device at police headquarters, when the officer was not technically on duty but entering the facility using his police credentials.

    Holding

    Yes, because the injury arose from a risk “associated with the particular dangers inherent” in police work, specifically the heightened risk of encountering security devices protecting police facilities from terrorist attacks.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the firefighter rule as articulated in Zanghi v Niagara Frontier Transp. Commn., which states that police officers may not recover in common-law negligence for line-of-duty injuries resulting from risks associated with the particular dangers inherent in that type of employment. The court distinguished between situations where an officer’s duties increased the risk of injury and those where the duties merely furnished the occasion for the injury. The court stated, “[W]here some act taken in furtherance of a specific police or firefighting function exposed the officer to a heightened risk of sustaining the particular injury, he or she may not recover damages for common-law negligence.”

    The court found that the high-security device protecting the police headquarters parking lot was plainly a risk “associated with the particular dangers inherent” in police work. While ordinary civilians might encounter such devices, police officers are far more likely to do so, especially when working in secure areas at risk of terrorist attacks. The court emphasized that the officer’s entry into the protected parking lot, permitted only by his police credentials, exposed him to this risk.

    The court dismissed the plaintiff’s argument that he was not technically “on duty” at the time of the injury, stating that the nature of the risk, rather than the officer’s duty status, is dispositive. Police officers often face significant risks even when not technically at work. The court concluded that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the firefighter rule because the injury stemmed from a risk inherent to police work.

  • McCormick v. City of New York, 8 N.Y.3d 355 (2007): Establishing Liability for Police Officer Injuries Under General Municipal Law § 205-e

    McCormick v. City of New York, 8 N.Y.3d 355 (2007)

    To establish liability against an employer or co-employee under General Municipal Law § 205-e for injuries sustained by a police officer, the plaintiff must demonstrate a violation of a statute imposing clear duties, and a rebuttable presumption exists that the Penal Law has not been violated if no criminal charges were brought.

    Summary

    These consolidated appeals concern wrongful death claims brought under General Municipal Law § 205-e following the deaths of three New York City police officers. In McCormick, an officer was killed during a drug raid by friendly fire. In Williams, two officers were killed by a prisoner who obtained a weapon from an unsecured locker. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the Penal Law can serve as a predicate for § 205-e liability, the plaintiff in McCormick failed to prove a Penal Law violation. The court also held that Labor Law § 27-a did not apply to the uniquely dangerous aspects of police work, and thus the plaintiff in Williams also failed to prove a violation. Thus, in both cases, the claims were dismissed.

    Facts

    McCormick: During a no-knock drug raid, Officer Huvane encountered a pregnant woman, Perez, with a gun. A struggle ensued, and both Huvane and Perez fired their weapons. Sergeant McCormick was fatally struck by a bullet fired during the confrontation. Perez was charged with crimes related to the incident, but was acquitted of all crimes related to McCormick’s death, except for criminal possession of a weapon.

    Williams: Detectives Williams and Guerzon transported a prisoner, Harrison, to the DA’s office. Harrison, while handcuffed, managed to retrieve a revolver from an unsecured locker in the detention area. On the return trip to Rikers Island, Harrison shot and killed Williams and Guerzon. Harrison was convicted of murder.

    Procedural History

    McCormick: The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the City, finding the officers were justified in using deadly force. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that an unproven Penal Law violation cannot support a § 205-e claim.

    Williams: The jury found the City liable for violating Labor Law § 27-a and Administrative Code provisions. The Appellate Division reversed, finding no evidence the locker room was maintained unsafely and that Labor Law § 27-a did not apply to the use of the room.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether alleged violations of the Penal Law can serve as a predicate for liability under General Municipal Law § 205-e.

    2. Whether Labor Law § 27-a and Administrative Code provisions can serve as a predicate for liability under General Municipal Law § 205-e where police officers were killed by a prisoner who obtained a weapon from an unsecured locker.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a claim may be predicated on a violation of those Penal Law sections that prohibit specific acts; however, in the absence of a criminal conviction, a rebuttable presumption exists that the Penal Law has not been violated.

    2. No, because Labor Law § 27-a does not cover the special risks faced by police officers, and the Administrative Code provisions do not apply to the facts presented.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analyzed the requirements for a claim under General Municipal Law § 205-e, emphasizing the need to identify a statute or ordinance with which the defendant failed to comply. The court clarified that while the statute’s language is broad, it cannot be applied literally. A police officer must demonstrate injury resulting from negligent noncompliance with a clear duty imposed by a well-developed body of law.

    Regarding the Penal Law, the court held that while justification defenses alone cannot form the basis of a § 205-e claim, violations of specific Penal Law sections prohibiting certain acts can. However, the court established a rebuttable presumption that the Penal Law has not been violated if no criminal charges were brought against the defendant. In this case, the plaintiff failed to rebut this presumption with compelling evidence demonstrating a material question of fact as to whether the conduct was criminal and not justified. The officers acted in self-defense when confronted with a suspect wielding a gun.

    Regarding Labor Law § 27-a, the court reasoned that this provision, designed to provide public employees with workplace protections similar to those in the private sector, does not extend to the unique risks inherent in police work. The court stated, “We think it highly unlikely that the Legislature intended the general language of section 27-a to authorize Department of Labor inspectors enforcing PESHA to second-guess the decisions of police supervisors” regarding sensitive matters like weapons storage and prisoner detention. The court distinguished this case from Balsamo v. City of New York, noting that the injury in Williams arose from risks unique to police work, not from a general workplace hazard.

  • Ruotolo v. City of New York, 740 N.E.2d 586 (1993): Application of the Firefighter’s Rule to Police Officers

    Ruotolo v. City of New York, 740 N.E.2d 586 (1993)

    The “firefighter’s rule,” which generally prevents firefighters and police officers from recovering damages for injuries resulting from the special risks inherent in their duties, applies to injuries sustained while responding to emergency calls, even if the injury is caused by the negligence of a fellow officer, provided the injury is related to the inherent risks of police duty.

    Summary

    A police officer, Ruotolo, was injured when the police vehicle in which she was riding collided with another vehicle while responding to an emergency call. She sued the City, alleging negligence. The New York Court of Appeals held that the “firefighter’s rule” (extended to police officers via Santangelo v. State of New York) barred her claim because her injuries resulted from a risk inherent in police duties—responding to emergencies. The court rejected the argument that the negligence of a fellow officer created an exception to the rule, clarifying that the critical factor is the connection between the injury and the special hazards assumed as part of police duties. The ruling emphasizes the policy that police officers are trained and compensated to confront such risks.

    Facts

    On December 14, 1984, Ruotolo was working as a police officer, serving as a recorder in a patrol car driven by Officer Bakal.
    Responding to a top-priority “officer in need of assistance” call (“1013” call), the officers drove at approximately 40 mph with flashing lights and sirens.
    Their vehicle collided with a car stopped at a red light; Ruotolo sustained injuries.
    Conflicting evidence existed regarding whether the other driver had changed lanes improperly prior to the impact.

    Procedural History

    Ruotolo sued the City of New York, Officer Bakal, and the driver of the other vehicle. The City moved to dismiss based on the Santangelo rule, but the trial court denied the motion.
    The jury found Officer Bakal solely negligent and exonerated the other driver. The trial court denied the City’s renewed motion to dismiss but reduced the damages award.
    The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision and dismissed the complaint, applying the Santangelo rule.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the “firefighter’s rule” (as extended to police officers) bars recovery for injuries sustained while responding to an emergency call, even when the injury is caused by the negligence of a fellow officer?

    2. Whether a “separate and distinct” exception to the firefighter’s rule exists when the negligence causing the injury is distinct from the event necessitating the emergency response?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the injury was related to a particular risk that she had assumed as part of her duties, specifically the possibility of injury while rushing to the scene of an emergency.

    2. No, because such an exception would be inconsistent with the rationale of Santangelo. The determinative factor is whether the injury sustained is related to the particular dangers which police officers are expected to assume as part of their duties.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court based its reasoning on the principles established in Santangelo, which extended the “firefighter’s rule” to police officers. The rule is grounded in the public policy that officers, trained and compensated to confront dangers, should not recover for injuries stemming from the situations that necessitate their services. The court emphasized that responding to emergencies inherently involves risks, such as collisions, which officers are expected to assume.

    The court rejected the “separate and distinct” exception, stating it was inconsistent with Santangelo. The critical factor is the relationship between the injury and the inherent risks of police duty. The court stated that, “the determinative factor is whether the injury sustained is related to the particular dangers which police officers are expected to assume as part of their duties.”

    Regarding the fellow-servant argument, the court clarified that abrogating the common-law fellow-servant doctrine does not automatically create liability for all fellow-servant negligence claims. It emphasized that the Santangelo rule bars claims arising from the special hazards inherent in police functions, regardless of whether the negligence is by a third party or a fellow officer. To carve out such an exception, would create an “obvious anomaly” according to the court.

    The Court emphasized the narrow scope of the ruling, specifying that it only applies to claims arising from the special hazards inherent in police functions and doesn’t impact other negligence claims outside the scope of the Santangelo rule.

  • Lichtenstein v. Board of Trustees, 57 N.Y.2d 1010 (1982): Defining ‘Accidental Injury’ for Disability Retirement

    Lichtenstein v. Board of Trustees, 57 N.Y.2d 1010 (1982)

    For purposes of accidental disability retirement benefits, an ‘accident’ is defined as a sudden, fortuitous mischance, unexpected, out of the ordinary, and injurious in impact.

    Summary

    This case defines the term “accident” within the context of New York City Administrative Code § B18-43.0, concerning accidental disability retirement for city employees. The Court of Appeals held that a police officer who sustained a back injury while performing a routine task (leaning over a car hood to place a summons) did not suffer an “accidental injury” as contemplated by the statute. The injury was not the result of a sudden, unexpected event, but rather an ordinary activity performed in the course of his duties.

    Facts

    The petitioner, a New York City police officer, injured his back while leaning over the hood of an automobile to place a summons on the vehicle. He subsequently applied for accidental disability retirement benefits, claiming the injury incapacitated him from performing his duties.

    Procedural History

    The Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund denied the petitioner’s application for accidental disability retirement benefits. The Appellate Division reversed the Board’s decision. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the Board’s original determination.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a back injury sustained while leaning over the hood of an automobile in order to place a summons on the vehicle constitutes an “accidental injury” within the meaning of New York City Administrative Code § B18-43.0, thereby entitling the petitioner to accidental disability retirement benefits.

    Holding

    No, because the injury occurred without an unexpected event as a result of activity undertaken in the performance of ordinary employment duties. The injury, therefore, does not qualify as an accidental injury within the meaning of section B18-43.0.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals adopted a “commonsense definition” of accident, defining it as a “sudden, fortuitous mischance, unexpected, out of the ordinary, and injurious in impact” quoting Johnson Corp. v Indemnity Ins. Co. of North Amer., 6 AD2d 97, 100, affd 7 NY2d 222. The court reasoned that not every line-of-duty injury qualifies for accidental disability retirement; the injury must result from an accident. The court emphasized that the 1940 amendment to the statute added the express requirement that the line-of-duty injury be incurred as the result of an accident. The court distinguished between injuries resulting from unexpected events and those that occur as a result of ordinary job duties. Because the police officer’s injury resulted from a common task, and not from an unexpected event, the court determined that it did not meet the definition of an accidental injury. The court cited similar cases, like Matter of Covel v New York State Employees’ Retirement System, 84 AD2d 902, mot for lv to app den 55 NY2d 606 and Matter of Panek v Regan, 81 AD2d 738, for comparison. The Court explicitly stated that “an injury which occurs without an unexpected event as the result of activity undertaken in the performance of ordinary employment duties, considered in view of the particular employment in question, is not an accidental injury within the meaning of section B18-43.0”.