New York Law Review

Tag: Police Discretion

  • Johnson v. City of New York, 15 N.Y.3d 676 (2010): Police Discretion and Duty of Care During Firearm Discharge

    15 N.Y.3d 676 (2010)

    A municipality is shielded from liability for its employees’ actions involving professional judgment, provided such judgment is exercised in compliance with the municipality’s established procedures.

    Summary

    In 2005, New York City police officers responded to a report of an attempted armed robbery. During the pursuit and subsequent shootout with the suspect, the plaintiff, Tammy Johnson, was injured by an errant bullet. Johnson sued the City, alleging negligence and violation of police department guidelines on the use of deadly force. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the officers acted within their professional judgment and did not violate police guidelines, as they testified they did not see any bystanders in the area when discharging their weapons. This case highlights the balance between police discretion in dangerous situations and the duty to protect innocent bystanders.

    Facts

    On May 27, 2005, NYPD officers received a complaint about an attempted armed robbery. Officers pursued a suspect who subsequently fired at them. The officers returned fire. Plaintiff Tammy Johnson, who was nearby with her child, was struck by an errant bullet during the exchange. Johnson and her daughter were taking cover behind an SUV. The officers testified that they did not see any bystanders when they fired at the suspect.

    Procedural History

    Johnson sued the City and officers for negligence. The Supreme Court denied both Johnson’s cross-motion for summary judgment and the City’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint, finding no violation of police guidelines. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police officers violated New York City Police Department Procedure No. 203-12, specifically the guideline stating that officers shall not discharge their weapons when doing so will unnecessarily endanger innocent persons, thereby negating the municipality’s immunity from liability under the professional judgment rule.

    Holding

    No, because the officers exercised their professional judgment in compliance with established procedures, as they testified that they did not see any bystanders in the immediate vicinity when they discharged their weapons at a suspect who was actively firing at them.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the professional judgment rule, which shields a municipality from liability when its employees exercise professional judgment in performing their duties. The court noted that this immunity presupposes that judgment and discretion are exercised in compliance with the municipality’s procedures. The relevant police guideline states that officers shall not discharge their weapons when doing so will unnecessarily endanger innocent persons. The court emphasized that this guideline doesn’t prohibit firearm discharge whenever bystanders are present, but allows officers to exercise judgment. The court highlighted the uncontroverted testimony of the officers, stating they had a clear view of the suspect and did not observe any bystanders when they fired. The court distinguished this case from cases like Lubecki v. City of New York and Rodriguez v. City of New York, where officers clearly violated police procedures by firing when innocent persons were directly in the line of fire or being used as shields. The court stated, “the very basis for the value judgment supporting immunity and denying individual recovery becomes irrelevant where the municipality violates its own internal rules and policies and exercises no judgment or discretion”. The dissenting opinion argued that the officers’ failure to affirmatively look for bystanders before firing created a triable issue of fact as to whether the police violated departmental guidelines.

  • McCormack v. City of New York, 80 N.Y.2d 808 (1992): Municipal Liability and Discretionary Decisions in Emergency Response

    McCormack v. City of New York, 80 N.Y.2d 808 (1992)

    A municipality is generally not liable for injuries resulting from discretionary decisions involving expert judgment or policy matters in emergency response situations, unless the decisions are irrational.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of municipal liability for discretionary decisions made by police officers in emergency situations. The plaintiff sued the City of New York after her husband, an Emergency Services Unit (ESU) officer, was fatally shot during a standoff. The plaintiff argued the city was negligent in providing an inadequate bullet-proof vest and issuing a “no-shoot” order. The Court of Appeals held that the city was not liable because the vest, while not state-of-the-art, was reasonably safe, and the “no-shoot” order was a discretionary decision made in light of the circumstances, including the presence of a negotiator.

    Facts

    An ESU officer was shot and killed while responding to a situation involving an emotionally disturbed person barricaded in a house. The officer was wearing a “Davis vest,” a type of bullet-proof vest that left the sides of the wearer exposed. A commanding officer allegedly issued a “no-shoot” order, preventing the ESU team from firing even if fired upon. The officer was shot by the barricaded individual, who emerged from the house and fired a shotgun.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff brought a wrongful death claim against the City of New York, alleging negligence in supplying an inadequate bullet-proof vest and issuing a negligent “no-shoot” order. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on both theories of liability. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment and dismissed the complaint, finding neither theory legally supportable. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the City of New York was negligent in supplying the decedent with a “Davis vest” that was not the most advanced bullet-proof equipment available?

    2. Whether a commanding officer’s “no-shoot” order was a negligent discretionary act that proximately caused the decedent’s death, thus rendering the City liable?

    Holding

    1. No, because the City is only required to furnish equipment that is reasonably safe and suitable for its intended use, and the Davis vest provided a measure of protection from gunfire.

    2. No, because the “no-shoot” order was a discretionary tactical decision, and the presence of an unarmed negotiator provided a rational basis for the order.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that employers are only required to furnish equipment that is reasonably safe, not the best available. The Davis vest, while not “state of the art,” provided protection from gunfire and was suitable for use in situations where hostile gunfire was anticipated. The court noted that more protective devices might reduce mobility, a valid consideration for city officials. The court stated, “when official action involves the exercise of discretion or expert judgment in policy matters, and is not exclusively ministerial, a municipal defendant generally is not answerable in damages for the injurious consequences of that action.”

    Regarding the “no-shoot” order, the court emphasized that liability will not be imposed for injuries resulting from a colleague’s discretionary decision involving professional judgment or tactical decisions. The court cited Kenavan v City of New York, 70 NY2d 558, 569. Even though the “no-shoot” order was unusual, the presence of a negotiator provided a rational basis for the directive. Therefore, the city could not be held liable, as the order involved discretionary judgment. The court emphasized that even if the jury believed the order was issued and caused the death, the City wasn’t liable.