New York Law Review

Tag: Police Discipline

  • Town of Wallkill v. Civil Service Employees Ass’n, 19 N.Y.3d 1068 (2012): Local Laws Govern Police Discipline Despite Collective Bargaining Agreements

    19 N.Y.3d 1068 (2012)

    When a general, special, or local law predates and expressly commits disciplinary authority over a police department to local officials, that law supersedes the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) regarding police discipline.

    Summary

    This case addresses the conflict between the Taylor Law, which supports collective bargaining, and the policy favoring strong disciplinary authority over police forces. The Town of Wallkill enacted a local law governing police discipline that conflicted with an existing CBA. The Court of Appeals held that because the local law predated the Civil Service Law provisions regarding discipline and expressly granted the Town authority over police discipline, the local law controlled, and arbitration under the CBA was not required. This reaffirmed the principle that local control over police discipline can supersede collective bargaining agreements.

    Facts

    Since 1995, the Town of Wallkill had a CBA with the Town of Wallkill Police Officers’ Benevolent Association, Inc. (Wallkill PBA), granting police officers the right to arbitration in disciplinary matters. In 2007, the Town adopted Local Law No. 2, which established a different disciplinary procedure without arbitration, instead vesting authority in the Town Board. Shortly after, the Town initiated disciplinary action against two police officers under the new local law. Wallkill PBA requested arbitration on behalf of the officers.

    Procedural History

    The Town commenced a CPLR article 75 proceeding to stay arbitration and declare Local Law No. 2 valid. Wallkill PBA cross-petitioned to compel arbitration and declare Local Law No. 2 invalid. Supreme Court denied the Town’s petitions and granted the PBA’s cross-petitions, declaring the local law invalid and directing arbitration. The Appellate Division reversed, citing Matter of Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., which addressed similar tensions between collective bargaining and local disciplinary authority.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Town of Wallkill properly exercised its authority to adopt Local Law No. 2 pursuant to Town Law § 155, thereby superseding the disciplinary provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between the Town and Wallkill PBA.

    Holding

    Yes, because Town Law § 155, a general law enacted prior to Civil Service Law §§ 75 and 76, commits to the Town the power and authority to adopt and make rules and regulations for the examination, hearing, investigation and determination of charges made against members of the police department.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior decision in Matter of Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn., which addressed the tension between collective bargaining under the Taylor Law and the policy favoring strong disciplinary authority for police forces. The Court emphasized that “police discipline may not be a subject of collective bargaining under the Taylor Law when the Legislature has expressly committed disciplinary authority over a police department to local officials.” In this case, Civil Service Law §§ 75 and 76 generally govern disciplinary procedures for public employees, including police officers, allowing for collective bargaining on the subject. However, Civil Service Law § 76 (4) states that nothing in sections 75 or 76 should repeal or modify any general, special, or local preexisting laws. The Court found that Town Law § 155, which predates Civil Service Law §§ 75 and 76, grants the Town the authority to regulate police discipline. Therefore, the Town properly exercised its authority to enact Local Law No. 2, and the subject of police discipline resides with the Town Board, making it a prohibited subject of collective bargaining. The court reasoned that the legislature had committed disciplinary authority to local officials, thus trumping the CBA. As such, the Appellate Division’s order was affirmed.

  • City of New York v. Detectives’ Endowment Association, 14 N.Y.3d 41 (2009): Police Commissioner’s Authority over Drug Testing Methodology

    14 N.Y.3d 41 (2009)

    A New York City Police Commissioner’s disciplinary authority extends to the selection of drug testing methodologies and triggers, exempting these decisions from mandatory collective bargaining under the Taylor Law.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the NYPD must collectively bargain with police unions over the methodology used for drug testing (hair analysis vs. urine analysis) and the triggers for such testing. The Court of Appeals held that the Police Commissioner’s disciplinary authority, granted by the New York City Charter and Administrative Code, encompasses the discretion to choose drug testing methods and triggers. Requiring collective bargaining on these issues would unduly limit the Commissioner’s ability to maintain discipline within the force. Therefore, these decisions are not subject to mandatory negotiation under the Taylor Law.

    Facts

    The NYPD informed police unions of its intent to use radioimmunoassay (RIAH), a hair analysis method, for all drug screening of uniformed members. Previously, urine analysis was primarily used for random and promotional drug screenings, while hair analysis was used for reasonable suspicion, end-of-probation, and voluntary testing. The unions protested, arguing that the change in methodology was subject to collective bargaining. The City maintained that the change was within the Police Commissioner’s authority.

    Procedural History

    The Detectives’ Endowment Association (DEA) and other unions filed improper practice petitions with the Board of Collective Bargaining (Board), alleging that the NYPD unilaterally changed its drug testing policy in violation of the New York City Collective Bargaining Law. The Board granted the petitions, finding that expanding the categories of employees subject to hair testing and changing the testing methodology constituted a unilateral change subject to collective bargaining. The City then filed an Article 78 proceeding to annul the Board’s decisions. The Supreme Court granted the City’s petition, but the Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the Board’s decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Police Commissioner’s disciplinary authority under the New York City Charter and Administrative Code includes the discretion to choose the scientific methodology for drug testing of uniformed officers and the triggers for such testing, thereby exempting these decisions from mandatory collective bargaining under the Taylor Law.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Police Commissioner’s disciplinary authority extends to the selection of drug testing methodologies and triggers, making these decisions management prerogatives not subject to mandatory collective bargaining.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court recognized the strong state policy supporting collective bargaining under the Taylor Law. However, it also acknowledged that some subjects are excluded from collective bargaining as a matter of policy. The Court relied on its previous decision in Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., (6 NY3d 563 [2006]), which held that New York City Charter § 434 (a) and Administrative Code § 14-115 (a) express a policy favoring management authority over police disciplinary matters, overriding the policy favoring collective bargaining.

    The Court reasoned that the detection and deterrence of wrongdoing, including illegal drug use, is a crucial aspect of the Police Commissioner’s responsibility to maintain discipline. Allowing the Commissioner to unilaterally institute drug testing is insufficient if his discretion to select effective investigatory measures is constrained. Requiring collective bargaining over testing methodology and triggers would unduly limit the Commissioner’s ability to enforce discipline effectively. As the Supreme Court stated, “if the Commissioner is not at liberty to use a particular drug test even after determining that [it] would be more effective at exposing drug use among police officers, then his ability to carry out his disciplinary ‘authority’ has been significantly limited.”

    The Court clarified that its holding was limited to the specific issues presented: drug testing methodology and triggers. It did not address whether every step taken to implement drug testing is excluded from bargaining. The Court emphasized the need to balance collective bargaining rights with the Police Commissioner’s authority to maintain discipline within the NYPD.

  • Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n v. NYS PERB, 6 N.Y.3d 563 (2006): Collective Bargaining Limits in Police Discipline

    6 N.Y.3d 563 (2006)

    When the legislature expressly commits disciplinary authority over a police department to local officials, police discipline may not be a subject of collective bargaining under the Taylor Law.

    Summary

    This case addresses the conflict between the Taylor Law’s support for collective bargaining and the policy favoring strong disciplinary control over police forces. The Court of Appeals held that the Taylor Law does not mandate collective bargaining when legislation specifically grants disciplinary authority to local officials, like the NYC Police Commissioner or a Town Board. The Court reasoned that while collective bargaining is generally favored, statutes explicitly assigning police discipline to local authorities outweigh this policy. This decision affirmed Appellate Division rulings prioritizing local control over police discipline when specific legislation exists.

    Facts

    Two separate cases were consolidated. The first involved the NYC PBA challenging PERB’s decision that the City wasn’t obligated to bargain over certain disciplinary procedures from an expired agreement. The second involved the Town of Orangetown seeking to stay arbitration of a police disciplinary dispute, arguing a collective bargaining agreement provision on discipline was invalid.

    Procedural History

    In the NYC PBA case, the Supreme Court upheld PERB’s decision, and the Appellate Division affirmed. In the Orangetown case, the Supreme Court granted the stay of arbitration, and the Appellate Division affirmed. Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether police discipline is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining under the Taylor Law when other legislation expressly commits disciplinary authority over a police department to local officials.

    Holding

    No, because where the legislature has expressly committed disciplinary authority over a police department to local officials, police discipline may not be a subject of collective bargaining under the Taylor Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged the tension between the Taylor Law’s support for collective bargaining and the public policy favoring local control over police discipline. Generally, Civil Service Law §§ 75 and 76 govern public employee discipline, allowing for collective bargaining agreements that supplement or modify their provisions, as established in Auburn Police Local 195. However, § 76(4) preserves pre-existing laws granting specific disciplinary control to local officials. Citing New York City Charter § 434(a) and Administrative Code § 14-115(a), the Court noted the NYC Police Commissioner’s explicit authority over department discipline. Similarly, the Rockland County Police Act § 7 grants town boards the power to regulate police discipline. The Court gave weight to a line of Appellate Division cases holding that such legislation overrides the presumption in favor of collective bargaining. While acknowledging PERB’s expertise in Taylor Law application, the Court determined that the case hinged on weighing competing policy considerations reflected in the local laws, an area outside PERB’s purview. Quoting People ex rel. Masterson v. French, 110 NY 494, 499 (1888), the Court emphasized the quasi-military nature of police forces and the need for discretionary authority over discipline. The Court concluded that the legislative commands in the NYC Charter, Administrative Code, and Rockland County Police Act express a policy favoring management authority over police discipline that outweighs the policy favoring collective bargaining, even if those enactments predate the Taylor Law and did not intend to create an exception to it. As the Court noted: “The issue is whether these enactments express a policy so important that the policy favoring collective bargaining should give way, and we conclude that they do.”

  • Matter of Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. v. New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 6 N.Y.3d 514 (2006): Collective Bargaining and Police Discipline

    Matter of Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 6 N.Y.3d 514 (2006)

    When the legislature has expressly committed disciplinary authority over a police department to local officials through specific statutes or charters, police discipline is not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining under the Taylor Law, even if it concerns “terms and conditions of employment.”

    Summary

    This case addresses the conflict between New York’s strong policy supporting collective bargaining under the Taylor Law and the policy favoring local control over police discipline. The Court of Appeals held that when specific legislation, such as the New York City Charter or the Rockland County Police Act, expressly grants disciplinary authority to local officials, this legislation takes precedence. Consequently, police discipline in those jurisdictions is not subject to mandatory collective bargaining, despite the Taylor Law’s broad mandate to negotiate terms and conditions of employment.

    Facts

    The Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association of the City of New York (NYCPBA) challenged a decision that the City didn’t have to bargain over five subjects related to police discipline, which had been included in a previous agreement. Similarly, the Town of Orangetown sought to prevent arbitration of a police disciplinary dispute, arguing that the collective bargaining agreement’s disciplinary procedures were invalid. The specific disciplinary issue in Orangetown became moot but the underlying dispute regarding the validity of the disciplinary procedures in the collective bargaining agreement remained.

    Procedural History

    In the NYC case, the Supreme Court upheld the PERB decision. The Appellate Division affirmed. In the Orangetown case, the Supreme Court granted the stay of arbitration. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases due to the similar legal issue. The Orangetown matter was converted into a declaratory judgment action to determine the validity of the disputed provision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether police discipline is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining under the Taylor Law when the Legislature has expressly committed disciplinary authority over a police department to local officials through statutes or charters?

    Holding

    No, because specific legislation granting disciplinary authority to local officials takes precedence over the general policy favoring collective bargaining under the Taylor Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged the tension between the Taylor Law, which generally requires collective bargaining over terms and conditions of employment, and the need for strong disciplinary control over police forces. While the Taylor Law has a strong presumption favoring collective bargaining, this presumption can be overcome by ” ‘plain and clear, rather than express, prohibitions in the statute or decisional law’ ” or by strong public policy considerations, whether explicit or implicit in statute or decisional law. The Court distinguished its prior holding in Matter of Auburn Police Local 195, where police discipline was deemed a subject of collective bargaining because no specific legislation vested disciplinary authority in local officials. However, in cases where such legislation exists, like the New York City Charter § 434 (a) which gives the police commissioner “cognizance and control of the … discipline of the department” and New York City Administrative Code § 14-115 (a) which empowers the commissioner to punish officers, the policy favoring local control prevails. Similarly, the Rockland County Police Act § 7 grants the town board the power to make rules for disciplinary proceedings. These specific grants of authority demonstrate a legislative intent to prioritize local control over police discipline, overriding the collective bargaining mandate of the Taylor Law. The Court emphasized that while the statutes predated the Taylor Law, the key question is whether they express a policy so important that the policy favoring collective bargaining should give way. The Court concluded that they do, especially considering the quasi-military nature of police forces and the importance of maintaining discipline and morale, quoting People ex rel. Masterson v French, 110 NY 494, 499 (1888) emphasizing that “a question pertaining solely to the general government and discipline of the force . . . must, from the nature of things, rest wholly in the discretion of the commissioners”. The Court thus affirmed the Appellate Division’s holdings, finding that the specific legislation in question removed police disciplinary procedures from the scope of collective bargaining. This decision reinforces the principle that general laws can be superseded by specific statutes addressing particular issues or circumstances, particularly when strong public policy considerations are at stake.

  • Safir v. Civil Service Commission, 93 N.Y.2d 579 (1999): Limits on NYC Civil Service Commission’s Disciplinary Appeal Jurisdiction

    Safir v. Civil Service Commission, 93 N.Y.2d 579 (1999)

    The New York City Civil Service Commission lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals from uniformed police officers disciplined under § 14-115 of the New York City Administrative Code; its jurisdiction is limited to discipline imposed under Civil Service Law § 75.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the New York City Civil Service Commission has the power to review disciplinary actions taken against police officers by the Police Commissioner under § 14-115 of the New York City Administrative Code. The Court of Appeals held that the Commission’s authority is limited to reviewing disciplinary actions taken under Civil Service Law § 75. Because the Police Commissioner acted under the Administrative Code, the Commission’s review was improper. The Court emphasized the comprehensive nature of the City’s disciplinary provisions for police officers and the intent of the Civil Service Law to maintain the Police Commissioner’s authority in these matters, subject to Article 78 review.

    Facts

    Officer Montella tested positive for cocaine metabolites and was charged with violating police regulations. He argued he unknowingly ingested the cocaine. After a departmental hearing, the Police Commissioner dismissed him under § 14-115 of the Administrative Code. Montella initially challenged the dismissal via an Article 78 proceeding, which resulted in a new hearing. Following the second dismissal, Montella appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which reversed the dismissal and ordered his reinstatement. The Police Department requested the Commission withdraw its determination, arguing a lack of jurisdiction. The Commission refused.

    Procedural History

    Montella filed an Article 78 proceeding to enforce the Commission’s order. The Police Department and Police Commissioner then filed a separate Article 78 proceeding challenging the Commission’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases, finding the Commission had jurisdiction under the New York City Charter. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that § 14-115 administered Civil Service Law § 75, giving officers the option of Article 78 review or an appeal to the Commission. The Court of Appeals reversed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the New York City Civil Service Commission has subject matter jurisdiction to hear appeals from disciplinary determinations made by the Police Commissioner pursuant to § 14-115 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York.

    Holding

    No, because the Civil Service Law explicitly limits the Commission’s jurisdiction to appeals from discipline imposed pursuant to Civil Service Law § 75, and punishment imposed by the New York City Police Commissioner pursuant to section 14-115 does not fall within that provision.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Civil Service Commission’s jurisdiction is limited by statute to actions taken under Civil Service Law § 75. The Police Commissioner acted under the authority of the New York City Administrative Code § 14-115, which grants broad power to discipline officers for various infractions. The court noted the comprehensive nature of the City’s disciplinary provisions, including Administrative Code § 14-116, which provides for Article 78 review of the Commissioner’s decisions, demonstrating a legislative intent to grant substantial deference to the Police Commissioner’s disciplinary determinations, “because he * * * is accountable to the public for the integrity of the Department”. The Court cited Matter of Scornavacca v Leary, holding that the Police Commissioner’s power to discipline is governed by the Administrative Code, not Civil Service Law § 75. Civil Service Law § 75(3-a) acknowledges that NYC police officers are disciplined under Administrative Code §§ 14-115 and 14-123, further evidencing the separate statutory scheme. Allowing appeals to the Commission would circumvent the Article 78 review process established in the Administrative Code and undermine the Police Commissioner’s disciplinary authority. The Court emphasized that Administrative Code § 14-115 predates the relevant Civil Service Law provisions, indicating the Legislature did not intend to supplant the Administrative Code’s disciplinary framework. The Court concluded that the Commission’s determination was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, quoting Editorial Photocolor Archives v Granger Collection: “a judgment or order issued without subject matter jurisdiction is void, and that defect may be raised at any time and may not be waived”.

  • Purdy v. Kreisberg, 47 N.Y.2d 354 (1979): Upholding Restrictions on Police Officers’ Political Activities

    Purdy v. Kreisberg, 47 N.Y.2d 354 (1979)

    A police department regulation prohibiting officers from using their official power in aid of or against any political entity is constitutional and enforceable, and dismissal for violating such a regulation is not disproportionate if supported by substantial evidence.

    Summary

    Purdy, president of the Greenburgh Police Association, was dismissed for violating a departmental rule prohibiting the use of official power in political activities. He campaigned against the town supervisor, Veteran, using the association’s stationery and shield, implying official endorsement. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the Board of Police Commissioners’ determination was supported by substantial evidence, and the penalty of dismissal was not excessive. The Court also upheld the constitutionality of the departmental rule, emphasizing the need to maintain police neutrality in political matters. This case highlights the permissible restrictions on political activities of law enforcement officers to ensure impartiality.

    Facts

    Purdy, as president of the Greenburgh Police Association, initiated a campaign against Town Supervisor Anthony Veteran’s re-election. He distributed letters to fellow officers urging political involvement to defeat Veteran. He sent a follow-up letter stating 70% of officers supported opposing Veteran. At a police association meeting, he offered to donate his $4,000 retirement benefit to the anti-Veteran campaign. A letter, signed by Purdy and printed on police association stationery with the association’s shield, was mailed to town residents accusing Veteran of political interference and causing a rise in crime.

    Procedural History

    The Board of Police Commissioners found Purdy guilty of violating departmental rules and dismissed him. Purdy filed an Article 78 proceeding seeking to annul or modify the Board’s determination. The Appellate Division annulled the Board’s determination and directed Purdy’s reinstatement. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the Board’s determination.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Board of Police Commissioners’ determination to dismiss Purdy was supported by substantial evidence.
    2. Whether the penalty of dismissal was unduly harsh given the violation involved.
    3. Whether chapter 9.5.14 of the departmental rules, prohibiting officers from using their official power in political activities, is constitutional.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because there was a rational basis to support the Board’s findings that Purdy used his official power as a police officer directly in aid of or against a candidate for political office.
    2. No, because the dismissal was not so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness.
    3. Yes, because the rule prohibits a policeman from utilizing his status and authority as a law enforcement officer as the means to aid or to hinder a political entity and is thus constitutional.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court held that a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency if the agency’s determination is supported by substantial evidence. The Court found a rational basis for the Board’s finding that Purdy was the moving force behind the police association’s political activity. The Court emphasized the implication of Purdy’s actions, stating, “By printing the letter distributed to the town residents on police association stationery with the shield of the association prominently displayed and by labeling the same as ‘An Important Message from your Police Association’, it is the inescapable conclusion that such letter, signed by petitioner, both embodied and reflected the full strength and power of police authority.”

    Regarding the penalty, the Court stated, “Once it is determined that there is substantial evidence to support an administrative body’s determination, the sanction imposed by that body will not be set aside unless the measure of punishment is ‘”so disproportionate to the offense, in light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness.”’” The Court emphasized the dangers inherent in allowing police officers to use their official power in partisan politics.

    Addressing the constitutionality of the departmental rule, the Court quoted McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, stating, “[The petitioner] may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.” The Court recognized the importance of removing police personnel from active politics to maintain discipline and integrity within the police department. The Court found that the rule was evenhanded, without differentiation as to political cause or otherwise, and does not prevent a police officer, as a private citizen, from expressing his or her political views.

  • Alfieri v. Murphy, 38 N.Y.2d 976 (1976): Upholding Administrative Sanctions for Repeated Violations by Police Officer

    Alfieri v. Murphy, 38 N.Y.2d 976 (1976)

    An administrative agency’s disciplinary decision against an employee will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence and the sanction is not disproportionate to the offense, especially when considering a pattern of repeated violations.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court’s decision upholding the police commissioner’s disciplinary action against a police officer. The officer had a record of repeated violations of police regulations, despite some commendations. The Court of Appeals held that the commissioner’s determination was supported by substantial evidence and that the sanction imposed was not so disproportionate as to warrant judicial correction, emphasizing the need for order, authority, and discipline within a police force. The court considered the officer’s pattern of violations, demonstrating an unwillingness to obey orders or adapt to the discipline required of a police officer.

    Facts

    A police officer, Alfieri, had a record that included both commendations and instances of disciplinary action for violating police regulations. He was disciplined again, leading to the administrative action that was the subject of this case. The specific nature of the latest violations is not detailed, but the court emphasized the pattern of repeated violations.

    Procedural History

    The Police Commissioner made a determination regarding disciplinary action against Alfieri. The lower court reviewed the commissioner’s determination and upheld it. Alfieri appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court’s decision, thereby upholding the commissioner’s disciplinary action.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police commissioner’s determination regarding disciplinary action against the officer was supported by substantial evidence, and whether the sanction imposed was so disproportionate as to warrant judicial correction.

    Holding

    No, because the commissioner’s determination was supported by substantial evidence, and the sanction was not so disproportionate considering the officer’s pattern of repeated violations of police regulations.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the commissioner’s determination was supported by substantial evidence, citing precedent such as Matter of Alfieri v Murphy, 38 NY2d 976; Matter of O’Connor v Frank, 38 NY2d 963; and Matter of Pell v Board of Educ., 34 NY2d 222. The court acknowledged the officer’s commendations but emphasized that his record also revealed a pattern of repeated violations for which he had been previously disciplined. This pattern, along with the present violations, demonstrated either an unwillingness to obey orders or adapt to the disciplines required of a police officer. The court stated that the commissioner had the right to consider these factors in his disposition, citing Matter of Slominski v Codd, 52 AD2d 762, affd 41 NY2d 1086. Even though the infractions did not involve a lack of integrity, the court stated, it was within the commissioner’s province to base his findings on the “requirements [for] order, authority, and discipline,” referencing People ex rel. Guiney v Valentine, 274 NY 331, 334 and People ex rel. Masterson v French, 110 NY 494, 499. The court deferred to the commissioner’s judgment regarding the necessary level of discipline for maintaining order and authority within the police force.