New York Law Review

Tag: Police Corruption

  • People v. Dillion, 48 N.Y.2d 765 (1979): Accomplice Testimony Requires Corroboration, Even for Pre-Accomplice Conduct

    People v. Dillion, 48 N.Y.2d 765 (1979)

    An accomplice’s testimony must be corroborated to support a conviction, even if the testimony concerns events that occurred before the witness became an accomplice.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether an accomplice’s testimony can be divided into pre- and post-accomplice conduct, with the former serving as corroboration for the latter. The Court of Appeals held that such a division is impermissible. The accomplice corroboration rule, as mandated by CPL 60.22(1), prevents an accomplice from corroborating their own testimony. The case involved police officers taking bribes from gamblers. Some defendants’ convictions were initially reversed due to uncorroborated accomplice testimony, but the Court of Appeals reinstated some convictions based on procedural grounds while upholding the reversal of others where the issue was properly preserved for appeal. The Court emphasized the inherent unreliability of accomplice testimony.

    Facts

    Several New York City police officers devised a scheme to solicit funds from gamblers in exchange for protection from police interference. Police Officer Buchalski, initially part of the conspiracy, became a police agent. Police Officer O’Brien, assigned as an undercover agent, eventually joined the conspiracy. Defendants Reitano, Maroney, Brown, Conti, Carter, Cona, and Auletta were implicated by Buchalski’s testimony. Defendants Zummo and Mattina were implicated by O’Brien’s testimony. The trial court instructed the jury that O’Brien was an accomplice for his actions after joining the conspiracy, but not for prior events.

    Procedural History

    Defendants were convicted of bribery, receiving rewards for official misconduct, conspiracy, and official misconduct in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed some convictions but reversed others (including Reitano, Maroney, Brown, Conti, Carter, Cona, Auletta, Zummo, Mattina, Callis, and Greene) based on uncorroborated accomplice testimony. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the convictions of Reitano, Maroney, Brown, Conti, Carter, Cona, and Auletta, based on Buchalski’s testimony, should be reversed due to lack of corroboration when the defendants failed to object to the jury charge on accomplice corroboration.

    2. Whether O’Brien’s testimony regarding events before he became an accomplice required corroboration for the convictions of Zummo and Mattina.

    Holding

    1. No, the convictions of Reitano, Maroney, Brown, Conti, Carter, Cona and Auletta should not have been reversed, because the defendants failed to preserve the issue for appeal by objecting to the jury charge.

    2. Yes, O’Brien’s testimony regarding events before he became an accomplice required corroboration, because the accomplice corroboration rule applies to all of an accomplice’s testimony regardless of when the events occurred.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the first issue, the Court held that because the defendants failed to object to the jury charge concerning the accomplice corroboration rule, they failed to preserve the issue for appeal. The Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing questions of law. The Appellate Division erred in concluding a question of law was preserved. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to determine if it should exercise its discretionary power to review the claim despite the lack of objection.

    Regarding the second issue, the Court emphasized CPL 60.22(2), defining an accomplice as someone who may reasonably be considered to have participated in the offense charged or an offense based on the same facts. Since O’Brien fully participated in the scheme, his testimony required corroboration. The Court rejected distinguishing testimony based on different time periods, stating it would allow evasion of the accomplice corroboration rule. Such a result would allow convictions based solely on the testimony of individuals criminally implicated in the general conduct on trial. The Court stated that, “conviction [based] solely upon the testimony of persons who are in some way criminally implicated in * * * the general conduct or factual transaction on trial”.

    The Court reasoned that the accomplice corroboration rule is based on the inherent suspect nature of testimony from individuals who may be criminally liable, who may be subject to pressures to color their testimony to minimize their involvement or please prosecutors. The court stated that, “The accomplice corroboration rule is premised upon a legislative determination that the testimony, of individuals who may themselves be criminally liable is inherently suspect.” The dissent’s view that a person liable for some but not all crimes would be less inclined to lie was rejected as unrealistic. The Court emphasized that any change in the accomplice corroboration rule should come from the Legislature, not the courts.

  • People v. Stannard, 42 N.Y.2d 148 (1977): Limits on Background Evidence in Perjury Cases

    People v. Stannard, 42 N.Y.2d 148 (1977)

    In a perjury trial, background evidence is admissible to make the subject matter of the perjury intelligible to the jury, but the trial court must carefully monitor the introduction of such evidence to prevent it from prejudicing the defendant.

    Summary

    Robert Stannard, a New York City police officer, was convicted of perjury for lying to a grand jury investigating police corruption. At trial, the prosecution introduced extensive testimony from another officer, Serpico, detailing corrupt activities of other officers, none of which directly related to Stannard’s alleged perjury. The trial court admitted this testimony as background evidence. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the extensive background testimony was unduly prejudicial and exceeded the permissible scope, thereby denying Stannard a fair trial. The Court emphasized that while some background evidence is permissible to provide context, it must be carefully monitored to avoid unfairly influencing the jury.

    Facts

    A Grand Jury investigated police corruption in the Seventh Division of the New York City Police Department. Stannard testified before the Grand Jury and denied collecting protection money from Juan and Dolores Carreras and denied meeting with Carreras and others to discuss how Carreras could continue his policy business. He was subsequently charged with perjury based on these denials. At trial, Inspector Sachson testified about the investigation triggered by Patrolman Serpico. Serpico then provided extensive testimony about police corruption involving other officers and gamblers, but this testimony was unrelated to Stannard’s specific interactions with Carreras.

    Procedural History

    Stannard was convicted of five counts of perjury. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. Stannard appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the order and remanded for a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting extensive background testimony regarding police corruption that was unrelated to the defendant’s alleged perjury, thereby prejudicing the defendant’s right to a fair trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the extensive background testimony exceeded permissible discretionary bounds and was unduly prejudicial to the defendant, denying him a fair trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged that some background evidence is permissible in perjury cases to make the subject matter intelligible to the jury, citing People v. Doody. However, it emphasized that the introduction of such evidence must be carefully monitored to prevent it from spilling over its barriers and distorting the jury’s contemplation of the determinative and critical evidence, quoting People v. Gleason. The Court found that Serpico’s testimony was overly extensive and added facts involving the defendant and others in a web of activity which could only be considered by the jury reprehensible, resulting in the perjury testimony becoming only background for the evidence of police corruption in the Seventh Division. The Court noted the District Attorney’s summation exacerbated the prejudice by urging the jury to send a message to Stannard and other officers about police corruption. The Court stated, “Truly prejudicial evidence cannot be erased from a juror’s mind by the court’s instructions”. The Court distinguished People v. Doody, noting that in that case, the prosecution lacked direct witnesses and relied on circumstantial proof, whereas in Stannard’s case, the prosecution had direct witnesses (Carreras and others) to testify against Stannard’s grand jury testimony. The Court concluded that the excessive amount of background evidence destroyed the reasonable balance between its claimed importance and its potential for prejudicing the defendant’s case, warranting a new trial.