New York Law Review

Tag: Plea Agreements

  • People v. McAlpin, 17 N.Y.3d 936 (2011): Consequences for Violating a Plea Agreement Must Be Accurately Stated

    17 N.Y.3d 936 (2011)

    When a court advises a defendant of the potential consequences of violating a plea agreement, it must accurately describe all possible penalties, including post-release supervision (PRS), to ensure the defendant’s plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

    Summary

    McAlpin pleaded guilty to robbery with the understanding he’d be a youthful offender and receive probation if he met certain conditions. The court warned that violating the agreement could lead to a prison sentence. McAlpin violated the agreement, and the court imposed a prison sentence with post-release supervision (PRS). On appeal, McAlpin argued the court failed to mention PRS when outlining the potential consequences of violating the agreement, thus violating the Catu rule. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal, holding that because the court failed to mention PRS when outlining the possible penalties, McAlpin’s plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

    Facts

    McAlpin was arrested for forcibly taking an electronic game console from a subway passenger. He was indicted on robbery charges. He pleaded guilty to one count of robbery. The court placed him on interim probation, stating that if he adhered to the probation conditions, he would be treated as a youthful offender and receive probation. The court also stated that if he failed to meet these conditions, he would receive a prison sentence between 3 ½ and 15 years. The court did not mention post-release supervision at the plea proceeding.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially accepted McAlpin’s guilty plea with the conditions for youthful offender status. After McAlpin violated the conditions, the Supreme Court imposed a prison sentence with PRS. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s judgment, vacated the plea, and reinstated the indictment, finding a Catu violation. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a court’s failure to mention post-release supervision (PRS) during a plea proceeding when outlining the potential consequences of violating a plea agreement requires reversal and vacatur of the plea.

    Holding

    Yes, because when a court elects to advise a defendant of the consequences of violating a plea agreement, it must reference all potential penalties, including PRS, to ensure the defendant’s plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that because the court referenced only a prison term and omitted the possibility of post-release supervision, McAlpin was given an inaccurate impression of the sentencing options available to the court. The court distinguished this case from People v. Murray (15 N.Y.3d 725 (2010)), where the defendant had ample opportunity to object to the sentence before it was formally imposed. In this case, the court first mentioned PRS moments before imposing the sentence. The court was also unconvinced that a brief remark by the court at sentencing about previously advising McAlpin about PRS conclusively established that McAlpin was properly advised before accepting the plea. The court reasoned, “There is no indication in the record that the court or either counsel had reviewed the plea transcript or had focused specifically on whether, during the plea proceeding, the court had discussed the possibility of postrelease supervision—a potential sentence that was not part of the original agreement.”

  • People v. Anonymous, 6 N.Y.3d 271 (2006): Enforceability of Plea Agreements and Court’s Duty of Inquiry

    People v. Anonymous, 6 N.Y.3d 271 (2006)

    A court must conduct a sufficient inquiry to determine if a defendant has violated a condition of a plea agreement, and the People bear the burden of proving that a violation has occurred.

    Summary

    This case addresses the enforceability of plea agreements and the court’s duty of inquiry when a defendant allegedly fails to comply with the terms of such an agreement. The defendant pleaded guilty with the understanding that the charges would be dismissed if he successfully completed a drug treatment program. After the defendant completed the program, the court adjourned the matter to investigate “family issues” identified in a letter from the treatment program. The Court of Appeals held that the Supreme Court erred in adjourning the matter and requiring family counseling because the People did not establish that the defendant had failed to comply with the plea agreement’s terms.

    Facts

    The defendant entered a plea agreement requiring him to participate in a residential drug treatment program. Successful completion was defined as completing vocational training, obtaining a GED, securing full-time employment, and finding suitable housing approved by the Office of Special Narcotics Prosecutor (OSN). Progress reports were regularly sent to OSN and the court. After completing the program, the defendant moved to dismiss the case. A letter from the treatment center indicated that the defendant had completed all phases of treatment but noted “unresolved family issues” with his girlfriend. The People did not oppose the motion to dismiss but did not join in it as required by the plea agreement. Supreme Court adjourned the motion to explore these “family issues,” and the defendant objected, stating that he had completed all requirements.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court adjourned the matter to determine whether family counseling was needed. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Supreme Court erred in adjourning the motion to dismiss and imposing family counseling as a condition when the defendant claimed to have fulfilled the terms of the plea agreement and the People had not established a violation of the agreement.

    Holding

    Yes, because the court must conduct a sufficient inquiry to determine if a defendant has violated a condition of the plea agreement, and the People bear the burden of proving that a violation has occurred. The Supreme Court’s duty was to determine whether the defendant had complied with the terms of the plea agreement at the time of the motion. The court erred in adjourning the matter to determine whether family counseling was needed for the defendant and also erred in imposing family counseling as a condition.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that plea bargaining is vital to the efficient administration of the criminal justice system, and an integral part of the process is the negotiated sentence. If a defendant violates a valid condition of the plea agreement, the court is not bound by the agreed-upon sentence, but the court must conduct a sufficient inquiry to determine if the defendant violated any condition, and the People bear the burden of proving the violation. A court does not have discretion to unilaterally impose conditions that were not originally agreed upon by the parties. The court found that Supreme Court adjourned the matter to investigate “family issues” separate and apart from any agreement between the court and defendant. The People did not contest the defendant’s claim that he was entitled to have the charges dismissed, nor did the court make such a finding. The court had in its possession monthly progress reports from Veritas, as well as the October 11th letter, indicating that the defendant had successfully completed the program. “Inasmuch as the State may hold the defendant to the precise terms of the plea agreement as stated on the record, as a matter of fairness, defendant should be entitled to no less.” (quoting People v. Danny G., 61 N.Y.2d 169, 174 [1984]).

  • People v. Anonymous, 99 N.Y.2d 186 (2002): Enforceability of Plea Conditions Requiring Truthful Statements

    People v. Anonymous, 99 N.Y.2d 186 (2002)

    A defendant’s sentence may be enhanced if they violate a plea agreement condition to truthfully answer questions from the Probation Department, especially when the lie hinders the preparation of an accurate presentence report.

    Summary

    The defendant pleaded guilty to rape charges, agreeing to truthfully answer questions from the court and Probation Department as part of the plea deal. During a presentence interview, the defendant denied guilt and provided a different version of events. The sentencing court, based on this lie, enhanced the defendant’s sentence beyond the originally negotiated terms. The New York Court of Appeals held that the enhanced sentence was permissible because the defendant violated a material condition of the plea agreement, and the false statement hindered the preparation of an accurate presentence report. The court emphasized the importance of truthful information for appropriate sentencing and potential rehabilitation.

    Facts

    The defendant admitted to sexual contact with two young sisters in a written statement to the police and was indicted on multiple charges. As part of a plea bargain, the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree rape. A key condition of the plea agreement, which was in writing, required the defendant to truthfully answer all questions asked by the court and the Probation Department. During the plea colloquy, the defendant confirmed his understanding of this condition and admitted to having sexual intercourse with the children. However, during a subsequent interview with the Probation Department, the defendant denied guilt and claimed the children initiated sexually suggestive contact. This directly contradicted his prior admissions.

    Procedural History

    The trial court enhanced the defendant’s sentence based on his false statements to the probation officer. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the court improperly enhanced the sentence and reinstated the originally bargained-for sentence. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a sentencing court can enhance a defendant’s sentence when the defendant violates an explicit condition of a plea agreement by falsely denying criminal conduct to the Probation Department.

    Holding

    Yes, because conditions agreed upon as part of a plea bargain are generally enforceable unless they violate a statute or public policy, and a defendant’s failure to answer truthfully about the crime hinders the preparation of an accurate presentence report, which is crucial for appropriate sentencing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that plea agreements are generally enforceable, citing People v. Avery, 85 N.Y.2d 503, 507 (1995). It emphasized that sentencing is ultimately the court’s responsibility, citing People v. Farrar, 52 N.Y.2d 302, 306 (1981), and that a sentencing promise is conditioned on its being lawful and appropriate based on the presentence report or other reliable information, citing People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 238 (1974). The court highlighted the importance of presentence investigations under CPL 390.20(1) and CPL 390.30(1), noting that the presentence report is a crucial document for sentencing. The court distinguished this case from People v. Outley, 80 N.Y.2d 702 (1993), because the condition to answer truthfully was explicit and objective, and the breach was conceded. The court further noted that accepting responsibility for a sexual offense is a step toward rehabilitation, citing McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 57 (2002). The court stated, “the result we reach in this case is premised on the nature of defendant’s breached promise and its pertinence to his sentence.”

  • People v. Cosme, 80 N.Y.2d 790 (1992): Limits on Prosecution Appeals Based on Plea Agreements

    People v. Cosme, 80 N.Y.2d 790 (1992)

    A prosecutor cannot appeal a sentence solely to challenge the validity of the underlying conviction when the sentence itself is legal.

    Summary

    Cosme was convicted of burglary and resisting arrest. His conviction was vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel, after which the trial court accepted Cosme’s guilty plea over the People’s objection. The District Attorney sought a writ of prohibition, arguing the plea violated CPL 220.10(4)(a). After appeals and dismissal as moot, the People appealed the sentence imposed, challenging the underlying conviction’s validity. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s dismissal, holding that the People cannot use a sentencing appeal to challenge the validity of a conviction when the sentence itself is legal. The court emphasized that CPL 450.30(2) only allows appeals from illegal sentences, not illegal convictions.

    Facts

    Defendant Cosme was indicted on nine counts and convicted of burglary in the second degree and resisting arrest.
    Cosme’s motion to vacate his conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel was granted.
    The trial court then accepted Cosme’s guilty plea to burglary and resisting arrest, despite the People’s objection.

    Procedural History

    The District Attorney sought a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the plea agreement, which was denied by the Appellate Division.
    The District Attorney’s appeal to the Court of Appeals was dismissed as moot because Cosme had already been sentenced.
    The People then appealed the sentence to the Appellate Division, arguing that the vacatur of the original conviction revived all counts of the indictment, requiring the District Attorney’s consent to a plea of guilty to less than the entire indictment.
    The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal, stating its focus was on the validity of the conviction, not the legality of the sentence.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People can appeal a sentence when their true challenge concerns the validity of the underlying conviction, rather than the legality of the sentence itself.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 450.30(2) only allows the People to appeal from a sentence that is invalid as a matter of law, not from a conviction they believe to be invalid where the sentence itself is legal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the scope of CPL 450.30(2), which authorizes the People to appeal a sentence that is invalid as a matter of law. The court noted that the People were not alleging the indeterminate sentence of four to eight years’ imprisonment was illegal for second-degree burglary and resisting arrest. Instead, the People were challenging the trial judge’s decision to accept Cosme’s plea over the prosecutor’s objection. The court stated, “Thus, in the guise of challenging the sentence imposed, the People are in essence attacking the validity of the defendant’s underlying conviction. This the statute does not permit them to do.”
    The court interpreted the statute narrowly, preventing the People from using a sentencing appeal as a backdoor to challenge a conviction’s validity. The decision underscores the importance of adhering to statutory limits on appeal rights. It also highlights the policy consideration of finality in criminal proceedings. Once a legal sentence is imposed, the prosecution’s opportunity to challenge the underlying conviction is limited. The ruling prevents the prosecution from circumventing restrictions on appealing convictions by framing their arguments as challenges to the sentence.

  • People v. Thompson, 60 N.Y.2d 513 (1983): Appellate Division’s Power to Reduce Sentences

    People v. Thompson, 60 N.Y.2d 513 (1983)

    The Appellate Division has the statutory authority to reduce a sentence it deems unduly harsh or severe in the interest of justice, even if the sentence was part of a plea agreement, and is not required to grant the prosecution an opportunity to withdraw from the plea agreement when it exercises this authority.

    Summary

    Thompson pleaded guilty to first-degree manslaughter and received a sentence of 8 1/3 to 25 years. The Appellate Division initially reduced the sentence to 3 1/3 to 10 years as excessive. Relying on People v. Farrar, the Appellate Division amended its order to allow the prosecution to withdraw its consent to the plea. The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division has broad statutory authority to reduce sentences it deems unduly harsh and is not bound by the Farrar rule, which applies only to trial courts. The Court reinstated the Appellate Division’s initial sentence reduction.

    Facts

    In July 1978, 17-year-old Thompson shot and killed another youth in Brooklyn. The victim and others confronted Thompson, accusing him of stealing a bicycle. Thompson claimed self-defense, alleging the victim had previously hit him with a car, leading him to borrow a gun for protection. Thompson had no prior criminal record. He was indicted for second-degree murder and first-degree weapon possession.

    Procedural History

    Thompson was indicted and initially went to trial. After jury selection, he pleaded guilty to first-degree manslaughter in exchange for a stipulated sentence of 8 1/3 to 25 years. The trial court imposed the agreed-upon sentence, denying youthful offender treatment. Thompson appealed, arguing the sentence was unduly harsh. The Appellate Division initially reduced the sentence to 3 1/3 to 10 years in the interest of justice. On the People’s motion, the Appellate Division amended its order to allow the prosecution to withdraw its consent to the plea, consistent with People v. Farrar. Both sides appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division, when finding a sentence excessive, is required to afford the prosecution an opportunity to withdraw its consent to the plea agreement, as mandated for trial courts in People v. Farrar.

    Holding

    No, because the Appellate Division’s power to review and reduce sentences is governed by statutes that do not require affording the prosecution an opportunity to withdraw from the plea agreement. The Farrar rule applies only to trial courts.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished the Appellate Division’s power from that of the trial court, noting that the Farrar decision was based on statutes applicable only at the trial court level (CPL 220.10). The Appellate Division’s power to review sentences stems from CPL 450.10(2), 470.15(6)(b), and 470.20(6), which authorize the court to modify sentences that are “unduly harsh or severe” in the interest of justice. The court emphasized that CPL 470.20(6) mandates that the Appellate Division “must itself impose some legally authorized lesser sentence” when modifying a judgment on the grounds of excessive harshness. The Court stated, “Thus the Appellate Division was not bound, as it assumed, to afford the People the option of withdrawing their consent to the plea once it concluded in the exercise of its discretion that the sentence imposed was excessive.” The Court highlighted the long-recognized power of the Appellate Division to reduce sentences, originally an inherent power and later codified. The Court also rejected the argument that Thompson forfeited his right to appeal his sentence by pleading guilty, stating, “Although the scope of appeal in a criminal case after a guilty plea is narrowly limited, one of the questions reviewable by an Appellate Division is the severity of sentence”. Finally, the court reiterated that whether a sentence is harsh or severe is a discretionary matter not reviewable by the Court of Appeals.

  • Matter of Perrotta v. McGuire, 56 N.Y.2d 807 (1982): Enforceability of Plea Agreements in Police Disciplinary Proceedings

    Matter of Perrotta v. McGuire, 56 N.Y.2d 807 (1982)

    In police disciplinary proceedings, plea agreements negotiated by a trial commissioner are not binding on the police commissioner absent an express delegation of authority or subsequent approval.

    Summary

    Perrotta, a police officer, entered a *nolo contendere* plea during a disciplinary proceeding with the understanding he would forfeit 30 days’ pay and be on probation for a year. The trial commissioner recommended acceptance, but the police commissioner rejected it and ordered a departmental hearing. After the hearing, Perrotta was dismissed. Perrotta argued the plea agreement was binding. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that plea agreements negotiated by trial commissioners in police disciplinary matters are not binding on the police commissioner unless there is express prior delegation of authority or subsequent express approval, due to the sensitive nature of police work and the importance of discipline and morale.

    Facts

    Petitioner, a police officer, faced disciplinary charges. During the disciplinary proceeding, the petitioner agreed to enter a *nolo contendere* plea. The understood agreement was that he would forfeit 30 days’ pay and be placed on probation for one year. The trial commissioner recommended accepting the plea.

    Procedural History

    The police commissioner rejected the plea and ordered a departmental hearing. After the hearing, the charges were sustained, and the police commissioner dismissed the petitioner, following the trial commissioner’s recommendation. The petitioner initiated an Article 78 proceeding, arguing the plea arrangement was binding. Special Term annulled the commissioner’s determination and remanded for rehearing, relying on *Matter of Brown v. Codd*. The Appellate Division affirmed, constrained by *Matter of Brown*. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a plea agreement negotiated by a trial commissioner in a police disciplinary proceeding is binding on the police commissioner absent express prior delegation of authority or subsequent express approval.

    Holding

    No, because given the sensitive nature of police work and the importance of maintaining discipline and morale, policy considerations preclude enforcing plea agreements negotiated by a trial commissioner without express prior delegation of that authority by the commissioner or subsequent express approval of the particular bargain made in an individual case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the police commissioner was estopped by the trial commissioner’s plea arrangement, noting the petitioner suffered no detriment. CPLR 2104, regarding oral stipulations in court, was deemed inapplicable because departmental proceedings are administrative, not conducted in a court. The Administrative Code provisions authorizing a deputy to conduct hearings do not address the extent to which a trial commissioner can bind the commissioner. The court distinguished *Matter of Brown v. Codd*. The court emphasized the sensitive nature of police work and the importance of maintaining discipline and morale. It stated, “Given the sensitive nature of the work of the police department and the importance of maintaining both discipline and. morale within the city’s ‘chosen mode of organization for its police force’ (*Kelley v Johnson*, 425 US 238, 247), we believe that there are, indeed, policy impediments precluding enforcement of plea arrangements negotiated by a trial commissioner, absent express prior delegation of that authority by the commissioner or subsequent express approval of the particular bargain made in an individual case.” The court reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the commissioner’s order of dismissal.

  • People v. Torres, 45 N.Y.2d 751 (1978): Enforceability of Plea Agreements

    People v. Torres, 45 N.Y.2d 751 (1978)

    A guilty plea induced by an unfulfilled promise by the court, as part of a plea agreement, must either be vacated or the promise honored.

    Summary

    George Torres, a 16-year-old, pleaded guilty to robbery in the third degree based on a promise from the court that he could withdraw his plea if the court refused to adjudicate him a youthful offender. At sentencing, the court denied youthful offender status and imposed a prison sentence without allowing Torres to withdraw his plea. The New York Court of Appeals held that the court’s failure to honor its promise rendered the plea involuntary, requiring either specific performance of the promise (allowing withdrawal of the plea) or vacatur of the plea. The case was remitted for resentencing, giving the sentencing court the option to reconsider youthful offender status or allow Torres to withdraw his plea.

    Facts

    George Torres, a 16-year-old, was indicted for robbery, assault, and petit larceny. He pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of robbery in the third degree. This plea was based on an agreement that he would receive youthful offender treatment. The presiding judge stated that they could not promise youthful offender status before reviewing the presentencing report. The judge further promised that if Torres was not adjudicated a youthful offender, he would be allowed to withdraw his plea.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court convicted Torres based on his guilty plea. Torres appealed the conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s judgment. Torres then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the sentencing court was required to fulfill its promise to the defendant, made when his plea was accepted, that he would be allowed to withdraw that plea if the court refused to adjudicate him a youthful offender.

    Holding

    Yes, because “a guilty plea induced by an unfulfilled promise either must be vacated or the promise honored.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the fundamental principle that a guilty plea induced by an unfulfilled promise must either be vacated or the promise honored, citing People v. Selikoff and Santobello v. New York. The court reasoned that the promise to allow Torres to withdraw his plea if not adjudicated a youthful offender was an essential inducement for his guilty plea. The court found that the failure to fulfill this promise, even due to oversight, violated Torres’ right to fair treatment. The Court noted that while the original plea was voluntary, the subsequent failure to honor the promise rendered it involuntary ab initio. The court stated, “While the guilty plea of this 16-year-old defendant was originally voluntary, it was in a sense rendered involuntary ab initio by the subsequent failure of the court to fulfill the promise to allow him to withdraw that plea should the court refuse or fail to adjudicate him a youthful offender.” Instead of simply vacating the plea, the court remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for resentencing. This allows the sentencing judge to reconsider the decision to deny youthful offender treatment. If the judge adheres to the original decision, Torres must be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. The court’s decision aims to ensure fairness and uphold the integrity of the plea bargaining process.

  • People v. Frederickson, 36 N.Y.2d 231 (1975): Enforceability of Plea Agreements When Sentencing Recommendations are Not Followed

    People v. Frederickson, 36 N.Y.2d 231 (1975)

    A prosecutor fulfills obligations under a plea agreement by recommending a specific sentence, even if the sentencing court does not follow that recommendation, provided there was no explicit promise by the court itself regarding sentencing.

    Summary

    Frederickson, a police detective under investigation for corruption, entered into a cooperation agreement with the District Attorney, promising information and testimony in exchange for a misdemeanor plea covering all charges and a recommendation of probation. After Frederickson cooperated, the trial court accepted his guilty plea but ultimately sentenced him to imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the District Attorney fulfilled the agreement by recommending probation, and the court’s decision to deviate from the recommendation did not violate the defendant’s rights, as long as the judge never committed to a specific sentence.

    Facts

    Frederickson, a Newburgh police detective, was a target in a corruption investigation. He negotiated a “cooperation agreement” with the District Attorney’s office. He agreed to provide information, testify before the grand jury, and waive immunity. In return, the DA agreed Frederickson could plead guilty to a misdemeanor to cover all pending charges (except homicide) and that the DA would recommend probation. At the time of the agreement, Frederickson hadn’t been formally charged. He was later indicted on 50 counts across 19 indictments, including burglary, larceny, perjury, and bribery. Frederickson complied with the agreement, providing information and testifying.

    Procedural History

    Frederickson applied to plead guilty to one count of petit larceny, a misdemeanor, as per the agreement. The trial court was reluctant, leading to a hearing regarding alleged additional commitments. The trial court ultimately accepted the plea but did not commit to the sentencing recommendation. Frederickson was sentenced to one year of imprisonment. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the District Attorney’s recommendation of probation, as per the cooperation agreement, was the full extent of the promise, or whether additional promises (specifically concerning sentencing) were made, and if so, whether the trial court’s sentencing of imprisonment violated the agreement.

    Holding

    No, because the District Attorney fulfilled his obligations by recommending the agreed-upon sentence, and the trial court’s discretion in sentencing was not constrained by the agreement, absent an explicit promise from the court itself regarding the sentence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the District Attorney had fulfilled his obligations under the agreement by consenting to the misdemeanor plea and recommending probation. The court distinguished between the acceptance of the plea and the sentencing, noting that sentencing involves the trial court’s discretion. The defendant could not object simply because the recommendation was not followed. The court stated, “As sentencing involves the exercise of discretion by the trial court, the defendant cannot now object merely because the District Attorney’s recommendation as to sentence was not followed by the court.” The court also noted conflicting testimony regarding whether the District Attorney represented that the judge had pre-approved the sentencing recommendation. The Court deferred to the lower courts’ findings that representations only related to the acceptance of the plea, not sentencing. Finally, the Court reiterated the importance of creating a clear record of all agreements and representations made during plea negotiations, citing People v. Selikoff. The Court emphasized having “as complete a record as possible of the agreements, promises and representations which have been made by either the prosecutor or by the judiciary and which have led to a guilty plea.”