New York Law Review

Tag: Plea Agreement

  • People v. Reynolds, No. 78 (N.Y. 2016): Validity of Plea Agreements Conditioned on Presentence Incarceration

    People v. Reynolds, No. 78 (N.Y. June 7, 2016)

    A plea agreement that includes an illegal condition, such as presentence incarceration lacking statutory authority, renders the plea invalid.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the validity of a plea agreement where the defendant’s sentencing was conditioned on a period of presentence incarceration. The court affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the defendant failed to preserve his claim that his plea should be vacated. The court distinguished this case from previous rulings, finding that the defendant’s challenge was based on a violation of a lawful, not an illegal, presentence condition (being arrested). The dissent argued that the presentence incarceration lacked statutory basis and rendered the plea invalid, and that the defendant’s claim was preserved despite the lack of objection before sentencing. The dissenting opinion argued that the six months of presentence incarceration was punitive, rather than rehabilitative and therefore illegal.

    Facts

    Baasil Reynolds was indicted on charges of criminal possession of a weapon and menacing. After approximately six months of pre-plea incarceration, he agreed to plead guilty to a felony charge with delayed sentencing, conditioned on his compliance with specific terms. The conditions included an additional six months of incarceration, followed by release on his own recognizance with the restriction that he not be arrested or violate any orders of protection. Reynolds served the additional six months. However, he was arrested on the day of his sentencing. After an Outley hearing, the court imposed the originally promised two-to-four-year sentence. Reynolds appealed, claiming his plea was invalid due to the additional incarceration, but the lower court upheld the original plea agreement.

    Procedural History

    Reynolds accepted a plea agreement, which the trial court approved. He subsequently appealed this plea after the trial court imposed sentence after he failed to comply with conditions, which was upheld by the Appellate Division. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Reynolds preserved his claim that his plea should be vacated due to the allegedly illegal presentence incarceration condition.
    2. Whether the trial court’s findings at the Outley hearing were sufficient.

    Holding

    1. No, because Reynolds did not object to the plea before sentencing, and he did not challenge an illegal sentence, the claim was not preserved.
    2. Yes, the trial court’s findings at the Outley hearing were sufficient.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority determined that Reynolds did not preserve his claim challenging the plea’s validity because he did not move to withdraw the plea before sentencing. The court distinguished this case from prior cases where an illegal sentence was imposed. The court found that Reynolds’ sentence was lawful. The court also affirmed the trial court’s findings from the Outley hearing, stating that the court properly determined there was a legitimate basis for Reynolds’ arrest, which was enough to uphold the initial plea.

    The dissent argued the plea was invalid because the presentence incarceration lacked statutory authorization and thus was an illegal condition. The dissent argued that the court could consider the claim because the condition imposed was illegal. It cited People v. Rodney E. and People v. Avery, where the court considered claims of illegal presentencing conditions, even without a pre-sentencing objection. The dissent emphasized that the presentence incarceration was not authorized by any statute, and thus was illegal.

    Practical Implications

    This case highlights the importance of preserving challenges to plea agreements before sentencing to protect the possibility of appeal, and that in New York, claims of illegal sentences, or even those resulting from illegal conditions, are more likely to be reviewed on appeal than those where only an illegal condition, but not the sentence itself, is challenged. Attorneys must carefully examine the conditions of plea agreements to ensure they are authorized by law, and to challenge any unauthorized conditions before sentencing to preserve the client’s rights. Courts must ensure that any presentence conditions are authorized by law and appropriately related to rehabilitation or lawful conduct. Further, the case offers insights for criminal defense attorneys on distinguishing between an illegal sentence versus an illegal condition for purposes of preservation on appeal. Finally, this case demonstrates the importance of the Outley hearing and how a court must evaluate the basis of an arrest to satisfy the conditions imposed post-plea.

  • People v. Rossborough, 24 N.Y.3d 486 (2014): Felony Defendant’s Right to Waive Presence at Sentencing

    24 N.Y.3d 486 (2014)

    A defendant in a felony case may expressly waive the right to be present at sentencing if the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals considered whether a defendant who pleaded guilty to a felony could waive their right to be present at sentencing. The court held that an express waiver of this right is permissible, provided the waiver is made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The court distinguished this from implied waivers and noted that, like other fundamental rights, the right to be present at sentencing can be relinquished. The court affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, which upheld the defendant’s sentence in absentia after he explicitly requested and received permission to waive his presence at sentencing.

    Facts

    The defendant faced multiple charges across three counties and pleaded guilty in Wyoming County to grand larceny in the third degree (a class D felony). As part of a plea agreement, the defendant was to be sentenced as a second felony offender to an indeterminate term of 3 to 6 years, concurrent with existing sentences. At the plea proceeding, the defendant, after being informed of the right to be present at sentencing, explicitly requested to waive his personal appearance at sentencing, which the court granted. The defendant’s attorney appeared at the sentencing, and the court imposed the agreed-upon sentence.

    Procedural History

    The County Court sentenced the defendant in absentia based on his prior express waiver. The Appellate Division upheld the sentence, finding that the defendant had waived his right to be present. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a felony defendant may waive the right to be present at sentencing.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a defendant may expressly waive the right to be present at sentencing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court analyzed Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 380.40, which mandates a defendant’s presence at sentencing with specific exceptions. However, the court noted the statute does not provide a similar exception for felony defendants. The court also recognized the common law rule and previous cases that allowed waiver if done knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The Court distinguished this case from *People v. Stroman*, where the court declined to find an implied waiver when the defendant was sentenced in absentia because there had been no effort to inform him of his right to be present. The Court of Appeals cited that “waiver results from a knowing, voluntary and intelligent decision”. The court reasoned that the right to be present at sentencing, while fundamental, is not among those rights that cannot be waived, especially when the defendant is receiving the sentence to which they agreed in the plea bargain. This principle aligns with the court’s recognition of waivers for other fundamental rights like the right to a jury trial and the right to counsel.

    Practical Implications

    This decision clarifies that a felony defendant can waive their right to be present at sentencing if the waiver is knowing and voluntary. It provides guidance to trial courts when dealing with defendants seeking to waive their presence at sentencing hearings. It also highlights the importance of a clear record showing the defendant was fully informed of their right and made an informed decision. The ruling provides a practical framework for courts in similar situations where a defendant, as part of a plea agreement, seeks to be sentenced in absentia.

  • People v. Monk, 21 N.Y.3d 27 (2013): Duty to Inform Defendant of Reincarceration Potential for Post-Release Supervision Violation

    People v. Monk, 21 N.Y.3d 27 (2013)

    A trial court is not required to advise a defendant during a plea agreement that a violation of post-release supervision could result in reincarceration because the potential for reincarceration is considered a collateral, not a direct, consequence of the plea.

    Summary

    Defendant Monk pleaded guilty to robbery and was sentenced to a prison term followed by post-release supervision. He was not informed during the plea process that violating the terms of his post-release supervision could result in additional imprisonment. On appeal, he argued that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because he was unaware of this potential consequence. The New York Court of Appeals held that a trial court does not have a constitutional duty to inform a defendant that violating post-release supervision could lead to further incarceration, as it is a collateral consequence, not a core component of the sentence.

    Facts

    Defendant pleaded guilty to robbery in the second degree. At the time of the plea, the trial court advised the defendant of the prison sentence and the mandatory period of post-release supervision. The court did not inform the defendant that a violation of the conditions of his post-release supervision could result in reincarceration.

    Procedural History

    The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because he was not informed of the potential for reincarceration for violating post-release supervision. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court has a constitutional duty to advise a defendant, prior to accepting a guilty plea, that a violation of the conditions of post-release supervision could result in reincarceration.

    Holding

    No, because the possibility of reincarceration for violating post-release supervision is a collateral consequence of the plea, not a direct consequence that the court is constitutionally required to disclose.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court has a constitutional duty to ensure that a defendant understands what the plea connotes and its consequences. However, this duty extends only to the direct consequences of the plea, which are considered the “core components” of the sentence. The Court distinguished direct consequences from collateral consequences, which are specific to the individual defendant and generally outside the control of the court.

    The Court found that the potential for reincarceration due to a violation of post-release supervision is a collateral consequence because it depends on the defendant’s future actions and is subject to a separate hearing and determination by the Parole Board. The court emphasized that “the possible reincarceration of defendant as a result of a violation of the conditions of postrelease supervision is not a ‘core component[ ]’ of the sentence imposed on the defendant by the judge to fulfill the bargain struck by the parties.” Therefore, the trial court was under no obligation to advise the defendant of this possibility.

    The dissent argued that the potential extent of imprisonment under the agreed-upon plea is central to the sentence and that the defendant should be informed that the statutory allocation between incarceration and post-release supervision may change in a direction adverse to the defendant. The dissent cited People v. Catu, 4 N.Y.3d 242 (2005), asserting that the trial court must advise a defendant of the direct consequences of the plea.

  • People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862 (1994): Admissibility of Grand Jury Testimony After Defendant Breaches Plea Agreement

    People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862 (1994)

    When a defendant breaches a plea agreement after providing Grand Jury testimony, the prosecution may use that testimony against the defendant at trial, provided the use was a foreseeable benefit bargained for in the agreement.

    Summary

    Curdgel agreed to testify against his accomplices in exchange for a reduced sentence. After testifying before a Grand Jury, he publicly recanted his testimony. The prosecution then used his Grand Jury testimony against him at his own trial, resulting in a conviction. Curdgel argued he was entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement and that his Grand Jury testimony should not have been used against him. The New York Court of Appeals held that because Curdgel breached the agreement, the prosecution could use his prior testimony, as its use was a foreseeable benefit of the plea agreement.

    Facts

    Curdgel admitted to involvement in an arson that resulted in four deaths. He agreed to cooperate with the investigation and testify against his accomplices in exchange for a lenient sentence. He signed a waiver of immunity, relinquishing his privilege against the use of his testimony in any proceeding. After testifying before the Grand Jury, Curdgel publicly recanted his testimony, apologizing to his accomplices.

    Procedural History

    Curdgel was convicted of murder and related charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to consider the admissibility of Curdgel’s Grand Jury testimony and the plea agreement.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution could use Curdgel’s Grand Jury testimony against him at his trial after he publicly recanted the testimony, thus breaching the plea agreement?

    Holding

    Yes, because Curdgel breached the plea agreement by recanting his testimony, the prosecution was entitled to use the Grand Jury testimony against him at his trial, as this was a foreseeable benefit of the agreement and the People are permitted to keep what they already had.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principle of “essential fairness” in plea agreements. It distinguished this case from situations where defendants fully comply with their plea agreements. The court cited People v. Evans, stating that “each party to the voluntarily entered-into plea agreement is entitled to the benefits emanating from the agreement which cannot be retroactively vitiated.” The court reasoned that Curdgel’s breach rendered the agreement valueless to the People, justifying their refusal to call him as a witness. His Grand Jury testimony, induced by the plea agreement, was a benefit the prosecution had already obtained. The court distinguished People v. Spitaleri, which bars the use of withdrawn guilty pleas, noting that the Spitaleri doctrine rests entirely on fairness grounds. Here, fairness dictated allowing the prosecution to use the testimony, as Curdgel’s conduct caused him to lose the benefit of his bargain, while the People were permitted to keep what they already had. The court emphasized that the use of his testimony was a counseled, foreseeable use, and a benefit that should not be retroactively vitiated. Ultimately, since Curdgel undermined the agreement’s purpose, he could not then prevent the State’s use of the information he provided.

  • People v. Francabandera, 86 N.Y.2d 788 (1995): Enforceability of Appeal Waivers in Plea Agreements

    People v. Francabandera, 86 N.Y.2d 788 (1995)

    A defendant’s voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right to appeal, made as part of a plea agreement, is enforceable, precluding appellate review of claims within the scope of the waiver, except for the legality of the sentence itself.

    Summary

    Francabandera pleaded guilty and waived her right to appeal as part of a plea bargain. On appeal, she challenged the excessiveness of her sentence. The New York Court of Appeals held that her waiver was valid and enforceable, precluding review of the sentence’s excessiveness. The court clarified that while a defendant can waive the right to appeal most issues, they cannot waive the right to appeal the legality of the sentence. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s dismissal of the appeal, remitting the case with instructions to affirm the judgment and sentence instead.

    Facts

    The defendant, Francabandera, entered into a plea agreement. As part of the agreement, she explicitly waived her right to appeal any rulings made by the trial court, including the negotiated sentence.

    Procedural History

    The defendant appealed her sentence, claiming it was excessive. The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal based on the waiver. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal, made as part of a plea agreement, bars appellate review of a claim that the sentence is excessive.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived her right to appeal as part of a plea agreement, and a claim of excessiveness falls within the scope of a valid waiver. However, the proper disposition is affirmance of the judgment and sentence, not dismissal of the appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of enforcing plea agreements, including waivers of the right to appeal, when they are made voluntarily and intelligently. The court reasoned that the defendant’s plea allocution demonstrated a clear understanding and acceptance of the waiver. The court distinguished between waiving the right to appeal the *excessiveness* of a sentence (which is permissible) and waiving the right to appeal the *legality* of a sentence (which is not). Citing People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 9, the court reiterated that a defendant may not effectively waive the right to appeal the legality of the sentence. The court interpreted the trial court’s statement that the defendant was waiving her right to appeal from “anything that has happened up to this point” as an indication that the waiver was intended to be all-encompassing, not a limitation on the scope of the waiver. Finally, the Court noted that the Appellate Division erred in dismissing the appeal; the proper disposition is to affirm the judgment and sentence, citing People v. Callahan, 80 N.Y.2d 273, 285.

  • People v. Danny, 50 N.Y.2d 746 (1980): Prosecutor’s Implicit Sentencing Recommendation Violates Plea Agreement

    People v. Danny, 50 N.Y.2d 746 (1980)

    When a prosecutor promises not to take a position at sentencing as part of a plea agreement, any remarks that implicitly convey the People’s position regarding the appropriate punishment constitute a breach of that agreement.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a prosecutor violated a plea agreement where they promised not to take a position at sentencing but then made remarks characterizing the case as “very very serious” and highlighting the defendant’s flight and perjury. The Court reasoned that these remarks implicitly conveyed a request for a substantial prison term, breaching the agreement. The Court ordered resentencing before a different judge, finding that vacating the guilty plea would be unduly prejudicial to the People after a significant amount of time had passed and the trial was nearly completed.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with attempted murder and related offenses. He proceeded to trial, but after summations, he pleaded guilty to attempted murder and criminal possession of a weapon in full satisfaction of the indictment. As part of the plea bargain, the prosecutor promised not to take any position at sentencing, and this promise was placed on the record.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was initially tried before a jury. After summations, he entered a guilty plea. At sentencing, the prosecutor made remarks that the defense argued violated the plea agreement. The Appellate Division’s order was modified by the Court of Appeals; the sentence was vacated, and the case was remitted to the Supreme Court for resentencing before a different judge.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a prosecutor’s remarks at sentencing, characterizing the case as “very very serious” and noting the defendant’s flight and perjury, constitute a breach of a plea agreement where the prosecutor promised not to take any position at sentencing.

    Holding

    Yes, because the prosecutor’s remarks implicitly conveyed the People’s position as to the appropriate punishment, which is tantamount to a request for a substantial prison term and violates the promise not to take any position at sentencing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Santobello v. New York, which established that a prosecutor must adhere to a promise made as a condition of a guilty plea. The Court reasoned that the prosecutor’s remarks went beyond a mere introduction and implicitly conveyed the People’s position on sentencing. The court emphasized that the impact of the breach on the actual sentence is irrelevant when determining the appropriate remedy. The Court found that resentencing before a different judge was sufficient to remedy the breach, as it would give the defendant the benefit of his bargain without unduly prejudicing the People. The court noted that vacating the guilty plea would be prejudicial to the People because they relied on the plea to their detriment by abandoning efforts to obtain a jury verdict after a two-week trial and closing arguments. The court referenced that the prosecutor’s few remarks, characterizing the case as “very very serious” and noting appellant’s flight and perjury, were tantamount to a request for a substantial prison term, in derogation of the People’s promise.