New York Law Review

Tag: Plain View Doctrine

  • People v. Spinelli, 35 N.Y.2d 77 (1974): Warrantless Search of Commercial Property and Plain View Doctrine

    People v. Spinelli, 35 N.Y.2d 77 (1974)

    A warrantless search and seizure of items on private commercial property is unconstitutional, even if the items are in plain view, when there is no exigency and ample time to obtain a warrant.

    Summary

    This case concerns the legality of a warrantless search and seizure of stolen trucks located on the defendant’s commercial property. The Court of Appeals held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment because the trucks, although in plain view, were not discovered inadvertently and there was no exigency justifying the failure to obtain a warrant. The court emphasized that the plain view doctrine does not eliminate the need for a warrant when law enforcement has prior knowledge of the evidence and ample opportunity to secure judicial authorization.

    Facts

    The FBI received information in September 1971 about two hijacked trucks, one leased by Hertz to P. B. Trucking Company marked “Roxanne Swim Suits,” and another belonging to Metropolis Trucking Company. In March 1972, an informant told FBI Agent Garber that both trucks were behind the defendant’s business, Al Spinelli Company. Garber, using binoculars from a public golf course adjacent to the property, observed the trucks matching the descriptions. The local police confirmed the trucks were still listed as stolen.

    Procedural History

    After months of surveillance, the Clarkstown police, acting on Garber’s information, also observed the vehicles from the golf course in August 1972. On August 21, 1972, the defendant was arrested outside his business on an unrelated warrant for unlawful use of credit cards. After the arrest, officers entered the property without a search warrant, inspected the trucks, and seized them. The defendant was later indicted for unlawful possession of one of the trucks. The County Court ordered suppression of the evidence, but the Appellate Division reversed. This appeal followed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the warrantless search and seizure of the truck from the defendant’s commercial property violated the Fourth Amendment, despite the truck being in plain view.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plain view doctrine requires inadvertent discovery and does not eliminate the warrant requirement when the police have prior knowledge of the evidence and ample opportunity to obtain a warrant. Additionally, the arrest on the credit card charge did not justify the search of the area behind the premises.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the warrantless search and seizure were unconstitutional. The court acknowledged that a businessman’s private commercial property is entitled to Fourth Amendment protections. The court emphasized that the officers knew about the trucks for months, there were no license plates, and there was no risk of the evidence being moved. Therefore, there was no exigency justifying the failure to obtain a warrant. The court cited Coolidge v. New Hampshire, stating that “plain view alone is never enough to justify a warrantless search” and that the discovery must be inadvertent. The court reasoned that, here, the viewing of the trucks could not be said to be inadvertent, as the police anticipated finding them there. The Court emphasized that the officers had probable cause and ample time to secure a warrant. The arrest of the defendant on a credit card charge did not justify a search of the area behind the premises. “The mere fact that it would be burdensome to obtain a warrant, standing alone, is never justification for not obtaining a search warrant.” The court also noted that while the officers could testify to what they observed from the golf course, the actual entry and seizure required a warrant under the circumstances.

  • People v. Brosnan, 32 N.Y.2d 254 (1973): Warrantless Vehicle Search Based on Plain View

    People v. Brosnan, 32 N.Y.2d 254 (1973)

    Evidence of a crime observed in plain view inside a vehicle, with the defendant’s consent, provides probable cause for a warrantless search and seizure of the vehicle incident to a lawful arrest.

    Summary

    Brosnan was convicted of larceny and assault after a brutal attack on a woman he met in a bar. Police, investigating the crime, found Brosnan and asked to see his truck. He voluntarily showed them the truck, and through the windows, they observed bloodstains, a woman’s shoe, and glasses. Brosnan was arrested and the truck was seized. A subsequent search revealed more evidence. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the initial observation of incriminating evidence in plain view justified the warrantless seizure and subsequent search of the vehicle incident to a lawful arrest. The court also addressed concerns about the prosecutor’s summation, ultimately deeming it not prejudicial enough to warrant a new trial given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

    Facts

    Margaret Sullivan met Brosnan at a bar and later left with him in his panel truck.
    Sullivan was found unconscious and severely injured the next morning near a gas station. Her injuries included a fractured skull, lacerations, and bite marks.
    Police learned of Brosnan’s association with Sullivan and went to his home.
    Brosnan voluntarily led the police to his panel truck in a public garage.
    Through the truck’s window, police saw bloodstains on the dashboard, a woman’s shoe, and a pair of glasses.

    Procedural History

    Brosnan was convicted of larceny and assault in a jury trial.
    The Appellate Division modified the conviction, upholding only the assault conviction.
    Two justices dissented, arguing that the prosecutor’s summation warranted a new trial.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the warrantless seizure and subsequent search of Brosnan’s panel truck violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
    Whether the prosecutor’s summation was so inflammatory as to require a new trial.

    Holding

    Yes, the warrantless search and seizure was permissible, because the police had observed incriminating evidence in plain view inside the truck with the defendant’s consent prior to the arrest, justifying the seizure as incident to a lawful arrest.
    No, the prosecutor’s summation, while improper, did not warrant a new trial because it was not sufficiently prejudicial given the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the key factor was the police’s observation of incriminating evidence in plain view within the truck before any action was taken to seize it. Brosnan voluntarily showed the police the truck, and the bloodstains, shoe, and glasses were visible through the window. This established probable cause to believe the truck was the scene of the assault. The court emphasized, “Unlike the legion of automobile search and seizure cases which have occasioned interest and difficulty, in this case before the police took any action with respect to the panel truck, they had seen the incriminating evidence in the truck which identified it as the scene of the bloody assault and which linked the victim’s last-known companion, the defendant, to its perpetration.” The court distinguished this case from others where the search preceded the establishment of probable cause or where the evidence discovered was unrelated to the initial reason for the arrest. The seizure occurred when a police guard was placed on the truck, preventing its removal. The court cited Chambers v. Maroney, stating that there is no constitutional difference between seizing and holding a car before obtaining a warrant and conducting an immediate search without a warrant when probable cause exists. The court dismissed the claim that a delayed search was impermissible. It found that the later examination of the truck at the site was merely a further examination of an object of evidence already lawfully seized. Regarding the prosecutor’s summation, the court acknowledged it was improper, using inflammatory language and epithets. However, it held that the impropriety was not significant enough to influence the jury, given the overwhelming evidence. The court stated, “The rule is that an improper summation, at least when the objectionable parts consist largely of abusive and intemperate language as here, should be assessed for its prejudicial effect, and it requires greater impropriety to produce that effect in a stronger case.”